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ABSTRACT 
This study compares the privacy policies of Germany and the US in the field of 
identity management. It analyses the emergence of unlinkability within the 
countriesÕ electronic citizen identity initiatives. The study used qualitative 
research methods, including semi-structured interview and document analysis, 
to analyse the policy-making processes surrounding the issue of unlinkability. 
The study found that unlinkability is emerging in different ways in each 
country. GermanyÕs data protection and privacy regimes are more coherent 
than the US, and unlinkability was an incremental policy change. US 
unlinkability policies are a more significant departure from its data protection 
and policy regimes. New institutionalism is used to help explain the similarities 
and differences between the two countriesÕ policies. Scholars have long been 
calling for the use of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) in policy-making, 
and unlinkability falls into this category. By employing PETs in this way, 
German and US identity management policies are in the vanguard of their 
respective privacy regimes. Through these policies, the US comes closer to 
German and European data protection policies, doing so non-legislatively. The 
digital citizen identities appearing in both countries must be construed as 
commercial products inasmuch as official identities. Lack of attendance to the 
commercial properties of these identities frustrates policy goals. As national 
governments embark on further identity management initiatives, commercial 
and design imperatives, such as value to the citizen and usability, must be 
considered for policy to be successful. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This first chapter introduces the core subject matter, problem space, research 
aims, and research questions of this thesis. It then briefly introduces the 
theoretical approach, which is explained in detail in Chapter 2. The final 
section details the overall structure of the thesis. 
 
The internet was born without an identity layer. The capacity to identify people 
was not built into the core protocols of the internet. Successful sending and 
receiving of messages was the critical consideration. Identification was a local 
phenomenon, specific to each organisationÕs needs and practices. People were 
given usernames and passwords, one for each resource or organisation. These 
were the earliest digital identities (Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD], 2007, pp. 41-42). 
 
As the internet became commercial, identification was a matter of 
personalisation. It was helpful to website owners to know who was returning to 
make her or his online experience richer. As the web proliferated, so did the 
number of usernames and passwords. ÔThe password problemÕ was recognised 
Ð people have too many, and they manage them insecurely (Small, 2004). The 
next evolution in digital identity was the use of the same username and 
password for multiple resources. The username and password became a single 
sign-on Ð login once, use for many applications. Soon after, logins could be 
used for disparate resources external to the host organisation. This is known as 
federated identity. The originating source of a digital identity was called the 
identity provider; those who relied on their identity assertions were called 
relying parties. This addressed the password problem because it allowed fewer 
logins to be used for many activities. 
 
Alongside these innovations in digital identity, governments were putting more 
resources and information online. Meaningful e-government Ð such as 
exchanges of tax data, health data, court information, benefits information Ð 
usually requires an exchange of personal information. North American and 
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European governments mandate privacy and protection for personal data in 
many contexts, especially in citizen-government relations. To conduct business 
online, government needed to know who was at the other end of the screen; 
they needed to authenticate citizens. The absence of an identity layer in the 
internet posed challenges to this need. The appearance of federated identity 
was a potential solution. 
 
Federated identity has inherent privacy challenges (Landau, Le Van Gong and 
Wilton, 2009). When one entity, the identity provider, vouches for the identity 
of a person at multiple websites, the identity provider knows where the person 
went online. The promise of simplified logins is counterbalanced by the 
profiling of usersÕ activities. When you use an identity provider, Ôsomeone is 
always looking over your shoulderÕ (N005, Interview). This is true in both 
commercial and government contexts. Governments could not address their 
identity problems without considering these challenges. More broadly, as 
identity transactions on the internet increased and sources of identity became 
more concentrated, peopleÕs online activities became more linked, and 
profiling became easier. 
 
Given the broad duty to protect the privacy of their citizens, governments are 
adapting to the growth of an identity layer and its inherent challenges. They 
have greater sway within their own dominion of e-government than in the 
commercial domain, but national policies have begun to reflect concern over 
the profiling that is possible as the internet becomes a more identifiable place. 
Law and policy are notoriously out of step with technological change Ð 
Òtoday's regulations may easily pertain to yesterday's technologiesÓ 
(Reidenberg, 1997, p. 586). Identity technologies are complex and obscure, 
propelled forth by commercial interests and the work of standards bodies. The 
impulses that underpin data protection regimes are being re-applied and 
innovated to meet the privacy challenges new identity technologies pose.  
 
The question remains, though, how much can regulation and policy affect the 
privacy landscape? A deterministic reading of internet technology would seem 
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to support Scott McNealy, former Chief Executive Officer of Sun 
Microsystems, who in 1999 infamously said,  
ÒYou have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.Ó (Sprenger, 1999).  
The great computer trends of recent years are predicated on networking, 
sharing, storing and mining data. Information processing also yields a 
tremendous amount of logging to ensure that systems perform correctly. The 
widespread intentional sharing of data and the porousness of boundaries 
between organisations, systems and contexts challenge those who seek to 
strengthen privacy regimes. The centralisation of identity transactions 
amplifies the problem by making people more identifiable, potentially clashing 
with the internetÕs historically pseudonymous character.  
 
Much research and standards development in the field of identity management 
(IDM) occurred through the early and mid-2000s, often with a focus on 
privacy. In 2004, the Privacy and Identity Management for Europe (PRIME) 
project was launched with an explicit goal Òto develop a working prototype of 
a privacy-enhancing Identity Management SystemÓ (PRIME, 2008). In 2005, 
Microsoft identity architect Kim Cameron published his ÒLaws of IdentityÓ as 
part of his work on an Ôidentity metasystemÕ that would give users greater 
control over their digital identities. Microsoft created CardSpace, an 
implementation of Information Cards, a user-centric identity management 
model (Chappell, 2006). PRIME was succeeded by PrimeLife, with a specific 
goal to help Òmaintain life-long privacyÓ (PrimeLife, n.d.). Standards such as 
OpenID (OpenID Foundation, n.d.) and SAML (OASIS, 2013) appeared and 
evolved, both ultimately containing privacy-enhancing features. The work of 
Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, and others 
on Ôprivacy by designÕ was incorporated into identity management literature 
(Cavoukian, 2006). The Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) 
project launched to help ÒEurope É develop a deeper understanding of how 
appropriate identities and identity management can progress the way to a 
fair(er) European information societyÓ (FIDIS, n.d.).  
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All of the above research and standards addressed privacy concerns. In 
particular, this body of work and related scholarship recognised the criticality 
of pseudonymity. Privacy goals of data minimisation, the separation of 
different social contexts, and the frustration of illegitimate profiling are 
assisted by pseudonyms (Independent Centre for Privacy Protection and Studio 
Notarile Genghini [ICPP and SNG], 2003). When an identity management 
system uses different pseudonyms to represent a user in separate contexts, the 
term ÔunlinkabilityÕ is used, referring to the breaking of ÔlinksÕ that connect a 
userÕs online activity to her or him. Ideal types of identity management systems 
made frequent reference to unlinkability and pseudonymity (Camenisch, et al., 
2005; Storf, Hansen and Raguse, 2009), and IDM standards like OpenID and 
SAML included the capability to create unlinkable credentials. Advanced 
cryptographic systems such as MicrosoftÕs U-Prove and IBMÕs idemix had 
privacy principles built into their core architectures, including unlinkability and 
selective disclosure of attributes (Paquin, 2013; Camenisch and Van 
Herreweghen, 2002). Unlinkability is part of the family known as Ôprivacy-
enhancing technologiesÕ (PETs), and calls for such technologies to be included 
in policy and commercial products have appeared in academic literature 
(Clau§, Kesdogan and Klsch, 2005; Clau§ and Kntopp, 2001; Koops and 
Leenes, 2005; PrimeLife, 2009; Reidenberg, 1997). 
 
This thesis is about the translation of the values, research and technology of 
PETs into public policy. It explains how unlinkability has emerged in Germany 
and the United States. Calls for unlinkability by researchers, technologists and 
data protection practitioners have been echoed in agency position documents, 
national strategies, international research and supranational regulations. The 
US Federal Trade Commission discussed the privacy challenges of linkability 
in its 2012 report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change. 
The White House (2012) championed a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights which 
contained data minimisation principles that could be aided by unlinkability. 
The US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace took a clear 
position on such issues: 
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ÒThe Identity Ecosystem will use privacy-enhancing technology and 
policies to inhibit the ability of service providers to link an individualÕs 
transactions, thus ensuring that no one service provider can gain a 
complete picture of an individualÕs life in cyberspace.Ó (White House, 
2011, p. 2). 
The Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development (OECD), 
whose 1980 data protection guidelines are a foundation for much modern data 
protection policy (Gellman, 2012), published a primer for policy-makers on 
identity management, stating: 
ÒIdentity systems that facilitate anonymity and pseudonymity may offer 
promise. Their deployment would raise issues regarding who has the 
right to decide which data should be veiled and the circumstances under 
which it might be unveiled. This is of particular importance to the 
exercise of free expression, free association, and the security of the 
person.Ó (OECD, 2009, p. 14) 
German internet law requires the option for pseudonymous use of internet 
services (Telemedia Act, 2007, Sec. 13(6)). It is aligned with German data 
protection lawÕs pseudonymity requirements (Federal Data Protection Act, 
2003, Sec. 3a); this is covered in depth in Chapter 6. The 2012 draft regulation 
intended to update the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive promotes the use of 
pseudonyms (Albrecht, 2013). In a 2013 speech, Viviane Reding, Vice-
President of the European Commission, stated:  
ÒWe should encourage companies to use pseudonyms rather than the 
actual names of persons. This makes sense. It is in the interest of 
citizens.Ó (Reding, 2013) 
Statements such as this and government encouragement of PETs appear at a 
time when citizen concern over losses of privacy is increasing (Eurobarometer, 
2011). The breadth of national surveillance activities has been thrust into the 
spotlight after the high profile leaks of classified documents by Edward 
Snowden, a former contractor to the US National Security Agency (Greenwald 
and MacAskill, 2013). This follows more than a decade of increased 
cybersecurity initiatives accompanied by weakened privacy protections in the 
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 (Lyon and Haggerty, 
2012). Identity management policies and the evolution of privacy-enhancing 
technologies are counter-currents to these trends. They are a competing 
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narrative and set of priorities within government. The prerogative of law 
enforcement and the encouragement of PETs represent tension between the 
stateÕs desire to know and to not know about its citizens; a tension between 
legitimate and illegitimate informational intrusion. The transformation of IDM 
privacy policy goals into implementable solutions and the challenges therein, 
and the institutional forces influencing those goals, are the subject of this 
thesis. 
Research Aims and Questions 
The research aims are two-fold: 
¥ Examine how governments are addressing the privacy challenges 
inherent in the use of new identity technologies through the strategy of 
unlinkability 
 
¥ Examine the interplay of government, market and technological 
imperatives within national identity management initiatives 
 
The first aim of this study is to examine the policy mechanisms that 
governments are employing to address the privacy challenges inherent in the 
use of new online identity technologies. The goal is to understand how privacy 
interests are emerging as public policy in relation to evolving identity 
technologies. Data protection is accomplished through a variety of policy 
instruments, and this study examines two countriesÕ initiatives to apply those 
instruments to the new field of identity management. This field is subject to 
multi-stakeholder governance, lying at the intersection of public policy, 
business and technical standards, so policy-making must encompass a wide 
variety of interests and influences. The study traces the policy development of 
a modern privacy interest Ð unlinkability. It is a specific strategy to effect the 
data protection goals of proportionality and minimisation, increase user control 
over personal information, separate informational contexts, and frustrate 
illegitimate profiling. This study will examine the question of how 
unlinkability is emerging as public policy in Germany and the US. 
 
The second purpose of the study is to examine the interplay of government, 
market and technological imperatives within national identity management 
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initiatives. To accomplish this, the study analyses large-scale efforts to supply 
citizens with digital credentials to use on e-government and commercial 
websites. This analysis aligns with the first research aim above as unlinkability 
is a strategy and technical architecture that occurs within IDM systems. 
 
This thesis adds to the limited body of empirical research on policy-making 
processes related to identity management and PETs. Regarding identity 
management research generally, Halperin and Backhouse (2008, p. 12) note: 
ÒEmpirical studies are emerging but so far are the minority, as perhaps 
might be expected, but the focus, by turns, is shifting from the 
technological artifact per se to the social, legal and cultural hinterland 
in which the technology thrivesÉ.Ó 
Further, the strategy of unlinkability in national information policy is an under-
researched area (Aichholzer and Strauβ, 2010; Noack and Kubicek, 2010). In 
part, this is a reflection of the dearth of PETs being used as policy instruments. 
Koops and Leenes (2005, p. 187) observe: 
ÒÉ PETs by and large seem a pet of data protection commissioners and 
privacy lobbyists, but so far they do not seem to get through to others. 
They remain a mainly theoretical solution that has yet to prove its effect 
in practice.Ó 
This thesis yields new knowledge by exploring in depth the rare appearance of 
PETs in national information policy. The study ties historical data protection 
principles to current identity management policy problems, and analyses the 
institutional effects that influenced such policy-making. Moreover, there is no 
academic literature on US credentialing initiatives for citizen access to e-
government. This thesis yields new knowledge by analysing these initiatives, 
and then comparing them to those of Germany. 
 
German and US identity management policy did not formally influence one 
another. Despite this, both countries have developed policies of unlinkability in 
their citizen credentialing initiatives in similar timeframes. Given the lack of 
formal policy influence on one another, an explanation of the similar 
appearance impels an examination of informal influences such as relationships 
among actors, norms, lexicons, international standards, and cultural factors. 
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Further, information policy scholarship decries a lack of theoretical approaches 
within such research, and calls for attendance to norms, values and the 
institutional dimensions of policy-making (Browne, 1997a; Rowlands, 1996; 
Trauth, 1986). The theoretical approach of new institutionalism analyses 
informal influences and values, as well as the formal influences of laws, rules 
and court decisions. The Theoretical Framework section below expands on the 
utility of new institutionalism.  
 
To address the research aims, the following questions are posed: 
¥ How is unlinkability emerging as public policy in Germany and the 
US? 
 
¥ What is the relationship between unlinkability and historical privacy 
and data protection regulations? 
 
¥ What are the similarities and differences between US and German 
unlinkability policies? 
 
¥ To what extent can new institutionalism explain the emergence of 
unlinkability? 
 
These questions mandate examining policy requirements for unlinkability in 
credential architectures for citizen digital identities. The research will explore 
the formal policy instruments, their genesis, history and influences, relationship 
to prior policy instruments, and technical implementations. It will examine the 
informal influences of values, relationships, common lexicons, and cultural 
phenomena. Unlinkability is a characteristic of a technical system, so the 
research necessarily explores the context in which it appears: citizen 
credentialing. As such, this thesis is also a detailed examination of German and 
US initiatives to provide their citizens and residents with online credentials for 
use with e-government and commercial websites. In doing so, it examines the 
institutional role of the material technologies of credentialing systems. 
Theoretical Framework 
While a comparison of the formal policy instruments and their implementation 
is a fruitful endeavour, a full accounting of the emergence of unlinkability 
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benefits from an analysis of the informal influences on policy development. 
Information policy literature decries the theoretical poverty of the field, and 
instead calls for attendance to institutional factors of policy-making, and 
examination of the values and norms influencing policy (Browne, 1997a; 
Rowlands, 1996; Trauth, 1986). Also present in this literature is the view that 
information policy scholarship is fragmented and discipline-bounded (Browne, 
1997a; Rowlands, 1996; Trauth, 1986). Halperin and Backhouse (2008) find 
the same to be true for the broader emerging field of digital identity research. 
They observe: 
ÒÉ interdisciplinary research seems desirable, indeed necessary, for 
achieving a multifaceted and rounded understanding of the identity 
domain. However this is not the prevailing trend. Research in identity is 
currently fragmented along disciplinary lines.Ó (Halperin and 
Backhouse, 2008, p. 13) 
To answer these calls for greater use of theory, attendance to norms, values and 
institutional factors, and discipline-spanning research, an institutionalist 
theoretical approach is applied to the case data. The broad church of new 
institutionalism is used to analyse the institutional influences underpinning the 
privacy regimes of German and US citizen credentialing efforts, and examine 
the role of norms and values in IDM policy-making. This analysis includes the 
formal instruments of policy, such as laws and government technical 
specifications, and the informal influences, such as culture, lexicons, common 
mindsets, and relational networks. The analysis conceptualises data protection 
as an institution, and thereby able to be examined as a process that is 
influenced by a plurality of formal and informal forces. Human actors and 
material technologies enact this institution, and it exerts an influence on 
identity management policy while also being affected by it; this dual role is 
characteristic of institutions (Katzenbach, 2012). Credentials Ð both ÔsoftÕ ones 
and those based on cards Ð further institutionalise data protection among the 
German and American polities by concretising data protection principles 
within their technical architectures.  
 
Institutionalist analysis helps to explain the past, present and future of 
unlinkability. It does so by incorporating cultural influences and material 
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artefacts into an explanation of the emergence of unlinkability as public policy. 
The empirical material provides insight into policy development processes and 
the theory helps to develop an explanation of the institutionalisation of data 
protection for IDM and the use of PETs. New institutionalism draws upon 
economics, sociology, organisational theory and political science. This 
interdisciplinary character comports well with calls in information policy and 
identity management scholarship for integrative approaches to research. This 
thesis contributes to information policy by applying an institutionalist approach 
to introduce further social theory into the field, as well as examine 
institutionalismÕs suitability as an explanatory framework. It contributes to 
institutionalist scholarship by applying it in a novel empirical domain Ð identity 
management. New institutionalism and the rationale for applying it are the 
subject of Chapter 2. 
Significance of Study 
This thesis explores the reapplication of core data protection and privacy 
principles in the field of identity management. Concern over privacy in the 
online world is on the rise (Eurobarometer, 2011). The internet is no longer an 
experiment Ð it is a social space in which an estimated one third of the worldÕs 
populace interacts (Internet World Stats, 2013). A key characteristic of the 
internet is its ability to link data, resources and people together; this can be 
both valuable and harmful. Privacy researchers have long spoken of 
technologyÕs Ôpanoptic gazeÕ into the lives of all whom it touches (Gandy, 
1993; Reiman, 1995). As more people use the internet and as identity 
technologies evolve, the breadth and depth of profiling increases, as does the 
potential for people to lose control over their digital identities. 
 
Another key characteristic of the internet is that its inner workings are 
invisible. This invisibility combined with linkability and logging, a by-product 
of information systems, lays bare the online activities of millions of users, most 
of whom are unaware of the breadth of data collected about them. Commercial 
companiesÕ appetite for consumer data adds an urgent pressure to this 
collection. At the root of concern is identifiability, as that ties profile data to 
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individual people. The field of identity management lies at the intersection of 
concerns over profiling, identifiability, privacy and user control. Born of the 
need to correctly match user accounts with their owners, identity management 
has become an important component of the increasingly electronic character of 
human interrelations and political phenomena. 
 
This study examines how regulative instruments can be brought to bear in this 
more identifiable internet; how historic impulses to protect privacy are being 
reinterpreted and reapplied. It examines a particular application of privacy-
enhancing technologies Ð long touted as critical tools Ð as a deliberate policy 
initiative. Identity management and its privacy challenges are the subject of a 
great deal of research, and much of it calls for privacy to be designed into 
systems at a fundamental level (Cavoukian, 2006; Hansen, 2008a, 2012; 
Leenes, 2008). This study examines government attempts to do that in the 
realm of citizen credentials. It tests normative arguments for privacy against 
the empirical complexities of policy-making and the constraints of competing 
government, technological and commercial imperatives. By approaching the 
data through the theoretical lens of neo-institutionalism, unlinkability can be 
seen to emerge through formal instruments, technical artefacts and informal 
modes of policy-making. 
 
A small amount of literature exists on the policy-making process of the 
German e-ID and its online authentication features (Hornung and Ro§nagel, 
2010; Noack and Kubicek, 2010). This scholarship touches upon its 
unlinkability features, but only superficially; its main concerns are the 
technical and political aspects of the e-IDÕs ability to authenticate its bearer 
online. The present research explores unlinkabilityÕs nature and genesis with 
more rigour by placing it in historical context within the institution of data 
protection, and by examining the norms and values that helped to shape the 
policies. A comparative policy study is used, drawing upon institutionalist 
theory to examine the processes through which unlinkability is emerging. This 
research also subjects the German process of certifying access to personal data 
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stored on the e-ID to the same degree of contextual, value-critical and 
comparative study.  
 
As to the US case, there is very little academic literature on American citizen 
credentialing efforts, and all of it is focused on credentials for non-
governmental access (Adjei, 2013; Grant, 2011; Katzan, 2011a, 2011b; 
Schwartz, 2011). The empirical data and subsequent analysis of US initiatives 
adds to the mainly European body of scholarship on national identity 
management. Political, technical and institutional analyses of US IDM efforts 
contribute much needed research to this new sub-field of information policy. 
With regard to privacy research, much normative literature exists on 
pseudonymity and unlinkability, but there is limited empirical data on 
government efforts to enact specific policies (Aichholzer and Strauβ, 2010; 
Marin and Van Audenhove, 2010; Noack and Kubicek, 2010; van der Hof, 
Leenes and Fennell, 2009). Research on public policy development and 
implementation of these privacy goals is critical for holistic scholarship in 
identity management. In conducting such research, the thesis broadens 
knowledge about the journey of privacy values to their codification in social 
policies. This research is also significant for its synthesis of US and European 
IDM lexicons and concepts into forms and examples suitable for analysis by 
non-technical information policy scholars. 
 
Identity management research has been approached from legal, technical and 
sociological viewpoints (ICPP and SNG, 2003; Storf, Hansen and Raguse, 
2009). Political science approaches, however, are under-researched (Kubicek, 
2010). This thesis addresses this gap. Further, much academic literature is 
published in the form of journal articles, reports and edited book chapters. 
Empirical data is often submerged, and instead scholars offer syntheses of the 
data. The length of PhD theses allow for much more empirical data to be 
exposed to readers, providing a richer experience and a greater opportunity to 
assess validity of the work. 
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The core contribution of this thesis is an analysis of the process through which 
unlinkability Ð and thereby, PETs Ð are appearing in the information policy of 
Germany and the United States. Actors in both countries set out to provide 
online citizen credentials with high degrees of confidence in their authenticity. 
This is part of each countryÕs identity management policy, a sub-field of 
information policy concerned with the creation, use and privacy of citizen 
credentials. Specific policy choices by administrators led to the inclusion of 
unlinkability among the privacy features of national credentialing systems. 
These choices are among the most forward-looking national privacy policies in 
both countries.  
 
Prior academic literature does not synthetically define national identity 
management policy-making. A key contribution of the thesis is this definition: 
Identity management policy is the set of laws and policies enacted by 
governments and supranational bodies concerning the facilitation, 
procurement, use, liability, legal nature, interoperability, technologies, risk 
methodologies, lifecycle and privacy of digital identities for its citizens and 
employees. This includes physical and logical authentication, e-signature, and 
electronic identification technologies for access to physical and electronic 
resources. The definition is explicated in Chapter 7.  
 
This thesis argues that data protection is an institution Ð a repeating pattern of 
social action that does not need extraordinary effort to maintain it. The research 
examines how the institution of data protection is exerting a strong influence 
on the development of identity management policy in Germany and the US, 
contributing to the emergence of unlinkability. Identity management policy-
making is inherently technocratic due to its reliance on complicated 
technologies and concepts. Privacy concerns relating to digital identities did 
not rise to the level of legislatures in the two countries, leaving such policy to 
administrative and bureaucratic levels. This, plus the inclusion of data 
protection practitioners, technologists, standards developers and consultants 
allowed a set of privacy-conscious values to guide policy-making and become 
embedded in technical systems. Investigating unlinkability leads to an 
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examination of policy processes that are not often visible in the final outputs of 
legislatures. This study thereby contributes to information policy research by 
broadening the empirical base from which to analyse how national privacy 
regimes develop. 
 
Digital identities, from either state or private sources, differ from classic 
official identities such as national ID cards. Digital identities are products, and 
therefore subject to market influence. In the US case, where policy-makers 
hope that private organisations will supply credentials to the citizenry, this 
product nature is paramount. In Germany, where credentials are non-
mandatory and built upon a national e-ID, the need for product marketing is 
evident in the slow take-up of the credentials. The two case studies illustrate 
how inattention to market considerations can harm policy goals. Overall, by 
tying its policy implementation to private actors, the US is more susceptible to 
a conflict of market and government rationales than Germany. 
 
Digital identity is also tied to risk management. The risk to be managed is the 
certainty that the correct person is using an identity credential. The US case 
fully illustrates this risk perspective through its policy reliance on credentials 
that are produced and managed by private actors. To harmonise government 
agenciesÕ ability to judge a credentialÕs authenticity, a risk management 
methodology called the ÔLevels of AssuranceÕ was built. In the German case, a 
similar methodology is in formative stages to enable German digital identities 
to be used in other European countries. The risk-bound nature of digital 
identity highlights that identities are ÔlocalÕ Ð organisationally-derived Ð and 
the crossing of organisational boundaries requires a framework in order to trust 
the credential. These risk management characteristics of digital identity are 
under-researched in identity management scholarship. This thesis adds to new 
knowledge by exploring the relationship between identity credentials and risk 
management strategies in Germany and the US. 
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Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured into nine chapters plus bibliography and appendices. 
The first chapter is this introduction. The second chapter sites the research in 
the multidisciplinary field of information policy. This chapter also explains and 
justifies the use of the new institutionalist theoretical approach. The third 
chapter explains the methodology of the research. The fourth chapter supplies 
the reader with the key terms and technical concepts needed for an exploration 
of unlinkability. The fifth chapter is the empirical data for the US case. It is 
broken into Policy and Themes sections. The sixth chapter is the empirical data 
for Germany, structured identically to the US chapter. The seventh chapter is a 
comparison of the policies and implementations of the two countries. The 
eighth chapter is the application of new institutionalism to further explain the 
emergence of unlinkability. The final chapter contains overall conclusions of 
the research and suggestions for future research into identity management 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: INFORMATION 
POLICY AND NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
This chapter will expand on how unlinkability can be examined as an example 
of the developing identity management policy of Germany and the US. This 
thesis is rooted within the field of information policy as the research aims and 
questions focus on topics typically examined within information policy 
research. These include data protection, privacy, identity management and e-
government practices. The empirical research investigates how the US and 
German governments are building identity management systems for citizens, 
their privacy architectures, and the values, norms and goals embedded within 
them. Specifically, the strategy and architecture of unlinkability is examined. 
The formal policies behind these IDM systems consist of laws, regulations, 
court decisions, administrative and bureaucratic choices, protocols and 
standards, and technical choices. The informal influences include values, 
norms, relationships, narratives and cultural phenomena. All these policy 
elements are embedded within and affected by institutions such as data 
protection, the market, and the state. The institution of data protection 
influenced US and German choices to require unlinkability within their citizen 
credentialing systems. This chapter will explain the theoretical basis from 
which these influences will be analysed in the empirical material. 
 
The chapter begins with a review of the domain of information policy, 
highlighting its definitional and disciplinary challenges. It goes on to examine 
its under-theorised state and related calls for taking account of the institutional 
dimension of policy-making. Information policy embraces formal and informal 
rules, expectations and norms. These qualities suggest that the Ônew 
institutionalismÕ theory is well-suited for information policy research as it 
emphasises analysis of the informal versus the formal, norms, narratives, and 
values. The chapter explicates this theory, and illustrates how it is applied to 
the empirical material. The chapter concludes by conceptualising data 
protection as an institution, and arguing that the choice to include unlinkability 
in citizen identity management systems can be fruitfully explained by an 
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application of institutionalist thought. A synthesis of the various branches of 
new institutionalism based on the work of Scott (1995, 2003, 2008, 2010) and 
Lowndes (1996, 2010; also Lowndes and Roberts, 2013) is used. To facilitate 
analysis, this work is distilled and applied to the empirical research in the form 
of seven institutionalist propositions. These are used to explain the process 
through which unlinkability emerges and forms part of German and US 
identity management policy. 
 
This chapter also surveys the use of institutionalism in information policy 
generally. There is little academic literature on the institution of data 
protection, and less on how material technologies reify the norms and values of 
it. There is a small amount institutional analysis of identity management 
(Aichholzer and Strauβ, 2010; Kubicek, 2010; Noack and Kubicek, 2010). This 
research addresses these gaps using new institutionalism to provide a more 
theoretically-informed analysis of the emerging sub-field of identity 
management policy research. Doing so contributes to a holistic explanation of 
the emergence of unlinkability in Germany and the US, and illustrates the 
intersection of government, market, standards and technology in the policy-
making process. This further contributes to information policy scholarshipÕs 
theoretical development, and the development of new institutionalism by 
testing it against novel empirical data. 
Information Policy: Definitional Problems 
Information policy is a heterogeneous field. A consistent theme in information 
policy literature is the difficulty of defining it. Information policy is Òcontested 
ground É a moving targetÓ (Doty, 1998, p. 59), a Òfuzzy setÓ (Overman and 
Cahill, 1990, p. 803; Rowlands, 1996, p. 14); it has Òporous boundariesÓ 
(Browne, 1997a, p. 270), and is Òfragmentary, overlapping and contradictoryÓ 
(Rowlands, 1996, p. 14, quoting Hernon and Relyea). Several attempts have 
been made at defining information policy. Weingarten (1989, p. 79) described 
it as Òthe set of all public laws, regulations, and policies that encourage, 
discourage, or regulate the creation, use, storage, and communication of 
information.Ó In later work, he specifically included informal policies, such as 
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organizational rules, standards and guidelines, mores and norms, as well as 
formal policies such as constitutions, laws and regulations (Weingarten, 1996, 
p. 45). Burger (1993, p. 6) defined information policy as Òsocietal mechanisms 
used to control information, and the societal effects of applying those 
mechanisms.Ó Trauth (1986, p. 41) called it  
ÒÉ the set of activities currently in existence which aim to achieve 
certain goals in the realm of information processing and 
communication. The goals may either be implicit or explicit.Ó  
Doty (1998, p. 60) calls information policy Òthe collection of laws and policies 
dealing with information from its creation, through its collection, organization, 
dissemination, and repackaging, to its destruction.Ó Braman states that the 
information policy field includes Ògovernment É governance É and 
governmentality,Ó (2009, p. 3) and that it appears Òat the intersection of 
informational, technological, and social structuresÓ (2009, p. 6). Given these 
definitional challenges, Duff (2004, p. 70) observed that Òinformation policy 
suffers from disciplinary territorialism, conceptual underdevelopment, and É 
the absence of a widely accepted definition.Ó  
 
The survey of definitions above yields a number of common themes. There is 
widespread agreement that a foundational element of information policies is 
the set of formal laws, policies or regulations within a given policy context; 
that information policy, near its heart, is (at least partly) concerned with 
constitutions, the products of legislatures, court decisions, regulations and the 
formal rules of state-based agencies. The more inclusive definitions above cite 
ÔnormsÕ or Ôsocietal mechanismsÕ Ð these can arguably be contrasted with 
TrauthÕs assertion that information policies Òaim to achieve certain goalsÓ 
(1986, p. 41). As will be further discussed below, policies that derive from 
norms may not be goal-oriented. The inclusion of norms and mores in a 
definition of information policy is critical; according to Braman (2009, p. 5): 
ÒIt is a classic analytical error É to believe that it is possible to 
understand what is happening to society via the use of information 
policy to exercise power by looking at only laws and regulations.Ó  
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Yusof, Basri and Zin (2010) take a classification approach to describing the 
boundaries of information policy. Based on a literature review, they identify 91 
issues underlying information policy and classify them into 6 groups: technical 
and scientific information, library, information and communication technology, 
social issues, government information, and economy (Yusof et al., 2010, p. 
207). They argue that this classification of issues has not changed since the 
Òearliest researchÓ (2010, p. 205), only the variety of issues within those 
groups. They conclude that information policy is Òa multidiscipline of its ownÓ 
(2010, p. 210), echoing earlier work by Duff (2004). They cite the fluidity with 
which researchers of various disciplines rely on scholarship from outside their 
own fields: ÒDifferences in background did not limit debates and acceptance of 
issues presented by researchers in different disciplinesÓ (2010, p. 210). 
However, Rowlands (1996, pp. 19-20) argued that while classification-based 
approaches to information policy research are useful given its very broad 
scope, he decries them for their theoretical poverty: 
ÒWhile there may be some practical benefits in a classification-based 
approach to information policy, there is little to recommend this 
approach from a theoretical standpoint: classification can only deal with 
policy in a very superficial way, obscuring the political, social, and 
institutional contexts within which policy is shaped and implemented. 
A more fundamental objection is, that by classifying policies into 
mutually exclusive categories, we risk losing a sense of the 
interrelationships between groups of issues.Ó 
RowlandsÕ points can be illustrated with an example from US law. The USA 
PATRIOT Act was enacted soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Section 215 of the Act amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) to allow FISA court orders to apply to a wider array of businesses and 
organisations Ð interpreted to include libraries. These orders can compel 
organisations to grant access to Òany tangible item no matter who holds it, 
including by implication library loan records and the records of library 
computer useÓ (Doyle, 2003, p. 1). This provision has been criticised by parts 
of the US library community as an infringement on constitutional rights and 
privacy (ALA, n.d.). In Yusof, Basri and ZinÕs classification above, research 
on this topic would minimally fall into both the library and social issues 
categories. RowlandsÕ critique implies that we may not help our understanding 
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of the social implications of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act by identifying 
categories in which to home the policy. He argues that Òperhaps classification 
is best regarded as a tool for the initial exploration and perception of pattern in 
complex policy dataÓ (Rowlands, 1996, p. 20). Supporting this, Yusof, Basri 
and ZinÕs classifications cause one to consider alternative ways of construing 
an information policy. For example, using their categories as a starting point 
encourages consideration of the economic or technical dimensions of Section 
215. This leads to questions regarding fair remuneration for the labours 
involved in granting access, or consideration of the technical measures needed 
to efficiently supply data to law enforcement. While Rowlands argues 
persuasively that classification lacks theoretical weight, there is still value in it 
as an exploratory strategy. That said, the classification approach fails to 
elucidate the interlocking political influences that contributed to the PATRIOT 
Act: the history of informational privacy, anti-terrorism legislation, the rapid 
passage of laws in the wake of September 11th, and other factors. 
 
This thesis adopts the following definition of information policy, adapted 
largely from Weingarten (1989, 1996): Information policy is the set of all 
formal and informal policies, rules, standards, guidelines, norms and laws that 
governments apply to encourage, discourage, or regulate the creation, use, 
storage, and communication of information. This definition captures the formal 
instruments of information policy, such as laws and regulations, as well as the 
informal, such as policy-makers getting input and advice from consultants and 
private organisations. The informality element also captures the view that 
policy includes government inaction as much as action (Heidenheimer, Heclo 
and Adams, 1990, p. 3). The definition includes standards, which are to be 
understood in both the informal sense, as in values and Ôstandard operating 
proceduresÕ, but also in the formal sense of technical standards and protocols, 
such as the SAML identity standard. A contribution of this thesis is the analysis 
of government-promoted technical standards as both a regulatory outcome and 
a ÔcarrierÕ for the institutionalisation of data protection. The above definition 
specifies ÔgovernmentsÕ as the policy actor. This sets the definition apart from 
other sources of information policy-making, such as private organisations, and 
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connects it specifically to public policy. Privacy and data protection, the central 
issues of this research, are captured by Òencourage, discourage, or regulate.Ó  
Disciplinary Ghettos 
Much literature on information policy derives from the field of library science, 
but Rowlands (1996, p. 17) noted that disciplines as diverse as economics, law, 
political science, sociology, management science and policy studies are said to 
comprise the field. Given this mixed heritage, it is difficult to have a unifying 
view of what information policy is, or what its research focus can or should be. 
Doty (1998, p. 59) wrote:  
ÒConflicts over the definition of information policy reveal and result 
from deep conflicts in the disciplinary allegiances, training, and 
political values of information policy analysts. Such conflicts are also 
based on opinions about appropriate questions, acceptable methods of 
inquiry, appropriate rhetorics of persuasion, realistic models of social 
life, acceptable modes of social behavior, the identity and relative status 
of stakeholders, and the role of the analyst in policy making and 
implementation.Ó  
Duff (2004, p. 78), citing a disciplinary list similar to Rowlands, asked, ÒIs it 
possible É to speak of information policy as having an academic identity?Ó To 
further complicate matters, formal information policies promulgated by the 
state have been Òtechnology-drivenÓ (Trauth, 1986, p. 42; Rowlands, 1996, p. 
17). Policies are Òpiecemeal, sporadic and É reactive in the face of specific 
issuesÓ (Browne, 1997a, p. 262). Braman (2009, p. 5) argued that to understand 
what is happening to society as a result of information policy 
ÒÉ three types of knowledge must necessarily be brought together. 
Research on the empirical world É [s]ocial theory É [and] 
[k]nowledge of current law and its history.É Historically, these diverse 
domains of knowledge were pursued within different disciplines that 
only rarely interacted.ÉÓ 
This thesis answers BramanÕs call directly by bringing together empirical 
research on the emergence of unlinkability, neo-institutionalist theory, and an 
extensive review of relevant law and policy. 
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McClure and Jaeger (2008, p. 259-260) turn the problem of fragmentation on 
its head, arguing,  
ÒÉ information policy research is uniquely situated to draw from a vast 
range of approaches, sources, and disciplines. When applied properly, 
this array of methods can produce important insights into policy and 
society.Ó  
Yusof, Basri and Zin (2010, p. 210) concluded that the variety of disciplines is 
growing, ergo, Òthe study of information policy is expanding and has the 
potential to become a multidiscipline of its own.Ó This thesis embraces this 
view and approaches the empirical data in an interdisciplinary way, using 
political, technical and business perspectives. 
The Purpose of Information Policy 
Information policy scholars debate the purpose of policy research. That debate 
in part is about the primacy of normative theory Ð a conceptualization of a 
preference Ð and empirical theory Ð a conception of what actually exists 
(McCool, 1994). That is, should information policy research be performed in 
service of bettering the policy-making process, or of justice and improving 
social conditions (Browne, 1997a; Doty, 1998; Duff, 2004)? Or, should it be 
neutral, value-free, and explanatory without saying what policy and policy-
making should be (Rowlands, 1996; Trauth, 1986)? Turner (1997, p. 19) 
portrays this distinction as, Òanalysis for policy-making and of policy-making.Ó 
Rowlands (1996, p. 16) described the latter focus as a ÒscientificÓ rationale for 
studying policy, and the former as ÒprofessionalÓ or Òpolitical.Ó He explains: 
ÒThe scientific motivation seeks to understand policy, not to suggest 
what that policy ought to be. Clearly however, information policy 
studies undertaken for professional or political ends have a different 
emphasis É This approach is concerned with achieving the ÔrightÕ goal, 
with what policy ought to be, and therefore cannot be arrived at without 
reference to an ideological É or normative position. As such, it is a 
value-oriented approach ÉÓ (Rowlands, 1996, p. 16). 
Of these two poles Ð the scientific and the normative Ð Duff (2004, p. 70) took 
a clear position: 
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ÒInformation policy É needs to be more clearly positioned as a 
normative field, one that utilizes axiological reasoning to articulate 
goals for the future of society É [I]t occupies a normative role in 
prescribing conceptions of the good information society.Ó 
Browne also agrees with the need for prescription, but in service of guiding the 
fieldÕs disciplinary development rather than for DuffÕs putative information 
society. She argued that a prescriptive focus Òis essential É to point a direction 
for the development of the field of information policyÓ (Browne, 1997a, p. 
264). Doty (1998, p. 61) also argued that the purpose of information policy 
research was to influence policy-making, as well as Òunderstand social 
interactionÓ and Òforge political and intellectual alliances,Ó given its cross-
disciplinary nature. McClure and Jaeger (2008, p. 258) cite both the scientific 
and normative purposes of information policy research, arguing for summative 
roles Ð Òhelping to ascertain whether the policy goals and objectives are being 
metÓ Ð and formative roles Ð Òhelping to continually refine and update 
policiesÓ and to increase policyÕs Òpositive impact on society.Ó 
 
Related to the scientific/normative divide, information policy literature calls for 
value-critical approaches to research (Overman and Cahill, 1990; Browne 
1997a, 1997b; Rowlands, 1996; Rowlands and Turner, 1997; Braman, 2002; 
Rowlands et al., 2002; Duff, 2004; McClure and Jaeger, 2008). Rein (1976, p. 
13) writes:  
ÒA value-critical approach subjects goals and values to critical review, 
that is, values themselves become the object of analysis; they are not 
merely accepted as a voluntary choice of the will, unamenable to 
further debate.Ó  
Overman and Cahill (1990, p. 803) observed, Òthere is a shortage of policy 
research that calls attention to the countervailing trends and conflicts of values 
in information policy.Ó Browne (1997b, p. 344) noted, Ò[v]alues in information 
policy have been largely neglected in information policy scholarship.ÉÓ 
McClure and Jaeger (2008, p. 258) stated:  
ÒPolicy research moves beyond purely technical issues. It explains 
conflicts between policies and stakeholders, excoriates assumptions and 
values, offers guidance in articulating conflicting issues.ÉÓ  
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This thesis adopts RowlandsÕ (1996, p. 16) ÔscientificÕ rationale; what Turner 
(1997, p. 19) called Òanalysis É of policy-making.Ó It does not proffer a 
normative position in regards to privacy within identity management or the 
policy-making process. The research explores novel policy phenomena so as to 
better understand evolution within the policy fields of data protection and 
identity management, and to define identity management as an emerging sub-
field of information policy. As will be shown below, the new institutionalist 
approach can be used to address the above criticisms of policy research. It can 
subject the values underpinning unlinkability choices to critical analysis so as 
to articulate the norms informing policy choices. 
Theoretical Weaknesses of Information Policy 
One frequent point of agreement in assessments of information policy research 
is its under-theorised character (Overhill and Cahill, 1990; Rowlands, 1996; 
Browne, 1997a, 1997b; Doty, 1998; Agre, 2003; Bjorck, 2004; Duff, 2004; 
Braman, 2009). Overhill and Cahill (1990, p. 803) wrote:  
ÒFrom a theoretical perspective, the problem [of coordinated policy 
development] is one of understanding the values and normative 
structure that shape that shape the information policy debate. Most 
approaches to information policy have understated the role of values 
and normative structures.Ó  
Rowlands (1996, p. 13) highlighted the Òrelatively scant attention É paid to 
the theoretical foundations of the subject.Ó Browne called for ways to Òensure 
that the field is based on defensible ontological and epistemological 
foundationsÓ (1997a, p. 264) in order Òto form a unique interdisciplinary field 
which builds on the theoretical foundations of both information studies and 
policy studies ÉÓ (1997b, p. 340). Duff (2004, p. 69-70) wrote, Òin both theory 
and practice, information policy has not yet reached any kind of satisfying 
plateau.Ó 
 
These theoretical weaknesses and the highly heterogeneous nature of 
information policy frustrate systematic analysis. Trauth (1986, p. 41) called for 
an Òintegrative approach to information policy research.Ó She described the 
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history of US information policy as being tied to developments of particular 
kinds of information processing technology, rendering policies sectoral and 
fragmented. This causes related policy research to be Òdiscipline-boundedÓ 
(Trauth, 1986, p. 42). Citing technology convergence, a growing dependence 
on information and its value as a societal resource, Trauth argued for change in 
information policy analysis; an interdisciplinary and integrative approach. To 
do so, she identified  
ÒÉ the set of activities comprising [US] information policy. What 
comes immediately to mind is the set of existing laws. However, 
information practices are influenced by other forces as well: economic, 
societal and international. In addition to establishing the component 
parts, the interactions among them must also be examined. Further it is 
by extrapolating from specific policy contexts that we can make general 
observations about US policy. Thus, this research needs to examine the 
component interactions not only within, but between policy contexts.Ó 
(1986, p. 43) 
In addition to this cross-contextual analysis, Trauth (1986, p. 43) argued that 
Òpolicy research should make note of the philosophies underlying such policy 
and the extent to which they are consistently reflected.Ó Rowlands (1996) 
discussed in detail the fragmentation within information policy studies, and 
repeated TrauthÕs assertion that research has been discipline-bounded. He 
argued that Ò[t]he fragmentation of information policy research is mirrored by 
a fragmentation of policy-making institutionsÓ (Rowlands, 1996, p. 17). 
Browne (1997a, p. 262) reiterated this view: 
ÒÉ responsibility for different, and often overlapping, aspects of 
information policy has been based across different government 
departments in developed countries. Overarching frameworks which 
can be used to integrate policy at a broad conceptual level and in a 
coherent fashion are notably absent.Ó 
Accordingly, several authors cite the need for theoretical and methodological 
pluralism (Trauth, 1986; Braman, 1989; Rowlands, 1996; Browne, 1997a, 
1997b; Doty, 1998; Duff, 2004; Galperin, 2004; McClure and Jaeger, 2008). 
The reasons cited are to achieve greater coherence in analysis, to advance the 
field, and to improve policy-making. Braman (1989, p. 233) wrote:  
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ÒTheoretical pluralism seems an appropriate way to think about 
phenomena that occur and processes that unfold in different ways at 
different levels of a highly articulated social structure.Ó  
In recent work, Braman (2009, p. 5) noted that failure to bring together 
empirical work, social theory and knowledge of law and its history Òcripples 
policy-making." Information policy research lends itself to multiple methods of 
data collection and analysis, helping to optimize data collection and allow for 
better analysis (McClure and Jaeger, 2008, p. 259). 
 
Rowlands (1996, p. 20) noted that Òinformation policy exists at two layers: that 
which is explicit and recorded in documentary form, and that which is 
expressed implicitly in the form of habits, received wisdoms, unwritten codes 
of behaviour, expectations and societal norms.Ó Browne (1997b, p. 342) wrote: 
Òthe newer approaches to understanding phenomena are critical for information 
policy, given their capacity to show events through the eyes of the actors in 
situations within a public world of norms, conventions and rules.Ó Trauth 
(1986, p. 41) stated:  
ÒUS policy has evolved in a decentralized fashion. The resulting 
national policy is implicit in nature, consisting of a collection of laws, 
precedents, expectations, and societal norms.Ó  
This focus on the normative aspect of information policy is seen in a host of 
publications (Overman and Cahill, 1990; Weingarten, 1996; Meijer, 2003; 
Braman, 2004; Duff, 2004; Galperin, 2004; Adams, Murata and Orito, 2010; 
Mueller and Lentz, 2010).  
 
In summary, information policy is an under-theorised, decentralised, 
heterogeneous policy domain. Information policies encompass laws, rules, 
norms, expectations, cultural elements, formal and informal practices, the 
explicit and the implicit. While there is an ongoing debate as to the purpose of 
information policy research, there are strong arguments to examine that 
research for its underlying value assumptions. The above qualities steer 
research in the direction of social theories that can encompass these 
characteristics so as to explain policy development and change. This thesis 
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embraces the arguments for greater theoretical engagement within information 
policy research. It acknowledges the interplay of the formal and the informal, 
norms, values and culture within information policy-making. The next section 
specifies the disciplinary sub-topics of this thesis: identity management, data 
protection and e-government. The remainder of the chapter explores new 
institutionalism as an approach to theoretically enrich the research.  
Information Policy Sub‐topics 
The empirical research of this thesis concerns unlinkability within identity 
management, data protection, and e-government, all of which are part of the 
multidiscipline of information policy. Identity management encompasses the 
creation, maintenance, alteration and revocation of electronic identity 
credentials and attributes. A European Commission research report succinctly 
states: 
ÒOne crucial question lies at the heart of digital identity management: 
how do I know you are who you say you are?Ó (Stevens et al., 2010, p. 
1) 
Data protection includes a wide variety of issues related to the creation, 
processing, privacy, use, storage and transmission of personal data. E-
government is the use of electronic technologies by government to accomplish 
its business with the private sector, with citizens and internally; it denotes the 
use and transmission of digital data. Unlinkability is a characteristic of identity 
management systems where the online activities of an individual are 
intentionally obfuscated by breaking the ÔlinksÕ created as she goes from site to 
site. All of the above terms and concepts are examined in Chapter 4.  
 
A governmentÕs choice to build unlinkability into its identity management 
system is an information policy choice that is both influenced by and part of its 
data protection regime. Taken together, all of the choices related to the creation 
and management of electronic identities can be said to be a countryÕs Ôidentity 
management policy.Õ If electronic identities are used with government websites 
and other resources, then its identity management policy interacts with its e-
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government policy. All of these policies form part of a countryÕs information 
policy.  
 
There is limited discussion in information policy literature about the existence 
or boundaries of national identity management policy (Davies and Hosein, 
2007; Whitley and Hosein, 2009). A core contribution of this research is the 
definition of this sub-field of information policy: Identity management policy is 
the set of laws and policies enacted by governments and supranational bodies 
concerning the facilitation, procurement, use, liability, legal nature, 
interoperability, technologies, risk methodologies, lifecycle and privacy of 
digital identities for its citizens and employees. This includes physical and 
logical authentication, e-signature, and electronic identification technologies 
for access to physical and electronic resources. The empirical data chapters (5 
and 6) and policy comparison chapter (7) supply necessary data and analysis to 
validate this definition. 
 
By studying the intersection of privacy, data protection, national citizen 
identification initiatives and e-government, this thesis enriches understanding 
of the relationship between policy actors, values, technology and policy-
making in the field of identity management. A definition of identity 
management policy and an exploration of its institutional dynamics broaden the 
field of information policy. 
Theoretical Approach 
In line with the information policy scholarship cited above and its calls for 
integrative and interdisciplinary approaches to information policy research, the 
new institutionalist theoretical approach is used to frame and analyse the 
collected empirical data on the emergence of unlinkability. As will be 
explained below, a new institutionalist, or neo-institutionalist, approach 
addresses the institutional dimension of policy-making, examining the formal 
rules underpinning a policy domain, norms, values, and implicit and informal 
rules. This approach analyses the actors within policy-making Ð such as 
legislatures, interest groups, bureaucracies, the subjects of policies, 
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organisations and citizens Ð and the institutional landscape in which they are 
embedded. It facilitates the analysis of actorsÕ values and how their choices are 
influenced by norms, cultural beliefs, cognitive scripts, narratives, institutional 
structure and past decisions. New institutionalism is not discipline-bounded Ð 
political science, economics, organisational studies and sociology all use and 
contribute to its theoretical development. It encompasses a wide range of 
methodologies and data collection techniques, and subjects the values of 
institutional actors to examination (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). These 
characteristics address many of the criticisms of information policy research 
outlined above.  
 
One research question of this thesis is: How is unlinkability emerging as public 
policy? A neo-institutionalist approach would analyse the institutions involved 
in such a policy choice: 
ÒÉ institutions are the variable that explain political life in the most 
direct and parsimonious manner, and they are also the factors that 
themselves require explanation.Ó (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 6) 
The remainder of this chapter will show how an analysis of the institutions 
involved in identity management policy-making helps to explain the policy 
development of unlinkability. This analysis highlights formal instruments, 
informal practices, relationships and artefacts Ð the ÔcarriersÕ of 
institutionalisation (Scott, 2003) Ð and how different actors enact the institution 
of data protection, which powerfully influenced identity management policies.  
 
Several scholars have applied an institutionalist approach to information policy 
issues. Bellamy and Taylor (1996; see also Bellamy and Taylor, 1998) 
examined the institutional dynamics of computerisation in the UK criminal 
justice system. They use a case study of a UK government project to coordinate 
informational resources within the criminal justice system as a way to illustrate 
mechanisms of change and barriers to change in government (1996, pp. 51-52). 
Bellamy and Taylor conceive of an Ôinformation polityÕ Ð a Ònormative, 
cognitive and symbolic orderÓ (1996, p. 56) of information resources amongst 
a set of political institutions; in this case, the departments of the criminal 
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justice system. They illustrate how the institutional dynamics of power, 
organisational boundaries, the structuring of information and rationalising 
discourses shape the political environment in which attempts at government 
change occur. Bellamy and Taylor show how the tension between actors and 
political change programmes can be usefully examined through analysis of 
symbols, methods of legitimating agency structures, political agendas and 
historical context. 
 
Robbin (2000) examined the rules and practices of the political institutions 
involved in US government decisions about how to classify population data, 
considering theories of the role of the state and the social construction of 
identity. She used a case study of the revision of a US national standard of 
categories on ÔraceÕ and ÔethnicityÕ to illustrate the role of political institutions 
in the shaping of social identities and preferences. Robbin showed how the 
prior institutionalisation of these categories became destabilised by interest 
groups and conflicting discourses, leading to minor revisions in the standard. 
The revision was contested because the categories were tied to political and 
material benefits for disenfranchised groups, such as American Indians. They 
were also powerful symbols that influenced the ways that category members 
self-identified. The categories were given weight by their state origins, and as 
informational boundaries they influenced a variety of other institutions. 
RobbinsÕ work illustrates the institutional power of vocabularies (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) in defining political choices. 
 
Agre (2003) examined how digital libraries are embedded in their institutional 
environments so as to encourage designers of such libraries towards 
appropriate and practicable designs. He posited that digital libraries are both 
machines and institutions; both a database and an extension of the institution of 
libraries. Society, Agre wrote, Òwill evaluate digital libraries in terms of the 
ways that they fit, or fail to fit, into the institutional world around themÓ (p. 
219). He pointed out that libraries interact with a wide variety of other 
institutional domains, such as scholarship, law and the professions. Such 
diverse interaction poses challenges for designers of digital libraries, who must 
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balance the orientations of a home institution of libraries with the other 
institutions it interacts with. 
 
Meijer (2003) analysed how institutional safeguards, separate from 
technological and organisational ones, led actors to trust the authenticity of 
digital public records. He examined eleven different Dutch cases where the 
authenticity of records was critical to accountability in public administration. 
In eight of the cases, either technical or organisational safeguards were used to 
ensure the recordsÕ authenticity. In the three remaining cases, there were 
neither technical nor organisational safeguards, but the authenticity was not 
questioned. Meijer argued that an institutional safeguard was relied upon: the 
belief that public servants would behave lawfully and appropriately with regard 
to recordkeeping.  
 
Bjrck (2004) argued for new institutionalist theory to be used in information 
technology security research. Finding research in this area to be largely 
atheoretical, he cites institutional scholarship in general information systems 
research to show how institutional concepts might be used in security research. 
He proposed that institutionalism could help explain why formal security and 
actual security behaviours differ, why organisations create and maintain formal 
security structures without fully implementing them, and what mechanisms are 
actually controlling security behaviour. 
 
Galperin (2004) explains the differences between the UKÕs and USÕs digital 
television spectrum policies through an explicitly new institutionalist analysis. 
To explain political outcomes in communications policy research, he contrasts 
theories of interest groups, the role of ideas, and technological change, finding 
them inadequate to explain outcomes. He uses institutional analysis to examine 
the power relationships and political structures that underpinned the giveaway 
of digital television spectrum licenses to incumbent broadcasters. The analysis 
shows that the broadcasters won the day because members of Congress relied 
upon close relations with local broadcasters to help win their elections. It was 
not only the actions of powerful national interests that caused a political 
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choice, but also a self-interested action by policy-makers who needed 
favourable local news coverage from local broadcasters 
 
Aichholzer and Strauβ (2010) applied actor-centered institutionalism to their 
investigation of identity management systems in Austria. They explain the 
system innovation of the national IDM system for citizens by considering the 
various political actors involved and institutional features, such as the lack of a 
requirement for Austrians to possess an identity document. Citing e-
government as the main driver of the IDM system, Aichholzer and Strauβ 
explain that e-government stakeholders took a preeminent role in the 
constellation of actors influencing the system design. 
 
Kim, Kim and Lee (2009) explained the success of a local Korean e-
government platform and the adoption of it as a model for national use through 
institutionalist analysis. The platform, known as OPEN, was deployed both to 
increase administrative transparency and reduce corruption. The authors show 
how three institutional mechanisms Ð regulatory/coercive, cognitive/mimetic 
and normative Ð acted to create the e-government platform, reinforce its use in 
Korean society, and diffuse it to a national scale.  
 
While there is literature that uses neo-institutionalism within information 
policy research, and some of it deals directly with data protection issues, there 
is little discussion of treating data protection as an institution. Burkert (1981) 
examined the institutions of data protection, but from a purely functional 
perspective. His goal was to problematise the role of data protection authorities 
vis--vis European data protection laws. Adams, Murata and Orito (2010) 
examined legal, economic, technological and cultural factors in the adoption of 
JapanÕs data protection regime. They admitted that their arguments are not a 
rigorous use of institutionalism, but rather that some evidence of path 
dependence appears in the background pressures leading to the adoption of 
Japanese data protection rules (2010, p. 98). Righettini (2011) explicitly used 
new institutionalist analysis in a comparison of the regulative policies of 
French and Italian data protection authorities. Her work is an excellent analysis 
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of the relationship among institutional actors, networks, norms, and narratives 
leading to the choice of regulative instruments and ÒstyleÓ (2011, p. 162). 
These works consider institutional effects and actors that influence data 
protection, and they focus on the institutions of data protection Ð authorities Ð 
and factors leading to the creation of data protection instruments. They do not, 
though, discuss data protection as an institution in and of itself.  
 
Following the explanation of new institutionalism below, this chapter 
conceptualises data protection an institution, defined here by March and Olsen 
(2004, p. 5, orig. emph.): 
ÒAn institution is a relatively stable collection of rules and practices, 
embedded in structures of resources that make action possible Ð 
organizational, financial and staff capabilities, and structures of 
meaning that explain and justify behavior Ð roles, identities and 
belongings, common purposes, and causal and normative beliefs.Ó 
The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to explaining new institutionalism, 
how data protection is an institution, and the utility of new institutionalism in 
explaining the policy development of unlinkability. 
The ‘Old Institutionalism’ 
Most political science in the first half of the 20th century is characterised by a 
study of formal institutions: constitutions, legal systems, government structures 
and economic organizations (Shepsle, 1989; Scott, 2008; Lowndes, 2010). 
ÒInstitutionalism was political scienceÓ (Lowndes, 2010, p. 60). This early 
institutionalist orientation yielded intricate descriptions of rules, rights, 
procedures and structures, with limited attention paid to any notions of change 
(Scott, 2008, p. 6). Further, Òthe tone of these studies was more that associated 
with moral philosophy and less that of empirical science.Ó (Scott, 2008, p. 6) 
This focus on formal institutions and normativity was rejected by the 
behavioralism movement in political science and rational choice economics 
which saw those institutions and political outcomes as the Òaggregation of 
individual actionsÓ (Shepsle, 1989, p. 133; Scott, 2008, p. 7). These actions, it 
was argued, arose from sociological and psychological principles and 
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preferences to maximise self-interest, respectively. The two movements 
eschewed the normative, prescriptive approaches of earlier scholars, and 
devoted their attentions to the primacy of the individual actor over the internal 
workings of political structures (Scott, 2008, pp. 7-8).  
 
Modern conceptions of institutions within sociology are evident from the end 
of the 19th century onwards. The binding power of norms and their 
transmission via groups of people appear in the scholarship of Spencer, 
Sumner, Cooley and Hughes in the first half of the 20th century (Scott, 2008, 
pp. 8-11). Belief systems, symbols and cultural rules are seen to govern social 
behaviour in the work of Durkheim and Weber (Scott, 2008, pp. 11-15). In the 
1960s, Berger and Luckmann emphasised the Ôsocial construction of reality,Õ 
and the role of cognitive frameworks in shaping behaviour (Scott, 2008, pp. 
15-16).  
 
Institutionalist thinking appears within the study of organisations in the 1950s 
(Scott, 2008, pp. 20-23). This work highlighted how values, rituals and 
symbols influenced actors. Organisations came to be seen as analytically 
separate from institutions. Within organisational theory, the dominant 
perspective in the late 1970s was of organisations adapting (or attempting to do 
so) to their environment to secure an appropriate fit within the confines of 
Ôbounded rationalityÕ Ð the set of rational choices perceived to be available 
given the limitations of awareness, information and time (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin, and Suddaby, 2008, p. 3).  
The New Institutionalism 
From the late 1970s onwards, scholars became disenchanted with the atomistic, 
Òundersocialized conceptions of human actionÓ (Granovetter, 1985, p. 483; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In 1984, March and Olsen coined the term Ônew 
institutionalismÕ in recognition of a resurgent interest in institutions and their 
power to explain and understand society. Rather than seeing political 
phenomena as the aggregate consequences of individual behaviour, new 
institutionalist scholarship asserted that political institutions play a more 
  
44 
autonomous role in shaping outcomes (Lowndes, 2010, p. 63); that political life 
is organised around rituals, ceremonies and symbols; that political experiences 
shape and are shaped by peoplesÕ preferences, rather than those preferences 
being exogenous; that institutions affect power distribution, which in turn 
affects the institutional landscape; that culture has a role in shaping 
organisational reality (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 12). March and Olsen 
(1984, p. 735) rejected prior political science scholarship that saw politics as 
ÒepiphenomenaÓ Ð phenomena that arise secondarily from other phenomena Ð 
affected by conditions such as class, geography, ethnicity, language, economic 
conditions and culture, but not affecting them. They disagreed that social 
systems could be ultimately described and explained by the actions of 
individuals and their calculated, deliberate decisions. March and Olsen (1984) 
drew attention to the omnipresence of myth, symbols, ritual and ceremonies in 
political and social life. They noted that the political science of their day 
reduced these elements to mere strategic manoeuvring by actors Ð Òwindow-
dressing for the real political processes, or as instruments by which the clever 
and the powerful exploit the nave and the weakÓ (1984, p. 738). Instead, the 
new institutionalism they posited treated symbols and ritual as core phenomena 
that could explain behaviour and outcomes. Meyer and Rowan (1977) asserted 
that myths and ceremonies, rather than formal structures of coordination and 
control, are the critical dimensions of how organisations function. Further, they 
argued that organizations become isomorphic Ð tending towards structural and 
behavioural similarity Ð with other organisations in their institutional 
environment because of interdependencies that occur between them, so as to 
enhance legitimacy, and to better survive. 
 
Admittedly, the new institutionalism was and is not necessarily consistent or 
coherent. A dozen years after March and Olsen (1984) noted this, Hall and 
Taylor wrote, Òit does not constitute a unified body of thoughtÓ (1996, p. 5). 
Partly, this is because of the tension caused by two potentially irreconcilable 
views: rationally coherent behaviour of actors maximizing their utility versus 
sociological conceptions of preferences and behaviours shaped by the actorsÕ 
institutional landscape (March and Olsen, 1984; Lowndes, 2010). Further, 
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there is disagreement as to whether or not institutions yield efficient outcomes 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Shepsle, 1989). Different scholars focus on different 
kinds of institutions, defining exactly what an institution is in limited or more 
expansive terms. There are many institutionalisms, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991, p. 1) noted, and Òit is often easier to gain agreement about what [the 
new institutionalism] is not than about what it is.Ó 
The Variants 
There are several variants of new institutional approaches (Lowndes, 1996; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hay and Wincott, 1998; Lowndes, 2010). Initially, three 
were identified: rational choice, historical, and sociological. Through the 1990s 
and 2000s, additional variants were postulated and named, including 
normative, empirical, network and constructivist (Lowndes, 2010). Lowndes 
(2010, p. 64-66) and Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 7) have pointed to two ÔpolesÕ 
of the spectrum of approaches: rational choice or ÔcalculusÕ on one end, and 
normative or ÔculturalÕ on the other. All of the variants exist between these two 
poles. The initial three variants are the Ômain strandsÕ of institutionalism 
(Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 32). 
 
Rational choice institutionalism is derived largely from the field of economics, 
arguing that individuals create political institutions to maximise their self-
interest (ÔutilityÕ), stabilise relationships and reduce the transaction costs 
between people, groups and organisations (Koelble, 1995). Preferences (in 
favour of utility maximisation) are seen as exogenous, not influenced by 
institutions, although institutions Òdefine the choice setÓ (North, 1991, p. 97). 
Rational choice theorists frame institutions as solutions to collective action 
dilemmas, providing reasons and ways for individuals to act in a concerted 
way. Institutions rely, in part, on enforcement (e.g., penalties) in order to be 
robust (Levi, 1990; North, 1991). Rational choice theorists tend to emphasise 
institutionsÕ durability. This durability arises in part because the transaction 
costs of alternative institutions are too high to allow change (Shepsle, 1989, p. 
144) or because entrenched players are incentivised to maintain current 
institutional structures (North, 1990, p. 99). 
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Sociological institutionalists argue that institutions shape and are shaped by 
norms and values, interests, identities and beliefs. In contrast with rational 
choice, individualsÕ preferences are seen to be influenced by institutional 
arrangements and power dynamics; peopleÕs behaviour is not strategic, but 
bounded by a worldview influenced by institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that institutions persist and thrive by their 
actorsÕ adherence to myths, ceremonies and rituals that validate the rationality 
of the rules those myths and rituals promote. Deviation from these myths and 
rituals threatens the perceived legitimacy of organisations. Institutions both 
adapt to and shape their environment, and more powerful actors attempt to 
build their goals and processes directly into society as institutional rules. Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) also speak of the importance of organisational language and 
vocabularies of structure as specific means of legitimating actorsÕ activities. In 
this way, and by aligning internal goals with externally defined worth, 
organisations improve their appearance of legitimacy and thereby their 
survival. They note the potential for conflict from inconsistent myths co-
existing within institutional environments, and point out that efficiency is often 
less important than adherence to rituals and rules. Greenwood, et al. (2008), in 
contrast with rational choice conceptions of institutions, disregard overt 
enforcement as a defining characteristic, and see institutionalisation in simple 
actions between individuals, such as a handshake. In regards to organisations, 
they summarise the process of institutionalisation in three mechanisms: 
coercive, where external constituents encourage or force institutional elements 
to be absorbed; normative, where actors adopt local norms and obligations; and 
mimetic, where organisations copy others so as to seem legitimate, or not seem 
deviant (see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
Historical institutionalism sees the institutional organisation of a polity as the 
principal factor in generating distinctive policy outcomes (Hall, 1996). Giving 
primacy to political institutions over economic and cultural ones, historical 
institutionalists highlight power asymmetries inherent in and affected by 
changes within institutional arrangements. These asymmetries influence the 
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decision-making processes that create policy. Historical institutionalism 
highlights the stable nature of institutions, noting that social forces and prior 
policy choices and institutional arrangements may engender Ôpath 
dependency.Õ That is, historical events lay down paths that shape future 
outcomes, versus the view that similar forces in different contexts would 
produce similar results. Accordingly, historical institutionalism is often used to 
compare policies in different countries. Important to these comparisons is the 
concept of ÒsequencingÓ (Thelen, 1999, p. 388; Weir, 1992, p. 192). The 
sequence Ð i.e., the timing Ð of events and interactions between political 
processes and institutional development must be considered to illuminate path 
dependency and analyse policy outcomes. And, given the influence of past 
choices, institutions are acknowledged to suffer from and cause unintended 
consequences, resulting in inefficiency. Path dependency arises from Ôfeedback 
mechanisms,Õ including Ôcoordination effects,Õ where, Òonce a set of 
institutions is in place, actors adapt their strategies in ways that reflect but also 
reinforce the ÔlogicÕ of the systemÓ (Thelen, 1999, p. 392). 
The other feedback mechanism is the:  
ÒÉ distributional effects of institutions. The idea is that institutions are 
not neutral coordinating mechanisms, but in fact reflect, and also 
reproduce and magnify, particular patterns of power distribution in 
politics É facilitating the organization and empowerment of certain 
groups while actively disarticulating and marginalizing others.Ó 
(Thelen, 1999, p. 392) 
Policy choices can thereby be constrained as past decisions restrict future 
possibilities. 
 
Like its sociological variant, historical institutionalism sees institutions as 
shaping ideas and interests, which influence the goals of political action 
(Koelble, 1995, p. 239). Those goals and resultant actor choices, in turn, 
influence institutional arrangements. Powerful actors seek to embed rules into 
institutional arrangements that favour their desired outcomes. Path dependency, 
however, can result in limitations on future policy-making, what Margaret 
Weir calls Òbounded innovationÓ (1992). Further, historical institutionalists 
give credence to non-institutional factors in political outcomes, such as 
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economic structures and the diffusion of ideas. Proponents and commentators 
on historical institutionalism point out that such analysis does not represent an 
all-encompassing evaluation of the causes of political outcomes (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, p. 13). 
A Holistic Approach to Institutional Analysis 
Information policy scholarship calls for integrative approaches to research, 
arguing for the necessity of analysing norms, mores, rules and informal 
influences alongside the formal products of legislatures, courts and 
administrations. To achieve this value-critical approach that examines the 
implicit as well as the explicit, each of the three institutionalist variants can 
contribute. Given the rich variety of empirical evidence and potent range of 
analytical approaches, a holistic evaluation would be most constructive. Rather 
than declaring for one branch of institutionalism or another, an ÔomnibusÕ 
conception of institutions and their dynamic processes will offer a fruitful 
analysis of the data under study. Scott (2003, p. 881) observes that Òit is 
important to recognize that most full-fledged institutions are made up of 
diverse elements. There are few ÔpureÕ cases.Ó Historical institutionalismÕs 
focus on political institutions, process tracing, the foreclosure of policy choices 
due to prior choices, and comparative studies makes it particularly valuable for 
this research. And, while German and US information policy can be usefully 
analysed from the perspective of timing, sequence and history, there are also 
traces of cultural scripts, leading one to include a sociological institutionalist 
perspective as well. Commercial actors pursuing their own self-interested ends 
are usefully examined with a rational choice perspective. 
 
This study will adopt LowndesÕ (2010), Lowndes and Roberts (2013) and 
ScottÕs (2008) holistic approach, which opens up institutional theory as a 
pluralistic framework that has particular utility for addressing gaps in 
information policy research. This will align the analysis with calls in 
information policy research for inclusiveness and theoretical pluralism. The 
next sections synthesise the various strands of institutionalist thought into a 
holistic approach. 
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The Core Propositions of Institutionalism 
In a synthetic appraisal of its various camps, Lowndes (2010, pp. 66-71) 
describes the evolution of ÔoldÕ to new institutionalism as movement along six 
Òanalytic continuaÓ: 
(a) ÒFrom a focus on organizations to a focus on rules.Ó Institutions 
are seen as rule sets rather than organisations themselves. For example, 
instead of a focus on specific government agencies, new 
institutionalists would be more likely to study the procedures that guide 
and constrain them. Organisations become both the actors subject to 
institutional constraints, and arenas in which those rules and constraints 
are developed and expressed. 
(b) ÒFrom a formal to an informal conception of institutions.Ó Informal 
rules and unwritten conventions are seen to be as important as formal 
arrangements and mechanisms; formal and informal rules may 
influence and support one another. 
(c) ÒFrom a static to a dynamic conception of institutions.Ó New 
institutionalists explicate the stability and change processes of 
institutions, recognizing that, as rules and processes rather than things, 
they must be sustained or changed through human action.  
(d) ÒFrom submerged values to a value-critical stance.Ó New 
institutionalism attempts to identify the ways that institutions embody 
values, and how institutions may cultivate values. There is a 
recognition that political values shape power relationships, and must 
therefore be analysed to understand how the institutional landscape is 
formed. 
(e) ÒFrom a holistic to a differentiated conception of institutions.Ó 
Rather than focusing on systems of government, new institutionalists 
focus on component institutions of political life: e.g., decision-making 
systems, contracting rules, budgetary arrangements, and tax systems. 
Institutions preserve and embody differential power resources, 
privileging some and disenfranchising others. And, institutions exist 
and adapt within a diverse environment, producing variation and 
deviation. 
(f) ÒFrom independence to embeddedness.Ó Institutions exist within a 
plurality of rules and contexts; they are nested within other rules and 
regimes. Some writers see institutional choices made early in policy 
processes as delimiting future choices, causing those institutional 
structures to become embedded. Some policy development paths are 
foreclosed, while others are not. 
 
This final point is summarised by Powell (1991, p. 188): 
ÒThe critical agenda for institutional analysis should be to show how 
choices made at one point in time create institutions that generate 
recognisable patterns of constraints and opportunities at a later point.Ó 
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Most important to the present research are (a), (b), (d) and (f). The institution 
of data protection is best viewed as rules and procedures. Taken together, they 
constrain and enable actors and technology. Those actors and that technology 
then, in turn, enact and affect the institution of data protection. Understanding 
how unlinkability emerged requires attendance to the informal and normative 
features of policy-making. The values of relevant actors must be critically 
appraised to understand how those values influenced policy development. Data 
protection, identity management, national identification and other policy 
contexts overlap with one another; unlinkability cannot be explained without 
analysing the interdependencies of its policy milieu. 
 
LowndesÕ treatment pulls together various analytical pathways of 
institutionalist thought, enabling further synthesis that can be applied to the 
empirical data. The next sections define institutions, and introduce ScottÕs 
framework to collapse the various institutionalisms into a synthetic analytical 
approach. 
Various Definitions of Institutions  
The core features of an institution are shared across all of the different camps: 
institutions are rule-like and impersonal; they are, in part, comprised of norms; 
they have stabilising effects, allowing actors to make choices in the absence of 
information they might use to make decisions (rational choice), or by 
encouraging people to behave in line with established cultural practices or 
cognitive scripts (sociological); they affect and are affected by their 
environments; they tend to be stable, though are subject to change, competition 
and destruction. However, there is dissent, or at least a different focus, along 
the purported spectrum of rational choice to normative. The former sees 
behaviour as driven by rationality (however bounded) in favour of utility 
maximisation. The latter explains behaviour as deriving from a Òlogic of 
appropriatenessÓ (March and Olsen, 2004); as a result of ÔsatisficingÕ (settling 
for the best sub-optimal choice available) (Simon, 1955); as a result of being 
unable to conceive of alternatives, or a belief that alternative choices are 
  
51 
unrealistic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Rational choice sees institutions as 
the product of conscious human design, whereas the normative viewpoint 
disavows conscious design. 
 
In general, there is a taken-for-granted quality to institutions, as well as 
repetition and formal and informal constraints (Greenwood, et al., 2008). Offe 
(2006, p. 16) writes of institutions having codes of conduct and Òsector-specific 
ethosÓ Ð this comports with new institutionalism in general, as does his view 
that institutions subsume and subordinate individuals. Depending on the 
author, institutions can be seen as organisations themselves, such as the US 
Congress (Shepsle, 1989), formal rules, such as those of electoral systems 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992) and constitutions (North, 1991), and macrosocial 
conditions, such as sovereign statehood (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Broader 
yet is Friedland and AlfordÕs (1991, p. 249) conception of institutions: 
ÒThe central institutions of contemporary Western societies Ð 
capitalism, family, bureaucratic state, democracy, and Christianity Ð are 
simultaneously symbol systems and material practices.Ó 
This issue of Ômaterial practicesÕ is important to the cases under study, and will 
be discussed further below. 
 
In an explicit attempt to bring Òsome order into the discussion,Ó Scott (2008, 
pp. 47-48) proposed the following omnibus conception of institutions: 
ÒInstitutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and 
resources, provide stability and meaning to social lifeÉ. In this 
conception, institutions are multi-faceted, durable social structures 
made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material 
resources.Ó (see also Scott, 2003, p. 880) 
This broad definition, encompassing the symbolic, the social and the material, 
captures a wide swathe of institutionalist thought. It provides a foundation on 
which to analyse the empirical data of this thesis, which exhibits all three 
dimensions. The next section expands upon ScottÕs synthesis. 
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Synthesis of Institutionalisms 
Scott (1995; 2003; 2008) draws together the various strands of new 
institutionalist scholarship and finds three key emphases that he terms the 
Ôthree pillarsÕ of institutions: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive.  
ÒThese elements are the central building blocks of institutional 
structures, providing the elastic fibers that guide behavior and resist 
change.Ó (Scott, 2008, p. 49) 
One or all of these pillars appear across the various conceptions of institutions, 
with different scholars weighting one or the other as central (Scott, 1995, p. 34-
35). Scott (1995, p. 35; 2008, p. 51) writes: 
ÒBy employing a more analytical approach to these arguments, we can 
identify important underlying theoretical fault lines that transect the 
domain.Ó 
Scott (2008, p. 51) explained the three pillars in the following figure: 
 
Figure 2.1  Three pillars of institutions  
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Source: Scott, 2008, p. 51 
 
Scott further writes: 
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ÒThe three elements form a continuum moving Ôfrom the conscious to 
the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for granted.ÕÓ  
(2008, p. 50, quoting Hoffman) 
The regulative pillar concerns explicit regulative processes: Òthe capacity to 
establish rules, inspect or review othersÕ conformity to them, and as necessary, 
manipulate sanctions Ð rewards or punishments Ð in an attempt to influence 
future behaviorÓ (Scott, 2008, p. 52). These processes may be formal, such as 
via police or judicial actions, or informal, such as shaming. Scott (2008, p. 53) 
explained: 
ÒForce, sanctions, and expedience responses are central ingredients of 
the regulative pillar, but they are tempered by the existence of rules, 
whether in the guise of informal mores or formal rules and laws.Ó  
The primary mechanism of control, in the language of DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983, p. 150) is coercion (Scott, 2008, p. 52). This coercive power can 
commonly originate with states as an ÔenforcerÕ via surveillance and 
sanctioning. However, it is also seen in inducements and with other actors, 
such as favourable pricing by private firms to select groups (Scott, 2008, p. 
53). 
 
The normative pillar emphasises Ònormative rules that introduce a prescriptive, 
evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life. Normative systems 
include both values and normsÓ (Scott, 2008, p. 54). Values are conceptions of 
the desirable or the preferred, including standards by which to compare and 
assess existing structures and behaviours (Scott, 2008, p. 54). Norms define 
how things should be done; how to legitimately pursue valued ends. Normative 
systems define goals and the appropriate way to pursue them (Scott, 2008, p. 
54-55). Specialised values and norms that apply only to specific social 
positions or particular individuals are called ÔrolesÕ. Roles are normative 
expectations held by actors in a situation, experienced as both an internal and 
external force (Scott, 2008, p. 55). Scott explained: 
ÒThe normative approach to institutions emphasizes how values and 
normative frameworks structure choices. Rational action is always 
grounded in social context that specifies appropriate means to particular 
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ends; action acquires its very reasonableness in terms of these social 
rules and guidelines for behavior.Ó (Scott, 1995, p. 38) 
The basis of compliance of normative institutional elements is the force of 
mutually reinforcing obligations. 
 
The cultural-cognitive pillar concerns Òthe centrality of cultural-cognitive 
elements of institutions: the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of 
reality and the frames through which meaning is madeÓ (Scott, 2008, p. 57). 
This pillar gives primacy to symbolic systems and cultural rules, and their 
preservation and modification through human behaviour. Of foremost 
importance are constitutive rules that involve the creation of categories, 
typifications, and the social construction of actors and roles. Scott uses 
American football as an example: the rules constituting the game create Òthe 
goalposts and [field layout], ideas such as winning and sportsmanship, and 
events such as first downs and offsides,Ó as well as the players, coaches and 
referees (Scott, 1995, p. 41-42). These constitutive rules are fundamental to 
social life, manifesting in basic concepts such as citizens, employer/employee, 
and families. The rules construct not only individual actors, like people, but 
also collective entities, such as firms and organizations and states. Moreover, 
the social construction of actors resulting from these rules defines what the 
actors see as their interests: political parties seek votes, firms pursue profits, 
Ph.D. students seek to submit and pass their theses. The basis of compliance of 
cultural-cognitive structures is their taken-for-granted qualities; other types of 
behaviour may be literally inconceivable (Scott, 2008, p. 58). 
 
Jepperson (1991) calls institutionalisation a Òparticular set of social 
reproductive processesÓ (p. 145), Òa property of an orderÓ (p. 147), Òa 
particular state, or property, of a social patternÓ (p. 149). He speaks of three 
primary ÔcarriersÕ of institutionalization: culture, regimes and formal 
institutions (1991, p. 150-151). Regimes are  
ÒÉ explicitly codified rules and sanctions Ð without primary 
embodiment in a formal organizational apparatus. A legal or 
constitutional system can operate as a regime in this sense, but so can, 
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for example, a profession (or for that matter, a criminal syndicate).Ó 
(Jepperson, 1991, p. 150) 
Monitoring and sanctioning are expected to come from some kind of 
differentiated or central authority. Culture is Òthose rules, procedures, and 
goals without primary representation in formal organization, and without 
sanctioning by some ÔcentralÕ authorityÓ (Jepperson, 1991, p. 151). Scott 
(2008, p. 79-85) adapted JeppersonÕs concept of carriers, stating that 
institutions are carried by symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and 
artefacts. Institutions are ÔconveyedÕ upon these carriers: 
ÒThey point to a set of fundamental mechanisms that allow us to 
account for how ideas move through space and time, and who or what 
is transporting them.Ó (Scott, 2008, p. 79) 
The relationship between the three pillars and carriers is summarized by Figure 
2.2 
 
Figure 2.2  Institutional pillars and carriers  
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Source: Scott, 2008, p. 79 
 
The entries in the table in Figure 2.2 Òdescribe the content of the message Ð 
what is being transportedÓ (Scott, 2008, p. 80). 
 
With regard to symbolic systems, 
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ÒÉ the symbols of interest include the full range of rules, values and 
norms, classifications, representations, frames, schemas, prototypes, 
and scripts used to guide behavior.Ó (Scott, 2008, p. 80) 
The symbol emphasised varies depending on which element (pillar) of 
institutions is accorded prominence. Symbolic systems code and convey 
information. In relation to the empirical data under study, the institution of data 
protection is carried in part by laws (regulative) and by expectations that 
society should take steps to ensure some measure of privacy of personal data 
(normative). 
 
Relational systems are Òmade up of connections among actors, including both 
individual and collective actorsÓ (Scott, 2003, p. 886). They rely Òon patterned 
interactions connected to networks of social positionsÉÓ (Scott, 2008, p. 81). 
In this category of carrier we find, for example, professional groups, ties within 
and among organisations, and communities of practice.  
 
Routines Òare carriers that reflect the tacit knowledge of actors Ð deeply 
ingrained habits and procedures based on inarticulated knowledge and beliefsÓ 
(Scott, 2008, p. 82). Routines are Òrepetitive patterns of activityÓ (Scott, 2008, 
p. 83, quoting Winter) learned within organisations and often sustained by 
relational systems. They are habitualised behaviours and tacit knowledge.  
 
An artefact is Òa discrete material object, consciously produced or transformed 
by human activity, under the influence of the physical and/or cultural 
environmentÓ (Suchman, 2003, p. 93). It is created Òto assist in the 
performance of tasksÓ (Scott, 2003, p. 882). Artefacts embody Òboth technical 
and symbolic elementsÓ (Suchman, 2003, p. 99). Within information policy 
research, the institutional consideration of artefacts is a neglected subject. This 
research broadens such research by examining the institutional effects of 
privacy-enhancing technology on data protection and on related policy fields. 
 
Returning for a moment to JeppersonÕs term, Ôregime,Õ there are useful 
parallels in the recent scholarship of Sandra Braman. Braman (1989, 2004) 
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speaks of an emerging global information policy regime, using this term in line 
with regime theory in the field of international relations. She writes: 
ÒThe dominant view of regimes is meso-level, referring to specific 
ways of shaping relationships among actors that embody abstract 
principles but are operationalised in a multitude of diverse concrete 
institutions, agreements, and procedures. Krasner É offered the 
definition of a regime that is most widely used: implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actorsÕ expectations converge in a particular issue area É Regimes thus 
understood are a cooperative, sociological, mode of conflict 
management.Ó (2004, p. 23-24) 
This application of the regime concept bears kinship to new institutionalist 
thinking, relating well to ScottÕs pillars and carriers. In addition to the 
sociological connections above, we can also see in BramanÕs writings 
connections to historical institutionalism. Invoking path dependency, she 
stated, Òit currently appears that political and economic relations of the past 
will be reproduced in the global information policy environment of the futureÓ 
(2004, p. 11). Of unintentional consequences, she observed  
ÒWhile it may be the fancy of many that policies are always the result 
of intention É policy can also result from sheer chance and inadequacy 
in the face of complexity.Ó (2004, p. 11)  
Neo-institutionalist thought can be synthesised into three ÔphasesÕ (Lowndes 
and Roberts, 2013, pp. 18-45). Phase one contains scholarship from the 1930s 
to 1970s, encompassing the traditions and rediscovery of the ÔoldÕ 
institutionalism. Phase two runs from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, and 
sees the splitting of new institutionalism into the three major strands discussed 
above. Phase three begins in the early 2000s and continues on, and is 
characterised by convergence and consolidation. Scott (2008) is cited as a third 
phase institutionalist, and Lowndes and Roberts (2013, pp. 46-76) align their 
synthesis with his. ScottÕs (2008, p. 79) Ôregulative,Õ ÔnormativeÕ and Ôcultural-
cognitiveÕ equate to Lowndes and RobertsÕ (2013, p. 46) Ôrules,Õ ÔpracticesÕ 
and Ônarratives.Õ 
 
The work of Scott, Lowndes, Lowndes and Roberts, Jepperson and Braman 
support the view that data protection and the protection of privacy are 
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institutions. BramanÕs conception of regime can be applied in order to analyse 
data protection regimes, privacy regimes, or identity management regimes. 
LowndesÕ analytic synthesis yields an inclusive lens through which to examine 
empirical data. ScottÕs framework of pillars and carriers, building on 
JeppersonÕs work, generates clear categories by which to analyse the 
institutional landscape in which unlinkability policies are embedded. The 
scholarship detailed above allows for a comprehensive application of 
institutionalist thinking rather than choosing a specific camp. The regulative 
(rules), normative (practices) and cultural-cognitive (narratives) institutional 
elements of data protection and identity management are useful in explaining 
the policy development of unlinkability. The next section expands on the 
conceptualisation of data protection as an institution. 
Data Protection as an Institution 
Data protection is an institution. Institutionalisation is Òthe process whereby 
things become institutionalized, which, in turn, simply means that things are 
more or less taken for grantedÓ (Greenwood, et al., 2008, p. 15). This is 
consistent with JeppersonÕs (1991) view of institutionalisation as the encoding 
of patterns in social reproductive processes. An institution is defined as 
follows: 
ÒAn institution is a relatively stable collection of rules and practices, 
embedded in structures of resources that make action possible -- 
organizational, financial and staff capabilities, and structures of 
meaning that explain and justify behavior Ð roles, identities and 
belongings, common purposes, and causal and normative beliefs.Ó 
(March and Olsen, 2004, p. 5, orig. emph.) 
Data protection Ð and its kin, the protection of privacy Ð is institutionalised in 
liberal democracies. The state assigns resources to enact data protection: 
agencies, budgets, courts, lawyers, administrators, scientists and material 
technologies. The expectation that certain types of information will be 
restrained, controlled, limited, or whose transmission, storage and use are 
otherwise regulated is interwoven into laws, professional practices, formal and 
informal codes of conduct, and expectations by citizens. It has become taken 
for granted in many countries that the use and transmission of personal data 
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will be regulated in some way, though the character of that expectation is 
different between the two countries under study. The institution of data 
protection is sustained by laws, such as the US Privacy Act of 1974 or the 
German Federal Data Protection Directive, enforced by coercive powers to 
sanction. It is embedded within citizen expectations and norms of behaviour, as 
well as non-coercive strategies and best practices within communities. It can be 
seen within a Ôdesign ethosÕ of computer engineers, and in the discourses of 
national leaders. It is a stable feature of Western political systems (Bennett, 
1992), subject to change, reinvention and conflict. 
 
Choices made by policy-makers are constrained by the institutional landscape 
in which information policy resides. The choices are influenced by cultural-
cognitive scripts, such as the American rejection of national ID and the 
German rejection of an informationally intrusive state. Within the empirical 
research, there is evidence of a strong influence of prior policy choices 
informing and constraining current ones, as with the German Constitutional 
CourtÕs finding of a right to informational self-determination later shaping 
German identity management policy. The data also can be examined from the 
perspective of institutional power arrangements, as with the need to include US 
privacy lawyers in decisions about federal identity management, though they 
were added in the eleventh hour, resulting in a minor struggle and a delay in 
the project (G010, Interview). 
 
ScottÕs pillars and carriers will be used as a framework to analyse the collected 
data on the requirement of unlinkability. Identity management policies and the 
privacy and data protection choices therein are influenced by laws, 
administrative rules, expectations, standard operating procedures, technical 
protocols, system configurations (technical choices), sanctions, incentives and 
material technologies. By conceptualising data protection as an institution, the 
policy choices and forces that acted upon those elements can be analysed for 
the influences of other institutions, such as the market and the state, and for 
signs of stability or change.  
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Furthermore, the cases under study allow a consideration of the institutional 
effects of technology, protocols and standards. Unlinkability is a property of a 
technical system Ð as an analytical object, it must be considered within its 
material milieu. The policy choice to require unlinkability in citizen 
credentialing systems is influenced by the institution of data protection, and 
reflexively influences it. The technical components Ð artefacts Ð of 
unlinkability are usefully examined via ScottÕs regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive pillars: they are objects that comply with mandated 
specifications, they reflect conventions and standards, and they have symbolic 
value (see Figure 2.2, p. 54). The artefacts of unlinkability Ð cryptography, 
embedded chips, servers Ð are shaped by institutional forces, and in turn shape 
the behaviour of citizens. In doing so, these artefacts reproduce the institution 
of data protection, reinforcing and reshaping it. Katzenbach (2011, p. 125) 
argues: 
ÒÉ technologies can hold the status of institutions É in the sense that 
they embody the duality of institutions both (1) as a result of an 
institutionalization process: certain patterns of conduct and 
interpretation crystallize into material objects, technological devices or 
services Ð which then again are subject to negotiations and varieties of 
usages, starting another process of (de-)institutionalization; as well as 
(2) part of an institutional setting that facilitates, coordinates and 
constrains the É behavior of actorsÉÓ 
Similarly, Pinch (2008, p, 466) writes: 
ÒInstitutions have an inescapable material dimension and part of the 
agency that actors bring to institutions is their work in producing and 
reproducing (and sometimes changing) the material dimension of 
institutions. Likewise materiality itself exercises a form of agency and 
part of the agency that materiality brings to institutions is the work of 
producing and reproducing (and sometimes changing) the social 
dimensions of institutions.Ó 
The technology that enables unlinkability is a crystallisation of privacy and 
data protection norms and laws within both the US and Germany. Forces 
internal and external to the institution of data protection influenced the 
decisions to embed policy choices in material substrates: within the chips of the 
German e-ID, and within US identity management protocols and architectures. 
Unlinkability is an example of Òinstitutional developmentÓ (Jepperson, 1991), 
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extending the earlier, core privacy and data protection goals of data 
minimisation, collection limitation and proportionality. Unlinkability 
technologies are a material result of institutional innovation, expanding and 
reproducing those goals. This argument conceptualises Òthe digital economy as 
an emergent, evolving, embedded, fragmented and provisional social 
production that is shaped as much by cultural and structural forces as by 
technical and economic onesÓ (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001, p. 154). More 
broadly, analysing the institutional dynamics of the technologies that underpin 
electronic citizen credentials helps to show how identity management policy 
affects and is affected by the institution of data protection. 
Institutional Change 
Institutionalism has been criticised for its challenges in explaining the genesis 
of new institutions and institutional change (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 
111). By definition, institutions are recurring patterns that need little support to 
recur; their very reproduction, embedded in social interactions, implies 
stability. So, what accounts for change? Organisational theory scholars 
proposed an Ôexogenous-shock modelÕ where change is seen to arise from 
ÔshocksÕ occurring in an institutionÕs external environment. Later, they asserted 
that institutional settings were Òmore conflicted and pregnant with suppressed 
interestsÓ; rather than stable, they were Òcontested terrains contoured by 
variation, struggles and relatively temporary trucesÓ (Greenwood et al., 2008, 
p. 9). Historical institutionalism embraced its own version of the exogenous-
shock model: Òcritical junctures,Ó where history ÒbranchesÓ and institutional 
change occurs (Hall and Taylor, 1996). However, as Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 
10) note: 
ÒThe principal problem here, of course, is to explain what precipitates 
such critical junctures, and, although historical institutionalists 
generally stress the impact of economic crisis and military conflict, 
many do not have a well-developed response to this question.Ó 
In his synthetic view of institutionalisation, Scott (2008, p. 62) argues that the 
misalignment of the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars may 
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motivate different behaviours and choices, leading to confusion and conflict; 
conditions likely to bring about institutional change. 
 
Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 143) addressed the challenges of explaining 
institutional change by arguing that earlier (second phase) considerations of 
change were preoccupied with Òstop-go models driven by periodic external 
shocks.Ó Instead, both stability and change are Òactively constructed out of the 
ongoing interaction of actors, existing institutional constraints and contextual 
challenges,Ó in line with the idea that institutions are contested terrains 
(Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 130). Lowndes and Roberts reject that 
institutionalism is not adept at explaining change, and instead illustrate that 
institutionalist scholarship explains change differently according to two key 
variables: the tempo of change (incremental versus punctuated) and the balance 
between structure and agency. Mapping these together yields four perspectives 
on how institutions change (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, pp. 116-132): 
¥ Structured, incremental change: institutional change happens 
incrementally and as a result of structural features of institutions and 
their environments.  
 
¥ Agential, incremental change: institutional change happens 
incrementally and as a result of actors making choices and imposing 
those choices on the world (Lim, 2010, p. 76) 
 
¥ Structured, punctuated change: institutional change happens as a result 
of structural features of institutions and their environments, but in a 
punctuated way. This embraces the ideas of ÔshocksÕ and Ôcritical 
junctures.Õ 
 
¥ Agential, punctuated change: institutional change occurs due to the 
actions of agents happening in a punctuated, rather than gradual, way. 
 
These are mapped in the figure below: 
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Figure 2.3  Map of institutional change explanations 
 
 
Source: Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 117 
 
This study adopts this framework as a way to organise the explanations of 
changes within data protection that influenced the emergence of unlinkability. 
It facilitates comparison between Germany and the US, and further 
contextualises the process through which data protection is institutionalised via 
unlinkability. The framework focuses the contribution of the research on the 
tempo of the institutional development of unlinkability with respect to prior 
political choices. It analyses this development with regard to the balance of 
structural and agential factors influencing policy change. 
Application of New Institutionalism to Empirical Data 
To apply new institutionalism to the empirical data and enable a comparison 
between the two cases, LowndesÕ and ScottÕs syntheses can be combined into a 
set of testable propositions related to the research questions. In the process, 
new institutionalism can be evaluated for fitness for use in information policy 
research. The propositions are: 
 
Tempo of change
Most incremental Most punctuated
Structure/
agency balance
Highest structure
Highest agency
structured, incremental change structured, punctuated change
agential, incremental change agential, punctuated change
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1. The choice to include unlinkability in citizen credentialing is influenced 
by formal and informal mechanisms. A chief value of the new 
institutionalist approach is its exposure of the informal and the implicit. 
Understanding the emergence of unlinkability requires a review of all 
salient formal policy instruments, but an examination of the informal 
factors influencing policy-making is critical to a fuller explanation. This 
proposition addresses the calls in information policy scholarship for 
attendance to norms and values in policy research. 
2. There is a taken-for-granted quality to the rationale to require 
unlinkability. The institution of data protection exerts influence on 
policy development through regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive forces. The cultural-cognitive dimension of institutions relies 
on them being taken for granted. The emergence of unlinkability is 
partly explained by this taken-for-granted quality. Attending to this 
sociological dimension of data protection helps to expose the values 
within the narratives of data protection. 
3. There is an isomorphic dimension to the choice to require unlinkability. 
Isomorphism is an indication of institutional effects. The institution of 
data protection influences policy through coercive, normative and 
mimetic mechanisms. Similarities between German and US 
unlinkability policies may be partly explained by these mechanisms. 
This proposition directly addresses the comparative nature of the thesis 
and helps to test new institutionalismÕs explanatory power. 
4. Prior policy choices constrained and affected the choice to require 
unlinkability. The effects of path dependence are critical to 
understanding the context of unlinkability policies. This proposition 
addresses the research question, ÒWhat is the relationship between 
unlinkability and historical privacy and data protection regulations?Ó 
and tests a central theory within institutionalism. 
5. Networks of social actors influence the choice to require unlinkability. 
Various actors enact the institution of data protection. Their networks 
are pathways for institutional stability and innovation to occur. 
Examining the influence of these relational groups helps explain the 
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policy outcome of unlinkability. This proposition addresses a 
significant informal influence on policy. 
6. Material artefacts further institutionalise data protection. Data 
protection is institutionalised through artefacts. Technology is the 
material dimension of this institution. The technologies of unlinkability 
are reflections of the institutional influences of data protection upon 
identity management. This proposition illustrates an implementation of 
unlinkability policy, and tests the institutionalist view that material 
technologies are carriers of institutionalisation. 
7. The requirement of unlinkability embeds the power dynamics of actors 
and institutional relationships. Institutional analysis helps to show 
power relationships between actors and organisations, and the 
influences that maintain or alter those relationships. This analysis can 
add to the explanation of the emergence of unlinkability. This 
proposition addresses institutional change, highlighting the contested 
nature of the institution of data protection by analysing power dynamics 
in the policy-making process. 
 
Taken together, the propositions capture the information policy scholarsÕ 
criticisms of the fieldÕs under-theorised state: the need to analyse the norms 
and values influencing policy, the need to make the implicit explicit, and the 
call for theoretical pluralism. The propositions reflect ScottÕs pillars (see p. 52), 
encompassing a synthesis of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements. The propositions focus on informal policy influences, path 
dependency, and material elements Ð critical parts of a holistic explanation of 
how unlinkability policies are developing. The analysis in Chapter 8 will use 
these propositions as a way to evaluate both the institutional effects within the 
German and US case data, and the suitability of new institutionalist thought to 
identity management research. The propositions also facilitate a direct 
comparison of the USÕs and GermanyÕs citizen credentialing policies. The 
analysis will use Lowndes and RobertÕs (2013, pp. 117) map of institutional 
change discussed in the preceding section to analyse the changes within data 
protection that led to the emergence of unlinkability.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
This chapter details the research design and methods of this thesis. A 
comparative case study was undertaken, comparing German and US identity 
management policies, specifically focusing on the privacy interest of 
unlinkability. The study was qualitative, consisting of semi-structured 
interviews and primary and secondary documentation review. The research 
design draws upon the methodologies of comparative politics and comparative 
policy studies. The theoretical approach of new institutionalism was applied to 
help explain policy development. The key purposes of the research were 
exploration of new phenomena and theory testing. 
Research Aims 
The aim of this research was to understand how privacy interests are supported 
by public policy as digital identity evolves in the internet. The management of 
digital identities and attendance to their inherent privacy challenges is a topic 
of much research literature in the last decade (ICPP and SNG, 2003; Hansen, 
Schwartz and Cooper, 2008; OECD, 2007, 2009; Lips, Taylor and Organ, 
2009a, 2009b; Lusoli, Maghiros and Bacigolupo, 2008; van der Hof, Leenes 
and Fennell, 2009; Pfitzmann and Borcea-Pfitzmann, 2010; European Network 
and Information Security Agency, 2011; FIDIS, n.d; PrimeLife, n.d.). Scholars 
and practitioners have drawn attention to the importance of designing systems 
that enhance the privacy of users and give them greater degrees of control over 
the storage, use and sharing of information about their online lives (Bhargav-
Spantzel, Camenisch, Gross and Sommer, 2007; Hansen, 2008b; Leenes, 
2008). In particular, there is recognition that ÔlinkabilityÕ Ð the linking of data 
  
 
 
 
 
 
67 
and activity to a specific person, yielding a detailed, sensitive profile Ð is a 
salient and important topic in the field of identity management (Hansen, 2008a; 
Landau, Le Van Gong and Wilton, 2009; Storf, et al., 2009). This research 
addresses this topic by providing empirical data and analysis of two countriesÕ 
attempts to employ Ôunlinkability,Õ the severing of links so as to separate 
contexts and frustrate profiling, in their citizen credentialing initiatives. The 
thesis applies the new institutionalist theoretical approach to explain the policy 
development of unlinkability in the two countries, and to test its efficacy for 
use in identity management and privacy policy research.  
 
The research questions are: 
¥ How is unlinkability emerging as public policy? 
 
¥ What is the relationship between unlinkability and historical privacy 
and data protection regulations? 
 
¥ What are the similarities and differences between US and German 
unlinkability policies? 
 
¥ To what extent can new institutionalism explain the emergence of 
unlinkability? 
 
By answering these questions, this research adds empirical data and analysis to 
the fields of identity management, privacy and information policy, and 
illustrates the connection between historical privacy and data protection 
interests and current policy dilemmas. It contributes to an understanding of 
citizen credentialing and the policy instruments being employed to protect 
citizensÕ privacy with regard to digital identity. By comparing the US and 
Germany, a greater understanding of each countryÕs identity management 
initiatives can be achieved than what could be understood by studying each in 
isolation. 
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Research Methods 
The central method of this research is the comparative method, drawn from the 
field of comparative politics. This field Òexamines the interplay of domestic 
and external forces on the politics of a given country, state, or societyÓ (Lim, 
2010, p. 13). Comparison is the Òprincipal methodÓ to test theory in political 
science (Peters, 1998, p. 1). Within comparative politics, this research falls into 
the category called comparative policy analysis, or comparative public policy. 
Heidenheimer, Heclo and Adams (1990, p. 3) define comparative public policy 
as Òthe study of how, why, and to what effect different governments pursue 
particular courses of action or inaction.Ó They further state: 
ÒÉ comparative policy analysis occupies a middle ground between 
Ôpure researchÕ of a theoretical nature and Ôapplied scienceÕ directed 
towards the nuts and bolts of detailed problem-solvingÉ. It also helps 
us test general theories and hypotheses by exposing the varied nature of 
political decision making as it confronts concrete issues.Ó 
(Heidenheimer, et al., 1990, p. 2) 
This research methodology has been used comprehensively in prior policy 
research on privacy issues by Bennett (1992) in Regulating Privacy: Data 
Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States. In this work, 
Bennett argued that policy problems related to informational privacy and data 
protection were Òclearly É amenable to analysis using the theoretical and 
methodological tools of the political scientistÓ (1992, p. 2). In the present 
research, the ÔhowÕ and ÔwhyÕ of particular information policies are the 
primary foci. As Ôto what effectÕ the pursuit of unlinkability yields, this 
research analyses the technical implementation of policies, but given the youth 
and immaturity of the policies, an assessment of their impact on citizens or 
their efficacy in relation to original policy goals would be premature. 
 
This research also relies upon literature review. The study was interdisciplinary 
and used a wide range of primary and secondary literature: laws, policy 
documents, administrative memoranda, posts on official blogs, commercial 
  
 
 
 
 
 
69 
white papers, trade association position papers, government requests for 
proposals, official technical guidelines, legal analysis, international standards, 
technical architecture documents, lexicons, government reports and testimony, 
and academic journal papers and book chapters. Literature selection was 
thematic and purposive Ð strategically chosen for relevance to the research 
questions Ð and the selection ÔsnowballedÕ; documents in one area would lead 
to additional papers and sources (Bryman, 2012, pp. 418-424). The literature 
review is comprised of several academic disciplines: political science, law, 
sociology, computer science, and policy studies. 
 
To facilitate comparison and fully explicate the policies of unlinkability and 
citizen credentialing, this thesis follows McClure, Moen and BertotÕs (1999) 
methods for descriptive assessment of information policy initiatives. These 
methods help to provide Òa gestalt or multidimensional view of an information 
policy initiativeÓ (McClure et al., 1999, p. 314). The empirical data chapters 
present a holistic picture of the emergence of unlinkability policies, examining 
formal policies, their origins and proximate influences, legislative and judicial 
relationships, individual and organisational actors, and political and 
commercial influences. This formal examination is then augmented with the 
application of institutional theory so as to analyse the informal, tacit, relational 
and cultural dimensions of policy formation.  
 
The research employs a comparative case study strategy, which is appropriate 
to investigate the emergence of unlinkability. Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 
(2002, p. 96) state, Òcase strategy is particularly well-suited to [information 
systems] research because the technology is relatively new and interest has 
shifted to organizational rather than technical issues.Ó Yin (2009, p. 18) states 
that case study is used when the Òboundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident.Ó The limited degree of empirical research into the 
policy development of unlinkability, the intersection of organisational and 
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technical subjects, and the prevalence of case-based research in policy and 
political science support these rationales. The case study type is ÔintrinsicÕ Ð 
the particulars of the cases themselves are important, versus using the case to 
examine or demonstrate another topic (Stake, 1995, p. 3). The intent of the 
study is particularisation rather than generalising. Case study is also well-suited 
to theory testing (Yin, 2009, p. 36). As such, this research tests the new 
institutionalist theoretical approach against the empirical data on identity 
management and unlinkability. 
 
To explain the similarities and differences in the development of unlinkability 
policies in Germany and the US, the research follows the Ômost similar 
systemsÕ design (Meckstroth, 1975; Peters, 1998, pp. 37-41). In this design, the 
systems being compared are largely similar along a range of political and 
social phenomena in order to ÔcontrolÕ for those factors, and then seek out 
other factors that led to the development of a particular policy. Two cases were 
chosen to examine how unlinkability was emerging in public policy, Germany 
and the US. The comparison of two or a similarly low number of cases is 
known as Ôsmall NÕ research (Peters, 1988, pp. 68-69). The small number of 
cases has inherent challenges. By examining two countries which, while 
similar, still have very diverse histories and cultures, it becomes difficult to 
isolate explanations that neatly apply across both. Anckar (2008, pp. 389-390; 
see also Peters, 1998, pp. 65-69) writes: 
ÒAlthough theoretically robust, the [most similar systems design] 
suffers from one serious practical shortcoming. There are a limited 
number of countries and therefore it will never be possible to keep 
constant all potential explanatory factors.Ó  
The two ways to address this shortcoming are to focus on Òa single institution, 
policy or processÓ (Peters, 1998, p. 67) and restrict Òthe analysis to the key 
variables and omitting those of only marginal importanceÓ (Lijphart, 1975, p. 
159). In the present research, the focus is on the policies of unlinkability. These 
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policies can only be understood in the context of identity management policy, 
e-government initiatives, and data protection and privacy policy. Further, 
single case studies and comparative studies of two countries are established 
methods of analysing political phenomena with the new institutionalist 
approach (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). The goal of particularisation 
and the aim of understanding the institutionalisation processes leading to 
unlinkability in Germany and the US necessitate a great deal of empirical 
depth, which in turn limits the number of cases due to time and resources.  
 
Case selection was based on a number of factors. First was the Ômost similar 
designÕ model: Germany and the US are both liberal democracies with federal 
governments, are technologically advanced nations with mature economies, 
and have federal-level data protection regimes. Both were in the midst of 
developing or implementing citizen-focused digital identity management 
policies in the same timeframe, and both included unlinkability in their 
technical designs. The policies in question were being developed at the federal 
level in both countries without variation or influence by state-level policies. 
There were important differences that would enable a rich comparison. 
Germany has an omnibus data protection law covering all instances of 
Ôpersonal data,Õ whereas US data protection is sectoral. Germany has a data 
protection policy ÔlayerÕ in the form of a federal data protection commissioner 
and state data protection authorities; the US lacks an equivalent. In Germany, 
citizen credentials were being issued by the state. The online credentials where 
unlinkability was to be found were derived of GermanyÕs electronic national 
ID card, issued in 2010. The Ôidentity supply chainÕ was completely under the 
control of the German Ministry of Interior. The Ministry coordinated the 
enrolment of citizens and residents via local municipal offices, managed and 
paid for the cards to be created with identity data loaded onto them, and 
returned them to the municipal offices for distribution. This made the identity 
an official one, derived from data held and validated by the state. The German 
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processes and policies are fully detailed in Chapter 6. The US, in contrast, has 
no national ID card and, as Chapter 5 explains, it was politically impossible to 
deploy one, even one restricted exclusively to e-government. Consequently, the 
US elected to rely upon privately-issued credentials from companies like 
Google and Yahoo!, and from universities and research institutions. If one 
conceives of a spectrum of state-issued to privately-issued credentials, 
Germany and the US fall on either side: 
 
Figure 3.1  Spectrum of credential issuance sources 
 
 
 
Using these two issuance categories as a criterion for case selection is a form 
of Ôgeneric purpose samplingÕ (Bryman, 2012, p. 422). In this sampling 
strategy, a priori and fixed categories that are relevant to the research questions 
are used as criteria for selection. At the outset of the research, it was assumed 
that these two categories Ð state vs. private issuance Ð were the primary 
issuance methods of citizen credentials. 
 
The similarities and differences above support the rationale of selecting 
Germany and the US. The other key factor in choosing these cases was their 
accessibility. Through an internship and subsequent employment with 
Experian, a credit reference and marketing information company, a valuable 
set of contacts who could introduce stakeholders in both Germany and the US 
became available. With American citizenship, entry and travel within the US 
was unproblematic. A wide network of friends and offers of accommodation 
would assist in keeping costs down. Traveling in Germany was also easy as no 
visa was required. 
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The thesis is a work of qualitative research. The policy phenomena under study 
is recent, in limited degrees of implementation, and involves the contributions 
of a plurality of stakeholders who held a variety of views. Quantitative research 
tends to focus on the numerical quantification of phenomena in a structured 
way (Bryman, 2012, p. 408). It aims at generalisation, and the relationship 
between the researcher and participants can be seen as ÔdistantÕ (Bryman, 2012, 
p. 408). Qualitative research is more concerned with contextual understanding 
of rich data (Esterberg, 2002, p. 2). The researcher is ÔcloseÕ to her or his 
participants, and it is better suited to particularisation (Bryman, 2012, p. 408). 
However, there is debate over the ostensible contrasts between qualitative and 
quantitative methods (Hammersley, 1992). While some scholars note that 
qualitative research is less concerned with theory testing (Esterberg, 2002, p. 
7), others view qualitative methods as well-suited to it (Bryman, 2012, p. 387; 
Silverman, 2001, p. 71). To understand the policyÕs development, it was 
important to explore values, norms, goals, intentions, technical designs and 
history. Bryman (1988, p. 65) observed: ÒÉ whatever the sphere in which data 
are being collected, we can understand events only when they are situated in 
the wider social and historical context.Ó To comprehensively tell the ÔstoryÕ of 
unlinkability, a qualitative research design was called for. This would allow 
Ôthick descriptionÕ (Geertz, 1973) of a largely unexplored empirical domain. 
The limitation of particularisation is that the research does not lend itself to 
generalist explanations of phenomena.  
 
To understand the development of unlinkability, it must be placed within a 
social, historical and cultural context. Those contexts are particular to each 
country under study, supporting a particularist approach to the research design. 
The particularist nature of this thesis is consistent with the analytic goals of 
new institutionalism, which also seeks to place policy choices within a social, 
historical and cultural context. The limitation of this approach is the difficulty 
in drawing general analytic conclusions from the research. 
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Qualitative research is concerned with process (Bryman, 1988, p. 65). This 
comports well with studies of new policy phenomena. Unlinkability and 
privacy studies generally must account for norms and values as much as they 
account for prior policy, economics, history and technical issues. ÒThe most 
fundamental characteristic of qualitative research,Ó Bryman argued, Òis its 
commitment to viewing events, action, norms, values, etc. from the perspective 
of the people who are being studiedÓ (1988, p. 61). Semi-structured interview 
is a valuable method to accomplish this. It allows access to subjectsÕ accounts 
of the values and norms underpinning the policy development of unlinkability, 
and details of informal policy influences, such as cultural phenomena and 
professional relationships. Semi-structured interview is thereby a strategy to 
enable value-critical analysis of information policy subjects. It supports 
McClure and JaegerÕs (2008, p. 258) call for information policy research to 
explain Òconflicts between policies and stakeholders, [excoriate] assumptions 
and values, [and offer] guidance in articulating conflicting issues.ÉÓ In line 
with new institutionalism, semi-structured interview facilitates the analysis of 
how actorsÕ choices are influenced by norms, cultural beliefs, narratives and 
past decisions.  
 
Qualitative methods have been used in prior information policy research. Van 
der Hof, Leenes and Fennell (2009) undertook eight case studies on the 
changing nature of identity construction and citizen-government relations in 
relation to uses of identity management and information technology by the 
Dutch government using document analysis and semi-structured interview as 
chief methods. Lips, Taylor and Organ (2009b) used similar qualitative 
techniques in eight case studies of new uses of identity management 
technologies in UK public services to explore changing informational relations 
between citizens and the state. Noack and Kubicek (2010) used qualitative 
interviews to research the origins of the online authentication features of the 
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German e-ID. Kim, Kim and Lee (2009) used a single case study and semi-
structured interviews to examine a Korean anti-corruption e-government 
system. Weerakody, El-Haddadeh and Al-Shafi (2011) used case study and 
interview to understand the diffusion of e-government in Qatar. Burt and 
Taylor (2007) used qualitative methods to gain a holistic understanding of the 
use and impact of Scottish Freedom of Information requests. Bennett (1992) 
used primary and secondary document analysis and elite interviewing in his 
comparative study of the data protection policies of Sweden, the US, West 
Germany and Britain. He sought to build Ôcontextual and experiential 
knowledgeÕ (1992, p. 10, citing Anderson) of his subject, observing: 
ÒIt is more messy, more inductive, less definitive, but probably more 
faithful to political reality.Ó (Bennett, 1992, p. 10) 
This thesis joins these other publications in the use of qualitative methods to 
holistically examine information policy phenomena. 
Data Collection 
Primary and secondary documentation was reviewed to understand the issues 
and technologies of privacy and data protection within identity management, 
and to incorporate prior relevant research. Document selection was purposive 
and it snowballed, as described above. Literature sources were derived from 
coursework, academic journals, books, blogs, and websites. Academic 
publication databases, such as ProQuest, JSTOR, and Science Direct were 
searched with combinations of keywords, including Òidentity management,Ó 
ÒIDM,Ó Òprivacy,Ó Òdata protection,Ó ÒPETs,Ó Òinstitution,Ó Òinstitutionalism,Ó 
Òinstitutionalist,Ó and Òinformation policy.Ó A set of academic publishers 
contained a disproportionate amount of relevant literature, so further searches 
were focused on them: Springer, Elsevier, and Taylor & Francis. Certain 
authors recurred throughout the research, so their publications and references 
were specifically targeted (see Bibliography for complete citations):  
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M. Hansen, W. Scott, V. Lowndes, G. Hornung, R. Leenes, J. March & J. 
Olsen, P. DiMaggio & W. Powell, J. Taylor, R. Clarke, C. Bennett, S. Braman, 
A. Pfitzmann and M. Lips.  
  
To gather respondent data, semi-structured interviews were carried out with a 
wide variety of stakeholders. The sample of respondents was purposive and 
augmented by snowballing, where initial respondents identified other suitable 
subjects (Bryman, 2012, p. 424). A list of interview subjects and/or their roles 
is included in Appendix A. Respondents were selected for their connection to 
or influence over the policy-making process, because they had done research 
on related topics, or for their role in policy implementation. The sample 
contained policy elites, bureaucrats and administrators, government lawyers, 
privacy advocates, data protection authorities, businesspeople, academics and 
researchers. Twenty-eight interviews were conducted for the US case, three of 
which were in a group interview. For the German case, fourteen interviews 
were conducted; one in a group of two, and one in a group of four. All 
interviews were conducted in English. One German interview required the 
presence of a translator. He was not a formal, trained translator; he worked in 
the same organisation in a related field and was asked by the subject to be 
present. The main subject spoke English through the majority of the interview, 
but gave German answers to the translator for a small number of questions 
where his command of English failed him. One US interview subject declined 
to be interviewed and one did not respond to multiple requests. This was 
mirrored in the German case Ð one refusal and one failure to respond. On the 
whole, access problems were minimal and nearly everyone needed to provide a 
holistic picture of unlinkability policy development were interviewed. 
 
There were fewer German interviews because German citizen credentialing 
policy was more mature than that of the US. In late 2010, German e-IDs 
replaced their prior paper IDs Ð by this point, the development of identity 
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management and unlinkability policies was effectively complete and in a stage 
of advanced implementation. The US in contrast was still in a state of flux. 
During the field research period, initial implementation was still iterative, new 
significant policies were being developed, and initial identity management 
policy goals were not close to being achieved. Further, national identity policy, 
a precursor to citizen credentialing, was well developed and institutionalised in 
Germany; not so in the US. To best understand the policy inputs and outputs, 
the various influences, and the likely policy direction, a wider group of US 
stakeholders had to be interviewed.  
 
A topic guide was created for the interviews. It focused on the origins, genesis 
and justification of unlinkability policies, the broader policy landscape of 
identity management and citizen credentialing, stakeholder identification, 
institutional influences, the state of policy implementation and the challenges 
therein. The topic guide was separated into Policy and Technical sections to 
accommodate the variety of interview subject roles. The questions and topics 
came from an understanding of general public policy processes from prior 
coursework, e-ID and identity management literature, institutionalist literature, 
comparative policy literature, an understanding of IDM business issues from 
time spent working at Experian, an understanding of technical projects from 
previous work as a technologist, and suggestions from supervisors. The topic 
guide was influenced by Bennett (1992, p. 11), whose interview questions 
Òwere directed toward gaining an appreciation of the specific reasons that 
brought the issue to the agenda, of the most important actors in the policy-
making process, and of the wider impact of international and domestic factors 
on the countries in question.Ó See Appendix B for the topic guide used in the 
interviews. 
 
All of the interviews, American and German, were rich and detailed, running 
an average of ninety minutes each. The audio of the interviews was recorded 
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onto SD card with a digital recorder, and notes were taken throughout. The 
topic guide was followed and adapted to subjectsÕ specific roles, though 
subjects were also allowed to roam to related issues if they were germane to 
the overall research questions and context. 
 
US Interviews took place in seven cities: Washington D.C.; Mountain View, 
CA; Seattle, WA; Boston, MA; Gaithersburg, MD; Bethesda, MD; and, Silver 
Spring, MD. German interviews took place in Berlin, Bonn, Bremen, 
Darmstadt, Kiel, Kassel and Kln. Interviews took place in many settings Ð 
hotel lobbies, civic centres, the Google campus, the MIT campus, over Skype 
and the phone, in government buildings, and inside a Krispy Kreme donut shop 
on a lonely stretch of road in Seattle, Christmas music playing in the 
background. 
 
Interviews were transcribed by a confidential commercial service. A list of key 
terms, acronyms, proper names and foreign words was supplied to the service 
to aid transcription. The service was instructed to delete each audio file and all 
transcript data once the transcript was approved. Transcripts were reviewed 
against the original audio files for correctness. Backups of the recordings were 
stored on Dropbox, an encrypted cloud-based file storage service, also only 
with identifiers (Dropbox, n.d). There were additional backups burned to DVD 
that were always in my physical possession. All data was removed from 
Dropbox at the conclusion of the research. 
 
For subjects who elected anonymity, identifying information was removed 
from the filenames and metadata of the audio files. US subject identifiers 
began with ÔGÕ for government stakeholders, ÔNÕ for non-profit staff, and ÔPÕ 
for for-profit staff. Interviews were numbered sequentially excepting those 
who declined anonymity. For example, the third government stakeholder 
interview was denoted as ÔG-003,Õ while Dazza GreenwoodÕs interview was 
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denoted, ÔDGreenwood.Õ German interview identifiers were prepended with 
ÔDEÕ except for those waiving anonymity. A spreadsheet was maintained 
containing a list of all possible and desired interview subjects, including their 
organisation, role and focus area, why they should be interviewed, how they 
came to be selected (via literature or another person), where they were based, 
when the interview occurred, and whether they elected anonymity or not. This 
was done for both US and German subjects.  
Analysis 
Once all interviews were transcribed, they were coded using thematic analysis 
based on the research aims, questions and findings (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Thematic analysis is Òessentially independent of theory and epistemology, and 
can be applied across a range of theoretical and epistemological approachesÓ 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Thematic analysis locates patterned responses 
and meaning across a corpus of data. The themes identified were both 
inductively derived from a close reading of the data in union with an 
understanding of the problem space from literature and professional 
experience, and driven by an institutionalist theoretical approach. The themes 
were identified at a ÔsemanticÕ level: 
ÒWith a semantic approach, the themes are identified within the explicit 
or surface meanings of the data and the analyst is not looking for 
anything beyond what a participant has said or what has been written. 
Ideally, the analytic process involves a progression from description, 
where the data have simply been organised to show patterns in semantic 
content, and summarised, to interpretation, where there is an attempt to 
theorise the significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and 
implications É often in relation to previous literature.Ó (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006, p. 89) 
Thematic analysis is not a linear process. During interviews, when reviewing 
notes, while correcting transcripts and throughout document reviews, items of 
interest and potential themes were noted and revised. Once transcripts were 
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ready for coding, those items and themes were organised into a set of eight 
category headings: Fraud and Risk, Business, Policy, Architecture and 
Standards, Culture, Players, Faces of Identity, and Usability. Under each 
category was a set of codes to help organise the data into manageable groups. 
A colour was assigned to each category heading and the first interview was 
coded. The categories maintained their utility throughout the interview, but 
there were a number of emergent codes not captured in the codebook, so the 
process was reiterated twice more. The codes, themes and categories ultimately 
stabilised and were applied across the entire set of interview data. From this, a 
set of themes emerged that connected both cases, and ones that were particular 
to one or the other case.  
 
All of the research subjectsÕ views are represented in the thesis, including 
minority views. The following table lists the frequency of the appearance of 
respondents within their respective data chapters, the policy comparison 
chapter (Chapter 7), and the application of theory chapter (Chapter 8). 
 
Table 3.1  Frequency of respondent references 
 
US  Total 
 
Germany  Total 
G001  34 
 
DE‐G001  17 
G003  30 
 
DE‐G002  23 
G004  11 
 
DE‐G003  17 
G006  13 
 
DE‐G005  7 
G007  12 
 
ULD  36 
G008  5 
 
JFromm  37 
G009  5 
 
Hornung  19 
G010  5 
 
Kubicek  22 
N002  8 
 
Möller  34 
N003  21 
 
Margraf  3 
N004  6 
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N005  12 
     N006  9 
     DonT  11 
     DReed  6 
     SDavid  6 
     RWilsher  13 
     BMorgan  22 
     DGreenwood  7 
     P001  16 
     P005  2 
     P006  10 
     P007  2 
     PaulT  7 
     Nash  6 
      
The empirical data chapter on Germany is 20% shorter than the empirical 
chapter on the US. This is because German policy is more mature, more 
coherent, and fewer stakeholders were involved with policy development. As 
those chapters and Chapter 6 explains, German e-ID activities grew out of its 
prior national ID and e-government initiatives; the path from these policy 
inputs to the e-ID was ÔstraighterÕ than the US path to its IDM initiatives. The 
US had no prior national identification policy infrastructure, and its data 
protection influences were also less coherent than GermanyÕs. Prior 
pseudonymity requirements in other laws and the influence of GermanyÕs data 
protection authorities contributed to a more direct narrative of policy 
development. The larger number of key actors and commentators in the US Ð 
largely resultant of US reliance on the private sector and intermediaries Ð and 
the more formative state of its identity management policies necessitated a 
greater number of interviews and lengthier policy narrative. 
 
The referencing in this thesis follows the Harvard APA system. Within the 
text, where the authorÕs name is long, the full name is given in the first instance 
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of the reference followed by brackets that contain an abbreviation that will be 
used in all subsequent in-line citations. In the case of an interview subject, the 
first appearance of the reference contains the subjectÕs full name followed by 
brackets containing only the last name, which will then be used in all 
subsequent in-line citations. As per Harvard APA guidelines, interview 
subjects are not referenced in the bibliography. 
Ethics  
All interview subjects were presented with a Consent and Information form 
prior to data gathering. The form detailed the nature of the research, how a 
subjectÕs data would be used, a pledge of confidentiality and anonymity, and 
contact information for the manager of the Doctoral Training Centre for any 
questions or issues. Subjects were given the opportunity to waive anonymity 
before or after being interviewed, and to withdraw from the study at any point. 
Signing the form was deemed to be an act of informed consent. The form and 
research design were submitted to a school ethics committee for review prior to 
embarking on field research. 
Summary 
This chapter detailed the research aims, questions, design and methods used in 
this thesis. The aim of this research is to understand how public policy can 
support privacy goals with regard to the growth of digital identity. To 
accomplish this, a comparative case study design is used. The research 
explores the emergence of unlinkability in the identity management policies of 
Germany and the United States. There are key similarities between the two 
countries Ð they are both federal systems, economically advanced, and liberal 
democracies. Both countries also have privacy and data protection frameworks 
at the federal level, and both have embarked on e-government and identity 
management initiatives for citizens in the last decade. There are key 
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differences as well: the US is nearly four times the population of Germany, and 
Germany is part of the supranational European Union whereas the US is an 
independent nation. Germany has an omnibus data protection framework plus 
federal and state-level data protection authorities. The US has a sectoral data 
protection framework and no data protection authorities. Both countries have 
policies requiring or encouraging unlinkability within their citizen 
credentialing initiatives. 
 
The thesis falls within the category of comparative policy studies, though it 
draws upon sociology, organisational theory, law, political science, and 
computer science scholarship. Chapter 2 explains that the researchÕs primary 
discipline is information policy, a multidisciplinary field. It discusses the need 
for attendance to the institutional dimensions of information policy, and 
informal policy influences such as values, norms and relationships. The thesis 
answers this call by applying the new institutionalist theoretical approach to the 
case data, also explained in Chapter 2. The thesis uses a qualitative research 
strategy due to the need to explore values, norms, history, narratives and 
technical artefacts. The policy under study is new and in the US, still evolving 
Ð this and the institutionalist approach of placing policy in its historical, social 
and cultural context supports a qualitative research strategy. The main methods 
employed were semi-structured interview, which provides access to accounts 
about values, norms, goals and cultural beliefs, and primary and secondary 
document analysis. Thematic content analysis was used to code and analyse the 
data. A total of forty-two interviews were conducted in fourteen cities in two 
countries. Policy-makers, administrators, data protection officers, engineers, 
consultants, advocates, government lawyers, academics, trade groups and 
members of industry were among the stakeholders interviewed. 
 
The German case lacked a privacy advocate respondent, which would have 
added further diversity to that caseÕs stakeholders. Other respondents discussed 
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the role of one key advocate, who did not respond to requests for an interview, 
during the development of German e-ID policy. Further, a similar role Ð one 
highly sceptical and critical of government plans Ð was played by the ULD, a 
key German data protection authority. Still, the voice of the Chaos Computer 
Club, a group opposed to the e-ID in general, would have been a useful 
addition. In the US case, no academic voices were included, due to the near 
total absence of American scholarship on national identity management issues. 
In both cases, citizensÕ voices were not represented. While the thesis is focused 
on policy development, less so on policy outcomes, there were issues 
discovered during analysis that implicated citizens; usability, in particular. 
Further time and resources would have been needed to gather data from 
citizens in both countries. 
 
Upon reflection, the method was fit for purpose. It successfully elucidated the 
informal policy influences on unlinkability as well as the formal. The use of 
semi-structured interview drew out data that was amenable to institutionalist 
analysis. The qualitative research design allowed for unlinkability policies in 
Germany and the US to be placed into a historical, social and cultural context, 
enabling a rich understanding of policy development. 
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CHAPTER 4: KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
This chapter provides information on the key terms and concepts of this thesis. 
In line with the research questions and empirical data, the main topics are 
unlinkability, identity management and citizen credentialing. To understand the 
policies under study, it is first useful to clarify the technologies that underpin 
them. Information policy is often a highly technical domain, which has the 
potential to render the field opaque to non-technical researchers. Standards, 
protocols and technical architectures are themselves policy instruments. This is 
true for the present research, and it supports the view that information policy is 
a multidiscipline. As with most technical subjects, the ÔdevilÕ is in the details. 
This chapter presents the most important terms and concepts for a holistic 
consideration of unlinkability so that students of information policy may 
understand the nuances without prior extensive exposure to complicated 
technical subjects. 
 
Unlinkability is both a strategy and a characteristic of a technical system, and 
the term overlaps with a number of other related terms, such as pseudonymity. 
To complicate matters, the term unlinkability does not appear in many of the 
salient policy instruments of the US and Germany. Moreover, the term tends to 
appear in European documents rather than American; infrequent appearances 
in US policy documents often make reference to a specific European taxonomy 
(McCallister, Grace, and Scarfone, 2010; Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010). This 
thesis contributes to information policy scholarship by uniting US and 
European terminology across a range of policies, technologies and strategies.  
 
Unlinkability is a technical characteristic of a digital identity management 
system. The first section progresses towards an explanation of unlinkability by 
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discussing Ôdigital identity,Õ synthesising a number of proposed definitions. 
The next part explores how these identities are managed in dedicated systems, 
followed by an examination of one specific management architecture known as 
Ôfederated identity.Õ Both the German and US cases rely on federated identity 
systems, one based on e-ID cards, the other on ÔsoftÕ credentials. Federated 
identity means signing in once and being able to access multiple unrelated 
resources.  
 
To lay the groundwork for later discussions of privacy and data protection, the 
ÔID spectrumÕ of anonymity to full identification is explained. This part 
discusses pseudonymity, a critical element of unlinkability. The section 
concludes with an explanation of the technical characteristics of unlinkability, 
and situates it within privacy and data protection imperatives. Taken together, 
the above topics sketch out the necessary technical backdrop to understand 
 
Figure 4.1  Nested topics to understand unlinkability 
 
 
 
unlinkability sufficiently to analyse it as a policy choice. Figure 4.1 above 
shows how the topics nest within one another. 
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The second section explains the nature of citizen online credentials within the 
context of e-government. For over a decade, governments around the world 
have been building identity systems to enable their citizens to login to public 
and private websites with trustworthy credentials. Both US and German citizen 
identity management efforts have advanced in relation to a growth in e-
government activity. The two empirical chapters explore this relationship in 
depth. This section explores the difference between ÔhardÕ and ÔsoftÕ 
credentials, and discusses state issuance of them versus private issuance. 
Germany is a case of state-issued hard credentials in the form of an e-ID card. 
The US is a case of privately-issued soft credentials, existing only online. Key 
definitions and technologies are described, as well as inherent privacy and 
security challenges. Fundamental citizen identification issues are discussed and 
related to the main topics. 
Unlinkability 
This section explains the nature of unlinkability by laying out the conceptual 
and technical frameworks in which it occurs. Various definitions of digital 
identity, identity management, federated identity and pseudonymity are 
synthesised. Unlinkability is then defined and related to the protection of 
privacy. 
What is digital identity? 
The root of the considerations of this research is a human being, which can be 
called an Ôentity.Õ Clarke (2010, p. 4) defines an entity as such: 
ÒAn entity is a real-world thing. The notion encompasses pallets piled 
with cartons, the cartons, and each item that they contain; plus artefacts 
such as computers and mobile phones; and animals and human beings.Ó 
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Non-human entities are beyond the scope of this research. Ergo, all entities 
discussed herein are unique, living people. An entity has multiple Ôidentities.Õ 
While identity is a fluid concept, consisting of self- and socially-constructed 
aspects, here it is understood to be an external perspective, what Hildebrandt, 
Koops and de Vries (2008, p. 8) call Òidem-identityÓ: 
ÒIdem-identity is the third-person attribution of sameness: ÔThis is Miss 
Cheung, a blond female executiveÕ; it takes an objectified perspective.Ó 
Idem-identity and its counterpart, ipse-identity, or selfhood, are based on the 
work of the French Philosopher, Paul Ricoeur (Hildebrandt, Koops and de 
Vries, 2008; van der Hof, Leenes and Fennell, 2009; OECD, 2007). Idem-
identity is the focus of this research because the policies being examined relate 
to external organisations Ð the state and private ones Ð assigning identities to 
people. This external notion of identity also allows one to construe identity as a 
collection of Ôattributes,Õ or characteristics. Accordingly, Pfitzmann and 
Hansen (2010, p. 30) define identity as:  
ÒÉ any subset of attributes of an individual person which sufficiently 
identifies this individual person within any set of persons. So usually 
there is no such thing as Ôthe identityÕ, but several of them.Ó 
These multiple identities can be termed Ôpartial identities,Õ as none of them 
could ever comprise the totality of the entity which they describe and refer to 
(Bauer, Meints and Hansen, 2005, pp. 52-53). A partial identity therefore 
individuates a person in a particular context via a set of attributes. Clarke 
(2010, p. 4) expands on the contextual nature of partial identities: 
ÒA person (whether a human, or a legal entity) may É present many 
identities, to different people and organisations, and in different 
contexts. Each identity can be thought of as a presentation or role of an 
underlying entity. Examples important in eCommerce and 
eGovernment include customer/client, supplier, employee and 
contractor.Ó 
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Similarly, Pfitzmann and Hansen (2010, p. 31) affiliate partial identities with 
contexts and roles: 
ÒAn identity of an individual person may comprise many partial 
identities of which each represents the person in a specific context or 
role. A partial identity is a subset of attribute values of a complete 
identity, where a complete identity is the union of all attribute values of 
all identities of this person. On a technical level, these attribute values 
are data.Ó 
This partial identity requires an ÔidentifierÕ to individuate the underlying entity 
in a given role. An identifier is Òone or more data-items concerning an identity 
that are sufficient to distinguish it from other instances of its particular class, 
and that is used to signify that identityÓ (Clarke, 2010). The international 
standard, ISO/IEC 24760-1 (2011, p. 10), defines an identifier as:  
ÒÉ [a] reference to a unique object that is used by an entity to be 
uniquely represented within a specific domain or process; the purpose 
of an identifier is to provide entities with means of representation 
independent of the entity's identity in a given context without 
necessarily revealing the entity's identityÉ.Ó 
In union, these terms establish that an identifier represents an entity, 
individuating her or his partial identity from other humans in a given context. 
An identifier is a piece of data that may or may not reveal the underlying ÔtrueÕ 
identity, here understood to mean the set of information that can disaggregate a 
human from all other humans. 
 
ClarkeÕs definition of an identifier as a Ôdata-itemÕ and Pfitzmann and 
HansenÕs statement that attribute values are data drive these terms closer to a 
conception of digital identity. Complementing the data-centric view of identity 
is Thierry NabethÕs (2009, p. 36, orig. emph.) distinction that identity can be 
approached from a structural perspective and a process perspective: 
Ò1. A structural perspective: Identity as a representation. Identity is 
seen as a set of attributes characterising the person. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
90 
2. A process perspective: Identity for identification. Identity is 
considered according to a set of processes relating to disclosure of 
information about the person and usage of this information.Ó 
The empirical research of this thesis encompasses both of these perspectives, 
and so must a definition of digital identity. The structural perspective is 
descriptive, and from a data-centric view is understood to be records of a 
personÕs characteristics and the identifiers that refer to him. The process 
perspective implies the use of those records to achieve some aim. This 
distinction helpfully separates ÔidentityÕ from Ôidentification.Õ  
 
Borrowing the term ÔpersonaÕ from Jungian psychology, Clarke (1994a) 
defined a Ôdigital personaÕ as Òa model of an individual's public personality 
based on data and maintained by transactions, and intended for use as a proxy 
for the individual.Ó This idea comports with both the structural and process 
perspectives of identity, and implies an association with an identifier. Broader 
but related is CameronÕs (2005) definition of a Ôdigital subjectÕ: Òa person or 
thing represented or existing in the digital realm which is being described or 
dealt with.Ó Clarke (1994a) distinguishes between Òinformal digital personae 
based on human perceptions, and formal digital personae constructed on the 
basis of accumulations of structured data.Ó The formal digital persona is a data-
centric conception of idem-identity. Building upon this, Clarke (1993) defines 
digital identity: 
ÒDigital identity is the means whereby data is associated with a digital 
persona.Ó 
In line with Clarke, Cameron, Nabeth, and Pfitzmann and Hansen, another 
useful definition of digital identity is: 
ÒDigital identity should denote all those personally related data that can 
be stored and automatically interlinked by a computer-based 
application.Ó (ICPP and SNG, 2003, p. 6) 
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While this definition lacks ClarkeÕs ÔtransactionalÕ component of a digital 
persona, it retains the structural and process perspectives of identity (storing 
and interlinking). ClarkeÕs conception of the transactional nature of digital 
identity is vital, though. An entity is a living person Ð the structural 
components of the personÕs digital identity are descriptors, identifiers, and 
attributes stored in a computer. The processes related to the personÕs digital 
identity must invariably invoke some of this stored data. Those invocations are 
transactions, also known as Ôclaims.Õ Claims can be made by a subject entity 
(ÒI am Gilad Rosner, and my account number is 123456Ó), or on behalf of a 
subject entity (ÒGilad RosnerÕs credit score is 800Ó). As such, one author of an 
OECD (2007, p. 40) report on ÒDigital PersonhoodÓ defines digital identity as: 
ÒÉ the combination of two elements: an identifier and a collection of 
claims.É An identifier is simply a name Ð it can be a name which is 
comprehensible to a human É or a name which is comprehensible to a 
computer system.É A digital identityÕs identifier refers to the identityÕs 
collection of claims.Ó 
Here, information about a person Ð height, eye color, name, bank account 
number, education level attained Ð is equalised to the level of a claim, 
corroborated or uncorroborated. Similar to the OECD report is CameronÕs 
(2005) definition of digital identity in his ÒLaws of IdentityÓ paper: Òa set of 
claims made by one digital subject about itself or another digital subject.Ó The 
claims-based model captures a transactional conception of identity, but 
discards notions of selfhood, personal data and the distinction between an 
entity and its attributes.  
 
The terms and concepts discussed are contentious and overlapping. 
Considerations of digital identity are context-bound, and the above 
examination is meant to place boundaries Ð albeit fuzzy ones Ð around a fluid 
set of ideas to provide enough information to understand unlinkability and its 
emergence as public policy. For the remainder of the thesis, the definition of 
digital identity is as follows: Digital identity is a set of information and 
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attributes that can disaggregate a person from all other persons within a given 
context. It is transactional and composed of data, and is represented by an 
identifier which may or may not reveal the full identity of the underlying 
person. 
 
This definition synthesises the ones above in a way that is most useful to the 
empirical research. Further, the digital identities discussed herein are 
understood to be organisationally governed, meaning that the records and 
transactions comprising the identities are Ôowned,Õ held, managed or originated 
by public and private organisations. In the US case, corporations and 
universities ÔownÕ the identities Ð the data lives on their servers, and its 
disposition is under their control. In the German case, they originate with the 
state and are held on an e-ID card. The empirical data chapters 5 and 6 explain 
the organisational governance in detail. The next section explores how digital 
identities are managed. 
What is identity management? 
For digital identities to function they must exist within a technical framework Ð 
they must be managed. In this sense, they are not unlike products. NabethÕs 
(2009) structure/process perspectives are again useful: digital identities are 
structured pieces of data, claims are sets of procedures, and management of the 
whole enterprise is a process accomplished through a structural system made 
up of infrastructure and human and non-human actors. A paper produced by 
HP Labs defines identity management: 
ÒThe term Ôidentity managementÕ is currently associated to 
technologies and solutions, mainly deployed within enterprises, to deal 
with the storage, processing, disclosure and disposal of usersÕ identities, 
their profiles and related sensitive information.Ó (Baldwin, Mont and 
Shiu, 2007, p. 2). 
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In a slightly different formulation, a report by the US National Science and 
Technology Council (2008, p. ES-1) defines identity management as: 
ÒÉ the combination of technical systems, rules and procedures that 
define the ownership, utilization, and safeguard of personal identity 
information. The primary goal of the Identity Management process is to 
assign attributes to a digital identity and to connect that identity to an 
individual.Ó 
Ann Cavoukian (2006, p. 5), Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario, offers a reduced but related definition: Òin its broadest sense, [identity 
management] refers to the administration and design of identity attributes, 
credentials, and privileges.Ó Finally, Hansen, Schwartz and Cooper (2008, p. 
38) define it as Òprograms or frameworks that administer the collection, 
authentication, or use of identity and information linked to identity.Ó 
 
The above definitions all include the management of identity Ð others would 
say of partial identities Ð and information that relates to the human subject, 
such as attributes, identifiers, privileges and Ôsensitive information.Õ These 
frameworks, therefore, manage the relationship between people and data about 
them, for the purposes of the subject and others. Identity management is 
concerned with the ÔlifecycleÕ of digital identities: enrolment of the person, 
acquisition of relevant information, assignment of identifiers, management of 
transactions and problem resolution, and revocation or account deletion. Figure 
4.2 below illustrates the lifecycle. 
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Figure 1.2  The identity management lifecycle 
 
 
Source: adapted from Programming4Us, 2010 
 
A key feature of IDM systems is Ôauthentication,Õ the verification of an identity 
or attribute claim. The most common example of authentication is when a 
person logs into her account on a computer system. The person claims to be a 
specific human being in order to access the resources assigned to her and her 
alone. The claim must authenticated Ð the truth of it must be ascertained. The 
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (2011, p. vi) states: 
ÒElectronic authentication É is the process of establishing confidence in user 
identities electronically presented to an information system.Ó The language of 
Ôestablishing confidenceÕ demonstrates that the truth of an identity claim need 
not be binary; there may be greater and lesser degrees of confidence in the 
claim. This point is a critical feature of US identity management policy, and is 
explored at length in Chapter 5.  
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A claim can be interchangeably called an ÔassertionÕ Ð the subject asserts his 
identity or an attribute (ÔI am Gilad Rosner. I have security clearance.Õ) The 
types of authentication most relevant to this research are Ôindividual 
authenticationÕ and Ôidentity authenticationÕ: 
ÒIndividual authentication is the process of establishing an understood 
level of confidence that an identifier refers to a specific individual.  
Identity authentication is the process of establishing an understood level 
of confidence that an identifier refers to an identity. The authenticated 
identity may or may not be linkable to an individual.Ó (Kent and Millet, 
2003, p. 2, emphasis added) 
 
Figure 4.3  Individual authentication versus identity authentication 
 
 
 
The figure above illustrates the two authentication types. In referring to Ôan 
identity,Õ this second definition embraces the partial identity concept. The 
distinction between the two types of authentications is the former links to a 
specific, known human, and the latter verifies an identity claim but the 
Service Provider
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Identity Authentication
Name: Joe Smith
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verification need not contain sufficient information to reveal the identity of one 
specific person Ð it verifies that the claimant is the ÔownerÕ of the partial 
identity being asserted. This distinction becomes more important later, but for 
the moment, the key idea here is that authentication answers the question, ÒAre 
you who you say are?Ó 
 
The mechanism of authentication is a ÔcredentialÕ: ÒAn object or data structure 
that authoritatively binds an identity (and optionally, additional attributes) to a 
token possessed and controlled by a [person]Ó (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology [NIST], 2011, p. 8). A ÔtokenÕ is:  
ÒSomething that a person possess and controls (either a unique physical 
object or secret data or information) that is used to authenticate his or 
her identity (such as a secret password, PIN, cryptographic key, ATM 
card, USB token, etc.). Tokens are physical devices or electronic 
records designed for use in authentication systems and/or to hold 
authenticating information.Ó (American Bar Association Identity 
Management Legal Task Force, 2012, p. 44) 
In this research, the term ÔcredentialÕ will subsume the concept of tokens. The 
most widely known credential is a username and password. For example, when 
a person wishes to access an email service, he or she has an account with the 
email provider. The data comprising the account that ties it to the unique 
person is a partial identity. The personÕs username is the identifier. To prevent 
unauthorised people from accessing the account, a password is assigned. The 
username and password in combination are the personÕs credential. By entering 
the username and password (Ôlogging inÕ) the person authenticates that she is 
the appropriate subject identity. This very basic model is the origin of 
transactional digital identity (OECD, 2007, pp. 41-42). 
 
In recent years, passwords have been seen as insecure, and so a second ÔfactorÕ 
of authentication has become a regular feature of identity management 
systems. Besides a password, a person may have to enter a special code he 
receives on his phone at the time of login, or perhaps supply a fingerprint. As 
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such, there are three specific methods (factors) for authenticating someone; 
three things one possesses: Something you know, something you have, and 
something you are. Something you know is a secret, like a password or a PIN. 
Something you have is a physical object, such as a bank card, radio transceiver 
or a key fob that produces special codes. Something you are is a unique 
physical attribute, like fingerprints, vein patterns or the structure of the iris Ð 
these are known as Ôbiometrics.Õ A common two-factor authentication is the 
use of a bank card: possession of the card (have) and the entry of a PIN (know) 
yields access. This interaction is depicted in the figure below. 
 
Figure 4.4  Two-factor authentication 
 
 
 
The German e-ID is identical to a bank card in this respect. In addition to 
possessing the card, to use the data it holds the citizen must enter a six-digit 
PIN. With regards to US citizen credentials, requirements vary, but the most 
common credential in use is a username and password. However, the US 
policy infrastructure makes provision for two-factor authentication as online 
interactions become more sensitive. US and German credentialing models are 
detailed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Little academic literature on US citizen 
credentialing exists (Adjei, 2013; Katzan, 2011a, 2011b; Schwartz, 2011). Part 
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of the contribution of this thesis is an in-depth examination of its history, 
technical models and institutional dynamics. A number of publications explore 
German credentialing (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009; Noack and Kubicek, 
2010; Bender, Kugler, Margraf, and Naumann, 2010; Zwingelberg, 2011; 
Poller, Waldmann, Vow and Trpe, 2012), but examination of the 
institutional factors of its privacy architectures is less common (Noack and 
Kubicek, 2010) and none compare directly to non-European cases. 
 
This thesis shall use the following definition for identity management: 
Identity management (IDM) is an operational and technical framework that 
defines and administers the lifecycle, use and security of digital identities. 
Authentication and the management of credentials are key focuses of IDM 
systems. They are transactional, and operated by organisations. 
 
A key finding of this study is the definition of Ôidentity management policy,Õ in 
the sense of public policy. The empirical data chapters (5 and 6) and the 
analysis in Chapter 7 provide critical data and context to validate this 
definition, but it is appropriate to include it here: Identity management policy is 
the set of laws and policies enacted by governments and supranational bodies 
concerning the facilitation, procurement, use, liability, legal nature, 
interoperability, technologies, risk methodologies, lifecycle and privacy of 
digital identities for its citizens and employees. This includes physical and 
logical authentication, e-signature, and electronic identification technologies 
for access to physical and electronic resources.  
What is federated identity? 
People authenticate themselves to computer systems in order to gain access to 
resources, such as email, file storage or the myriad services one can use online. 
The basic model of logging in with a username and password described above 
would classically occur between a person and a single service or organisation, 
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such as an email provider. As the internet grew from a research and university 
tool to a ubiquitous technology accessed by hundreds of millions of people 
around the world, the number of websites and other resources grew 
commensurately. So, too, did the number of passwords each person needed to 
remember; every new service requiring a user to create an account also 
required a password. By the late 2000s, individual users had acquired an 
unwieldy, large number of passwords to use across a multitude of websites 
(Florncio and Herley, 2007). 
 
In enterprise and campus computing, the Ôsingle sign-onÕ (SSO) model 
appeared. Companies and universities had multiple, distinct services within 
their networks. It became more efficient for single user accounts to be used 
across them. The model was extended to services external to the network. For 
example, universities subscribe to academic publishers. An SSO model allows 
university members to use their local network login to access the publisherÕs 
(external) resources. To harmonise this kind of network access among the 
parties, a standard called Shibboleth (Shibboleth, n.d.) is used to specify the 
technology configurations needed to connect disparate organisations.  
 
The use of identity information from one source to access a separate, 
disparate, or external resource is called Ôfederated identityÕ Ð identity 
information is federated across multiple organisations. In the model described 
above, the university is the source of identity information about its members. 
Each student, researcher or other staff member has an account on the 
universityÕs network. That account, or login, is then used to sign on to the 
resources of an external organisation. The university is the Ôidentity providerÕ 
(IDP), and the external organisation is the Ôrelying partyÕ (RP) Ð they rely on 
the identity assertion of the IDP. The diagram in the figure below shows a 
simplified model of federated identity. 
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Figure 4.5  Federated identity 
 
 
 
This model is useful and efficient because it allows RPs to avoid the costs and 
labour of building and maintaining their own authentication infrastructure. 
Also, it lets users take advantage of having a single sign-on, reducing the 
number of passwords they must remember. With the federated identity model, 
identity claims can be exchanged as well as attribute information. For example, 
in the university model, the name of a researcher could be passed to an external 
resource as well as an attribute indicating that the person is an employee of the 
university. The figure below illustrates this interaction. 
 
Figure 4.6  Federated identity: university and publisher relationship 
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Identity federation is built on various technical standards. Shibboleth is based 
on the Secure Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (Shibboleth, n.d.), as are a 
majority of commercial federation products (OASIS, 2013). A popular but now 
largely disused standard called OpenID was the basis of many early federation 
implementations (Maler, 2011). The original OpenID standard is being 
replaced by OpenID Connect, a substantially different technology (OpenID 
Foundation, n.d.). Facebook Connect is a proprietary technology that allows 
millions of websites to accept the Facebook login Ð this is the largest consumer 
federation service in existence (Gigya, 2013). Part of the contribution of this 
research is demonstrating that standards development organisations are 
institutional actors in the realm of privacy and data protection. IDM 
technologies reflect the capabilities of their underlying standards, which in turn 
reflect the norms, values and choices of their developers. Where policy is 
reliant on standardised technology, standards and their connected communities 
of practice can assist or hinder policy goals. This theme is explored in Chapter 
8. 
 
Many internet services do not require people to validate their identities when 
they sign up. In the case of a free service, such as the popular email services 
Gmail and Yahoo! Mail, people do not need to provide proof of their identity 
when creating an account. Both providers have federated their logins with 
OpenID, meaning that relying parties who accept OpenID logins can use Gmail 
and Yahoo! Mail accounts despite the fact that those accounts are not 
Ôauthoritative.Õ That is, the identities ÔboundÕ to the logins (credentials) have 
not been ÔprovenÕ or Ôvetted,Õ i.e., corroborated. Contrast this with university 
logins. Universities must know definitively who their members are because 
they have a closer relationship: they are providing regulated services, 
maintaining long-term records, and are billing them. Accordingly, there is 
higher confidence that a university login is authoritatively bound to a specific 
person. Figure 4.7 below illustrates these identity relationships. 
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Figure 4.7  Authoritative versus non-authoritative identity relationships 
 
 
 
Returning to the Kent and Millet (2003) definitions above, a university login 
that is authoritatively bound to a person can be used for Ôindividual 
authenticationÕ; the process authenticates a specific human. Authentications 
with an unproven Gmail account are Ôidentity authenticationsÕ; the credential is 
authenticated, but not the underlying human. The issue of authoritative 
credentials is key in the US empirical research, and will be explored further in 
that chapter and the Citizen Credentialing section below. In Germany, their e-
ID credentials are strongly bound to the intended human by secure, state-based 
processes, so any claims based on the e-ID are considered authoritative.  
The ID spectrum 
The distinction between authenticating an identity versus authenticating a 
specific person leads to a discussion of the ID ÔspectrumÕ (Clarke, 1999). There 
University
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Non-authoritative
Name: Joe Smith
Confidence: High
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Identifier: 
iamadog@gmail.com
Confidence: None
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are three main forms of identification: anonymous, pseudonymous and 
identified.  
 
Figure 4.8  The ID spectrum 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 above depicts the ID spectrum. There is no widely accepted term for 
Ôfully identifiedÕ that sits easily within the spectrum, though two experts 
(Maler and Reed, 2008, p. 18) have trialled the word ÒveronymousÓ; it is 
aesthetically superior to the word, Òabsonymous,Ó proffered by the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (2011, p. 10). Broadly stated: ÒThe 
concepts of identification and anonymity are extremes on a continuum of 
degrees and modes of identifiability and non-identifiabilityÓ (van der Hof, 
Leenes and Fennell, 2009, p. 41). 
 
Anonymity, the state of being anonymous, means that no information can be 
tied from a message or other transactional data to its source. Clarke (1999, 
orig. emph.) defines it as such: ÒAn anonymous record or transaction is one 
whose data cannot be associated with a particular individual, either from the 
data itself, or by combining the transaction with other data.Ó There are degrees 
of anonymity (see Kling, Lee, Teich and Frankel, 1999), but the above 
definition is appropriate for this research.  
 
Pseudonymity is at the root of a famous 1993 New Yorker cartoon (Steiner, 
1993): 
 
 
 
Anonymous
Pseudonymous
Fully Identified
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Clarke (1999, orig. emph.) usefully defines pseudonymity: 
ÒA pseudonymous record or transaction is one that cannot, in the 
normal course of events, be associated with a particular individual. 
Hence a transaction is pseudonymous in relation to a particular party if 
the transaction data contains no direct identifier for that party, and can 
only be related to them in the event that a very specific piece of 
additional data is associated with it. The data may, however, be 
indirectly associated with the person, if particular procedures are 
followed, e.g. the issuing of a search warrant authorising access to an 
otherwise closed index. 
To be effective, pseudonymous mechanisms must involve legal, 
organisational and technical protections, such that the link can only 
be made (e.g. the index can only be accessed) under appropriate 
circumstances.Ó 
This thesis will use the above definition for pseudonymity. Anonymity is a rare 
condition on the internet, though pseudonymity is commonplace. The 
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distinction between individual authentication and identity authentication is 
pertinent Ð uncorroborated Gmail accounts that do not include a personÕs name 
in the username are pseudonymous. They are not anonymous because Google, 
the owner of Gmail, or a law enforcement agency could potentially tie a 
username to an individual computer, and thereby its human operator, by its IP 
address or through other means. Pseudonymity is a vital element of 
unlinkability, discussed below. The Ôlegal, organisational and technical 
protectionsÕ Clarke cites are the substance of the privacy and data protection 
policies this research examines. Through this lens, the thesis is an analysis of 
national pseudonymity policies.  
 
The other pole of the spectrum, fully identified, means that the identity of a 
unique person is known. A common example of full identification is online 
banking. Banks must not grant financial record access to unauthorized people, 
so they operate credentialing systems that unambiguously identify people when 
they log in. This is another illustration of an organisationally governed partial 
identity: banks enrol the customer, assign an identifier, bind it to a credential, 
and grant it access to sensitive information.  
 
Any identifier that does not contain a name or other ÔlinkableÕ attribute, such as 
a social security number or phone number, can be considered pseudonymous. 
In the venerable Gmail example, any username that does not contain a full 
name, e.g., Univac1234@gmail.com, is a pseudonym. In a federated identity 
system, IDPs assert identities to RPs by sending an identifier of the subject 
identity. For IDPs who have vetted the underlying subject identities, such as a 
university or a medical facility, they have the option of sending veronymous 
identifiers that disclose the full identity of a person, or pseudonymous 
identifiers. The choice may be based on the commercial relationship between 
the IDP and the RP, may be regulated by privacy laws, or both. For example, 
the US Drug Enforcement Agency requires that doctors who login to electronic 
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prescription services be bound to high confidence credentials that contain fully 
identifying information (Privacy and Security Tiger Team, 2012). In other 
cases, an IDP may send a pseudonymous identifier to an RP without further 
information that could identify the underlying person. More importantly, an  
 
Figure 4.9  Unidirectional versus omnidirectional pseudonyms 
 
 
 
IDP can send a different pseudonymous identifier to each relying party in order 
to frustrate profiling of a userÕs activity.  
 
These different pseudonyms are called Ôunidirectional,Õ versus single 
pseudonyms used across all transactions which are called Ôomnidirectional.Õ 
Figure 4.9 above illustrates the distinction. If a phone number was used as an 
identifier in all cases, it would be an omnidirectional pseudonym. It would be 
linkable because it would link all of a userÕs online activities, and could 
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potentially reveal the underlying subjectÕs identity with relative ease. 
Unidirectional pseudonyms are key to unlinkability, and feature prominently in 
the technical architectures of Germany and the US. 
What is unlinkability? 
One international standard, ISO/IEC 15408-1 (2009, p. 78) defines 
unlinkability as follows: 
Ò[Unlinkability] ensures that a user may make multiple uses of 
resources or services without others being able to link these uses 
togetherÉ. Unlinkability requires that users and/or subjects are unable 
to determine whether the same user caused certain specific operations 
in the system.Ó  
Marit Hansen (2012, p. 24) relates unlinkability to Ôprivacy-relevant dataÕ: 
ÒUnlinkability aims at separating data and processes: This means that 
processes must be operated in such a way that the privacy-relevant data 
are unlinkable to any other set of privacy-relevant data outside of the 
domain. If full unlinkability cannot be achieved, it should be realized to 
the extent that linking would require disproportionate efforts for the 
entity establishing such linkage.Ó 
These Ôdisproportionate effortsÕ are another face of ClarkeÕs (1999) Ôlegal, 
organisational and technical protections.Õ UnlinkabilityÕs opposite, 
Ôlinkability,Õ can therefore be defined as follows: 
ÒLinkability of two or more items of interest (É e.g., subjects, 
messages, actions, ...) from an attackerÕs perspective means that within 
the system É the attacker can sufficiently distinguish whether these 
[items] are related or not.Ó (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010, p. 12) 
This thesis shall use the following definition for unlinkability, largely 
absorbing ISO/IEC 15408-1: Unlinkability is the intentional severing of the 
relationships (ÔlinksÕ) between two or more data events and their sources, 
ensuring that a user may make multiple uses of resources or services without 
others being able to link the uses together. 
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The central mechanism of unlinkability is pseudonymity. As described above, 
a single pseudonym used across multiple contexts is called Ôomnidirectional,Õ 
whereas the use of a different pseudonym for each transaction is called 
Ôunidirectional.Õ Omnidirectional pseudonyms are susceptible to profiling 
because of the linkability created via identical identifiers. That is, if the same 
identifier Ð for example, an email address Ð is seen across multiple uses, and all 
of the uses are visible to a single organisation, all uses can be put in the same 
profile keyed to the identifier. If that pseudonymous identifier becomes tied to 
the real-world person, a profile of all those uses is then associated with one 
specific person. On the other hand, if each online activity is keyed to a separate 
unidirectional pseudonym, profiling is not possible via the identifier.  
 
Figure 4.10  Pairwise persistent pseudonyms 
 
In federated identity systems, a common configuration is the use of a single 
pseudonym for each relying party (rather than for each session or transaction) Ð 
these are called Ôpairwise persistentÕ pseudonyms, depicted in Figure 4.10 
above. In this arrangement, each relying party sees the same pseudonym each 
time, allowing it to recognise the user on return visits.  
 
This also means that the identity provider maintains a mapping of each 
persistent pseudonym pair between the user and the RP. If multiple RPs 
collude, in the absence of other linkable information, such as a credit card or 
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phone number, they should not be able to correlate the disparate activities with 
a single person. This can be termed, ÔRP/RP blindnessÕ Ð relying parties are 
blind to one another. However, collusion between multiple RPs and the IDP 
would connect the activity to one person because the IDP maintains the 
mapping. For US citizen identity management, this is the current technical 
arrangement; it is explored in Chapters 5 and 7. 
 
An alternative strategy to the above configuration is to insert a third party 
between IDPs and RPs Ð a Ôproxy.Õ In theory, an IDP can send a pairwise 
persistent pseudonym to an RP, but the identity of the RP is masked by the 
proxy receiving the user pseudonym from the IDP. The proxy then removes 
information that identifies the IDP, matches the credential request to the 
correct RP, and sends the credential on. This arrangement can be termed 
ÔIDP/RP blindness,Õ and it is a stated goal of near-term US identity 
management policy, detailed further in Chapters 5 and 7. Figure 4.11 below 
shows a simplified illustration of the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange 
(FCCX), which is intended to support IDP/RP blindness. Accomplishing this 
while making such a system auditable and secure is the subject of expert debate 
(John, 2012; Hare and Woodhill, 2013) and success is not yet a foregone 
conclusion.  
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Figure 4.11  Federated identity with a proxy: the US Federal Cloud Credential 
Exchange  
 
 
 
The German e-ID system creates a third variant. In that architecture, there is no 
identity provider per se. The e-ID card itself serves that function Ð identity 
information, attributes and pseudonyms are all sent by the card when a user 
consents. When citizens login to sites pseudonymously, RP/RP blindness is the 
result, but the credential issuer, the German government, is never aware of 
credential uses. This makes the system ÔunobservableÕ to the issuer; the card 
never reports or records its activities. This is an intentional policy choice, 
analysed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Unlinkability serves a number of privacy and data protection goals. Chief 
among these is the frustration of profiling: ÒUnlinkability technically prevents 
(illegitimate) merging of profiles by linking themÓ (Bhargav-Spantzel, 
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Camenisch, Gross, and Sommer, 2007, p. 500). It is thereby a means to realise 
the classic data protection principles of data minimisation, purpose specificity 
and use limitation (OECD, 1980; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2008). The ULD, a German data protection authority, writes: 
ÒUnlinkability is the key element for data minimisation because it 
encompasses all kinds of separating data from persons, e.g., by means 
of anonymisation, pseudonymisation, erasure or simply not having the 
data at allÉ. The overarching objective of this protection goal is to 
minimise risks to the misuse of the privacy-relevant data and to prohibit 
or restrict profiling spanning across contexts and potentially violating 
the purpose limitations related to the data.Ó (Zwingelberg and Hansen, 
2011, p. 247) 
Much academic literature on privacy has embraced the view that privacy is 
contextual (Prins, 2006; Waldo, Lin and Millet, 2007; Hansen, Schwartz and 
Cooper, 2008; Lips, Taylor and Organ, 2009a, 2009b; Nissenbaum, 2010). 
That is, a respect for the privacy of individuals takes into account the contexts 
in which information about them is shared. There are norms associated with 
those contexts, and it is a violation of privacy to transgress those norms by 
commingling contexts inappropriately (Nissenbaum, 2010). Identity 
management literature has incorporated this view: 
ÒIdentity is contextual. People have different identities that they may 
wish to keep entirely separate. Information can be harmful in the wrong 
context, or it can simply be irrelevant. Keeping identities separate 
allows a person to have more autonomy.Ó (OECD, 2007, p. 26) 
Unlinkability is a strategy to maintain separation between contexts, 
contributing to Ôlinkage controlÕ: ÒIn the digital world full of identifiers for 
digital identities which often can easily be linked, better linkage control by 
individuals is crucial for maintenance of their private sphereÓ (Hansen, 2008, 
p. 1591). The issue of control is fundamental to Ôinformational self-
determination,Õ a right derived by a 1983 German Constitutional Court that is 
fully detailed in Chapter 6. Briefly, this right confers, among other things, a 
wide latitude of control over information about oneself in service of dignity 
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and the ability to fully develop oneÕs personality. In German identity 
management policy, unlinkable credentials are part of a broader strategy to 
ensure informational self-determination. In the US, they are more directly 
connected to data minimisation goals. Both strategies serve a bias against 
profiling. 
 
Other recent considerations of privacy and data protection, such as CameronÕs 
(2005) ÒLaws of IdentityÓ and the broad spectrum of work on Ôprivacy by 
designÕ (Cavoukian, 2006; Rost and Bock, 2011) espouse additional principles 
which unlinkability addresses. CameronÕs (2005, p. 8) Laws specifically call 
for ÒDirected IdentityÓ: ÒA universal identity system must support both 
ÔomnidirectionalÕ identifiers for use by public entities and ÔunidirectionalÕ 
identifiers for use by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while 
preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles.Ó Unlinkability aids 
Ôuser-centricityÕ goals, which seek to place the concerns and control of users at 
the centre of identity management architectures (Bhargav-Spantzel, et al., 
2007). The privacy goals and strategies served by unlinkability underpin, in 
explicit and tacit ways, the IDM policies of Germany and the US. 
Citizen Credentialing 
The issuance or facilitation of identity credentials by and for the state is 
directly linked to larger discussions about national identification projects. This 
subject, covered in great depth by Torpey (1997, 2000, 2001), Caplan and 
Torpey (2001), Lyon (2009), Bennett and Lyon (2008), Lips, Taylor and Organ 
(2009a, 2009b), van der Hof, Leenes and Fennell (2009), Whitley and Hossein 
(2009), Kerr, Lucock and Steeves (2009), and the London School of 
Economics (LSE Systems and Information Group, 2010) provides a rich 
backdrop for discussions about the social dimensions of online credentials. 
Most of this literature follows identity cards and papers and their related 
systems. The German case study of this thesis can connect to these larger 
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discussions as their online credential is a function of their e-ID card, issued in 
2010 to replace the prior paper card. But the US case study is unanchored to 
physical ID cards, relying instead purely on software and its underlying 
infrastructure. There is a gap in identity literature of policy analyses of non-
card-based identity credential systems; the US cases addresses this. The 
research as a whole adds to information policy scholarship by analysing the 
privacy architectures of specific countriesÕ authentication infrastructures. There 
is a general lack of empirical research on US citizen credentialing efforts, 
which this thesis addresses.  
 
Identity systems help states to ÔembraceÕ their citizens (Torpey, 1997); they 
make people ÔlegibleÕ (Scott, 1998). James Scott (1998, p. 183) writes: 
ÒLegibility is a condition of manipulation. Any substantial state 
intervention in society É requires the invention of units that are visible. 
The units in question might be citizens, villages, trees, fieldsÉ. 
Whatever the units being manipulated, they must be organized in a 
manner that permits them to be identified, observed, recorded, counted, 
aggregated, and monitored.Ó  
The identity scholars noted above examine the harmful and beneficial sides of 
this embrace. Identity papers Ð more so electronic ones Ð enable broad and 
deep surveillance. John Torpey (1997, 2000, 2001) argues that identity papers 
and passports are administrative instruments to help states expropriate the 
legitimate means of peopleÕs movement. They help determine Ôwho is in and 
who is outÕ for purposes of control and, more germanely, who can access the 
benefits of the state. In addition to issues of movement and surveillance, 
identity documents facilitate access to public services. To ensure that the 
ÔrightÕ people are receiving services Ð only those eligible and the finer 
gradations of which particular service Ð public agencies must know with whom 
they are transacting. For in-person services, traditional paper documents 
usually suffice. But, for e-government, discussed further below, transactions 
take place remotely. Paper documents cannot be used to authenticate people at 
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a distance as there is no way to compare photos to the presenter, and anti-
counterfeiting measures are defeated when the documents are photocopied or 
scanned. 
 
In the two research cases, online credentials were developed in the context of 
electronic government services. In the US, a completely new set of policies had 
to be created for the government to plan to credential the whole of its populace. 
In Germany, the e-ID was borne of their prior national ID, adding features to 
allow citizens to authenticate online. In the policy development of both, the 
authentication needs of e-government were cited as central motivations 
(Schmidt, 2005; ULD, Interview; G001, Interview; G003, Interview). Also in 
the two cases was an explicit wish to enable Ôtrustworthy transactionsÕ online, 
both for the benefit of individuals and the internet as a whole (White House, 
2011; Mller, Interview). While there is much discussion in literature of the 
surveillance of citizens via electronic identity management systems, there is 
very little of government policies encouraging strong authentication for general 
benefit. The empirical work of this thesis contributes to the multi-faceted 
discussions of IDM by analysing specific attempts by government to both 
engender online trust and shut its panoptic eye to its citizensÕ online activities. 
 
Electronic government (e-government) is the use of electronic resources by 
government for its own internal processes or for the delivery of public services. 
The main goals for the introduction and expansion of e-government are cost 
savings, efficiency and greater engagement with relevant populations. 
Examples of e-government include online tax form submission, application for 
financial benefits, payment of fines, submission of medical information, 
obtaining court documents, consumer complaints, and participation in the 
political process (West, 2007). Many meaningful e-government services 
involve an exchange of personal information. In Germany, the US and many 
others, laws and policies that dictate fair and appropriate collection and use 
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govern the exchange of personal data. Governments must ensure that they do 
not release personal data to unauthorised people. Correspondingly, when they 
transact with their populaces online, agencies must have high confidence that a 
claimed identity is authentic. Citizens and other ÔcustomersÕ of public services 
therefore must be bound to identity credentials that agencies can rely upon.  
 
Online credentials make people legible in the electronic world. There are two 
forms of digital citizen credentials: hard and soft. That is, a physical credential 
Ð for this research, an electronic identity card Ð and an intangible one based on 
software or ÔcertificatesÕ (trusted documents written in computer code). There 
are also two types of credential issuers: the state and private actors. These 
forms and issuers can be represented as a matrix: 
 
Figure 4.12  Matrix of credential type and issuance 
 
 
 
Germany and the US are the two cases of this research, but Sweden and 
Finland are included for comparative, explanatory purposes. The upper left 
box, state-issued e-ID, contains countries where the state itself issues a plastic 
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card that contains an electronic chip. The chip holds the bearerÕs identification 
and attribute data, such as name, date of birth and residential address. The card 
also has a capability to authenticate the bearer online to e-government services. 
The German e-ID is a member of this group; the cardÕs genesis and features are 
described fully in Chapter 6. Another member is Finland, whose government 
issues FINEID, a national identity card that can be used online (Rissanen, 
2010). The lower left box, privately-issued e-IDs, are identical to the box 
above except that the issuer is a private organisation. In this box is Sweden, 
whose citizens can obtain e-IDs in card form from Swedish banks and a 
telecommunications company (Grnlund, 2010). These privately-issued cards 
can be used to authenticate the bearers to e-government and private services. 
The box in the upper right, state-issued software-based IDs, contains countries 
whose states issue trustable certificates for use in authentication. Finland also 
occupies this box because the Finnish government issues citizen identification 
certificates that can be downloaded into mobile phones (Stevens et al., 2010, p. 
23; Valimo, n.d.). The lower right box, privately-issued software-based IDs, 
contain countries whose citizens can use software or certificates issued by 
private organisations to access e-government resources. The US falls into this 
category; the technical and policy models are fully explained in Chapters 5 and 
7. Finland and Sweden are also members of this group as both countriesÕ 
citizens can obtain downloadable certificates issued from banks to authenticate 
themselves online. As the four country examples illustrate, citizen 
credentialing can be publicly managed, privately managed, or a combination of 
both.  
 
It is valuable to consider two other dimensions Ð longevity and whether 
credentials are compulsory. In the case of physical e-IDs, longevity becomes a 
factor because ID cards have finite lifespans. Also, the validity length of 
national ID cards may be specified by law, as in the case of Germany which 
requires a 10-year document life (Noack and Kubicek, 2010). This constraint 
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forced Germany down a path of using ÔcontactlessÕ (RFID) technology. 
Longevity is not a consideration for soft credentials as there is no physical 
document to Ôwear out.Õ Validity of a certificate may still be a factor, and a 
renewal period may be instituted. The US, which relies exclusively on 
privately-issued soft credentials does not institute a maximum validity 
requirement.  
 
The other consideration is whether a citizen must possess a credential by law. 
In Germany, citizens must hold either a national ID card or a passport from age 
16 onwards (Noack and Kubicek, 2010). This requirement means that all 
German citizens will hold either an e-ID or a passport by 2020, when all prior 
national IDs will have expired. However, activation of the online 
authentication feature of the e-ID is voluntary. As Chapter 6 details, only 28% 
of German citizens have elected to activate the feature 
(Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2013). Voluntariness is also a critical characteristic of 
US credentialing in accordance with AmericansÕ strong antipathy towards 
national identification schemes. As the US data chapter shows, national 
identity management policy documents explicitly disavow kinship with a 
national ID.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed key terms and concepts necessary for an 
examination of the appearance of unlinkability in national identity management 
policies. Identity management products, protocols and systems are being built 
with unlinkability features to comport with existing laws and policies, in 
service of the norms and values of relevant communities of practice, and to 
include features believed to be desirable to customers. Unlinkability is a 
member of the group known as Ôprivacy-enhancing technologiesÕ, though it is 
often accomplished through a combination of both technical and social 
enforcement mechanisms. This research explores the spectrum of enforcement 
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arrangements possible with unlinkable credential systems in the two empirical 
data chapters. Unlinkability is defined not by its method, though, but by its 
goals: to separate contexts and uses, and give users greater control over the 
sharing of identifying information and their online activities.  
 
The appearance of unlinkability in national policies is a recent phenomenon. 
No academic policy literature specifically gathers empirical case data on 
unlinkability policies. There is no literature that examines its institutional 
factors, and there is limited literature that situates unlinkability in larger 
analyses of extant information policy. This research addresses these gaps, 
gathering a rich body of empirical data to particularise the evolution of privacy 
interests in two countries. These are not only instrumental case studies (Stake, 
2005, p. 445), examining new, noteworthy phenomena. This research is 
important because it traces government activity to adapt data protection 
principles in light of rapid changes in technology. Public policy is notoriously 
out of step with technological change (Reidenberg, 1997). This thesis finds that 
governments and their agents have been considering the sensitivity and impact 
of identity management technologies alongside their swift evolution. The 
empirical data shows a great degree of collaboration between policy-makers, 
academics, technologists, and businesspeople to develop IDM policy. These 
processes are technocratic given the level of technical detail needed to 
understand the tools available to achieve policy goals; the processes are both 
iterative and not guaranteed of success. This thesis contributes to the study of 
information policy by connecting historical trends in data protection and 
privacy and their underlying principles to contemporary discussions of digital 
identity and its capacity to be regulated. It highlights the interplay of policy-
making, technical standards and business interests leading to the multi-
stakeholder processes that yielded modern identity management policies and 
their embedded privacy choices. The research unites US and European identity 
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management concepts, lexicons and technical designs which have so far not 
been directly compared. 
 
The key definitions for the present research are as follows: 
 
Digital identity Digital identity is a set of information and attributes 
that can disaggregate a person from all other persons 
within a given context. It is transactional and composed 
of data, and is represented by an identifier which may 
or may not reveal the full identity of the underlying 
person. 
Identity 
management 
Identity management (IDM) is an operational and 
technical framework that defines and administers the 
lifecycle, use and security of digital identities. 
Authentication and the management of credentials are 
key focuses of IDM systems. They are transactional, 
and operated by organisations. 
Identity 
management 
policy 
Identity management policy is the set of laws and 
policies enacted by governments and supranational 
bodies concerning the facilitation, procurement, use, 
liability, legal nature, interoperability, technologies, 
risk methodologies, lifecycle and privacy of digital 
identities for its citizens and employees. This includes 
physical and logical authentication, e-signature, and 
electronic identification technologies for access to 
physical and electronic resources.  
Federated identity The use of identity information from one source to 
access a separate, disparate, or external resource is 
called Ôfederated identityÕ Ð identity information is 
federated across multiple organisations. 
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Pseudonymity 
(the state of being 
pseudonymous) 
ÒA pseudonymous record or transaction is one that 
cannot, in the normal course of events, be associated 
with a particular individual. 
 
Hence a transaction is pseudonymous in relation to a 
particular party if the transaction data contains no direct 
identifier for that party, and can only be related to them 
in the event that a very specific piece of additional data 
is associated with it. The data may, however, be 
indirectly associated with the person, if particular 
procedures are followed, e.g. the issuing of a search 
warrant authorising access to an otherwise closed 
index. 
 
To be effective, pseudonymous mechanisms must 
involve legal, organisational and technical protections, 
such that the link can only be made É under 
appropriate circumstances.Ó (Clarke, 1999, emph. 
removed) 
Unlinkability Unlinkability is the intentional severing of the 
relationships (ÔlinksÕ) between two or more data events 
and their sources, ensuring that a user may make 
multiple uses of resources or services without others 
being able to link the uses together. 
E-government Electronic government (e-government) is the use of 
electronic resources by government for its own internal 
processes or for the delivery of public services. 
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CHAPTER 5: UNLINKABILITY IN US INFORMATION POLICY 
Introduction 
This chapter details empirical research into the federal privacy and data 
protection policies of unlinkability in the United States. The first part of the 
chapter is a chronology of the federal governmentÕs efforts to obtain digital 
identity credentials to enable citizens to access electronic government (e-
government) resources. Several privacy goals emerged within these efforts, 
including an intention to build credential services that disallowed or hindered 
website operators and credential providers from tracking citizensÕ online 
activity.  
 
The US was chosen as a research case for several reasons. Firstly, an initial 
literature review revealed evidence that unlinkability was emerging in some 
form within policy relating to digital identity. The US has a federal government 
and this policy was occurring at the federal level. This supported a most similar 
systems design for a comparative study with Germany. E-government and 
citizen identity management initiatives were occurring in a similar timeframe 
to Germany Ð the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s. A key difference 
between the two countries was the source of citizen credentials. The German 
state was supplying credentials directly to its citizens via a national e-ID, 
whereas the US was relying on private organisations to supply credentials to its 
citizens. Germany and the US both have institutionalised data protection, 
though it manifests differently in each country. Germany has, in line with 
Europe, an omnibus approach to personal data protection. The US has a 
sectoral approach, dividing its protective measures into data categories such as 
health, financial, and educational. Germany has a data protection ÔlayerÕ in the 
form of federal and state data protection authorities. The US has no equivalent. 
Nonetheless, unlinkability is appearing in both countries, in part because of 
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similar data protection principles Ð chiefly, data minimisation Ð at the heart of 
the US ÔFair Information Practice PrinciplesÕ and German data protection law. 
See Chapter 3 for a full explanation of the methodology and case selection 
criteria. 
 
The empirical data is derived from twenty-eight interviews with actors who 
directly influenced or were affected by unlinkability policy, plus primary 
documentation such as laws and official memoranda, and secondary 
documentation such as academic literature and commentary. Interview subjects 
include policy-makers; government lawyers; privacy advocates; Don Thibeau, 
Chairman of the Open Identity Exchange; Dazza Greenwood from the MIT 
Media Lab; Paul Trevithick, founder of the Information Cards Foundation; and 
Andrew Nash, head of identity for Google. See Appendix A for a complete list 
of all interview subjects. 
 
The first section of this chapter examines the intertwining of e-government 
priorities and identity management policies. It details the reasons behind the 
governmentÕs choice to obtain credentials from the private sector rather than 
create them themselves, and the policy frameworks necessary to ÔtrustÕ 
externally-generated credentials. This includes a risk methodology federal 
agencies needed to judge the validity of non-federal credentials. The section 
examines the policy distinctions between credentials intended for e-
government use, and those intended for private use. The chronology highlights 
the formal policy instruments and their privacy language to illustrate how 
unlinkability emerged in US policy.  
 
The second half of the chapter is a discussion of the major themes that emerged 
from the data. The themes were derived from interviews and literature, as well 
as inductive analysis. Themes are selected and presented in order to highlight 
the key issues relevant to explaining the policy of unlinkability (McClure, et 
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al., 1999; Braun and Clarke, 2006). The major themes analysed are: the spectre 
of a national ID, the various methods of unlinkability, commercial necessities, 
technical versus social methods of regulation, policy comparability versus 
compliance, the various policy actors, and usability of IDM systems. Several of 
these themes appear in the analysis of German unlinkability policies, and other 
themes are particular to the US case due to history, law, policy constraints and 
culture. 
Overview 
In the final years of the 20th Century, the US government sought to take 
advantage of the burgeoning internet technologies which had begun to thrive in 
the commercial world. The Clinton Administration laid out several policy goals 
intending to re-engineer government through the use of information technology 
(Lips, 2000, pp. 199-204). In the early years of the succeeding Bush 
Administration, government administrators recognised that sound identity 
management was vital to successfully advancing e-government (Turning the 
tortoise, 2002). An endemic rejection of national identification schemes 
stemming from civil liberties concerns foreclosed the possibility of the 
government creating online credentials for the American people. The 
government looked to the private sector to supply the credentials needed to 
authenticate people when they used federal websites. That is, the US 
government, in line with contemporaneous activities in the commercial world, 
wanted their IT systems to be able to ÔconsumeÕ identity credentials that were 
created and managed by external private sources. These private actors, in this 
context, are called Ôidentity providersÕ. 
 
E-government websites are part of government IT resources and are therefore 
subject to federal privacy and data protection laws regarding government-held 
data. Comparable policies had to be enforced upon the private actors whose 
systems would interact with government data. This set of policies expressed a 
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desire to inhibit the ability of government agencies to know about peopleÕs 
disparate online activity, as well as to inhibit identity providers from knowing 
which government websites people visited; or, at least prevent them from using 
and sharing that information. The intentional hiding of oneÕs online activity 
within the credential space Ð severing the links between the sites one visits Ð is 
called ÔunlinkabilityÕ. See Chapter 3 for a complete overview of unlinkability.  
 
The appearance of unlinkability as public policy is part of the larger story of 
the various policies and decisions made en route to government use of 
federated identity technologies, as well as the US governmentÕs formal pursuit 
of e-government. Unlinkability was part of a set of privacy and security 
concerns that manifested through most of the governmentÕs efforts to increase 
citizen participation electronically and gain benefits that the internet portended 
for citizen-government interaction. By relying on private actors to supply 
digital credentials for citizens, the US effectively outsourced the 
implementation of policy needed to realise its e-government goals. Private 
actors, however, did not see the value in meeting the governmentÕs needs for 
high confidence credentials. The US Ôuse caseÕ of secure, high confidence, 
privacy-preserving credentials for its citizens is in tension with the private 
sectorÕs need for a profitable Ôbusiness case.Õ As a result, US identity 
management efforts for citizens are stalled. Unlinkability, nested within these 
efforts, is also therefore unrealised. 
Early Government Identity Federation 
By the early 2000s, the federal government had begun to federate digital 
identity credentials among agencies across the ÔFederal PKI BridgeÕ (G003, 
Interview; G004, Interview; Dazza Greenwood [Greenwood], Interview). PKI 
Ð public key infrastructure Ð was an established method of using cryptography 
to ensure that messages originated from known senders and were not tampered 
with en route. In this case, the messages were, among other things, Ôidentity 
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assertionsÕ, allowing a federal employee from one agency to gain access to 
another agencyÕs IT resources by asserting that she was a specific, authorised 
person. The assertions (messages) would be cryptographically ÔsignedÕ to 
allow the receiving end to validate their origin and determine that they were 
not tampered with. Originally, the Federal Bridge only serviced federal 
employees; i.e., it was not for citizen access to federal resources. In 2006 the 
Federal Bridge cross-certified with a private service, the CertiPath PKI Bridge, 
serving the aerospace-defence industry, enabling federal relying parties to 
authenticate private sector employees at the same standards for trust as for 
federal employees (G004, Interview). 
E‐Government Priorities 
As the World Wide Web came into common usage, federal agencies began to 
put government resources online. E-government was a political priority for the 
Clinton Administration (1992Ð 2000) and Bush Administration (2000Ð2008) 
(Lips, 2000, pp. 199-204; G001, Interview; G003, Interview; G008, Interview). 
The Clinton Administration believed information and communications 
technology to be Òthe essential infrastructure for the government of the 21st 
centuryÓ (Lips, 2000, p. 200; White House, 1993, Executive Summary). 
Electronic access to government resources was a critical part of this vision. The 
White HouseÕs 1993 report on Reengineering Through Information Technology 
stated: 
ÒThe government must not apply information technology haphazardly 
or sporadically. It also should not simply automate existing practices. 
Instead, public officials should view information technology as the 
essential infrastructure for government of the 21st Century, a 
modernized Ôelectronic governmentÕ to give citizens broader, more 
timely access to information and services through efficient, customer-
responsive processes.Ó (White House, 1993, Executive Summary) 
Towards the beginning of the Bush Administration, identity management was 
identified as a critical priority to progressing e-government (Turning the 
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tortoise, 2002). Administrators working in this policy area recognised that 
accepting online credentials from sources external to the government was 
necessary to meet the Bush Administration priorities for expanding e-
government (G003, Interview). This would lead to the creation of initial policy 
instruments to allow government agencies to accept non-federal credentials. 
One administrator recalled: 
ÒAgencies were already trying to bring their services to the web, or to 
the internet, and for whatever reason were having trouble with that last 
mile, because the last mileÕs always the hardest. And so the idea was 
that weÕre going to put this together and actually help get them there.Ó 
(G001, Interview) 
Exposure to British Policy Models 
By the early 2000s, Britain had successfully built a framework named tScheme 
to allow credentials created outside of government to be used to access 
electronic government resources (G001, Interview; G003, Interview; G008, 
Interview; Richard Wilsher [Wilsher], Interview). tScheme was led and 
managed by the private sector. Seeing similar needs in the US, federal 
administrators met with tScheme administrators to understand what could be 
similarly applied. The principal architect for this framework, Richard Wilsher, 
was subsequently engaged by policy-makers to advise US efforts (G001, 
Interview; Wilsher, Interview). Policy designs were also influenced by the 
British E-Envoy Office that focused on British e-government efforts, and 
through discussions with other countries (G001, Interview; G003, Interview; 
G004, Interview; Wilsher, Interview). An administrator recalled the history of 
tScheme and its privately-led nature: 
ÒSo, the secret is that the whole concept for the E-Authentication 
Program, and then subsequently for the Trust Framework provider 
program, was borrowed from our friends across the pond and the 
tScheme program É The EnvoyÕs office É said, ÔWeÕre going to start 
this national validation scheme, or certification scheme, and, industry 
youÕre invited to play.Õ And British industry came back to them and 
said, ÔNo, weÕre not going to do that. We, industry, will manage this. 
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We will give you, government, a seat at the table. But we will manage 
this.Õ And the government said, ÔWell alright then. WeÕll give you five 
years. WeÕll let you take the lead. YouÕve got five years to make it 
work. If you donÕt make it work, weÕre taking it back.Õ They made it 
work. So, tScheme is real, itÕs run by industry. So we said, ÔWell, that 
worked in England, itÕs bound to work in America, surely.ÕÓ(G001, 
Interview) 
Acceptance of External Credentials 
To accept credentials generated outside the federal government, agencies 
needed to trust that they were appropriately bound to individuals. In the case of 
federal employees, agencies could trust the credential enrolment and issuance 
because it occurred under the auspices of the federal government itself, using 
established, secure processes. In the case of external identity providers, federal 
agencies had no oversight of their processes and therefore could not inherently 
trust the validity of a credential without a standardised method for judging it. 
This led the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (2003) to 
promulgate memorandum M-04-04, a risk methodology for judging the ÒLevel 
of AssuranceÓ (LoA) that a credential was valid and appropriately bound to a 
single individual. The memorandum ordered all executive branch agencies to 
assess the degree and likelihood of harm that would result from loss of or 
unauthorised access to personal data in their possession. Agencies were to 
consider six categories of harm and impact in their assessment of risks from an 
authentication error: 
           Ò¥  inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation  
¥   financial loss or agency liability  
¥   harm to agency programs or public interests  
¥   unauthorized release of sensitive information  
¥   personal safety  
¥   civil or criminal violationsÓ (Office of Management and Budget 
[OMB], 2003, p. 5) 
 
The potential impact values for these categories were Low, Moderate and 
High. OMBÕs risk methodology aligns the harm impact values with the Levels 
of Assurance of an asserted identity.  
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Figure. 5.1  Impact category/Level of Assurance matrix.  
 
 
Source: OMB, 2003, p. 7 
 
The Levels of Assurance are defined as follows:  
ÒEach assurance level describes the agencyÕs degree of certainty that 
the user has presented an identifier (a credential in this context) that 
refers to his or her identity. In this context, assurance is defined as 1) 
the degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the 
identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued, and 2) the 
degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the 
individual to whom the credential was issuedÓ (OMB, 2003, p. 4, orig. 
emphasis).  
The levels are: 
Ò¥   Level 1:  Little or no confidence in the asserted identityÕs validity   
¥   Level 2:  Some confidence in the asserted identityÕs validity  
¥   Level 3:  High confidence in the asserted identityÕs validity 
¥   Level 4:  Very high confidence in the asserted identityÕs validityÓ 
(OMB, 2003, p. 5) 
 
OMBÕs methodology standardised agencies' policies for judging confidence in 
external credentials. It allowed each agency to make its own determinations 
about the right mix of data sensitivity, potential harm, credential enrolment 
reliability and security model. One administrator stated: 
ÒAgencies were already trying to bring their services to the web, or to 
the internet, and for whatever reason were having trouble with that last 
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mile, because the last mileÕs always the hardest. And so the idea was 
that weÕre going to put this together and actually help get them there. 
M-04-04 was a part of that.ÉÓ (G001, Interview) 
Once an agency concluded its assessment, it was to select technology 
appropriate to the Level of Assurance as specified by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), a non-regulatory federal agency within the 
US Department of Commerce with a broad remit to advance measurement 
science, standards and technology. NISTÕs Special Publication 800-63 (Burr, et 
al., 2011) details security token types, token and credential management 
system types, authentication protocols, cryptography standards, and attack 
types to be defended against. As the consequences from an authentication error 
increase, so do the Levels of Assurance, as well as the required security 
strength of the identity management system.  
 
Special Publication 800-63 also describes identity proofing requirements for 
credential issuers. Separated into Ôin-personÕ and ÔremoteÕ applications for a 
credential, the publication specifies the types of existing identity proofs a 
person must provide to a credential issuer to validate his or her identity, the 
required method of validation, and any further actions the issuer must take to 
complete the identity assurance. For example, at Level of Assurance 3, in a 
remote application, an applicant must supply a government-issued ID number, 
such as a driverÕs license or passport number, and a financial or utility account 
number, such as a checking account number, a water bill account number, or a 
credit card number. The credential issuer verifies the applicantÕs identity 
Òthrough record checks either with the applicable agency or institution or 
through credit bureaus or similar databases, and confirms that: name, [date of 
birth], address and other personal information in records are consistent with the 
application and sufficient to identify a unique individualÓ (Burr, et al., 2011, p. 
34). Finally, the issuer confirms the applicantÕs address by sending information 
through the mail, or calls the applicant on the phone and Òrecords the 
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[a]pplicantÕs voice or [uses] alternative means that establish an equivalent level 
of non-repudiationÓ (Burr, et al., 2011, p. 34). 
Public‐Private Authentication Initiatives 
The policies to enable federal entities to accept non-federal credentials were 
grouped under the heading of the Electronic Authentication Initiative (EAI), 
under the management of the General Services Administration (GSA) (G003, 
Interview; G004, Interview; G006, Interview). US IDM policy-makers invited 
the Social Security Administration to consider becoming an authoritative 
source for citizen digital identities. They declined because the scale, 
complexity and the political unpalatability of building a system that could 
spark fears of national identification (G001, Interview). In 2004, a public-
private partnership formed called the Electronic Authentication Partnership 
(EAP). This partnership represented industry players interested in 
commercially engaging the government on its authentication needs. The EAP 
aligned itself with Electronic Authentication Initiative policies and 
frameworks, including M-04-04 and Special Publication 800-63 (G003, 
Interview). To enter into business arrangements with potential vendors, the 
federal government attempted to create standardised agreements between it and 
all potential identity providers. The IDPs pushed back on the agreements, and 
federal officials were unable to administer a programme with variable bilateral 
agreements with a host of different vendors (G003, Interview; G008, 
Interview; Wilsher, Interview). Nor was the federal government in a position to 
certify all of the potential IDPs for compliance with relevant federal policy. An 
official explained: 
ÒÉ we really didnÕt want to have hundreds of bilateral agreements 
between the federal government and all these IDPs.  So we were trying 
to get a standardised agreement, but if youÕre dealing with the financial 
services industry, youÕre dealing only with their legal department, and 
every one of them has got something, and so thatÕs why [it] got top 
heavy.É And we couldnÕt be the entity to go out and do the 
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assessments of everyone É we just couldnÕt reasonably set up [that] 
infrastructure.Ó (G003, Interview). 
Federal engagement with EAP failed, but the policy, commercial and 
intellectual work of it was merged with the Liberty Alliance, a standards 
development and management organisation focused broadly on identity 
federation and certification (G003, Interview). The merged organization 
renamed itself the Kantara Initiative (ÒKantaraÓ), and it remained closely 
involved in US identity management efforts. 
Establishment of FICAM 
In 2008, all US identity management policy and initiatives were put under the 
auspices of the Information Security and Identity Management Committee 
(ISIMC), a committee of the Federal CIO Council, itself made up of the Chief 
Information Officers (CIOs) of federal agencies and the defence and 
intelligence communities (G001, Interview). ISIMC formed the Identity, 
Credential and Access Management (ICAM) sub-committee whose remit 
included all management, security and privacy aspects of US identity 
management policy relating to interaction with and within the federal 
government (CIO Council, 2008).  
 
With administrative support from the consulting firm Deloitte, FICAM (as 
ICAM came to be commonly known, inserting ÔFÕ for Federal), released in 
2009 its Roadmap and Implementation Guidance (Identity, Credential & 
Access Management [ICAM], 2009c). The Roadmap included requirements for 
FICAM to develop harmonised policies to allow federal agencies to accept 
externally-created credentials. One administrator recalled: 
Ò[W]e had workgroups that met regularly, which had representation 
from across the ICAM committee, which is the 25 major Federal CIO 
agencies.É Deloitte actually went out and interviewed people from the 
agencies on the different topics. Not just from the Federal agencies, but 
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also from industry. So, there was an awful lot of collaboration and 
discussion that went into the writing.Ó (G001, Interview). 
Creation of Trust Frameworks 
The failure of EAP led US policy-makers and administrators to advance a 
model informed by tScheme: the Trust Framework Provider model, or TFP 
(G008, Interview; N002, Interview; Don Thibeau [Thibeau], Interview; 
Wilsher, Interview). Rather than enter into bilateral agreements with would-be 
identity providers, FICAM envisioned a multi-party arrangement. A non-
governmental entity would be placed between FICAM and vendors. It would 
be responsible for certifying the vendors against FICAMÕs requirements. 
FICAM would synthesise all of its requirements Ð operational, technical and 
privacy Ð into a single package; what it needed to ÔtrustÕ that vendors met the 
governmentÕs needs for identity services. The requirements package would be 
handed to a Trust Framework Provider, an intermediary who would publish 
those requirements and then certify participating entities against them. Those 
entities Ð for-profit companies, non-profits and universities Ð would provide 
identity credentials for use on government websites and resources. The Trust 
Framework Provider would accredit independent assessors to evaluate identity 
provider applicants and certify that their operational policies, technical 
architectures and privacy policies were comparable to those required by 
FICAM (ICAM, 2009d). The figure below illustrates the relationships of the 
Trust Framework model. 
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Figure 5.2  A Trust Framework  
 
 
Source: Open Identity Exchange, 2013 
 
FICAMÕs requirements contained the Level of Assurance risk methodology 
from the Office of Management and BudgetÕs memorandum M-04-04 and 
NIST Special Publication 800-63Õs related technical, security and identity 
proofing requirements. A Trust Framework could thereby certify external 
credential providers against the Levels of Assurance. This way, potential 
identity providers could be certified to a specific Level, and agencies Ð relying 
parties (RPs) Ð could accept an IDPÕs credentials for services at that Level. 
FICAM codified how it would approve Trust Framework Providers in its Trust 
Framework Provider Adoption Process (TFPAP) (ICAM, 2009d). A 
government administrator explained: 
Ò[W]e couldnÕt be the entity to go out and do the assessments of 
everyone. É So what got built out of that in the next phase É was we 
developed the Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process, where we 
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said É if we can work with entities that are operating under that same 
trust model, in other words policy compliance É and an assessment 
that theyÕre following their policies and procedures É then, if we can 
assess those Trust Framework Providers and their rules and how they 
go about certifying, then itÕs a much more scalable model ÉÓ (G003, 
Interview) 
Through this model, FICAM could amalgamate all federal requirements for the 
use of external credentials. This relieved federal agencies of many of the 
burdens connected to complying with the executive order to accept external 
credentials. Don Thibeau, Chairman of the Open Identity Exchange, an initial 
Trust Framework Provider, explained: 
ÒÉ if you think about Trust Frameworks, [they are] basically sets of 
specifications for interoperability. É the government would set out 
[specifications] that would also include a standard set of privacy 
requirements that had to be met in order for a commercial identity 
provider to be certified as per the É requirements that FICAM 
outlined.  So, the opportunity was that É FICAM aggregated privacy 
requirements across multiple government agencies.Ó (Thibeau, 
Interview) 
Identity Scheme Adoption 
The core of FICAMÕs citizen credentialing activities is the exchange of identity 
and attribute assertions between federal and non-federal entities. At a 
fundamental level, this means the passage of digital messages between the 
entities; putting Ôbits on the wire.Õ Disparate entities operate a variety of 
heterogeneous IT equipment and software. For two or more entities to 
interoperate with each otherÕs IT systems, they must agree upon the method of 
interoperation. This is the domain of standards and protocols, which define 
ways for technical systems to interoperate with one another. For FICAM to 
harmonise the elements necessary for government relying parties to accept 
credentials from a set of as-yet unknown identity providers it needed to 
stipulate technical interoperability specifications Ð how to send and interpret 
the bits on the wire Ð for each party to communicate.  
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A number of federated identity management standards existed. The standards 
could be configured in a variety of ways; they were supersets of all possible 
features. To meet its technical, security and privacy requirements, FICAM 
needed to constrain the standardsÕ features. FICAM termed the constrained 
subsets ÒschemesÓ and created a formal Identity Scheme Adoption Process 
(ICAM, 2009a). Three identity standards were selected to go through the 
Scheme Adoption Process: OpenID 2.0, Secure Assertion Markup Language 
2.0 (SAML), and Identity Metasystem Interoperability 1.0 (IMI). FICAMÕs 
Architecture Working Group evaluated each standard for its suitability in 
government federation efforts. This included selecting the subset of features 
and configuration that would meet FICAMÕs requirements. One government 
administrator recalled: 
ÒSo FICAM says well letÕs build the policies for how we can adopt 
technologies, standards and protocols in the federal government and 
how we go about doing that.  So we called that mix of technologies, 
protocols and standards, ÔschemesÕÉ And so we wrote a policy 
document É calledÉ the Scheme Adoption Process.É And so, that 
document [says] in order to adopt the scheme, theyÕll have to be 
industry-based consensus standards in place, standards have to be 
around long enough to mature to the point where there [are] sufficient 
products implementing those standardsÉÓ (G003, Interview) 
Pseudonymous Identifiers 
Each of the three schemes adopted by FICAM was configured to allow the 
option for relying parties to request a pseudonymous identifier. With regard to 
the citizen credentialing component of US identity management policy, the 
scheme configuration is currently the most concrete technical requirement for 
unlinkability. In theory, a citizen could use a digital identity credential from a 
FICAM-approved provider to access a federal resource. The hosting agency 
could request the provider to send a pseudonym in lieu of personally 
identifying information (PII) about the citizen. However, Level of Assurance 3 
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and 4 require a meaningful name to be transmitted as part of an identity 
assertion. Ergo, unlinkability is only possible in Level of Assurance 1 and 2 
transactions (Burr, et al., 2011).  
 
The identity scheme configurations pre-date FICAM, originating in the 
Electronic Authentication Partnership (G008, Interview; P006, Interview). The 
same consultants, Chris Louden and Dave Silver, were involved in the 
technical efforts of both EAP and FICAM, and FICAM inherited many of the 
configurations created for EAP (P006, Interview). This included the 
requirement for an ability to use pseudonymous identifiers. The impetus for the 
requirement was the consultantsÕ informal support of the principle of data 
minimisation (P006, Interview). One recent definition of data minimisation in 
US policy is: 
ÒOrganizations should only collect PII that is directly relevant and 
necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s) and only retain PII for 
as long as is necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s)Ó (White 
House, 2011, p. 45).  
This principle is part of what are commonly referred to as the Fair Information 
Practice Principles, or FIPPs, seen as influential on US informational privacy 
policies (explained further below) (G001, Interview; G003, Interview; G006, 
Interview; N005, Interview; Gellman, 2012). The relationship between 
unlinkability and data minimisation is discussed in the ÒRelationship to 
minimisationÓ section below. 
Privacy Criteria 
In addition to the limited privacy considerations codified in the adopted 
schemes, the Trust Framework Adoption Process (ICAM, 2009c) contained 
privacy requirements for prospective identity providers. The criteria were:  
ÒOpt-in: IDPs must obtain positive confirmation from an end user 
before transmitting any information to any government applications. 
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Minimalism: IDP must only transmit attribute information that was 
explicitly requested by an RP. 
 
Activity Tracking: IDPs must not disclose information on end user 
activities with anyone and must not use the information for any purpose 
other than the federated identity service. 
 
Adequate Notice: IDPs must provide adequate notice of the nature of 
authentication events, any transactions with the RP, the purpose of the 
transactions, and a description of any disclosure or transmission of PII 
to any party. 
 
Non-Compulsory: Agencies should provide alternative forms of access 
so that a 3rd party identity service is not required to access federal 
resources. 
 
Termination: In the event that and IDP terminates its federated identity 
service, it shall continue to protect any PII it holds." (ICAM, 2009c, p. 
12) 
 
It should be noted that the above definition of ÔMinimalismÕ is not a full 
evocation of the data minimisation principle contained in the FIPPs and related 
privacy frameworks. In the TFPAP definition, the ÔburdenÕ of minimising the 
data falls exclusively on federal agencies. However, the recommendation and 
requirement for pseudonymous identifiers in the identity schemes shifts some 
of the burden back to the identity providers. 
 
The privacy criteria were authored by members of the Identity Management 
Subcommittee of the Privacy Subcommittee of the CIO Council. Two 
administrators recalled: 
ÒÉ when we established the ICAM Subcommittee, a few folks from 
the Privacy Subcommittee came to us and said, ÒPrivacy: bake it in, 
donÕt bolt it on.Ó É And, so Naomi Lefkovitz É and Debra Diener É 
They established an identity management subcommittee under the 
Privacy committee with Debbie and Naomi leading it É So the privacy 
language in the ICAM roadmap was drafted by them.Ó (G001, 
Interview) 
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ÒThere is an interagency Privacy Council which are privacy leads for 
different federal agencies É tying that group into FICAM was really 
that bridge.É So the work that É spearheaded applying FIPPs to 
FICAM requirements originated out of that group É I think that they 
relished the opportunity that they were being brought into the FICAM 
picture and were able to work on policies that would be implemented 
É They responded very strongly to being included in the FICAM 
development and initiativeÉ.Ó (G003, Interview) 
The privacy criteria were added near the end of the FICAM development 
process, and largely focused on restricting the behaviour of identity providers, 
not government relying parties (G004, Interview; G006, Interview; N003, 
Interview). At the time of this writing, privacy guidance for government 
agencies is still in an unpublished, draft form (G009, Interview). The privacy 
criteria became part of the assessment performed against identity providers in 
order to become a FICAM-approved credential provider. An administrator 
explained: 
ÒÉ FICAM went one step further and said, ÔWell, we also have these 
privacy principles that we want applied to any IDP,Õ and itÕs up to the 
Trust Framework provider to build the infrastructure for how that 
assessment is performed for identity providers: the policy É procedural 
É and the operational compliance of any provider, and to do that 
certification of providers.Ó (G003, Interview) 
FIPPs in FICAM 
The FICAM privacy criteria are largely informed by and derived from the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (G001, Interview; G003, Interview; G006, 
Interview; Greenwood, Interview). The eight principles of the FIPPs are: 
Ò¥ Transparency: Organizations should be transparent and notify 
individuals regarding collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance 
of personally identifiable information (PII). 
¥ Individual Participation: Organizations should involve the individual 
in the process of using PII and, to the extent practicable, seek individual 
consent for the collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of PII. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
139 
Organizations should also provide mechanisms for appropriate access, 
correction, and redress regarding use of PII.   
¥ Purpose Specification: Organizations should specifically articulate the 
authority that permits the collection of PII and specifically articulate the 
purpose or purposes for which the PII is intended to be used.   
¥ Data Minimization: Organizations should only collect PII that is 
directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s) 
and only retain PII for as long as is necessary to fulfill the specified 
purpose(s).   
¥ Use Limitation: Organizations should use PII solely for the purpose(s) 
specified in the notice. Sharing PII should be for a purpose compatible 
with the purpose for which the PII was collected. 
¥ Data Quality and Integrity: Organizations should, to the extent 
practicable, ensure that PII is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. 
¥ Security: Organizations should protect PII (in all media) through 
appropriate security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized 
access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate 
disclosure.  
¥ Accountability and Auditing: Organizations should be accountable for 
complying with these principles, providing training to all employees 
and contractors who use PII, and auditing the actual use of PII to 
demonstrate compliance with these principles and all applicable privacy 
protection requirements.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 45) 
 
From the above principles, ÒTransparencyÓ and ÒPurpose SpecificationÓ inform 
FICAMÕs ÒAdequate NoticeÓ provision (see pp. 125-126). ÒIndividual 
ParticipationÓ informs the requirement for ÒOpt-In.Ó ÒData MinimizationÓ 
informs FICAMÕs ÒMinimalismÓ requirement and is supported by the 
pseudonymity features of the identity schemes. ÒSecurityÓ informs the 
ÒTerminationÓ provision, and ÒAccountability and AuditingÓ supports the 
requirement for on-going audits of identity providers specified by the Trust 
Framework Provider Adoption Process (ICAM, 2009d, pp. 12-13) 
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The FIPPs themselves have evolved since the early 1970s (Gellman, 2012). 
Beginning with the US Department of Health, Education and WelfareÕs (1973) 
report, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, the core principles of 
the FIPPs have appeared in a variety of US and European laws and policy 
instruments, including the Privacy Act of 1974, the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), and the 
European Data Protection Directive (1995) (Gellman, 2012, pp. 2-7). Some 
respondents viewed FICAMÕs application of the FIPPs as a positive, 
evolutionary step in US privacy policy (G003, Interview; Greenwood, 
Interview). One administrator opined: 
ÒSo what FICAM did was bold in saying É Ôthese are the rules, these 
are the privacy rules that we are going to apply to this online 
environment with the federal government as relying partyÉ.Õ They 
didnÕt base it on the Privacy Act, they didnÕt try to extend the Privacy 
Act É to non-federal entities or non-federal information systems. What 
they said was, ÔThis is how you are going to do business with us and 
these are our rules and it is important.ÕÓ (G003, Interview) 
Dazza Greenwood, an MIT lecturer and legal expert on identity management, 
observed: 
ÒThe fact that there are some fair information practices in FICAM 
assessment criteria at all is a major step forward toward fair information 
practices in the United States and itÕs good.Ó (Greenwood, Interview) 
Cybersecurity Policy Review 
As FICAM was developing its policies, the White House (2009, p. iii) released 
a Cyberspace Policy Review, a Òcomprehensive, Ôclean-slateÕ review to assess 
U.S. policies and structures for cybersecurityÓ ordered by President Barack 
Obama in the early part of his presidency. This Review highlighted identity 
management as critical to the development of comprehensive national 
cybersecurity while also focusing on privacy:  
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ÒWe cannot improve cybersecurity without improving authentication.É 
Identity management also has the potential to enhance privacy through 
additional protection against the inappropriate release of personally 
identifiable information.Ó (White House, 2009, p. 33) 
One administrator described the realisation in government of the importance of 
identity management: 
ÒSo what happened in 2009 or so there was this realisation that as a 
government we werenÕt paying as much attention to identity 
management as we should be and it was becoming the new important 
thing when it comes to information security.Ó (G001, Interview) 
The FICAM Roadmap (ICAM, 2009c, p. 1) cites the Cyberspace Policy 
Review as a specific policy influence: 
ÒIdentity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) efforts within 
the Federal Government are a key enabler for addressing the nationÕs 
cybersecurity need. The Cyberspace Policy Review includes an entire 
section on the use of identity management in addressing cyber threats. 
The report includes a near-term action to develop Ôa cybersecurity-
based identity management vision and strategy that addresses privacy 
and civil liberties interests, leveraging privacy-enhancing technologies 
for the Nation.ÕÓ 
OpenID and the Open Identity Exchange 
The Chief Information Officer of the US government, a member of the Obama 
Administration (2008Ð2016), informed the FICAM administrators that 
OpenID, a federated identity standard, should be a priority (G003, Interview; 
Scott David [David], Interview; Thibeau, Interview). It was deemed valuable 
because of its ostensible ubiquity (G003, Interview). OpenID went through the 
Scheme Adoption Process and it was determined that the standard would need 
to be altered to accommodate the governmentÕs requirements (N003, 
Interview). Ultimately, the OpenID 2.0 specification became able to be adopted 
by FICAM. A government administrator recalled: 
ÒOur Chief Information Officer came to us at GSA and said É 
Ômillions of people have these OpenIDs. Figure out how the federal 
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government can accept them.Õ  So [for] the Scheme Adoption Process 
É we would usually look to demand from the federal government 
agencies for [a] particular technology or protocol. In this case, the CIO 
of the government said, ÔFigure out how to use OpenIDs.Õ So, we 
looked at the Scheme Adoption Process, applied that, adopted the 
OpenID specification and how it would be implemented.Ó (G003, 
Interview) 
To embrace OpenID technology, the CIO of the US Government approached 
the Open Identity Foundation (OIDF), the organization responsible for 
managing the OpenID standard (G003, Interview; David, Interview; Thibeau, 
Interview). The OIDF is largely comprised of industry players who have a 
stake in the commercial dimension of the OpenID standard. Don Thibeau 
recalled: 
Ò[T]he government sought out the OpenID Foundation because they 
saw it frankly as two things. One: a singular place where they could 
talk to many companies; companies like Microsoft in the enterprise 
space, Google in search, Facebook in social, Symantec and others in 
security. So, from the governmentÕs point of view, they looked for an 
efficient way to talk to industry. And É from a process point of view, it 
is easier for them to engage non-profit organisations Ð standards-
oriented organisations Ð than it is for-profit.Ó (Thibeau, Interview) 
There was disagreement among members as to whether to engage with the 
federal government, so a new organization was spawned specifically to meet 
the governmentÕs needs: the Open Identity Exchange (OIX) (David, Interview; 
Thibeau, Interview). Don Thibeau explained: 
ÒÉ the reaction from the Open Identity Foundation was mixed. Some 
companies saw that engagement as an inevitable or necessary or 
positive one and others wanted to take a much more passive role. So 
essentially the OIX was created in part with a grant from the OpenID 
Foundation but also funding from companies like Google, AT&T, 
Verizon and othersÉ So some of the member companies É saw this 
É engagement with the government as a necessary function of their 
footprint in the industry, and other companies É did not see that this 
was the time or the manner that they wanted to engage the government 
in these kinds of issues. So the OIX was created and some companies 
joined and other companies have not.Ó (Thibeau, Interview) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
143 
OIX became the testing ground for the Trust Framework Provider model. As a 
provisionally-accepted TFP, OIX oversaw the certification of five companies: 
Google, Equifax, PayPal, VeriSign and Wave Systems (IDManagement.gov, 
n.d. a). OIX engaged a professional in the IT auditing community, John 
Steenson, to be the initial Assessor to certify that the companiesÕ operational, 
technical and privacy policies were comparable to FICAMÕs requirements 
(Thibeau, Interview). 
 
Three other Trust Framework Providers were ultimately approved: the Kantara 
Initiative, the entity born of the merger of the Electronic Authentication 
Partnership and the Liberty Alliance; InCommon, a federation operator focused 
on higher education and research institutions and relevant commercial actors; 
and SAFE-BioPharma, an industry association of medical and pharmaceutical 
organisations and supporting companies (IDManagement.gov, n.d. b). 
National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace 
In April of 2011, the White House (2011, p. i) released the National Strategy 
for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), Òa strategy to make online 
transactions more secure for businesses and consumers alike.Ó The NSTIC 
envisioned an Ôidentity ecosystemÕ comprised of all parties who have a stake in 
trustworthy online interactions Ð individuals, organizations and governments 
ÒÉwhere individuals and organizations will be able to trust each other because 
they follow agreed upon standards to obtain and authenticate their digital 
identities.ÉÓ (White House, 2011, p. 2). The NSTIC is an Òaspirational 
policyÓ (G007, Interview) that serves as a rallying point for US identity 
management efforts, though does not carry the force of legislation. It is Ôsoft 
lawÕ Ð the US is encouraging it as a national strategy but it is neither a formal 
compliance regime nor does it carry sanctions. It emphasises that US national 
identity management efforts are to be industry-led, digital identities are to be 
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voluntary and not a form of national ID, and that identity solutions are to be 
privacy-enhancing. 
 
The NSTIC states clearly that private industry should lead the efforts to create 
more trustworthy online credentials for the citizenry: 
ÒThe private sector will lead the development and implementation of 
this Identity Ecosystem, and it will own and operate the vast majority of 
the services within it. The Identity Ecosystem should be market-driven, 
and it should provide a foundation for the development of new and 
innovative services.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 4) 
ÒThe role of the Federal Government is to support and enable the 
private sector ÉÓ (White House, 2011, p. 4) 
ÒÉ the Identity Ecosystem will emphasize non-proprietary, 
international, and industry-led standards.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 14) 
This emphasis relates to the governmentÕs awareness of the strong antipathy 
towards national identification, explored in the National ID theme section 
below. The private character of US citizen credentials is a key difference with 
German policy; this is explored in Chapter 7. Relatedly, the NSTIC explicitly 
states that it is not part of plan to create a national ID: 
ÒÉ the Strategy does not advocate for the establishment of a national 
identification card or system ÉÓ (White House, 2011, p. 8) 
It further states that participation in the proposed identity ecosystem will be 
voluntary: 
ÒÉ participation in the Identity Ecosystem will be voluntary: the 
government will neither mandate that individuals obtain an Identity 
Ecosystem credential nor that companies require Identity Ecosystem 
credentials from consumers as the only means to interact with them.Ó 
(White House, 2011, p. 12) 
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This clear language illustrates the governmentÕs perceived need to allay 
AmericansÕ fear that NSTIC credentials would be used as part of a national 
identification effort.  
 
The NSTIC states that identity solutions are to be privacy-enhancing: 
ÒThe enhancement of privacy and support of civil liberties is a guiding 
principle of the envisioned Identity Ecosystem.Ó (White House, 2011, 
p. 2) 
ÒThe role of the Federal Government is to É enhance the protection of 
individuals; and ensure the guiding principles of privacy ÉÓ (White 
House, 2011, p. 4) 
Notably, the NSTIC specifically identifies pseudonymity and anonymity as key 
goals: 
ÒIt is vital to maintain the capacity for anonymity and pseudonymity in 
Internet transactions in order to enhance individualsÕ privacy and 
otherwise support civil liberties.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 1) 
ÒIn addition to privacy protections, the Identity Ecosystem will 
preserve online anonymity and pseudonymity, including anonymous 
browsing.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 2) 
ÒNor does the Strategy seek to circumscribe the ability of individuals to 
communicate anonymously or pseudonymously, which is vital to 
protect free speech and freedom of association.Ó (White House, 2011, 
p. 8) 
This language is a significant public commitment to modern privacy principles. 
Furthermore, the NSTIC details unlinkability goals without naming them as 
such: 
ÒThe Identity Ecosystem will use privacy-enhancing technology and 
policies to inhibit the ability of service providers to link an individualÕs 
transactions, thus ensuring that no one service provider can gain a 
complete picture of an individualÕs life in cyberspace.Ó (White House, 
2011, p. 2). 
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ÒThe offline world has structural barriers that preserve individual 
privacy by limiting information collection, use, and disclosure to a 
specific context. For example, consider a driverÕs license: an individual 
can use a driverÕs license to open a bank account, board an airplane, or 
view an age-restricted movie at the cinema, but the Department of 
Motor Vehicles does not know every place that accepts driverÕs 
licenses as identification. It is also difficult for the bank, the airport, and 
the movie theater to collaborate and link the transactions together.Ó 
(White House, 2011, p. 11) 
 ÒThe Identity Ecosystem willÉ protect individuals from those who 
would link individualsÕ transactions in order to track individualsÕ online 
activities.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 17) 
Ò[Strong privacy] protections will ensure that the default behaviour of 
Identity Ecosystem providers is to: É Minimize data aggregation and 
linkages across transactions ÉÓ (White House, 2011, p. 30) 
This type of language occurs in very limited amounts in other US policy 
documents (Federal Trade Commission, 2012; White House, 2012). Partly, this 
is because the NSTIC is a more of a call to action than an implementable 
policy initiative. But, in contrast to existing US law and data protection 
frameworks, it is ambitious language that has the potential to inform the 
character of future policy. This is certainly the case in the design of the Federal 
Cloud Credential Exchange, detailed below. 
 
The NSTIC highlights the role of standards in its privacy protection goals: 
Ò... privacy-enhancing technical standards ... will minimize the 
transmission of unnecessary information and eliminate the superfluous 
ÔleakageÕ of information that can be invisibly collected by third parties. 
Such standards will also minimize the ability to link credential use 
among multiple service providers, thereby preventing them from 
developing a complete picture of an individualÕs activities online.Ó 
(White House, 2011, p. 12) 
This is evidence of the technocratic nature of identity management policy, and 
it points out the need for multi-stakeholder governance. The above quote 
illustrates policy that intersects the norms and values of governments and 
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standards developers. It also shows the critical role of technical standards in 
identity management. This is evident in the German case as well. German 
unlinkability relies on established standards for cryptography and secure 
internet communications. When the German government determined that the 
basis for exchanging passwords across a contactless card interface was 
insecure, it created a new, more secure standard that was ultimately adopted by 
an international standards body. See Chapter 6 for a complete explanation. 
 
The NSTIC grounds its privacy rationale in the Fair Information Practice 
Principles: 
ÒThe Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) are the widely 
accepted framework for evaluating and mitigating privacy impactsÉ 
The envisioned Identity Ecosystem will be grounded in a holistic 
implementation of the FIPPs in order to provide multi-faceted privacy 
protections.Ó (White House, 2011, pp. 11-12) 
ÒÉ a FIPPs-based approach will promote the creation and adoption of 
privacy-enhancing technical standards ÉÓ (White House, 2011, p. 12) 
ÒÉ implementation of the FIPPs will protect individualsÕ capacity to 
engage anonymously in cyberspace. Universal adoption of the FIPPs in 
the envisioned Identity Ecosystem will enable a variety of transactions, 
including anonymous, anonymous with validated attributes, 
pseudonymous, and uniquely identified Ð while providing robust 
privacy protections that promote usability and trust.Ó (White House, 
2011, p.12) 
The NSTIC authors needed to use the non-binding FIPPs as a basis because of 
the lack of other applicable frameworks (such as an omnibus personal data 
protection law) to draw upon. As with FICAM, some respondents saw 
NSTICÕs use of and reliance on the Fair Information Practice Principles as an 
important step in the advancement of privacy goals in the United States (G003, 
Interview; Greenwood, Interview; N005, Interview). Dazza Greenwood 
observed: 
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ÒFor the first time ever at the highest level of government with a lot of 
agency integrated effort behind it and a lot of private sector 
cheerleading around it, we have a couldnÕt-be-more-clear statement that 
FIPPs needs to apply across the whole society and every sector of the 
economy.É ThatÕs notable to me.Ó (Greenwood, Interview) 
 
NSTIC has been described as ÔFICAM for the commercial domainÕ (G001, 
Interview; G007, Interview; N002, Interview), and it clearly draws upon 
FICAMÕs earlier policy development. A government administrator noted:  
ÒFICAM is how the government is taking caring of its own space; the 
government is a first or second party to a transaction. So if you think of 
somebodyÉ thereÕs a lake and somebody drops something in the 
middle of the water É thatÕs FICAM. And as the ripples go out, thatÕs 
NSTIC. So we take the work that we did in FICAM and weÕre applying 
it, weÕre saying, ÔCan we create that same kind of trusted environment 
that weÕre creating for ourselves for the rest of the country?Õ And so the 
work weÕve done in FICAM is informing the work that weÕre doing in 
NSTIC.Ó (G001, Interview) 
Accordingly, the NSTIC declares an intention to integrate FICAMÕs policy 
development: 
ÒThe Federal Government is already seeking to create this world for its 
own operations by executing the Federal Identity, Credential, and 
Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap. The Strategy seeks to 
accelerate those activities and to foster the development of an Identity 
Ecosystem in which trusted identities are available to any individual or 
organization.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 6). 
ÒBuilding upon FICAM, all online Federal Executive Branch services 
are aligned appropriately with the Identity Ecosystem and, where 
appropriate, accept identities and credentials from at least one of the 
trustmarked private-sector identity providers.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 
41) 
Relatedly, an administrator remarked that the policy influence between FICAM 
and NSTIC goes both ways: 
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ÒÉ if by some chance the NSTIC comes across É something new and 
wonderful that FICAM didnÕt think of, weÕll go back in and FICAM 
will get adjusted.Ó (G001, Interview) 
National identity management policy includes credentialing activities for e-
government and commercial use. The thesis finds that e-government, the 
delivery of public services and citizen digital identities are intrinsically tied 
together. However, digital identity is multi-faceted, and the separation between 
public uses of citizen credentials and private/commercial uses of them is an 
artificial one. This is well illustrated by the US Personal Identification 
Verification (PIV) initiative to create reliable credentials for physical and 
logical access by federal employees and contractors. PIV cards are issued by 
the federal government, but PIV-interoperable (PIV-I) cards, based on identical 
technical and operation rules, provide access to both federal resources and to 
private ones (Smart Card Alliance, 2012). National identity management 
policies and standards influence and are influenced by private endeavour. The 
definition of identity management policy, proposed in Chapters 4 and 7, 
accounts for this public/private relationship. 
Federal Cloud Credential Exchange 
Building, configuring and maintaining the technology necessary to accept 
identity assertions is non-trivial. In early 2012, federal administrators and 
policy-makers realized they needed additional infrastructure to enable agencies 
to accept externally-created credentials. Federal relying parties were not 
positioned to accept credentials despite ten years of various IDM initiatives. 
The one exception to this was the National Institutes of Health, who built a 
federated identity system called iTrust in 2009 (G004, Interview). To 
harmonise efforts and achieve economies of scale, government officials 
decided to procure technical infrastructure that could be centrally controlled 
and made available to all agencies. The infrastructure was dubbed the Federal 
Cloud Credential Exchange, illustrated below.  
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Figure 5.3  Proposed Federal Cloud Credential Exchange 
 
 
 
This proposed infrastructure would minimise start-up and maintenance costs 
for agencies, and accelerate policy implementation. Further, the FCCX would 
offer an additional technical layer to enforce privacy policies. The FCCX 
would sit between identity providers and relying parties, in theory providing 
the ability to blind identity providers and relying parties from one another. One 
senior official noted that the FCCX is a government-wide implementation of 
the NIH iTrust service (G004, Interview). 
 
A stated goal of the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange is Ò[p]reserving 
privacy (minimize storage of personal information and ÔpanopticalityÕ of the 
service)Ó (Gallagher and Lefkovitz, 2012). Panopticality is a reference to the 
Òpanopticon,Ó an 18th century prison design by Jeremy Bentham (1995) that 
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allows all prison cells to be seen into while preventing prisoners from knowing 
when they are being watched. It is a common trope in privacy discourse, 
emphasizing the invisible, pervasive monitoring possible in electronic systems 
(Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 2003; Reiman, 1995; Uteck, 2009). Explaining its 
application here, FICAM and NSTIC officials write that panopticality is:  
Ò 1. It is the ability of Credential Providers to ÔseeÕ all the Service 
Providers to which a citizen authenticates  
2. It is the visibility that the FCCX service itself may have into the 
citizen information that is flowing thru [sic] itÓ (Gallagher and 
Lefkovitz, 2012) 
 
The evolving, proposed architecture for the FCCX enables a degree of 
unlinkability that prior architectures, relying solely on the inherent privacy 
characteristics of SAML and OpenID, were unable to achieve. Those two 
protocols were able to provide a pseudonym for each user on a per-relying 
party basis Ð each relying party would see a different pseudonym for the same 
user. Without other identifying information (such as an email address), this 
would prevent one relying party from knowing that the user was visiting 
another relying party. However, the identity provider would know everywhere 
the user used her credential. The FCCX has the potential to not only blind 
relying parties from one another, but also blind the identity provider from the 
particular uses of its credential. A citizen could use a trusted credential at 
multiple relying parties, but each relying party would be ignorant as to which 
other relying parties the citizen visited. And, the identity provider would be 
ignorant to all of the relying parties she visited. Also, the FCCX ÔlayerÕ itself 
would, in theory, also not retain information about a userÕs activity (G009, 
Interview). 
 
At the time of this writing, the FCCX is still in a design phase. If implemented 
in the manner described above, it would be the USÕs most comprehensive set 
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of policy and technical requirements for unlinkability. In August 2013, 
SecureKey, a Toronto-based identity management and security company, was 
awarded a contract to build and manage a one-year pilot of the FCCX 
(SecureKey, 2013). SecureKey was previously involved in national identity 
management initiatives in Canada. 
Policy summary 
To summarise, as of September 2013, the privacy goal of unlinkability is 
emerging within US identity management policy aimed at citizens. Identity 
providers using FICAMÕs approved configuration of the OpenID protocol are 
required to use a pseudonym for each relying party that a user visits, and it is a 
recommended practice for SAML-based credentials. This is true, though, only 
for transactions at Level of Assurance 1 and 2. The proposed FCCX will also 
technically enforce unlinkability, but is still being designed, and so details are 
not yet available. With regards to non-technical enforcement, FICAMÕs 
Activity Tracking requirement prevents identity providers from using and 
sharing information they learn in the course of providing credentials to users. 
Practically, this means they may not link information about a citizenÕs e-
government usage with anything else they know about her, or share that 
information with business partners. As to the National Strategy for Trusted 
Identities in Cyberspace, pilot projects are only just being funded to explore a 
range of topics. The strong unlinkability language it espouses is as yet a 
strategic goal; an aspiration of the various stakeholders and authors that 
contributed to it. In September 2012, the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology announced an award of $9 million to five US organisations to 
create pilot projects to explore the NSTICÕs goals of privacy-preserving, secure 
online transactions.  
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Themes 
The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to exploring various themes that 
emerged from the data in order gain a holistic picture of the origins and future 
of US unlinkability. The themes were generated through analysis of the 
empirical data and a review of primary and secondary sources. Given the 
paucity of academic research of US citizen credentialing generally and 
unlinkability specifically, most of the themes were discovered inductively 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006) and through review of literature on broader identity 
management subjects. See the Analysis sub-heading in Chapter 3 for a 
complete explanation of the thematic analysis techniques employed. The 
headings of the sections are derived from the thematic coding and analysis of 
the data. 
 
The first part of this section explores the influence of the American rejection of 
national identification systems. In relation to the thematic categories generated 
during analysis of the empirical data, national identification was a major issue 
that emerged from the Cultural category. Following this, various policy and 
technical dimensions of unlinkability are analysed, including data 
minimisation, enforcement, and the translation of the physical world into the 
electronic. These emerged from the analytic categories of Policy and 
Architecture & Standards. The next section details how US identity 
management policies are intrinsically tied to commercial interests and 
standards. This emerged from the Business analytic category. An analysis of 
policy compliance versus policy comparability follows, and the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the role of consultants and the criticality of 
usability issues. These arose from the Policy, Players, and Usability categories, 
respectively. 
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National ID 
A pervasive theme within this case is the spectre of a national identification 
system. Or rather, the acknowledged political impossibility of proposing a 
policy instrument that Òsmacks of a national IDÓ (G001, Interview). When 
discussed by respondents, it was taken for granted that any proposed system 
bearing a resemblance to a national identification initiative would suffer a 
withering attack by privacy advocates, the citizenry and government officials 
alike, with no chance of coming to fruition. One administrator explained: 
ÒÉ whenever you talked about a centralised organisation managing 
identities in the federal government, you come to national ID card, even 
if itÕs a virtual national ID card. You still end up there Ð somebody will 
raise that, and then everything dies when that happens, everything 
stops.Ó (G001, Interview) 
National identification, it is feared, could lead to greater government profiling 
of citizens (G001, Interview; N005, Interview; N006, Interview). This 
constraint foreclosed the governmentÕs ability to create an authentication 
infrastructure that would be directly managed by the government itself. This 
was true even if such a programme was limited only to interaction with 
government websites (G001, Interview). The national ID constraint is the 
strongest reason that the US government chose to rely on credentials created 
externally, which in turn triggered the need to create policy instruments to 
allow government agencies to judge the validity and authenticity of those 
credentials. In countries with national identity infrastructures that lent 
themselves to online authentication of citizens, such as Germany, this need did 
not exist (see Chapter 6). Identity assertions rooted in official national identity 
schemes could be inherently trusted by agencies since the underlying processes 
that created those digital identities were administered by their respective 
governments. As such, these other countries did not create policy instruments 
akin to the Level of Assurance methodology relied upon by the United States. 
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Relationship to minimisation 
If there is a privacy/data protection policy antecedent to unlinkability, it is the 
principle of data minimisation. This principle has been formulated and restated 
in a number of US policies and reports, as well as those of the Organisation for 
Economic Coordination and Development, the European Union and other 
nations (Gellman, 2012, pp. 6-7). In 1977, a US presidential committee on 
informational privacy articulated eight principles that it believed were part of 
the US CongressÕs intent when it passed the landmark Privacy Act of 1974 
(Privacy Protection Study Commission [PPSC], 1977, Chapter 13). It dubbed 
one of those principles, ÒThe Collection Limitation PrincipleÓ: ÒThere shall be 
limits on the types of information an organization may collect about an 
individual, as well as certain requirements with respect to the manner in which 
it collects such informationÓ (PPSC, 1977, chapter 13; Gellman, 2012, p. 4). In 
the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, the Collection Limitation Principle is restated as 
ÒThere should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data 
should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the 
knowledge or consent of the data subjectÓ (Gellman, 2012, p. 6; OECD, 1980, 
Part Two). The NSTIC recasts this principle under the heading Data 
Minimization: 
ÒOrganizations should only collect [personally identifiable information] 
that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the specified 
purpose(s) and only retain [personally identifiable information] for as 
long as is necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s)Ó (White House, 
2011, p. 45).  
Seen through this lens, unlinkability is an attempt to minimise the amount of 
information collected and shared about a personÕs online activity. This 
principle was cited by some as a justification for the inclusion of pseudonymity 
requirements and/or unlinkability goals (G006, Interview; P005, Interview) It 
places unlinkability in the broader context of the global evolution of privacy 
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principles; as an application of prior privacy goals to the changing technical 
landscape of an electronic society. The data minimisation principle is also 
international in scope, which partly explains the appearance of unlinkability 
policy goals in countries such as Canada, the UK, Germany, and Austria. 
Spectrum of enforcement 
Unlinkability is a not a uniform state; it is a multi-dimensional technical and 
policy strategy. It is best viewed, with regard to policy, as a spectrum. 
Drummond Reed, a former Executive Director of the Open Identity Exchange 
and the Information Card Foundation, a standards development organisation, 
conceptualises unlinkability as a Ôlevel of blindnessÕ:  
ÒBlindness is probably a good metaphor becauseÉ my great-great aunt 
was legally blind, and she could still see enough to do a few things.Ó 
(Drummond Reed [Reed], Interview) 
ReedÕs views on unlinkability can be expressed in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 5.4  Reed's spectrum of unlinkability 
 
 
 
One side of the spectrum, the highest degree of unlinkability, is mathematical 
impossibility, where a credentialing system employs cryptography thought to 
be mathematically unbreakable. Next is the computationally unfeasible, 
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unfeasible to break given the state of modern computing. ÒAnd those two are 
so close,Ó Reed notes, Ò[that] I donÕt spend a lot of time distinguishing between 
them, because the technologies [that] are able to achieve either one are 
relatively few.ÉÓ (Reed, Interview). The next point on the spectrum is Òlegal 
or practical protectionÓ (Reed, Interview), where a system is configured in a 
privacy-preserving way but without the use of cryptography. For example, an 
identity provider can send a different pseudonym to each relying party, 
blinding the relying parties to the userÕs other activity. In this case, the identity 
provider knows where the user is going, but because of legal or contractual 
reasons would restrict disseminating the information; the relying parties would 
be denied the information by design. The final points on the spectrum are legal 
norms and social norms Ð external forces that are not enshrined in a system 
design, but exert a pressure nonetheless to constrain the release of information 
about a personÕs online activity. These could be contracts, laws, or cultural 
barriers. The spectrum of unlinkability is also a spectrum of enforcement, from 
a reliance on the technical to reliance on social forces.  
 
ReedÕs spectrum is a valuable tool in evaluating policy choices. In service of 
improving policy-making, explicating the ÔlevelsÕ of unlinkability provides a 
greater array of responses to the policy problem of protecting privacy in the 
digital identity space. Analytically, it allows for Germany and the US to be 
compared in way that preserves the particular methods each countryÕs policy-
makers pursued. This reflects the interdisciplinary nature of identity 
management research, marrying computer science with policy analysis. 
Relationship to Activity Tracking 
The privacy requirements section of the Trust Framework Provider Adoption 
Process includes a ban on ÒActivity TrackingÓ:  
ÒCommercial Identity Provider must not disclose information on End 
User activities with the government to any party, or use the information 
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for any purpose other than federated authenticationÓ (ICAM, 2009d, p. 
12)  
In line with ReedÕs spectrum of unlinkability, this requirement can be seen as a 
legal/practical constraint on the release of information pertaining to a userÕs 
online activity. Since an identity provider will know everywhere a user logs in, 
this restriction by FICAM creates a form of unlinkability by preventing the 
identity provider from sharing knowledge of a userÕs online activity. It is a 
legal/practical constraint because the identity provider is limited by FICAMÕs 
requirements as promulgated by the managing Trust Framework. 
Translating the physical world to the electronic 
Part of the intention behind a policy of unlinkability is to recreate social 
conditions in the physical world. There is a perennial reference to the privacy 
characteristics inherent in a driverÕs license: 
ÒThe offline world has structural barriers that preserve individual 
privacy by limiting information collection, use, and disclosure to a 
specific context. For example, consider a driverÕs license: an individual 
can use a driverÕs license to open a bank account, board an airplane, or 
view an age-restricted movie at the cinema, but the Department of 
Motor Vehicles does not know every place that accepts driverÕs 
licenses as identification. It is also difficult for the bank, the airport, and 
the movie theatre to collaborate and link the transactions together.Ó 
(White House, 2011, p. 11) 
The same unlinkable arrangement is evident with the use of cash. Though cash 
ÔassertsÕ a monetary value rather than identity attributes, the effect is the same. 
A governmentÕs mint (the identity provider) releases cash (a credential) that 
can be trusted and used by merchants (relying parties) without being able to 
link the cash to the person or to the other uses the cash has been subject to. 
Andrew Nash, GoogleÕs former head of identity management, was involved in 
the development of the identity federation technology, SAML. He noted that 
mimicking the unlinkable qualities of cash was an intentional goal: 
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ÒÉ in the Liberty Alliance when we actually defined [unlinkability] for 
SAML usage models, we were trying to protect the privacy of the users 
so that we could keep some level of anonymity as an analogue to a 
cash-based societyÉ [that] was kind of the motivation. And it you 
know it makes sense. ThereÕs a whole a bunch of things you could do 
without you actually giving away who you are.Ó (Andrew Nash [Nash], 
Interview) 
Another subject viewed the analogies to cash and the driverÕs license as a 
design ethos within the technical communities of identity management: 
ÒItÕs just a beautiful thing, right? ItÕs like cash and the driverÕs 
licenceÉ you take it for granted, itÕs such a beautiful thing. And we are 
so far from doing that onlineÉ I think the techies and a lot of the 
[identity technology community], we just canÕt help it. We get up in the 
morning and we think about distributed systems, we think about anti-
centralisation whatever, we try to shift control out to the edge of 
networks and we all feel, I think we all have this natural feeling like 
shouldnÕt we be sovereign actors, and shouldnÕt information about us 
be sort of as much as possible under our fingertips and controls?... [I]tÕs 
just a natural response to say, ÔWell, why we donÕt build systems like 
that?Õ And the real world works that way. When you pull your wallet 
out with your cards, and itÕs a very private, secret thing, whatÕs in your 
wallet É it just seems so natural to try and build a system that way.Ó 
(Paul Trevithick [Trevithick], Interview) 
However, another respondent also involved in standards development saw the 
driverÕs license example as misleading because it assumes that no other 
information is passing to the liquor store. 
ÒAssuming that you actually make a purchase, you give the merchant 
your credit card number which them gives them an omni-directional 
identifier and they can find out what last twelve things youÕve 
purchased you know, where you liveÉ so you know itÕs a nice 
theoryÉ [A]s long as you allow linkability through other mechanisms, 
you know sometimes you are just bending yourself out of shape for no 
good reason.Ó (N003, Interview) 
Commercial influences 
The quote above introduces the most important theme that emerges from the 
US case data: the inseparability of commercial considerations from policy 
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intentions. Two essential sub-themes are consistently present in the empirical 
data: the need for personal data in normal business operations, and private 
businessesÕ need to earn returns on their investments. The following sections 
explore various commercial dimensions of the policy of unlinkability. 
Need for personal data to conduct business 
Many standard business operations require personal data. Any business 
transaction that concludes with a purchase will require a payment method. For 
electronic commerce, this means a non-cash form of payment, such as a credit 
card. To ensure that a person is authorized to use a particular credit card, 
personal information is shared in the transaction: name, address, phone 
number. Most often, e-commerce websites also collect email addresses from 
customers to communicate with them, send receipts, contact them in case of 
trouble, and to personalise interaction with the site. Collecting personal data in 
the course of business is a standard operating procedure. Some of the data 
collected Ð name, email address and phone number, for example Ð are highly 
linkable data items. The same email address given out to different merchants 
makes it easy, should the merchants be owned by a common parent or 
otherwise collude to share information, to link the transactions and behaviour 
of a customer. One identity management technologist observed: 
ÒÉ the currency of the realm on the internet is [the] email address.Ó 
(Bob Morgan [Morgan], Interview) 
Businesses are accustomed to collecting this data, and so creating and using 
unlinkable architectures would be a departure from standard practice (G007, 
Interview; Morgan, Interview; N003, Interview; Trevithick, Interview). One 
identity and security expert explained: 
ÒIn general, relying parties like having more information. They are very 
uncomfortable when having purely pseudonymous or anonymous 
transactions É for account recovery or various other things that their 
back office systems require É they want some way of contacting or 
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dealing with the user.É Pretty much none of their other infrastructure 
supports this perfect unlinkability or anonymity. They may not be 
actually trying to use the identifier to link them to information in other 
systems. In general, they are not, but É the software systems that they 
have just donÕt deal with the notion of not really knowing who the user 
is except in some abstract sense.Ó (N003, Interview) 
There are not strong incentives to change business practices in favour of 
unlinkability. Consumers are, on the whole, not asking for it Ð the drive 
towards unlinkability is happening in more rarefied circles, such as among 
policy-makers and technologists (G007, Interview; Morgan, Interview). 
Personal data is valuable to businesses, for marketing, internal operations, 
personalisation and communications (N003, Interview; N006, Interview; P001, 
Interview; Nash, Interview). Commercial practice militates against reducing 
the collection of personal information. One computer scientist noted: 
Ò[I]nformation is an asset É for most people, and linkages infuse that 
information with richness and value so the asset increases, and so we 
see companies with huge valuations in the market because of all the 
linkages they have been able to assert and collect on people.Ó (P001, 
Interview) 
A privacy advocate observed: 
ÒBusinesses do not want non-correlation.ÉWhy go to all that trouble to 
not know who someone is?Ó (N006, Interview) 
Need for business cases in citizen identity management 
The issues above of collecting linkable data items pertain to commercial 
relying parties, such as online merchants. However, business considerations are 
also omnipresent for private identity providers, the issuers of credentials. In the 
course of developing policy for citizen credentialing, federal policy-makers 
conceived of a set of Ôuse casesÕ where citizens would access government 
resources with externally-created, privacy-preserving credentials. However, 
building those systems is a complex and costly endeavor (P001, Interview; 
Nash, Interview). Processes that verify identities and then strongly bind a 
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person to a credential are operationally and technically challenging. FICAM 
policy-makers and others saw these strongly authenticated, privacy-sensitive 
credentials as valuable both to the American people and to the identity 
providers who would create and manage them. However, the for-profit 
companies involved did not see similar value in providing them. They did not 
see a clear return on the investments required to alter their systems and 
augment their processes to meet the governmentÕs needs (G001, Interview; 
G003, Interview; G007, Interview; N003, Interview; Nash, Interview).  
 
The main divergence in viewpoints concerned credentials at Level of 
Assurance 2 and higher. Level of Assurance 1, which reflects little to no 
confidence in an asserted identity, does not require costly processes to validate 
a userÕs identity at enrolment; security requirements are also commensurately 
low. Most of the first group of FICAM-approved identity providers met the 
requirements for Level of Assurance 1 in their extant systems and therefore did 
not incur great costs to become certified (Nash, Interview; Wilsher, Interview). 
Higher Levels of Assurance were another matter. Levels of Assurance 2 to 4 
require stronger identity proofing methods and increasing security 
requirements. This raises costs Ð capital expenses, operating expenses, staff 
time, legal expenses Ð and increases business risk (N002, Interview; P001, 
Interview). To invest in higher assurance identity systems, commercial logic 
demands a return on that investment. As the government was not offering to 
pay identity providers, the path from investment to return was unclear. A 
government administrator stated: 
ÒHow do you monetise providing this service to the American people? 
É When you get above Level 1, weÕre having a much harder time with 
who can and will provide identity credentials.Ó (G001, Interview) 
Richard Wilsher, an identity management expert and a central figure in the 
British tScheme framework, remarked: 
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ÒLevel 1 was a dress rehearsal for the whole thing É [M]ost of the 
IDPs felt like the privacy requirements were something É they already 
met. So, it wasnÕt that difficult. Now, Level 2, Level 3 É itÕs like going 
from dress rehearsals to the real thing.Ó (Wilsher, Interview) 
Nor was there an evident demand from the identity providersÕ user bases. One 
expert recalled: 
ÒThatÕs why Yahoo! and other people just said, ÔYeah, sure, we did all 
the technical stuff to interoperate but we are not gonna pay to get 
certified, thatÕs craziness. None of our customers are asking to get in 
Government websites.ÕÓ (N003, Interview) 
Consequently, the market for identity providers offering credentials above 
Level of Assurance 1 is spare. At the time of this writing, there is only one for-
profit entity, Verizon, a telecommunications and business IT company, 
providing credentials above Level of Assurance 1. Moreover, those credentials 
are not for use by the general public; they are for healthcare professionals 
involved in the prescription and dispensing of medicines (N003, Interview; 
P007, Interview). The Verizon service is being offered because of a clearer 
return on its investments in high-assurance credentials: healthcare regulations 
are beginning to require the use of high-assurance credentials, creating a 
demand and therefore a market. Verizon sees an opportunity to make money 
from various parties in the healthcare field (N003, Interview; P007, Interview; 
Thibeau, Interview). 
 
The business case for providing credentials to the general public has not yet 
been made. This is true of both credentials for e-government use, and the 
broader identity ecosystem envisioned by NSTIC which some see as Òan 
unfunded wish listÓ (Wilsher, Interview; also see P006). So, the question 
remains: who will pay for high-assurance, privacy-preserving credentials for 
general use by the polity? The absence of a credible answer has forestalled 
businesses from investing in those systems. Drummond Reed (Interview) 
argued: 
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ÒThere is no successful system that will solve the problems of privacy 
and information exchange that doesnÕt have a successful business 
model. In other words É money and value exchange has to flow to 
offset the work that you undertake to protect information. If youÕve got 
information thatÕs got value and itÕs going to flow and therefore youÕre 
going to protect it, if you have donÕt have a way of compensating that 
then you donÕt have a market; you donÕt have a sustainable system.Ó  
Andrew Nash (Interview) of Google remarked: 
Ò[The government is] basically saying, ÔWe have this enormously 
expensive system, we canÕt run it and we canÕt scale it. So, we are 
unable to deal with this, but we think we ought to get it for free from 
someone else.Õ This is not a very workable equation.Ó  
Multiple Markets 
Many of the companies envisioned to participate in the identity ecosystem 
serve multiple markets, both in terms of industry and geography. To contain 
costs and increase sales, it behooves them to design products that can be sold 
across those markets, even if they have different needs and buyers. This leads 
to a number of effects. Firstly, identity products and services will be similar 
across ostensibly different sectors, such as government and enterprise. 
Secondly, weaker or less attractive markets will spur less commercial interest, 
and therefore product development, than stronger, more attractive markets. For 
example, the healthcare market will spur development in higher assurance 
credentials faster than government-to-citizen applications given the emerging 
demand by potential customers. Thirdly, vendors will attempt to harmonise 
different markets to align them with their product strategies (P001, Interview). 
This can happen through providing expertise to influence each marketÕs 
stakeholders and clients, through consulting services or informal channels, and 
via influencing international standards which various markets may rely upon. 
Commercial companies are vital to the creation of credentials as they create 
and sell much of the enabling technology. Ultimately, profitability drives many 
of their choices, and the need to sell influences the shape of digital identity. 
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The drive to harmonise across multiple markets affects policy. It can 
potentially cause better solutions to policy problems to appear. Similarly, it can 
curtail policy choices. Through the conduits of transnational companies and the 
use of their employees as consultants and experts to government, as well 
participation in international standards, policy transfer can occur between 
different contexts and polities. For example, Microsoft, a global vendor of a 
variety of technologies including identity products and services, has its 
employees participate in a number of international standards committees on 
identity management (P001, Interview). Those standards can influence which 
technologies are ultimately brought to market. As previously discussed, 
available technology affects the range of implementable policies. If the 
standards are in fact the best possible choices, they will Ôraise all ships,Õ 
benefiting the policy-making communities upstream, and those affected by 
those policies. If the standards favour proprietary and/or sub-optimal 
technologies, the range of policies may be reduced to the detriment of citizens. 
Relatedly, this highlights the policy effects and power of standards 
organizations Ð their efficacy, legitimacy and breadth affect the choices of 
policy-makers. 
Variation: Higher Education  
One variation to the necessity of a profitable business case comes from the 
domain of higher education and research. One of the first Trust Frameworks 
engaged with the government was the InCommon Federation. InCommon is a 
group of academic and research institutions and businesses related to higher 
education, such as academic publishers. Prior to the existence of FICAM, 
InCommon was a functioning federation of identity providers and relying 
parties. InCommon manages policies and infrastructure to allow members of a 
university to use their credentials at resources external to the university. This 
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model served as an early prototype for the use of external credentials with e-
government (Morgan, Interview).  
 
The commercial logic of for-profit companies discussed above does not apply 
in the case of InCommon. The mandate to build identity systems derives from 
higher education institutionsÕ mission to enable access to wide ranging 
research resources. Bob Morgan, an identity management technologist for the 
InCommon Federation explained: 
ÒÉ [I]tÕs our overall interest in trying to improve identity management 
with the key customers É in higher ed. because we have thousands and 
thousands of researchers and all kinds of other people who have to 
interact with all kinds of government agencies all the time, and that just 
raises all the typical identity management problems.Ó (Morgan, 
Interview) 
All of InCommonÕs 330 American university members (InCommon, n.d. a), 
are regulated by the Family Educational Rights Protection Act of 1974 
(FERPA), and those that deal in medical information fall under the Health 
Information Portability and Accountablity Act of 1996 (Morgan, Interview). 
Those two federal statues contain a number of privacy provisions regarding the 
safeguarding of personal data. The combination of those provisions with 
university enrolment, registration and billing processes allowed InCommon to 
be able to certify its members to a level of assurance comparable to NIST 
Levels 1 and 2. As in the commercial model, a potential identity provider (e.g., 
a university or research centre) must be audited to be certified. The number of 
relying parties is, at this time, small but growing, and includes grant 
submission through the National Institutes of Health, student loan reports 
through the National Student Clearinghouse, and access to scientific resources 
such as the Open Science Grid (InCommon, n.d. b). That said, compliance 
costs are not insignificant, and it is still unclear if there is enough value for 
universities to certify their systems (Morgan, Interview). As of September 
2013, one American university, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
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University, has been certified to the equivalent of Level of Assurance 2 
(Woodbeck, 2012). 
 
Prior to the existence of FICAM, InCommon had built unlinkability as an 
option into its federation (Morgan, Interview). InCommon conceived a use 
case where university students would log onto, e.g., an academic publisher. 
Inheriting some ideas regarding privacy from the Liberty Alliance, InCommon 
administrators felt that it was not necessary (and could possibly trigger FERPA 
considerations) for student names to be sent to the publishers; all that needed to 
be sent was an assertion that the student was, in fact, a member of the 
university (Morgan, Interview). This led to the use of Ôtransient identifiersÕ Ð a 
pseudonym that would only last for an individual session. The assertion from 
the university contained this identifier, which held no personally identifiable 
information, and an attestation that the user was a member of the university, 
and was therefore allowed to access the publisherÕs resources. By using the 
transient identifier, a publisher or other relying party would be less able to 
build a profile of a studentÕs other online activity. Other use cases exist, 
however, such as collaboration on research projects with common sets of 
resources. In those cases, email addresses and other linkable identifiers are 
shared without issue. Given the variety of interactions, system designs and 
organizational needs, unlinkability is but one tool in the Òtool kitÓ of federation 
technology (Morgan, Interview). 
When Linkability is Good 
In addition to the commercial value of linkages to both identity providers and 
relying parties, linkability benefits data subjects. Facebook, with a (self-
reported) user base of over 1 billion people at the time of this writing (Lee, 
2012; see also Tavakoli, 2012), has built its business around linking the habits, 
attributes and online activities of its members. Much of the data it collects is 
volunteered by its members who spend millions of minutes per day on 
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Facebook. The growth of social networking and other recent internet business 
trends has relied on the linking of personal data and online activity (David, 
Interview; Morgan, Interview; P003, Interview). One computer scientist 
observed:  
ÒÉ itÕs the linkability of particular kinds of data which has been 
responsible for so much innovative and new services that people are 
benefitting fromÉÓ (P001, Interview) 
Another beneficial example is fraud detection. The linking of various 
transactions in both the online and offline world helps financial companies 
detect, for example, if credit cards are being used fraudulently. Andrew Nash 
explained: 
ÒIf you have a conversation with somebody and say, ÔDo you want the 
credit card companies to track your information?Õ The answer is, ÔHell 
no.Õ However, if you say, ÔLook, an anomaly occurred or something 
went wrong in my credit ÉÕ do people want to be able to see an audit 
trail of their transactions? And the answer is, ÔAbsolutely.Õ And so the 
two of those are in conflict, but anybody thatÕs had an issue with their 
credit suddenly finds that you know they want to know whatÕs going 
on.Ó (Nash, Interview) 
One of the earliest use cases envisioned by the US government provides 
another example. Identity management goals from the early 2000s included an 
intention for Americans to be able to sign up for national park resources via the 
web (OMB, 2002). This could be done pseudonymously Ð assigning a number 
to a campsite reservation that a person could obtain without revealing her 
identity. However, it benefits the person to supply an email address in case 
something goes wrong with the reservation, or a weather event forces a closure 
of the campground.  
Technical vs. social methods of privacy enforcement 
As noted above in Drummond ReedÕs spectrum, a consideration of 
unlinkability as policy illustrates different methods available to policy-makers 
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to preserve privacy. The evolving efforts of the US government appear at 
multiple points on ReedÕs spectrum.  
 
Figure 5.5  US IDM privacy efforts in relation to Reed's spectrum 
 
 
 
On the technical side, there is a requirement for identity providers to issue 
different pseudonyms for each relying party when using the SAML protocol. 
The proposed Federal Cloud Credential Exchange, essentially a technical layer 
that can, among other things, enforce privacy policies, will also fall to the left 
of the spectrum. Towards the social side is FICAMÕs Activity Tracking 
restriction, preventing identity providers from using or divulging information 
about a userÕs online activity. Further right, Federal agencies are legally 
restrained from collecting more information than they need, including 
information on someoneÕs unrelated online activity (G006, Interview), by the 
Privacy Act of 1974 and other policies. 
 
To use technology as a regulatory mechanism for privacy policy enforcement 
requires both that the technology is feasible and that there is a sufficient 
Technical 
Enforcement
Social 
Enforcement
Mathematical
Impossibility
Computationally
Unfeasible
Practical 
Protection
Legal
(Contractual)
Protection
Legal
Norms
Social
Norms
Federal
Cloud
Credential
Exchange
FICAM-approved
Identity
Schemes
Ban on
Activity 
Tracking
1974 Privacy Act
and other US
laws and policies
  
 
 
 
 
 
170 
business case for the technology to be deployed. For example, the OpenID 
standard that the Federal CIO wanted to be used for citizen credentialing was 
not, at the time, capable of providing a pseudonymous identifier dynamically, 
i.e., upon request by an agency (N003, Interview). The standard had to be 
modified to meet FICAMÕs privacy requirement. SAML, the other federation 
protocol, had the same problem, but the standard could not be modified as 
easily Ò[b]ecause there was no perceived need in the SAML communityÓ 
(N003, Interview). OpenID implementations were Ôhome grownÕ and able to be 
configured to a very granular degree by an individual identity provider, but 
SAML implementations are underpinned by commercial software packages 
whose features are controlled by their vendors. Changes in the protocol would 
need to ÔpropagateÕ into the software packages, which the vendors were not 
required to do. A senior identity management standards developer noted: 
ÒSo most large OpenID providers É are using their own 
implementations, so getting them to make the required modifications 
versus É trying to deal with Oracle and Sun and Computer Associates 
and various other folks to attempt to get them to put the software to 
make this change without customers demanding it É Large software 
vendors, unless thereÕs [sic] customers waving money in front of their 
faces, good luck.Ó (N003, Interview) 
This is another example of the need for a business case to meet privacy goals in 
the online world. Since government is relying on industry to provide large-
scale identity management solutions for the public, its policy goals are 
constrained by both the state of the art of technology, and the commercial 
needs of the vendors who bring those technologies to market. It is the Ôbusiness 
of privacy protection.Õ Ò[M]aking a system anonymous and unlinkable is 
genuinely more complicated, therefore more expensiveÓ (P001, Interview). 
Given the costs involved, it is still unclear whether companies who build 
identity technologies will have a reason to make them as privacy-preserving as 
some hope. The senior standards developer reported: 
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ÒÉthe reality is that abstract claims in an unlinkable way have a really 
narrow use case É people spread around their correlatable identifiers 
willy-nilly using their email addresses É as their usernames to log into 
sites without thinking twice about it É While it might be nice to have 
theoretically unlinkable claims, there is no commercial marketplace for 
that. Without a business case, itÕs gonna be hard to É get people to 
change the way they theyÕre heading.Ó (N003, Interview). 
Privacy at the protocol level 
The issue of feasibility above highlights the role of protocols in online privacy. 
The internet is built on a wide array of standards Ð agreements between 
interested and/or official parties on the rules of a given system Ð and protocols 
Ð implementations of those standards into methods of communication 
(Tanenbaum, 1996, p. 17). Identity technologies such as SAML, OpenID and 
others are useful because they are standardised Ð different vendors and 
customers can all talk to one another reliably. However, in the case of a small 
pool of available standards, technical choices can become limited. Where 
policy requires a technical component, policy choices may be constrained by 
technical limitations. Standards and protocols therefore have power.  
ÒYou really canÕt separate the technical from the policy because the 
policy is implemented in the code.Ó (N002, Interview) 
In the cases of OpenID and SAML noted above, the standards were not capable 
of meeting government policy objectives without modification. Some of the 
real-time notice and consent characteristics envisioned by government 
administrators and policy-makers are still not feasible in currently deployed 
identity technologies (G001, Interview; N003, Interview; N004 Interview). The 
degree to which the standards can be modified is reliant on the caretakers of 
those standards, the standards development organisations, related interested 
parties, and the accompanying commercial environment. Thereby, standard 
development organisations are, in effect, actors within a policy community. 
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They, too, hold power, and are vital components in the landscape of privacy 
protection on the internet. An identity management expert observed: 
ÒHaving privacy as an ideal doesnÕt do you any good unless you got 
folks that are coding to itÉÓ (N002, Interview) 
The role of standards developersÕ norms and values is explored at length in 
Chapter 8. 
The challenge is not technical 
The difficulty of preserving privacy in the online world generally and the 
identity space specifically is not a technical one (David, Interview; Reed, 
Interview). Cryptographic tools, while possibly lacking in the consumer 
market, are well understood and mature. Identity standards are maturing and 
have robust communities of interested parties. There are certainly challenging 
issues of usability (discussed below), but the actual technology needed to 
protect data from unwanted gazes exists in a variety of forms. The challenges 
are economic, as described above, and ultimately social in nature. Scott David, 
an expert in contract law for identity management and Executive Director of 
the Law, Technology & Arts Group of the University of WashingtonÕs School 
of Law, remarked: 
ÒI think that we have been rowing with one oar in the water by trying to 
find technical solutions only to these issues.É [T]hese are social 
systems, not technical systems, and they need social solutions, and 
social solutions are solutions of norms and behaviour.Ó (David, 
Interview) 
Comparability vs. compliance 
By engaging the private sector through the policy and procurement mechanism 
of Trust Frameworks, the federal government set aside the traditional notion of 
compliance. By relying on an external third party to assess private sector actors 
against their published requirements, the government had to accept comparable 
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policies to their own, rather than an adherence to a compliance regime. This is 
because the government was abstracted from the private actors and was, in 
effect, outsourcing an element of its policy-making. A government official 
explained: 
ÒThe whole idea the Trust Framework provider process is to abstract 
federal Government from trusting individual IDPs.Ó (G004, Interview; 
See also Greenwood, Interview) 
An identity management expert noted: 
Ò[Comparability] means that if youÕre trying to add up to six, you can 
have a three and three, or you can have two and a two and a two, you 
know, you can get there [by] various ways.Ó (N002, Interview) 
The main reason for pursuing comparability versus compliance was to relieve 
the government of the burden of certifying identity providers (G003, Interview; 
G004 Interview; N002, Interview). By inserting a non-governmental third 
party, the overall ecosystem for credentials is made more scalable. More Trust 
Frameworks with different Assessors could be added to the ecosystem without 
the government needing to restate its own policies. More IDPs could become 
approved to interact with federal agencies without additional certification 
overhead for the government. 
 
Comparability is a form of ÔtranslationÕ Ð government policies are translated by 
the Trust Framework Provider and its independent assessors. The reinterpreted 
policy, now abstracted from its source, is then applied to identity providers. 
Official government policy becomes thus localised. This is true for the 
operational components of FICAM, though the technical requirements behave 
more like compliance. Technical interoperability has less flexibility than other 
processes Ð IT systems on either end of a credential exchange process have to 
be configured to understand and comply with one another by conforming to the 
published schemes. Therefore the technical dimension of unlinkability Ð e.g., 
the use of pseudonymous identifiers Ð is able to avoid becoming reinterpreted 
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as the original policy is more directly testable. The Identity Scheme Adoption 
Process (ICAM, 2009a) was used as a way to ensure close adherence to the 
governmentÕs policy intentions. An official explained: 
ÒThe scheme is a way of defining options in such a way that allows 
interoperability within the broad standard range.É The value of the 
government management in that particular case was that it enabled 
interoperability within the conceptual universe of the policy. And to the 
extent that anyone wants to play in that universe, you know what to do 
and how to do it.Ó (G004, Interview) 
The translation character of comparability is well-illustrated by the publishing 
of FICAMÕs privacy requirements. Kantara, one of the four approved Trust 
Framework Providers, accredits Assessors who audit companies that wish to be 
identity providers to the government. Those Assessors determine if the 
applicant company has comparable operational policies and are technically 
interoperable with FICAMÕs published protocol Schemes. They also ensure 
that the applicant meets FICAMÕs privacy requirements. Those requirements 
were published in the Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process. However, 
the Assessors are accredited by, and effectively work under the aegis of, 
Kantara. In order to make the privacy requirements auditable, Kantara had to 
ÔinternaliseÕ them. They created a Federal Privacy Profile (Kantara Initiative 
[Kantara], 2010) that aligned closely with the FICAM privacy requirements 
(N004, Interview; Wilsher, Interview). FICAM administrators were shown and 
approved the Profile. KantaraÕs interpretation of the privacy requirements into 
its Profile and the subsequent localisation of the requirements by Assessors 
illustrate the breadth of policy actors within identity management. 
Actors 
A central figure in the various iterations of identity management policy for 
citizen access is a consultant named Chris Louden. He and his associates in a 
company called Enspier, later acquired by Protiviti Inc. (Wilsher, Interview), 
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were present for some of the earliest iterations of citizen-focused identity 
management (P006, Interview). They were integral to the governmentÕs 
thinking regarding the privacy architectures in the Electronic Authentication 
Program and then FICAM (G004, Interview; N002, Interview; P006, 
Interview; Wilsher, Interview). One administrator recalled: 
ÒChris is the primary intellectual architect.É Chris is the brains behind 
the technical side of the operation.Ó (G004, Interview) 
Enspier also helped draft the Office of Management and BudgetÕs 
memorandum which laid out the Levels of Assurance methodology and NISTÕs 
electronic authentication guidelines (P006, Interview). Mr. Louden was partly 
responsible for the government requirement for identity systems to support 
pseudonymity. One engineer remarked: 
ÒÉ the intent was to try to minimise the amount of information.  So, 
one of ChrisÕs philosophies was, and it sounds somewhat trite, but Ôless 
is more.ÕÓ (P006, Interview) 
EnspierÕs role illustrates how consultants are part of a policy-making 
community, and can have long-lasting and wide-ranging effect on matters that 
affect an entire country. Mr. Louden and his colleaguesÕ contributions to US 
government efforts are part of the story of the evolution of US privacy through 
non-legislative means. 
Usability 
A consistent theme within the case is the usability of identity management 
systems: unless identity management systems are easy to use, people will not 
use them. A computer scientist noted: 
ÒThereÕs a huge issue around usability that if you canÕt address the 
usability concerns then É even if you have great technology, people 
wonÕt use it right. TheyÕll make silly mistakes and it wonÕt work.Ó 
(P001, Interview) 
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Some believe unlinkability to be conceptually difficult for users (G007, 
Interview; Morgan, Interview; N006, Interview; P001, Interview). While 
people may have facility with pseudonymity in the physical, social world, the 
use of identity credentials is obscure. The computer scientist observed: 
ÒÉ the mental model is not something people are used to seeing in 
terms of identity providers, relying parties, intermediaries, itÕs really 
complex and we need the average person to be able to embrace these in 
a way that they get intuitively and itÕs just a very big step, itÕs gonna 
take a while.Ó (P001, Interview) 
One privacy advocate echoed this observation: 
Ò[N]ormal people donÕt think of their identities as disjointed, at least 
not yet É [Y]es, [unlinkability is] the right thing to do from a É long-
term privacy protection [perspective], but industry doesnÕt want it, and 
normal people donÕt get it.Ó (N006, Interview) 
Further, the invisible nature of electronic communications causes identity 
management systems to need a degree of clarity that is, so far, challenging to 
system designers (N005, Interview). Technologists and policy-makers in the 
identity management community are aware that Ôburdening the userÕ with an 
overabundance of choices and information does not help (G001, Interview; 
G007, Interview; N004, Interview). ÔNotice and choice,Õ a concept rooted in 
the Fair Information Practice Principles and other privacy and data protection 
instruments, can sometimes have the opposite intended effect. Continual 
notifications about what information is being sent to whom, repeatedly asking 
a user if she consents, or which pieces of information should or should not be 
sent leads to Òuser fatigueÓ (G001, Interview). A government administrator 
stated: 
ÒÉ one of the issues we always deal with, and that our privacy people 
are actually very aware of, is if you build in too much choice, usability 
gets crushed. É people get confused and overwhelmed and they 
attempt to run away and tend to think that something bad is 
happening.ÉÓ (G007, Interview) 
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There is some concern that the goals of notice and choice Ð transparency, 
informed consent, and autonomous participation (Sloan and Warner, 2013) Ð 
will be hindered by deluging users with too much information; that users will 
become trained to click through without reading (G001, Interview; G007, 
Interview; Morgan, Interview; N004, Interview). One identity management 
expert expanded on this point: 
ÒSo we know that users have been trained to click through consents and 
É notices, which does not make them useful, valuable ... It does not 
make it something that you can regulate against if you canÕt prove É 
that the user actually understood what it was that they were doing É 
[I]f they know how their information [is] intended to be used or 
potentially may be used, then they can make a choice in terms of their 
own privacy.  If they donÕt understand these issues, then they canÕt 
really make a choice as to whether they want to participate in a system 
or not.Ó (N004, Interview) 
Privacy introduces ÔfrictionÕ into online transactions. That is, privacy goals, 
such as transparency, notice, consent, choice, user participation, and security 
goals like strong authentication usually require that an additional step is 
introduced between a userÕs actions and his desired outcome. Entering a 
password is a necessary step that intervenes when a user tries to access a 
resource. Informing a user which information will be sent to a relying party 
pauses a transaction. Asking a user to consent to the transmission of her 
personal data interrupts her activity. Given the conceptual difficulties of 
identity credentials, this friction can undermine the best intentions of system 
designers and regulators. Paul Trevithick, an identity management standards 
developer and founder of the Information Cards Foundation, observed: 
ÒÉ [E]verything about privacy/security is nothing but new friction to 
be introduced between you and what you want to achieve on the web.  
So, I know commercially thatÕs the struggle.Ó (Trevithick, Interview) 
One privacy advocate echoed this: 
ÒÉ it is very difficult to tell consumers in an iPhone age when people 
actually want slick frictionless services and donÕt want to have to read 
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and think and make decisions lot of the time Ð some people do, many 
people donÕt.  Asking companies to be clear about their notices, clear 
about their consent while still providing a product that is user friendly 
is a difficult balance.Ó (N005, Interview) 
Besides the additional steps and conceptual difficulties, it is unclear if users 
care about the privacy goals in identity management systems (G007, Interview; 
N005, Interview; N006, Interview; Trevithick, Interview). The ostensible 
harms of profiling are invisible to the user. A privacy advocate remarked: 
ÒItÕs hard to get people to care about something they canÕt see unless 
they have a reason to feel uncomfortable about itÉ. I think finding 
incentives for unlinkability are difficult because itÕs invisible to most 
people unless you misbehave É or not even misbehave.Ó (N005, 
Interview) 
Nor are relying parties necessarily inclined to do the additional work required 
to create unlinkable systems. Bob Morgan noted: 
ÒÉ [I]f youÕre a physicist putting up a website, the fine distinctions 
between the É opaque unlinkability identifiers and regular user IDs 
and transient IDs and all that stuff É itÕs like, ÔDonÕt bug me,Õ right? ÔI 
just want to know who the person is.ÕÓ (Morgan, Interview) 
There is agreement among the respondents that giving users choice Ð to be 
pseudonymous, to send certain kinds of data Ð has great value, but that doing 
so in a meaningful way is difficult (Morgan, Interview; N005, Interview; P001, 
Interview). A privacy advocate opined: 
ÒI think user control is one of the only stable places to hang your hat 
when youÕre talking about privacy É you can offer a service, you can 
offer almost any service you want, as long as itÕs not just 
unconscionable. But you got to give people choice as to whether or not 
they want to engage in that sharing of their informationÉ I think there 
is an inevitable tension between robust notice and choice stuff and 
frictionless user friendly stuff.Ó (N005, Interview) 
A computer scientist observed: 
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ÒSo even though thereÕs a tremendous desire to empower people with 
control for privacy, itÕs still very tricky É with É a user-centered 
architecture or É minimal disclosure [technology] É in the hot seat [to 
enable] a person [to] make the right kind of tradeoffs and decisions that 
they need to make to protect themselves.Ó (P001, Interview) 
Usability issues are critical to achieve the goals of greater user control and to 
ensure the effectiveness of privacy technologies in the identity management 
space. The Ôuser-centricÕ design movement in technology is a broad heading 
under which such issues can be addressed (Leenes, 2008). The data in this 
chapter underscores the challenge of user-friendly designs in IDM. Research 
on ideal types of privacy-preserving IDM systems has occurred in Europe 
under the PrimeLife project (PrimeLife, n.d.). Future research into IDM policy 
could fruitfully apply the usability lessons learned in PrimeLife (Graf, et al., 
2011) to national citizen credential initiatives, such as the UK Identity 
Assurance Programme and the interactions via the German AusweisApp (see 
Chapter 6). 
Conclusion 
This chapter detailed the empirical data gathered on the US policy of 
unlinkability. To do so, it explored in depth US identity management policies 
for citizen credentialing. These policies were born out of e-government 
authentication needs in the beginning of the 2000s, and were driven 
exclusively by the Executive branch. Rather than issue its own credential, the 
US government elected to obtain credentials from private organisations to 
enable citizens to authenticate themselves to e-government resources. This is 
due in large part to a strong, historical antipathy towards national 
identification, as well as the size of the US population.  
 
The choice to use externally-created credentials necessitated the creation of a 
risk management framework to harmonise federal agenciesÕ ability to judge the 
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credentialsÕ validity. An intermediate party known as a Trust Framework was 
inserted between agencies and private identity providers to ensure that the 
providersÕ technical, operational and privacy practices were comparable to the 
federal government. Privacy rules were encoded into operational guidance and 
within technical protocols Ð a mixture of social and technical methods of 
enforcement. In extant credentialing initiatives, identity providers are 
recommended or required to use unlinkable pseudonym identifiers depending 
on the underlying technology. A recently proposed national identity 
management system, the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange, requires stronger 
unlinkability and will rely on technical enforcement to a greater degree than 
current policy. When built, it will be one of the largest unlinkable credential 
architectures in the world. Current and proposed US citizen IDM systems are 
an example of PETs as policy. 
 
Unlinkability was added to US identity management policy by consultants and 
privacy practitioners. In the former case, a belief in the virtue of data 
minimisation led to unlinkabilityÕs inclusion in the technical architecture of 
early IDM efforts. As policy developed towards an initiative that would cover 
the whole of the US population, privacy officials reinterpreted the Fair 
Information Practice Principles, a non-binding set of principles that underpin 
much of US privacy policy. This reinterpretation plus an application of a 1974 
federal privacy law contributed to the inclusion of unlinkability requirements 
for citizen credentials. These requirements serve the privacy interest of 
separating informational contexts, despite the fact that, unlike Germany, there 
is no strong mandate in US law to do so. 
 
Citizen IDM systems, particularly in the US, are subject to commercial 
influences. By relying on privately-issued credentials, the governmentÕs policy 
intentions are bound to market logic. This is evident in the lack of interest by 
private issuers to supply credentials to the American public due to the lack of a 
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compelling business case. As a result, US policy intentions have been 
hindered, and there are no high confidence digital credentials available to the 
general citizenry. 
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CHAPTER 6: UNLINKABILITY IN GERMAN INFORMATION POLICY 
Introduction 
This chapter details empirical research on the appearance of unlinkability in 
German information policy. In order to explore this process, the chapter 
examines the genesis of the German electronic national identity card (e-ID) and 
its privacy features. The e-ID is a Ôpath continuationÕ (Noack and Kubicek, 
2010) of the prior paper national ID, and was brought into existence by a 
specific law, the Personalausweisgesetz. This law specified a data protection 
model, and subsequent technical guidelines based on the law required the e-ID 
to be able to produce pseudonyms on a per-relying party basis. The logins 
based on those pseudonyms, in the absence of other linkable identifiers, are 
unlinkable. Further, the German e-ID system as a whole is ÔunobservableÕ from 
the perspective of the identity credential issuer, the state. These policies and 
architectures are an example of privacy-enhancing technologies as public 
policy. 
 
Germany was chosen as a case for this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, an 
initial literature review indicated that the German e-ID produced pseudonyms, 
which was evidence that unlinkability may have been a policy choice. 
Secondly, Germany has a federal government, and the e-ID originated with a 
federal agency, the Ministry of Interior. This supported a most similar systems 
design for a comparative case study given that the US was also federal, and its 
citizen identification initiatives originated at the federal level with the 
Executive branch. The key difference between them was that the German state 
was issuing digital identities via the e-ID whereas the US sought externally 
created identities for its citizens via private organisations. This difference was 
analytically rich, illustrating the powerful differences between market forces 
and government logics. Both countries have institutionalised data protection, 
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but this manifests differently in each. Data protection and privacy in the US at 
the federal level derives from a variety of sectoral laws and policies, and is 
partly guided by a non-binding set of ÔFair Information Practice Principles.Õ In 
Germany, an omnibus data protection law covers all instances of Ôpersonal 
data.Õ This law is a transposition of the European UnionÕs Data Protection 
Directive which Germany was required to enact under the terms of its 
membership in the Union. The EU also requires that Germany have a data 
protection authority to ensure appropriate application of relevant policies 
(European Council, 1995, Art. 28) Ð these exist at both federal and state levels. 
Neither the omnibus conception of personal data nor a data protection authority 
ÔlayerÕ exists in the US. Still, unlinkability is appearing in both countries, 
partly because of commonalities between the US Fair Information Practice 
Principles and the EU Data Protection Directive (Gellman, 2012). 
 
The data in this chapter is drawn from fourteen interviews with key actors 
related to the policy of unlinkability and the creation of the German e-ID. 
Interviews were conducted with Jan Mller, a lawyer at the Ministry of Interior 
and a principle author of the Personalausweisgesetz; four members of the 
Unabhaengiges Landeszentrum fuer Datenschutz (ULD), the Independent 
Centre for Privacy Protection in the state of Schleswig-Holstein, including their 
Deputy Director, Marit Hansen; Jens Fromm of the Fraunhofer Institute; Prof. 
Dr. Herbert Kubicek of the Institut fr Informationsmanagement Bremen; Prof. 
Dr. Gerrit Hornung of the Universities of Kassel and Pasau; and other 
government officials and scientists. See Appendix A for a complete list of all 
interview subjects and sampling rationale. Data was also drawn from primary 
and secondary documentation, including laws, policies, technical guidelines, 
academic literature, blogs and the press. 
 
The first half of the chapter is a policy history of the e-ID, and covers the core 
policy intentions and reasons cited for creating it. Like the US case, e-
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government initiatives are interwoven into the history and reasons for citizen 
credentialing. The e-IDÕs features, user interaction and data protection model 
are explained, including an in-depth examination of its pseudonymity 
capabilities, which are most relevant to understanding unlinkability in the 
German context. The second half is an exploration of emergent themes within 
the data: informational self-determination, the German privacy Ômindset,Õ 
stronger protection of validated data versus volunteered or commercially 
obtained data, the e-IDÕs relationship to the electronic passport, the commercial 
dimension, technical versus social methods of privacy enforcement, marketing, 
the actors involved and usability considerations. The themes were derived of 
primary and secondary documentation, from repeated appearance within the 
interviews, and from induction. Themes are selected and presented in order to 
highlight the key issues relevant to explaining the policy of unlinkability 
(McClure, et al., 1999; Braun and Clarke, 2006). Some of these themes have 
been explored in relation to the US case data, and some are new, particular to 
German history, culture, law and policy implementation. 
Overview 
A new German e-ID card was rolled out in November 2010, replacing the 
larger paper one. The e-ID holds all of the same data as its predecessor plus 
post code, and stores all of that information on a chip inside the card body. By 
virtue of its electronic components, the card enables a number of privacy-
friendly features and can be used to authenticate citizens over the internet. The 
data protection regime and culture affecting the e-ID derives in large part from 
a seminal Constitutional Court case in 1983 that defined a broad set of rights 
for German citizens over their informational lives. E-government initiatives 
and other factors spurred the creation of the e-ID, taking approximately five 
years from the first public disclosure of the plan to deployment. However, due 
to poor marketing, a lack of perceived value, and a low number of websites 
that can access the card, less than one third of all cards have their online 
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authentication feature turned on (DE-G002, Interview; Jens Fromm [Fromm], 
Interview). Due to a 10-year card validity, both for the original and electronic 
ID, all German citizens will possess an e-ID by 2020, making it the largest 
national electronic ID infrastructure in Europe (DE-G003, Interview). As such, 
it will also be one of the largest examples of unlinkable credential architectures 
in the world because of its pseudonymity features and the size of the German 
population. 
E‐government Initiatives 
The German federal and state governments began to experiment with e-
government services at the end of the 1990s (Breitner, 2003, p. 12). In 2000, 
the federal government launched BundOnline2005, a broad programme 
intending to put all federal public services online by 2005 (IDABC, 2009, p. 8; 
Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 89). Many German public services required 
residents to sign forms; the signature served as the authentication necessary to 
ensure that the citizen was whom he claimed to be (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, 
pp. 88-90). As paper documentation was moved online, electronic signatures 
were seen as critical to the success of these early e-government efforts. This 
led Germany to promulgate an electronic signature law two years before the 
1999 EU electronic signature directive (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 89). 
However, electronic signature technology was both costly and nascent, and 
there was little use of it by the citizenry (Jan Mller [Mller], Interview). More 
importantly, electronic signatures contained insufficient information to identify 
and authenticate individuals uniquely (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 89; 
Kubicek, Interview). To obtain an electronic signature certificate, a citizen 
needed to show proof of identity. Despite this, because of the lack of 
information in the certificate, two people with the same name could not be 
distinguished by an entity receiving electronic signatures (IDABC, 2009, p. 6; 
Herbert Kubicek [Kubicek], Interview). Government officials in charge of 
evolving German e-signature law Òmaintained that a handwritten signature also 
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consists of surname and first name with no additional attributes and therefore 
saw no need to add any other attributes in the digital wordÓ (Noack and 
Kubicek, 2010, p. 90). Ultimately, government administrators and technical 
personnel recognized the insufficiency of e-signature as an authentication tool. 
In 2003, revised plans were sought for appropriate ways to authenticate 
citizens in e-government interactions. By 2004, electronic ID cards were being 
discussed within the Ministry of Interior, and had come to be viewed as the 
only suitable token for e-government authentication given the insufficiency of 
e-signatures (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 91). This time, the system would be 
designed specifically to separate legal intent (signature) from authentication. 
Not only would this correct the mistaken use of e-signatures for identity 
verification, but it would also mirror practices in the physical world with paper 
ID cards. That is, displaying an identity document in a face-to-face interaction 
does not leave a ÔtraceÕ; the interaction itself is not verifiable without 
additional information. A signature, however, is an attestation of legal intent 
meant to be provable in the future. Government officials specifically sought to 
separate these two situations in the electronic ID. One government scientist 
explained: 
ÒÉ [W]hen I show you my identity card you can see that IÕm the 
legitimate holder of it.  You can see my picture, you can see my name, 
my date of birth andÉ all my personal details on it but you canÕt prove 
it to any third party. With an É electronic signature mechanism as an 
authentication, you send me a form requiring me to sign [it], and 
afterwards you are able to prove to everyone that you received my 
signature.É So you can prove that we had some interaction. That is 
something which we wanted to prevent, and that was the reason why 
we came up with some purely authentication function with a 
pseudonym behind it and thatÕs all. That was the starting point: clearly 
separating authentication and, we call it Ôtransactions.ÕÓ (DE-G001, 
Interview) 
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Introduction of the e‐ID: Policy history, rationale and intentions 
In 2005, the Ministry of Interior released its Òe-card StrategyÓ (Schmidt, 2005; 
ULD, Interview). It envisioned the creation of an electronic identity (Òe-IDÓ) 
card to replace the existing paper laminated identity card (see Figure 6.1 
below), a health card for use with national health services, and an electronic 
passport (Òe-passportÓ). The new e-ID, the neue Personalausweis (see Figure 
6.2 below), would serve as a traditional official identity document as well as a 
travel document within Europe in lieu of a passport. European law requires 
member states to accept national ID cards as border documentation. The 
proposed e-ID would optionally have the ability to create electronic signatures, 
as well as allow cardholders to authenticate themselves online. 
 
Figure 6.1  The original paper laminated national ID card 
 
 
Source: Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 97 
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Figure 6.2  The new e-ID card 
Source: Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 98 
 
Soon after the Interior MinistryÕs announcement, the Ministry hired Jan Mller 
to work on the e-card project. Mr. Mller had worked for the prior four years at 
the Unabhngiges Landeszentrum fr Datenschutz (ULD), the Independent 
Centre for Privacy Protection, the data protection authority for the German 
state of Schleswig-Holstein (Mller, Interview). His experience working at the 
ULD would help shape the privacy characteristics of the e-ID, discussed 
further below. The Ministry also began to engage federal and state data 
protection authorities and privacy experts. The chief discussion point within 
the Ministry and the German Parliament was the inclusion of biometrics on the 
card (Gerrit Hornung [Hornung], Interview; Kubicek, Interview; Mller, 
Interview; ULD Interview). The cardÕs privacy features were otherwise 
accepted with little debate. Gerrit Hornung (Interview) recalled: 
ÒÉ [T]he federal data officer made a strong claim against the 
fingerprints but on the authentication mechanism he said, ÔWell, IÕve 
looked into that and itÕs technically sophisticated, itÕs data protection 
friendly, so IÕm happy with that.Õ So he sort of made strong statements 
on biometric side and that was what the political debate focused on 
then.Ó 
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The new e-ID was intended to mirror the original national ID. This meant 
holding the same data that was printed on the original card, including the 
holderÕs photograph. The e-ID would show the data on its printed surface and 
contain the same data on an internal chip. Initially, the Ministry wanted the e-
ID to also mirror the e-passport meaning the mandatory inclusion of digital 
images of the cardholderÕs fingerprints (ULD, Interview). Various data 
protection authorities objected to the mandatory inclusion and ultimately 
fingerprints became optional. The fingerprints are not stored in centralised 
databases Ð this would contravene German law (Hornung, Interview). They 
exist only on the cards themselves and the federal printer is required to delete 
them after card production (DE-G001, Interview; Hornung, Interview; ULD, 
Interview).  
 
In November 2010, the e-ID card was released to the citizenry at a cost of 
€28.80 each. The following year, the Ministry released the elektronischen 
Aufenthaltstitel (eAT), an electronic identity card for non-European residents. 
The eAT mirrors the e-ID identically plus additional data fields indicating 
residence status (DE-G003, Interview). 
 
A number of reasons to develop the new e-ID were cited by official documents 
and interviewees. The e-IDÕs size was a factor (DE-G001, Interview; ULD, 
Interview). The original national ID was in the ID-2 format: 105 × 74 mm 
(4.134 × 2.913 in). The new e-ID would conform to ID-1, 85.60 × 53.98 mm 
(3.370 × 2.125 in), the international standard used for credit and banking cards 
and the other electronic ID cards appearing in Europe (DE-G001, Interview; 
ISO/IEC, 2003). There was an intention to improve the security of online 
interactions by providing citizens with a hardware token to replace the use of 
username and password (Horsch and Stopcynski, 2011, p. 1; Noack and 
Kubicek, 2010, p. 99; DE-G001, Interview). This would allow for Ôtwo-factorÕ 
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authentication: possession of the card plus use of a password. One computer 
scientist explained: 
ÒThe main idea behind the authentication with the identity card in the 
internet was to provide an alternative to username / passwordÉ So 
from a one-factor authentication, like only knowing a password for a 
certain account, we wanted to have a two-factor authentication, so to 
make it more secure. That was a basic idea.Ó (DE-G001, Interview) 
Since the card was an official form of identification and its enrolment 
procedures were trusted by government, the Ministry of Interior created the 
capability to authenticate the bearer online. More broadly, there was a desire to 
enable German citizens to use their identity on the internet. Jens Fromm, a 
scientist at the Fraunhofer Institute who was closely involved with the 
development of the e-ID, stated: 
ÒÉ [I]t is the wish of the German government that every person, every 
citizen has an electronic identity through his German identity card with 
certain attributes with certain personal data so that he or she can use it 
for transactions in the digital world.  So this was really five years ago 
one of the reasons why the German government decided to push 
forward this electronic identity function.Ó (Fromm, Interview) 
From the beginning, the authentication feature was intended for use with both 
e-government applications and commercial ones (Schmidt, 2005; Fromm, 
Interview; Mller, Interview). Officials understood that a pure e-government 
focus would be insufficient because the relatively low number of citizen-
government interactions would not allow a person to acclimate to using the 
card online. Jan Mller stated: 
ÒThe whole concept was itÕs open to e-government and private. The 
main reason is that the average contact rate of a German citizen to 
administration is 1.8 a year, and if you have a technical process, you 
need some exercise that you know how it works.  If you do something 
just once a year, you donÕt get used to it, and something like that only 
works if you get used to it, so we needed more situations when people 
actually need it.Ó (Mller, Interview) 
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The cost of the card to the citizen was approximately triple the price of the 
original ID card. The online authentication function was seen as a way to 
increase the value of the card to the citizen, in part justifying the higher cost 
(Mller, Interview). The card could also produce electronic signatures, and was 
hoped to encourage greater citizen use of them. The e-signature function 
requires privately obtained certificates to be loaded onto the card. At the time 
of this writing, the signature feature is dormant in all e-IDs because of a lack of 
business interest in selling the necessary digital certificates. This is because the 
e-ID signature function would compete with established e-signature products 
(DE-G003, Interview). 
 
Features 
The neue Personalausweis contains nine data fields printed on its face and 
stored on its internal chip: first name, surname, birthdate, place of birth, 
doctoral degree, current address, post code, municipality ID, artist/religious 
name, and expiration date (Poller et al., 2012). It has a photograph of the bearer 
printed on its face and stored digitally in the chip. Optionally, two fingerprints 
can be stored in the chip as well. There is no current application that uses the 
fingerprints (Hornung, Interview; ULD, Interview). The card is contactless Ð it 
relies on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology to communicate 
with a reader. The card is capable of performing three mathematical functions. 
First, the card is capable of responding Yes or No to the question of whether 
the bearerÕs birthdate is before or after a particular date. An application can 
query if the bearer is, for example, between 16 and 35, or over 18, and the card 
will respond with a Yes or No. This feature is called Ôselective disclosureÕ. 
There is a similar capability with current residence. German regions are 
hierarchically divided from state to municipality, and the card is able to 
respond Yes or No to questions of which region does the bearer reside in. The 
third mathematical function is related to unlinkability Ð the card is capable of 
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producing pseudonyms. To fully explore this privacy feature, explanations of 
the e-IDÕs user interaction and data protection models are required. 
User interaction 
The primary use of the e-ID is as proof of identity in a face-to-face interaction. 
The secondary use is to authenticate the bearer online. The online model is a 
two-party interaction between a service provider and the cardholder. A service 
provider is any web-based entity: agencies that manage e-government 
applications, or private businesses. The online use case is a citizen accessing a 
website that needs validated proof of the citizenÕs identity. When the citizen 
goes to the website, she places her e-ID on a reader attached to her computer.  
 
Figure 6.3  AusweisApp screenshot: requesting service provider information 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior, personal communication 
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Figure 6.4  AusweisApp screenshot: requested personal data 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior, personal communication 
 
A piece of software called the AusweisApp launches and the citizen is shown 
contact details for the requesting entity and the data fields requested. Above are 
two screenshots in English of the AusweisApp showing the service provider 
details screen and the requested data screen. If the citizen agrees to send the 
data, she enters a personal identification number (PIN). The data is sent and the 
main transaction continues. 
Data protection model 
The law that brought the new e-ID into existence, the Personalausweisgesetz, 
requires service providers to transmit an authorisation certificate to the card in 
order to get access to the data on the e-ID (Zwingelberg, 2011, p. 151-154; DE-
G002, Interview; ULD, Interview). To obtain the certificate, service providers 
apply to the Bundesverwaltungsamt (BVA), the Federal Office of 
Administration, a sub-agency of the Ministry of Interior. Service providers 
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must make a case for the specific data fields and functions they wish to access. 
For example, if a company wished to obtain first name, surname and birthday, 
the company would have to justify its needs for that personal data based on its 
business model and the needs of its web application. Administrators at the 
BVA review all applications and judge whether the request is justified. The 
judgment is based on the Ôprinciple of necessityÕ Ð whether the service provider 
actually needs the data or not Ð as well as the principle of data minimisation, 
requiring that only the minimum information be sent (Zwingelberg, 2011, p. 
151-154; DE-G003, Interview). If an applicant is approved, it presents this 
legal authorisation to a private third party to obtain a technical authorisation, a 
cryptographically signed certificate bound to the applicant organisation. The 
certificate contains the legal authorisation, the name of the organisationÕs data 
protection authority, and a list of all of the data fields the organisation has been 
given the right to access.  
 
When the cardholder uses the AusweisApp, it displays all of this information 
on her screen prior to entering her PIN (see Figure 6.3 above). In this way, the 
citizen is able to trust the identity of the service provider much as the service 
provider trusts the identity of the citizen (Fromm, Interview). This is called 
Ômutual authenticationÕ. The original policy intention was that a service 
provider would need a different authorisation for each application. For 
example, if a company had two different websites for two different online 
software products, they would need an authorisation, and therefore a technical 
certification, for each. For e-government applications, authorisations may be 
granted at a variety of levels: application, agency, or for an entire state. For 
example, there is a portal for a variety of civil services offered by the state of 
Bavaria, and a single application for the city of Kln to notify the city if you 
change your address (DE-G002, Interview). The legal and political structure of 
the individual states help determine if an individual office or region seeks its 
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own certificate or falls under a larger political entityÕs certificate (DE-G002, 
Interview). 
 
The lack of a central database for e-IDs is also a notable data protection 
characteristic. In the federated identity model, with identity providers and 
relying parties, the German model relies on a single identity provider (the 
government) that acts only in an ÔofflineÕ mode. The link between the 
credential and the issuer is severed by design Ð the systemÕs architecture makes 
it impossible for the government to track or know of the online activities of 
cardholders (Bender, et al., 2010, p. 14). This is a form of unlinkability: 
identity provider blindness to the credentialÕs use. A government scientist 
stated: 
ÒWe have no centralised servers.... We have no possibility to do any 
observations on the whole system, so as a government we donÕt know 
what happens. That is by design.Ó (DE-G001, Interview) 
 
The German population can be largely disambiguated by the combination of 
first and last name, birthdate and place of birth (Kubicek, Interview; Mller, 
Interview). In addition to informational self-determination (see below), the 
birthdate selective disclosure feature was added to frustrate profiling of citizens 
(Mller, Interview) Ð by withholding a birthdate, it becomes harder to be sure 
you are gathering information about a unique individual. Jan Mller 
(Interview) explained: 
ÒIf you want to make sure that you have the right person basically 
youÕll try to get name É birthdate and place of birth. So this together 
gives you a very good probability actually to have one certain person 
É people are kind of collecting these birthdates to have this uniqueness 
of a certain dataset. And because [of this] we wanted to have the 
opportunity to let the other side know that somebody is over/under a 
certain age but not to have this uniqueness.Ó  
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Pseudonymity function 
The pseudonym generator on the e-ID contains ÔhalfÕ of the necessary maths to 
create pseudonyms. The other half is contained in each service providerÕs 
technical certificate described above. When a cardholder communicates with a 
service provider whoÕs been approved to access the cardÕs pseudonym 
function, the two halves come together and produce a pseudonym. This means 
that each pseudonym is Ôcard- and service provider-specificÕ Ð different service 
provider certificates will always produce different pseudonyms, and different 
cards will always produce different pseudonyms. 
 
Figure 6.5  The e-ID pseudonym generation process 
 
 
 
Thereby, in terms of these pseudonymous identifiers, the result is unlinkability. 
That is to say, in the absence of other linkable attributes, service providers 
should not be able to link a cardholderÕs online activity via his or her 
credentials. However, though there is an intention for each service provider to 
obtain a different authorisation, this has not happened with regard to 
government agencies. Depending on how e-government services are delivered 
by a political entity, authorisations are granted for individual offices, agencies, 
cities and entire states. Since the pseudonyms are card- and service provider-
specific, a single pseudonym is produced by one certificate, and therefore 
could be linked across any applications that fall under that certificate. For 
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example, if all e-government services for the state of Bavaria fall under a 
single, state-level authorisation, then all services that rely on the certificate for 
interactions with the e-ID would see the same pseudonym. By law, the e-ID 
has a 10-year validity, meaning that no pseudonym generated by the card can 
be used for more than 10 years.  
 
Four key use cases were envisioned for the pseudonym generator (DE-G002, 
Interview): 
¥ pseudonymous login 
¥ unique pseudonym to assist identification 
¥ pseudonym without personal data 
¥ pseudonym with verified attributes 
 
In the first case of pseudonymous login, a cardholder would register at a 
service provider upon an initial visit providing his name and other personal 
details. At the same time, a pseudonym is produced and included among the 
other personal data. The cardholder could subsequently log in with the 
pseudonym rather than a more linkable username or email address. The second 
use case envisioned was to add a pseudonym to a user account in order to 
disaggregate her better. Many Germans share similar names (DE-G001, 
Interview; Mller, Interview), and the use of a pseudonym in conjunction with 
a common name would uniquely identify the cardholder within a service 
providerÕs records without having to obtain more personal data, such as place 
of birth (DE-G001, Interview). The third case is the use of a pseudonym with 
no additional personal data. Examples given include an internet service that 
does not require personal data to create an account, and the use of pre-paid 
services, where the provider needs to know that money has been submitted but 
does not need other information except that when a person returns to pay again, 
it is the same person (DE-G002, Interview). The fourth use case is the 
transmission of the cardholderÕs attributes Ð place of birth, residence, age, etc. 
Ð without a name. One possible example cited is that of a library that can only 
download certain digital materials to people living within a certain area 
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(Mller, Interview). Another example is registering to volunteer as an election 
assistant in a local election where the requirement is that you are from that 
locality (Fromm, Interview). In both examples, the pseudonym could be 
associated with the verified residence, confirming the bearerÕs eligibility 
without disclosing her or his identity, and then affiliated with a local identifier 
for the bearer to continue the interaction with. The third and fourth use cases 
are examples of unlinkability as other linkable information about the person is 
not being passed to the relying party. The first case yields unlinkability with 
respect to credential usage subsequent to initial enrolment. 
Policy Summary 
The German e-ID was rolled out to citizens in late 2010. As both the old and 
new identity card have 10 year validities, by 2020, all German citizens 16 or 
older will possess an electronic ID card (or a passport). The e-ID serves the 
same function as the original paper ID Ð an official identity document for 
visual inspections Ð but has additional features by virtue of its electronic 
components. The e-ID is a contactless card with chip that contains all of the 
data displayed on the cardÕs face, plus an option for digital fingerprints. The 
digital face and fingerprint biometric data can only be accessed in a face-to-
face interaction by officials who possess authorised readers; they can never be 
sent from the card through the internet.  
 
The e-ID can electronically authenticate the bearer online. For a service 
provider to access the data on the card, it must have received a legal 
authorisation which is then used to obtain a technical certificate. It was 
originally intended that each service provider must obtain a different 
authorisation for each application, but this is being applied only to commercial 
organisations. Government agencies sometimes get authorisations that cover 
multiple applications, or an entire stateÕs e-government resources. During the 
authorisation application process, the Federal Office of Administration ensures 
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that only the minimum amount of data required will be accessible. In addition 
to sending identity data, the card is capable of indicating if the bearer is born 
before or after a certain date without disclosing the actual birthdate. It can 
indicate that the bearer resides within areas of declining size (state, region, 
municipality, etc.) without disclosing the actual residence. The card can also 
produce pseudonyms for use in online interactions. E-IDs are shipped with the 
authentication function switched off and citizens are given the option to turn it 
on when they obtain their card from their municipal registration office. 72% of 
cardholders have left this function off (Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2013).  
 
Service provider authorisation certificates contain cryptography that, in 
combination with cryptography on each e-ID, produces pseudonyms. Each card 
produces different pseudonyms, as does each service provider certificate. In the 
case of an umbrella certificate for a state, region, or specific agency, the same 
pseudonym would be linkable across multiple uses. In the absence of other 
linkable data, two different pseudonyms are unlinkable.  
 
The overall e-ID infrastructure has no centralised servers, and the government 
cannot track citizen usage of the card. However, a number of companies are 
offering ÔproxyÕ e-ID services. Deploying and managing e-ID authentication 
services at a service provider requires some cost and expertise. Third parties 
are offering that service to organizations who wish to access e-ID card data but 
are not prepared to build and maintain the local infrastructure to do so. 
Theoretically, these proxies could link certain activities of citizens, though it 
would be illegal and likely violate commercial contracts with the service 
providers (Kubicek, Interview).  
 
The technical guidelines that detail the pseudonymity function (Federal Office 
for Information Security, 2011), the cryptographic functions on the e-IDs, the 
e-ID system architecture and its specific lack of centralised servers, and 
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supporting policies all together constitute the German policy of unlinkability. 
The next section explores themes within the empirical data that further explain 
the genesis and context of the policy. 
Themes 
Within the case data are a number of themes that are repeated by different 
respondents, or are otherwise salient because of their relationship to the 
literature or research questions. This section examines the key themes 
emerging from the case which are relevant for explaining the process through 
which unlinkability is emerging in German public policy. See the Analysis sub-
heading in Chapter 3 for a complete explanation of the thematic analysis 
techniques employed. The headings of the sections are derived from the 
thematic coding and analysis of the data. 
 
The first section below discusses the right to informational self-determination, 
a fundamental principle of German data protection and privacy regimes. In 
relation to the thematic categories generated during analysis of the empirical 
data, this right emerged from the Policy category. Next the prevailing privacy 
ÔmindsetÕ in Germany is analysed. This emerged from the Cultural category. 
The section following discusses the greater protection of validated personal 
data on the e-ID versus data obtain through other means. This emerged from 
the Policy analytic category. The e-IDÕs relationship to the electronic passport 
is then analysed. This theme emerged from both the Policy and Architecture & 
Standards categories. The following section analyses the commercial 
dimension of e-ID policy generally and privacy specifically. This theme 
emerged from the Business analytic category. Technical versus social methods 
of privacy enforcement are analysed, followed by a discussion of the marketing 
of the e-ID. These themes emerged from the Policy and Business categories, 
respectively. Finally, the various policy actors and usability considerations are 
reviewed. These themes emerged from the Players and Usability categories. 
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Informational self‐determination 
A recurrent theme within the case data is the right to informational self-
determination. This right is the Òlegal anchor for data protection in the German 
constitution,Ó (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 84). This section details its 
history and relationship to the data protection and privacy choices made in the 
development of the e-ID. 
 
In 1982, the German federal parliament passed an Act requiring a general 
population census to take place the following year. The Act triggered a large, 
contentious debate and was challenged in the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the 
German Constitutional Court. In its December 1983 decision, the court found 
the Act unconstitutional for its lack of procedural and organisational 
safeguards of citizensÕ personal data (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 85; 
Poullet, 2009, p. 215). In its reasoning, the court derived a right to 
informational self-determination from the German constitutionÕs rights to 
dignity and the development of oneÕs personality (Cannataci, 2008; Hornung 
and Schnabel, 2009; Poullet, 2009; Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009). This right 
protected ÒÉ the authority of the individual to decide himself [sic], on the 
basis of the idea of self-determination, when and within what limits 
information about his private life should be communicated to othersÓ 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] cited by Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009, p. 
45). 
 
The first article of the German constitution states:  
ÒThe dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall 
be the duty of all states and authorities.Ó (Grundgesetz, cited by 
Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009, p. 53) 
The second article states:  
ÒEverybody shall have the right to the free development of his [sic] 
personality insofar he does not violate the rights of others or offend 
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against the constitutional order or the moral order.Ó (Grundgesetz, cited 
by Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009, p. 54)  
An earlier decision of the court had deemed that the depth of questioning a 
census would pose and its potential to draw far-reaching inferences about the 
populace was constitutionally problematic: 
ÔÔIt would be contradicting the constitutional guarantee of human 
dignity for the government to claim the right to compulsorily register 
and index an individualÕs complete personality even in the anonymity 
provided by a statistical census, since the individual would be treated as 
an object accessible to an inventory in every way.ÕÕ (BVerfG cited by 
Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 87) 
This reasoning was used in the 1983 decision and linked with the new right of 
informational self-determination (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 87). The 
census Act had Òno clear definition of the objectives, [and] no clear or 
transparent procedure for following or identifying inaccurate information 
regarding German citizens. These deficiencies constituted an attack on human 
dignity and the proper development of the personÓ (Poullet, 2009, p. 215). 
 
Articles 1.1 and 2.1 of the German constitution form the Ògeneral right of 
personality,Ó guaranteeing each individual the chance to fully develop her or 
his personality (Cannataci, 2008, p. 5; Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 86). 
Cannataci (2008, p. 5) wrote: 
ÒIt provides protection to valuable aspects/qualities/attributes É of the 
human personality É not protected elsewhere É and forms a final 
barrier against the erosion/penetration of privacy in the personal 
domain.Ó  
The personality right is tied to the capacity for self-determination. The 
Constitutional Court stated: 
ÒThe value and dignity of the person based on free self-determination 
as a member of a free society is the focal point of the order established 
by the [Constitution]. The general personality right É serves to protect 
these values.ÉÓ (BVerfG cited by Poullet, 2009, p. 215). 
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To facilitate the right to the unhindered development of oneÕs personality, there 
are number of implementations, or Ôsub-rightsÕ. These include the right to 
oneÕs own image, the right to know oneÕs biological parents, the right to have a 
sex change, and the right to informational self-determination (Hornung and 
Schnabel, 2009, p. 86). Hornung and Schnabel (2009, p. 86) wrote: 
ÒIn the German understanding, the right to informational self-
determination, as the constitutional anchor for data protection, is a part 
of the general personality right. It is therefore closely connected to and 
serves the idea of giving every person the possibility to develop a free 
and self-determined personality.Ó  
The 1983 Constitutional Court believed that information technology had 
reached a point that was especially challenging to the safeguarding of self-
determination. This was due to the capacity for near-instantaneous, automatic 
processing that could occur with no control by the subject. The court wrote: 
ÒIt is particularly endangered because in reaching decisions one no 
longer has to rely on manually collected registries and files, but today 
the technical means of storing individual statements about personal or 
factual situations of certain or verifiable people with the aid of 
automatic processing are practically unlimited and can be retrieved in a 
matter of seconds irrespective of distance. Furthermore, they can be 
pieced together with other data collection É to add up to a partial or 
virtually complete personality profile, the persons controlled having no 
sufficient means of controlling its truth and application.Ó (BVerfG cited 
by Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009, p. 53). 
 
The right to informational self-determination has two foci. First, providing 
individuals with the capacities to know about and act upon information about 
them. Without them, an individual cannot freely plan or decide elements of his 
life. The court reasoned: 
ÒIf someone cannot predict with sufficient certainty which information 
about himself in certain areas is known to his social milieu and cannot 
estimate sufficiently the knowledge of parties to whom communication 
may be possibly made, he is crucially inhibited in his freedom to plan 
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or to decide freely and without being subject to any pressure influence.Ó 
(BVerfG cited by Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009, p. 53) 
Correspondingly, the court believed that citizens must also be aware when 
information is being collected about them lest they alter their behaviour for 
fear of being watched:  
ÒIf citizens are unsure whether dissenting behaviour is noticed and 
information about them is being permanently stored, used and passed 
on, they will try to avoid dissenting behaviour so as not to attract 
attention.Ó (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 85) 
The second focus is the protection of democratic society. The court felt that 
individuals who cannot fully develop their own personalities and determine 
their own fates cannot fully contribute to democratic processes. Data protection 
rules thereby preserve the democratic state and are the stateÕs obligation to its 
citizens. Hornung and Schnabel (2009, p. 86) explained: 
ÒÉ data protection is É a precondition for citizensÕ unbiased 
participation in the political processes of the democratic constitutional 
state. The democratic constitutional state relies to a great extent on the 
participation of all citizens and its legitimacy is based on respecting 
each personÕs individual liberty É the right to informational self-
determination is not only granted for the sake of the individual, but also 
in the interest of the public, to guarantee a free and democratic 
communication order.Ó (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 86) 
Rouvroy and Poullet (2009, p. 55) concurred: 
ÒMaintaining and fostering private and public expression of 
individualsÕ thoughts, preferences, opinions and behaviours is among 
the obligations of the State in democratic societies.Ó  
Specifically, the court felt that conditions that could cause citizens to abandon 
their fundamental rights because of fear and risk would harm the Òcommon 
goodÓ of society (BVerfG cited by Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009, p. 47). 
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The 1983 Constitutional Court decision also prohibited the introduction of a 
unique personal identifier for any German citizen (Hornung and Schnabel, 
2009, p. 87). The court saw such identifiers as Òan enabling step to collecting 
and compiling all personal data related to an individual,Ó and as such, would 
violate that individualÕs dignity (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 87). 
Furthermore, the court decided that the state could not be considered to be a 
single entity with regard to the collection and use of personal data Ð an 
Òinformational separation of powersÓ was required (Hornung and Schnabel, 
2009, p. 87). This concept was first introduced in the German state of Hesse 
thirteen years prior in the worldÕs first data protection act (Burkert, 2012, p. 
101; Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 95). The separation of powers is based on 
two key data protection principles: purpose specification and proportionality. 
This first principle mandates that the purpose for which data is collected and 
processed must be stated at the time of collection, and that subsequent 
processing does not deviate from the stated purpose (Burkert, 2012, p. 101; 
Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 87). The second requires that methods used in 
relation to personal data collection and processing are suitable and appropriate, 
and not more intrusive than necessary. English judge Lord Diplock (cited by 
Kuner, 2008, p. 2) saw proportionality as: 
ÒIn plain English, it means ÔYou must not use a steam hammer to crack 
a nut, if a nutcracker would do.ÕÓ 
These two principles in combination led the court to conclude that the state as a 
whole cannot be considered a single data processor, and that data transfers 
from one state entity to another must be legally justified (Hornung and 
Schnabel, 2009, p. 87; DeSimone, 2010, p. 297). Also, the two principles yield 
the principle of data minimisation Ð Òthere must never be more data collected 
than absolutely necessary for a given purposeÓ (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, 
p. 87; see also Zwingelberg, 2011, pp. 151-152; Kuner, 2008, p. 3). In addition 
to German law, proportionality, purpose limitation and data minimisation can 
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be found in European data protection law, to which Germany is subject (Kuner, 
2008; Zwingelberg, 2011, p. 153). 
 
The rights and principles above Ð informational self-determination, purpose 
specification, proportionality and data minimisation Ð are at the heart of the 
data protection and privacy principles at work within the e-ID. The mutual 
authentication of citizen and service provider, visibly proven through the 
AusweisApp, notifies a citizen of the identity of a data collector/processor, 
reflecting a principle of transparency; an imperative for informational self-
determination. Mutual authentication is also hoped to inspire trust in the e-ID 
system, which is conducive to system adoption (Mller, Interview; Rahaman 
and Sasse, 2010, p. 607). Contained within the service provider certificate are 
the name and contact details of the providerÕs responsible data protection 
authority, giving the user an avenue to question or report the providerÕs 
activities. This serves informational self-determination as it gives citizens a 
route to take action against data processors. One researcher stated: 
ÒÉ from a consumer point of view you get to see the certificate, so you 
actually know who your provider is, actually who is his data protection 
authority É so you can claim if anything goes wrong you know [whom 
to talk to], and you see which bits of the data they collect.ÉÓ 
(Hornung, Interview) 
Also, citizen reporting is the first step in the prosecution of a malefactor. The 
BVA does not proactively police individual service providers, but does become 
involved if a data protection authority requests it (DE-G002, Interview). An 
author of the e-ID law said: 
ÒÉ basically we use the citizen as an indicator that something is wrong 
É they can just press a button then to say thatÕs something not okay 
and then it goes either to the privacy officer of the company or the 
private commissioners [next], and finally if [multiple reports are 
received] or something is going wrong, they can approach the BVA and 
say ÔthereÕs something wrong, please cut off or take back the [service 
provider authorisation].ÕÓ (Mller, Interview) 
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In a transaction conducted through the AusweisApp, all of the data requested 
by the service provider is listed, aiding the goal of transparency. The citizen is 
given the opportunity to deselect individual data fields to be sent to the service 
provider. However, a procedural safeguard exists to ensure that the data fields 
being requested are in fact the minimum required, proportional to the 
applicationÕs need: the BVA application process. And, a service provider is not 
required to complete a transaction if all of the requested fields are not sent. 
Despite this, the user is still given the opportunity to deselect fields, though it 
may cause the transaction to fail. In consideration of the friction that privacy 
introduces, discussed in Chapter 4, the failure of the transaction can be 
construed as the maximum friction possible. The balance between the 
governmentÕs desire to facilitate trustworthy authentications and its 
requirement to safeguard informational self-determination is, in this case, 
clearly tilted in oneÕs favour. A scientist recalled: 
ÒSome people said, ÔOkay, donÕt make it optional, you know, show the 
data which is read from the German e-ID and sent to the service 
provider and just write Do you agree?, then type in the PIN.Õ É But the 
other half of them said ÔNo but we want that the citizen sees which data 
is sent and has a choice.Õ And now I have the choice, but to be honest, 
if I want this service, I donÕt have a choice, but still this solution É is 
putting the expression on having a choice. Until the last moment the 
citizen has a choice to say ÔNo.ÕÓ (Fromm, Interview). 
 
The e-IDÕs selective disclosure feature serves the principle of minimal 
disclosure. For those transactions where age or age range is needed, birthdate 
can be withheld. For those where proof of regional residence is required, full 
address can be withheld. Minimal disclosure is also enforced by the BVA 
application procedures. State officials act as guardians of the ÔsovereignÕ data 
on the e-ID, ensuring that commercial and government organisations only gain 
access to the data truly necessary (in their view) to accomplish a transaction. 
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This is supported through technical means via the service provider certificates, 
which can only be obtained after a successful application to the BVA. 
 
The pseudonym generator serves a number of goals. The first is minimum 
disclosure. For those transactions where a service provider needs to know that 
the same person is returning and nothing else, or that a citizen has particular 
attributes (e.g., age or region) but does not need identity information, 
pseudonyms support this. The second goal is informational self-determination, 
by providing the means to separate the spheres of oneÕs online activities, 
controlling the dissemination of information about oneÕs digital life. The right 
to the full development of oneÕs personality is assisted by giving citizens the 
ability to control which parts of themselves they wish to reveal. A staff 
member of the ULD explained: 
ÒÉ the citizen must be able to intervene and decide if information 
should be linkable or not. Another aspect would be that it also gives 
them the freedom to actually act or live just certain aspects of their 
personality É the big risk is that you have all information dumped into 
one database, and the risk is also here that the citizen is reduced to this 
information.É So, itÕs a personal freedom to decide which aspect of 
your personality you want to reveal and you want to use, and so it is 
quite important to offer them to open that possibility to them.Ó (ULD, 
Interview) 
This is further supported by the ÔsectoralÕ nature of service provider 
certificates, in line with the Constitutional CourtÕs finding that the state cannot 
act as a single data processor. 
 
The cardÕs 10-year validity supports the Constitutional CourtÕs forbidding of 
long-lived general identifiers. This also ensures that pseudonyms Ð since they 
are card- and service provider-specific Ð become invalid within 10 years. The 
voluntary nature of the online authentication function serves informational 
determination by giving users the ability to decline its use. This is also true of 
the voluntary inclusion of fingerprints. 
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Privacy mindset 
A number of respondents cited a Ôprivacy mindsetÕ as part of the policy 
universe of the e-ID, described variously as: 
¥ a ÒphilosophyÓ (Fromm, Interview) 
¥ a ÒmindsetÓ (DE-G003, Interview; ULD, Interview) 
¥ ÒcultureÓ (DE-G003, Interview; Mller, Interview; ULD Interview) 
¥ a ÒvalueÓ (Fromm, Interview; DE-G003, Interview) 
 
This mindset was partly attributed to German history: the use of identification 
information by the Nazi and East German regimes to control, hunt and kill its 
citizens (DE-G002, Interview; Fromm, Interview; Kubicek, Interview). The 
1983 Constitutional Court decision forbidding unique personal identifiers 
draws on this history (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 88; Hornung, Interview; 
Kubicek, Interview). Noack and Kubicek (2010, p. 88) explained: 
ÒIn 1938, the National Socialist Regime (Third Reich) introduced an ID 
card with fingerprints, which was mandatory only for conscripts and 
Jewish citizens. 1939, with the beginning of the Second World War, it 
became mandatory for every citizen and inhabitants of the occupied 
territories. Jewish citizens were also assigned with numbers, which 
were used for their deportation and administration in concentration 
campsÉ This specific historical context has influenced the debate 
about É [the e-ID] in the last 10 years just as it did the earlier debate 
about a unique personal identifying number.Ó  
The extent of that influence is debatable, however. Gerrit Hornung (Interview) 
observed: 
ÒÉ weÕve had like two historic experiences, and one is only twenty 
years ago with the Stasi [East German police], and obviously that sort 
of influences É political discussions, those experiences. I am not sure 
É whether it goes a lot further than having this historical background 
as a general base for the discussions, because I donÕt see a direct 
connection from the having fingerprints on the Third Reich identity 
cards É and having it now.Ó  
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Nonetheless, the respondents believe that privacy is a valued, oft-considered 
concept in Germany (DE-G002, Interview; DE-G003, Interview; ULD, 
Interview). Gerrit Hornung (Interview) noted: 
ÒÉ the data protection issues and privacy issues in Germany are 
strongly debated always in every É new security application, new 
collection of data.ÉÓ 
Some saw the choice to include the pseudonymity feature of the e-ID as driven 
not by Òa specific service or application É it was more, letÕs say É a general 
approach following É a common mindsetÓ (DE-G003, Interview). Given the 
e-IDÕs other privacy functions, the pseudonym generator was ÒlogicalÓ to 
include (ULD, Interview). A data protection officer said: 
ÒI think putting the pseudonymity function is a must-have concept 
when once you already have these other anonymous authentication 
methods or age or the municipality you live in, and basically putting the 
pseudonym in as another function in this privacy area É it is just more 
or less logical.Ó (ULD, Interview) 
Pseudonymity requirements exist elsewhere in German law. The 
Telemediengesetz (Telemedia Act), which applies to telecommunications 
services, includes a provision requiring service companies to enable users to be 
able to use and pay for services pseudonymously (Telemedia Act, 2007, Sec. 
13(6)). The companies are forbidden from attempting to identify a 
pseudonymous user through combining other data it possesses (Telemedia Act, 
2007, Sec. 13(4)). These provisions pre-dated the e-ID and contributed to the 
mindset for pseudonymity (ULD, Interview). 
 
There is awareness among a few of the respondents that the German privacy 
culture is not embraced by other European countries. Some see the degree of 
data minimisation and the administrative processes of the BVA as Òtypically 
GermanÓ (Fromm, Interview; DE-G002, Interview; also N003, Interview). Jan 
Mller noted: 
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ÒÉ privacy and self-determination, itÕs a big issue in Germany.É 
[W]ithin Europe itÕs totally different É what people in these societies 
consider É is within this privacy sphere and what is not É Germany 
probably has a É higher wish for a bigger private area.Ó (Mller, 
Interview) 
One respondent believed that there was a strong trust in Germany for the 
original paper ID that could transfer to the e-ID: ÒÉ it has established itself as 
a trustworthy document Ð no one in Germany doubts this documentÓ (Fromm, 
Interview). Further, this trust led to a preference for the existence of a state-
issued ÔsovereignÕ identity rather than only having commercial ones available. 
Jens Fromm (Interview) explained: 
ÒI have the strong feeling that I donÕt want to be dependent on 
commercial identification.É I think that it is good that we have this, 
but I donÕt want to depend only commercial identities like a PayPal 
account or a Google ID, a Microsoft passport approach. It is great that 
we have all these solutions and companies are offering thisÉ but in 
some cases, in some situations, I am strongly convinced that itÕs good 
that we have a sovereign state-given identity. For example, to open up a 
bank account, to have governmental services, to use in any kind of 
situations, I think I donÕt want to involve any kind of other companies.Ó  
Stronger protections for validated data 
The case data reflects a belief that the personal data contained on the card Ð 
sometimes referred to as ÔsovereignÕ data by respondents Ð is deserving of 
greater protection than publically or commercially available information about 
citizens, or than data that they volunteer themselves (Fromm, Interview; 
Mller, Interview; ULD, Interview). Policy discourse during the genesis of the 
e-ID reflected this dichotomy. A scientist active in the e-ID policy community 
noted: 
Ò... what was very interesting the last five years, listening to data 
commissioners, listening to left wing politicians, right wing politicians, 
whatsoever É you know people are active on Facebook, they are 
writing emails so basically, a postal card through the Ônet É when you 
are buying products sometimes the cashiers ask for the postal code and 
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they are just giving it, they have [loyalty] cards, they have all this kind 
of stuff É as soon as we talk about the German identity card, each data 
field is discussed and protected like it would be you know, in England, 
the Queen or something.Ó (Fromm, Interview) 
In part, the impulse to protect it comes from a belief that validated data is 
qualitatively different because it can be trusted. Jan Mller stated: 
ÒSo itÕs just a different quality if you have proven from the card or you 
have just any information on the web; it makes it different. It needs 
different protectionÉ You can trust it, trust is the currency.Ó (Mller, 
Interview) 
However, itÕs also been suggested that the focus on the card data derives from 
the capability to influence it; that protection of the data falls within the remit of 
the responsible authorities, and so they are exerting their prerogative (Kubicek, 
Interview). To support increased protection of the official data on the e-ID, it 
was made illegal to store proof that authentication data originated from the 
card; partly to eliminate the possibility of a black market in authenticated 
official data. Jan Mller explained: 
ÒÉ they canÕt use any technical information deriving from this 
processÉ they are not allowed to store that stuff, so they cannot prove 
that actually this authentication with this data took place É we didnÕt 
want to have a new kind of currency in the address market like original, 
national ID data or something like that.Ó (Mller, Interview) 
This means that the identity data on the card is not ÔsignedÕ when it is 
transmitted Ð there is no cryptographic proof that the data originated from the 
card. However, one researcher has commented that this compromises security: 
ÒThis means that if the [cryptography] is compromised, an attacker can 
create a card that can send arbitrary data that will be accepted by the 
server at face value. As a consequence, the attacker can impersonate an 
arbitrary person.Ó (Hoepman, 2012) 
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Relationship to e‐passport 
The e-ID is very closely related to the e-passport. It largely mirrors the e-
passport technical infrastructure (DE-G001, Interview; Margraf, Interview). 
When the Federal Office of Information Security (BSI) was developing the e-
passport system, it also had in mind a future e-ID infrastructure. A government 
computer scientist recalled: 
ÒÉ when we started designing the protocols for the e-passport we 
already had also an identity card in mind. So when we planned for the 
protocols we planned it in a way we could also base an identity card on 
those protocols.Ó (DE-G001, Interview) 
The e-IDÕs mutual authentication feature, which serves the goal of 
informational self-determination (discussed above), was created for the e-
passport. In that prior implementation, instead of service providers 
authenticating themselves to the card, it was border agents with authorised 
terminals (Margraf, Interview; DE-G001, Interview). During the policy 
development of the e-ID, there was dissent regarding the mirroring of 
mandatory biometrics on the e-passport. Marit Hansen of the ULD said: 
ÒÉ the Minister of the Interior, Schuble, he really wanted to press 
people that they should give their fingerprints like with the e-passport. 
So in 2006, they issued this initiative, they seem to want to copy 
everything with the e-passport, and there was many objections from the 
data protection authorities because of centralisation of the databaseÉÓ 
(ULD, Interview) 
Both the e-passport and the e-ID fall under the remit of the Ministry of Interior. 
Gerrit Hornung, a legal scholar of the e-ID, believed that the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, played a role in the discourse of both the e-passport and 
e-IDÕs inclusion of biometrics: 
ÒÉ after September 11, people in Europe started to think about having 
this biometric passportÉ and so the German biometric passport [was 
deployed] in 2007 É and so when people started to implement that 
project I think there were parallel thoughts on having biometric data on 
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the identity card as wellÉ.Ó (Hornung, Interview; see also Noack and 
Kubicek, 2010, p. 91) 
After a privacy debate within the Parliament (Bundestag) that also involved the 
Federal data protection supervisor, the storage of fingerprints on the e-ID was 
made voluntary (Noack and Kubicek, 2010). There are no applications, travel 
or otherwise, that can use fingerprints on the e-ID; non-German governments 
are not reading the fingerprints stored on the card (Hornung, Interview). 
 
There were manufacturing ties between the e-passport and e-ID. T-Systems, an 
information technology company part of the Deutsche Telekom group, was a 
key supplier for both e-passports and the e-ID. One respondent explained: 
ÒT-Systems was the main contractor for the introduction of the new 
German É electronic passport a few years ago, and through this 
activity [they] were well placed and that was the reason why then our 
German Federal Ministry of Interior asked [them] to take over some 
responsibilities in the introduction of the new PersonalausweisÉ.Ó 
(DE-G003, Interview) 
To improve the security of sending passwords across the e-IDÕs contactless 
interface, the BSI developed a protocol called Password Authenticated 
Connection Establishment (PACE). In addition to use with the e-ID, PACE has 
since been adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization, the 
international body responsible for travel document standards (ULD, Interview; 
DE-G005, Interview). As such, PACE will become part of the security 
standards for all next-generation electronic passports (Nithyanand, 2009, p. 
10). 
Commercial influences 
Given the policy history of the e-ID, commercial considerations appear after 
the Personalausweisgesetz was passed and do not appear to have contributed 
greatly to the lawÕs genesis or provisions, though there was some public 
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support by industry trade bodies for the online authentication and e-signature 
functions (Hornung, Interview). There is some evidence of commercial 
influence in the presence of the cardholderÕs postal code in the card data. The 
German postal system is private so the post codes are privately assigned and do 
not follow political boundaries (ULD, Interview). The card contains both the 
post code and the government-created municipality ID. A scientist stated: 
ÒÉ on the old German identity card there was no postal code because it 
was private, now there is a postal code on the German identity card 
because the companies wanted it, because itÕs easier for themÉ.Ó 
(Fromm, Interview) 
Companies from the card manufacturing and IT security sectors were involved 
by the BSI while they were developing the e-IDÕs technical specifications. A 
security researcher said: 
ÒThe BSI did not create the protocols [from] scratch, but of course they 
were communicating with the card manufacturers and the technicians of 
the manufacturers, and all the manufacturers they act É 
internationally.Ó (DE-G005, Interview) 
Commercial and government relying parties were involved during a testing 
period, though there was a lack of strong commitment from industry generally 
(Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 103). At present, one of the greatest challenges 
to adoption of the online authentication function is a lack of service providers. 
The difficulty lies in making the business case to commercial providers to go 
through the certification process. For large international businesses, it is often 
not beneficial enough to become certified for a German-only system (DE-
G005, Interview). Further, the value of the card to commercial companies is 
only verified data (Kubicek, Interview). While this can conceivably reduce 
data entry problems, incorrect shipping addresses, and potentially fraudulent 
logins, itÕs so far not a very robust case (DE-G002, Interview). There is not a 
strong enough reason or cost reduction to cause businesses to alter their 
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practices Ð the data volunteered by customers or obtained through other means 
is sufficient. Herbert Kubicek explained: 
ÒWhat would be my motivation as an e-commerce provider to buy 
expensive middleware, to pay annual fees for all these É if I donÕt get 
more information then I get by username or password so far?Ó 
(Kubicek, Interview) 
Furthermore, the policy intention is for commercial service providers to obtain 
a separate authorisation for each service they offer online, making the process 
more financially unattractive. ItÕs also been suggested that the maximum 10-
year lifespan of a card-generated pseudonym dissuades businesses from using 
them. Jens Fromm stated: 
ÒThe biggest problem of the pseudonym function, itÕs at the same time 
the biggest advantage of the pseudonym function.É As soon as I lose 
this card, as soon as this card gets invalid and I get a new identity card, 
I get a new key on it and I cannot generate the same pseudonym with 
this service provider. Many companies É wanted to use this number in 
the beginning as a É permanent unique identifier. So this doesnÕt 
work.Ó (Fromm, Interview) 
As a result of these various challenges, administrators at the BVA spend more 
than 50% of their time trying to convince service providers of the value of 
becoming certified to access data on the e-ID (DE-G002, Interview). 
 
The e-ID has an electronic signature function that is enabled by loading on 
privately obtained certificates. However, that function is currently dormant in 
all e-IDs because no companies are selling the e-signature certificates. Contact-
based e-signature cards have been sold privately in Germany since the early 
2000s. Those vendors do not see a benefit in offering certificates for the e-ID 
as it could potentially ÔcannibaliseÕ their own markets by supplying a product 
that would compete with their own extant offerings (DE-G003, Interview). 
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The e-ID is also new and those businesses that might be inclined to use it Ð 
German-based businesses, for example Ð may need time to adopt it. Jens 
Fromm (Interview) observed: 
Ò... now we know that obviously we need to give this technology time 
and we need to give the companies time to offer services, and obviously 
a big company like Deutsche Bahn, the German train company, or the 
Tax Ministry, they donÕt introduce a new technology within three 
months. They need to go to certification processes, they need to 
integrate it in their data centres, they need to train people, so these are 
obviously processes that will take timeÉ.Ó  
Technical vs. social methods of privacy enforcement 
The privacy functions of the e-ID are accomplished largely through technical 
means. The card contains mathematical functions that enable selective 
disclosure of attributes, such as age range or locality. Different functions 
generate unlinkable pseudonyms when matched with cryptographic data 
contained in service provider certificates. The data protection model is broadly 
underpinned by cryptography: cards will only communicate in the presence of 
appropriate cryptographic certificates, data communications are encrypted, the 
cardÕs revocation method is a complex cryptographic system. In the case of bad 
actors, where a service provider is suspected of mishandling personal data, the 
BVA can order certificate authorities to invalidate the offenderÕs certificate, 
technically preventing data from flowing. 
 
The choice to eschew centralised databases in the overall architecture 
reinforces the strong privacy impulse to prevent the state from knowing about 
its citizensÕ online activity. The e-ID system, by design, disallows the state 
from tracking cardholders online. During the development of the e-ID policy, 
stakeholders reviewed the Austrian e-ID system which also rejected long-lived 
identifiers. However, the system relied on servers that could link citizen 
activities and so the architecture had a limited influence on German technical 
choices (Fromm, Interview). Similarly, the lack of centralised databases of 
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biometric information held on e-ID cards supports the rejection of an 
informationally intrusive state. Further, the biometrics can only be accessed in 
a face-to-face interaction Ð the architecture prevents the data from any other 
form of access. This layer of technical security further prevents the 
accumulation of biometric databases of the citizenry. 
 
The technology that underpins the e-IDÕs security and privacy features are 
largely derived of the German e-passport design, allowing the e-ID to easily 
inherit those features (Mller, Interview; Noack and Kubicek, 2010, pp. 108-
109). The pseudonym generator and selective disclosure features are unique to 
the card, and represent an intention to anchor privacy intentions in a technical 
model. Jan Mller explained: 
ÒÉ where we had the real trust anchors of the whole system, we tried 
to secure them in a technical way because this is not dependent on how 
far you can actually enforce law. But of course you cannot do 
everything in a technical way. So sometimes we had to look for 
protections which were in a legal way then.É So itÕs a mixture of both, 
but É the real important bits you want to have in a technical secure 
way or you want to have technical mechanisms to make sure that they 
are enforced.Ó (Mller, Interview) 
 
There are a number of non-technical methods of privacy enforcement. Firstly is 
the Personalausweisgesetz itself; it requires data minimisation principles to be 
applied to service providers who wish to access the card. It also forbids anyone 
from asking a citizen to surrender her or his e-ID (Mller, Interview). The 
BVAÕs application procedure is policy-driven. The 1983 Constitutional Court 
decision that derived a right of informational self-determination is the key 
influence driving privacy and data protection for the e-ID, in addition to the 
general German data protection law, itself a transposition of the European 
Union Data Protection Directive. Privacy sensitivity around biometrics is 
supported by policies requiring that the federal printer must delete any facial 
photographs or fingerprints it receives after producing a card (DE-G001, 
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Interview). Contracts are used by service providers to control the behaviour of 
e-ID service proxies, who are also subject to data protection law. Service 
providers are prohibited by law from recording cryptographic provenance of 
authentication data so data cannot be proven to have originated from the e-ID 
(Mller, Interview). 
Marketing 
Weak ÔmarketingÕ was cited as a key obstacle to broad adoption of the online 
authentication function (DE-G002, Interview; Fromm, Interview; ULD, 
Interview). Citizens were not effectively made aware of the online 
authentication Ð and hence its pseudonymity capabilities Ð or the value of it. 
Relatedly, municipal registration office workers were not trained well enough 
to discuss or support the authentication function (DE-G002, Interview; Fromm, 
Interview). There are approximately 6,000 municipal offices; an estimated 
20,000 people needed to be trained in those offices to produce and distribute 
the e-IDs (Fromm, Interview). As the citizenÕs main point of contact for 
obtaining an e-ID is her or his local municipal registration office, the 
insufficient training led to citizens receiving inadequate and inconsistent details 
about the authentication function and where it might be used. A government 
official stated: 
ÒWhen you get your card you can decide, and roundabout only 30% É 
decide to [turn on the authentication function].É And the first contact 
you have with the card [is] your local municipality office, and our way 
is to convince [those employees] because they have the first contact to 
the citizens. [ItÕs] a great problem because they are not marketing 
[professionals].Ó (DE-G002, Interview) 
ÒWhy should citizens use the identity function, are they aware of these 
identity functions?  About 65% of the citizens are opting out the 
function because they just donÕt know why they should use it, why they 
should opt in É if any other countries are thinking about this system, 
education, marketing is crucial.Ó (Fromm, Interview) 
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Part of the BVAÕs strategy to encourage adoption of the authentication function 
is to convince more public agencies and services to use the e-ID as part of their 
e-government strategy so as to illustrate its value to the citizen: 
ÒÉ the best way is it to show that the e-government business is 
working because then you can say, ÔItÕs okay for you [to turn the 
authentication function] on and not off because in our own community 
it works.ÕÓ (DE-G002, Interview). 
The issue of marketing illustrates the product nature of the e-ID. As a material 
trace of a citizenÕs official identity, the e-ID must be treated akin to other 
products and services, and must compete for space in the market for peopleÕs 
attention. One official explained: 
ÒÉ this chip and this card is a product and nothing else. ItÕs an official 
product from GermanyÉ Other persons, offices, they say, ÔOnly itÕs a 
legal decision to make this card,Õ final point, nothing else. For me itÕs a 
product and you have to [do] marketingÉ you have to go [to] the users, 
you have to go to the business cases and you have to decide what you 
want.Ó (DE-G002, Interview) 
As noted above, BVA officials responsible for managing the e-ID spend more 
than 50% of their time attempting to convince both governmental and 
commercial organizations to adopt the e-ID (DE-G002, Interview). They put 
on, in essence, a road show: 
ÒÉ we initiate conferences, we go to the states, we go to the cities, we 
talk to them and inform them about the possibilities and the functions 
that they could use just so that they get an idea of what they can benefit 
from.Ó (DE-G002, Interview) 
To help agencies and private organisations successfully apply for a certificate, 
the BVA consults with them iteratively to find the minimum set of data needed 
for an application. The official notes: 
ÒÉ they have an idea and they initiate a project and say, ÔWe want to 
do this and thatÕ and then we consult people and say, ÔOkay, what do 
you really need?Õ and this is really a process.É ItÕs not in the legal 
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system but we do it because we have learned that the other way is not 
good.Ó (DE-G002, Interview). 
When the federal government first began to discuss the e-ID in public, they, 
too, put on a road show to make the case to the citizenry of its value and 
security characteristics. The Ministry took branding and recognisability into 
consideration, adding a logo to the e-ID to help bearers know where they could 
use their card. 
 
Figure 6.6  The e-ID logo 
 
Source: Federal Office for Information Security, n.d. 
 
Jan Mller (Interview) noted that the two halves depicted in the logo symbolise 
the uniting of the physical world and the electronic one. 
Policy actors 
The key actor in the creation of the e-ID was the Ministry of Interior. The 
earliest appearance of a policy intention to change the laminated paper national 
identity card to the neue Personalausweis began and ended with the Ministry. 
Its influence is evident through the legislative process that created the e-ID 
law, the ground preparation of the citizenry, and through its sub-agencies the 
development of the cardÕs privacy architecture and certification system to 
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authorise service providersÕ access to citizen data. The Ministry essentially 
wrote the e-ID law in consultation with the German parliament (Mller, 
Interview). The technical guidelines, architectures and policies that underpin 
the Personalausweisgesetz were largely inherited from the e-passport system, 
which the Ministry also administers (DE-G001, Interview; DE-G005, 
Interview; Margraf, Interview). The section of the law requiring service 
providers to be authorised to access data on the card gave no details for 
implementation, and so was interpreted and developed by the Federal Office of 
Administration (BVA), an agency within the Ministry. They convened a 
working group made of state and federal data protection officers, the BSI, 
representatives of private companies, and government administrators, with 
observers from the Ministry. As regards the e-IDÕs privacy functions Ð 
pseudonymity, mutual authentication and selective disclosure Ð they were 
added to the design by Jan Mller who had been hired by the Ministry 
specifically to be one of the authors of the e-ID law. Mr. Mller is the chief 
figure inside the Ministry responsible for the e-IDÕs privacy features. He 
recalled: 
Òwe had the basic idea [of the privacy functions] from the beginning É 
this was my idea as far as I was involved, that we wanted to build a 
function people want to use because they can trust it. So I wanted to 
build something what I also myself want to use because it takes care 
about my rights and my self-determination.Ó (Mller, Interview) 
Herbert Kubicek (Interview) remarked on the trust placed in Mr. Mller: 
Ò[The Ministry] hired Mller to take care of the privacy issues. And my 
impression is that they didnÕt really care what he proposed because they 
believed in him, because the ULD is the most critical of all sixteen 
privacy state offices. So if they agree with something, you can be safe 
that there will be no discussion following.Ó 
The federal police, also a sub-agency of the Ministry of Interior played a role 
as well. When it was decided that the e-ID would conform to ID-2, the size of 
banking cards and other European e-IDs, the police were insistent that the size 
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of the photograph on the original ID not be reduced so as not to make visual 
identifications more difficult (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 96; Fromm, 
Interview; DE-G001, Interview; ULD, Interview). This, in turn, influenced the 
technology of the card: more space for the photograph left less Ôreal estateÕ for 
an electronic chip. This eliminated the possibility for a contact-based chip, 
forcing the use of a contactless chip, which, due to its capacity for more data 
storage, opened up the possibility for more functionality (Noack and Kubicek, 
2010, p. 96).  
 
Federal and state-level data protection authorities were also key players in the 
e-IDÕs development. At the federal level, the data protection supervisor was 
vocally opposed to the mandatory inclusion of fingerprints or a national 
centralised e-ID database (Hornung, Interview, ULD, Interview). The state data 
protection authorities provided commentary during the policy development of 
the e-ID. In particular, the ULD was involved due to its expertise in electronic 
identity having participated in the pan-European projects, Future of Identity in 
the Information Society (FIDIS) and Privacy and Identity Management for 
Europe (PRIME). The ULDÕs deputy commissioner, Marit Hansen, has 
published numerous identity management and privacy-related papers and 
articles, and was Jan MllerÕs manager when he was at the ULD (Mller, 
Interview; ULD, Interview). In early January 2010, data protection authorities 
were asked to interpret the e-ID lawÕs requirement that service providers only 
request the information necessary to perform their duties. The ULD responded 
with a set of use cases to illustrate the Ôprinciple of necessityÕ and later 
published a paper on their findings (ULD, Interview; Zwingelberg, 2011). 
State-level data protection authorities play an on-going role in enforcement: if 
they suspect that a service provider authorised to query the e-ID is mishandling 
personal data, they can notify the BVA who can then cut off the providerÕs 
access (Mller, Interview). 
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The approximately 6,000 municipalities played a role in the e-IDÕs 
development and on-going deployment. Constitutionally, the municipalities are 
responsible for citizen registration (ULD, Interview). As discussed above, the 
municipalities are the first port of call for citizens wishing to obtain an e-ID. 
The municipalities begin the process, take new photographs, transmit the data 
to the federal printer, and then distribute the e-ID upon its delivery from the 
printer. The municipal offices are the closest source of information about the e-
ID, and as such factor greatly in citizen awareness of the e-IDÕs functions. The 
difficulty in training and convincing the approximately 20,000 involved 
municipal workers of the benefits of the e-ID is cited as a reason that less than 
1/3 of the cards in circulation have its online authentication function turned on 
(DE-G002, Interview; Fromm, Interview). The cost of the e-ID Ð 
approximately €29 Ð is nearly three times the price of the original paper 
identity card (Fromm, Interview). This is largely due to the increased 
administrative and equipment costs borne by the municipalities (Fromm, 
Interview; Kubicek, Interview). This increased price caused the Ministry of 
Interior to consider adding features to the card, such as online authentication, 
to make the card more valuable to citizens. Jan Mller (Interview) explained: 
ÒÉ if you have the chip already you can use it for additional value and 
so kind of this e-ID function was born asÉwell we have to have the 
chip anyway for biometrics and so on, so we will have a more 
expensive card of cost and all that but then we also want to have extra 
value for the citizens of it if we have to make it more expensive.ÉÓ  
However, Prof. Dr. Herbert Kubicek, a scholar from the University of Bremen 
who has written on the e-ID, does not believe that the additional features were 
added to make the card more attractive: ÒThere is no stakeholder for this 
attractionÓ (Interview). 
 
Academics, universities and research institutions have played a role in the 
policy history and technical development of the e-ID. Experts in electronic 
signature law, a related antecedent to the e-ID, were engaged by the 
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government from the early 2000s onward (Hornung, Interview). Legal 
analytical texts have been produced on e-ID liability issues. Prof. Dr. Kubicek 
shared research on use cases for e-commerce with the Ministry (Kubicek, 
Interview). The Technical University of Darmstadt performed pilot tests, 
reported on functional and security weaknesses of the e-ID architecture, and 
worked with the BSI to develop some of the underlying cryptographic 
protocols used in the e-IDÕs privacy functions (DE-G005, Interview). The 
Fraunhofer Institute, one of EuropeÕs largest research institutions, was a 
Òmediator between government approaches and government philosophies and 
the industryÓ during the rollout of the e-ID (Fromm, Interview). 
Usability 
The usability of the e-ID system is a recurrent theme within the data. Jan 
Mller mentioned that helping users to manage multiple pseudonymous 
identities was one of his goals during the policy development of the 
Personalausweis: 
ÒÉ from my feeling you have to support the people, they donÕt wanna 
care about pseudonyms or not É basically they want to be sure but they 
donÕt want to care too much about the security issue or the question 
ÔWhere did I use it, what profile is behind this pseudonym or notÉ?ÕÓ 
(Mller, Interview) 
Usability concerns were part of the policy-making process. There was a desire 
to inform which data was being requested by whom and to give users control Ð 
transparency and the ability to intervene. But there was also concern of 
introducing too many steps into the authentication process. Jan Mller 
(Interview) remarked: 
ÒÉ on the one hand you want to get the information for transparency 
back; self-determination needs transparency and [a] way to act if 
something is not the way you want to have it. So we needed to build 
this into the AusweisApp. But on the other hand, nobody wants to 
hassle with thousands of steps, so we tried to minimise the number of 
  
 
 
 
 
 
226 
steps to go through. This is basically why [the AusweisApp is] just 
three steps. The first is you read the information, the second is you 
decide and choose, and the third is put your PIN in, and this is it.Ó  
As previously discussed (see Informational Self-Determination above), users 
are allowed to de-select data fields requested by the service provider even if 
doing so would prevent the transaction from completing. This is a design 
choice in service of informational self-determination Ð giving users the option 
to say ÔNoÕ: 
ÒÉ if you use public infrastructure for it, it needs to be transparent and 
you need to have the opportunity to say No.ÉÓ (Mller, Interview) 
The e-ID was designed as a general identity token for the authenticating on the 
internet. Ease of use was intentional in that citizens only need to enter a six-
digit PIN authenticate, rather than remembering multiple passwords for various 
websites (DE-G001, Interview; DE-G003, Interview). Ease of use was also a 
consideration in the design of the revocation system. For a citizen to revoke her 
e-ID because it is lost or stolen, she must begin the process with a revocation 
password. The password is a simple word from the dictionary so as to be easy 
to memorise (DE-G002, Interview).  
 
Though there was some usability testing of the e-ID system, some respondents 
saw it as insufficient (DE-G003, Interview; Fromm, Interview). Jens Fromm 
(Interview) believed that privacy and security had to be modulated initially so 
as not to introduce too much friction, reducing adoption: 
ÒÉ we are in the rolling out process and the higher you have the 
[privacy and security] standards in the beginning the less likely it is that 
citizens are happy to use this É you need to have a system easy to 
use.Ó 
Fromm also felt that using the e-ID consistently as an authentication token for 
the internet was unrealistic because of the number of times one would have to 
physically use the card and the AusweisApp: 
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ÒÉ there were people who believed that this would be used for any 
kind of identification, authentication, but you know if you look at the 
young people today using Facebook and hop on, hop off thirty, forty 
times a day, I think itÕs quite obvious that they are not prepared to type 
in a 6-digit PIN and to place their wallet with the German e-ID on the 
card reader thirty times a day.Ó (Fromm, Interview) 
Among some respondents there was a general belief that usability is critical to 
adoption (Fromm, Interview; DE-G003, Interview), and that it is Òone of the 
most difficult tasks to achieveÓ (Fromm, Interview). A respondent from 
industry noted: 
ÒÉ the overall major point for me is of course to find a good balance 
between necessary security on the one hand and secondly usability 
acceptance on the citizensÕ side.ÉÓ (DE-G003, Interview) 
Jens Fromm remarked on the primacy of usability in identity management: 
ÒÉ what we learned is really security is not all. ItÕs really about 
usability É you can have the most secure system Ð if itÕs not used, it 
doesnÕt change anything because itÕs not used É we need to go to a 
usability level where itÕs being accepted, then we can raise slowly 
security and privacy issues. It doesnÕt really work the other way 
around.Ó (Fromm, Interview) 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed empirical data gathered on German public policies of 
unlinkability. It explored the context in which unlinkability is nested: digital 
credentials for citizens to access e-government and commercial websites. 
Germany began issuing an e-ID card in 2010 that is capable of authenticating 
cardholders online. The card is able to send verified identification information, 
such as a name and address, and attributes such as place of birth and doctoral 
degree. The card can also produce pseudonyms when paired with a service 
providerÕs authorisation certificate which allows the provider to obtain data 
from the card. In the absence of other linkable information, the pseudonyms 
created by the card and certificate are unlinkable. This is GermanyÕs policy of 
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unlinkability. Unlike the US, the German policy is strictly one of technical 
enforcement, relying on cryptography to create pseudonyms and to separate 
contexts, and by deliberately avoiding centralised servers in the e-ID systemÕs 
architecture, which renders the system unobservable by government. 
 
This chapter illustrated how, like in the US, policy initiatives to facilitate 
online authentication of citizens are linked to e-government activities. Unlike 
the US, German identity management policies are also linked to e-signature 
policy. This is due in part to the advanced state of e-signature legislation in 
Germany and Europe, and to an early, unsuitable use of e-signatures as a form 
of strong authentication. The German e-ID is, technologically, a direct 
descendent of the German e-passport, inheriting nearly all of its infrastructure 
design. The e-ID was deployed to facilitate e-government authentication, to 
change the size of the national ID to a smaller, more common size, and to 
generally improve the security of online interactions for citizens. 
 
The e-IDÕs authorising law, architecture, and policy development were driven 
by the Ministry of Interior. The privacy features of the e-ID were largely 
driven by Jan Mller, a lawyer who previously worked for the ULD, a German 
data protection authority. Mr. Mller included the e-IDÕs unlinkability features, 
though it did not appear in the authorising law. Unlinkability and the cardÕs 
other privacy features Ð selective disclosure, mutual authentication with service 
providers, and a requirement to obtain an authorisation to retrieve data from the 
card Ð did not rise to the level of legislative debate. The only debate on privacy 
issues centred on the mandatory inclusion of fingerprints. These were 
ultimately made optional.  
 
The choice to include unlinkability in the German e-ID was informed by a 
seminal 1983 Constitutional Court case. This case derived a right to 
informational self-determination from the German constitution. This right is 
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Òthe constitutional anchor for data protectionÓ (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, 
p. 86). It requires that people know what data is being shared about them, and 
that they have the opportunity to refuse to share it. The Constitutional Court 
also prohibited the use of unique identifiers for citizens, and ruled that the state 
could not be considered a single data processor. Unlinkability serves these 
prohibitions by creating a different identifier for each person and separating the 
context of the use of them. German data protection is more coherent than that 
of the US due to its omnibus personal data protection law, the Constitutional 
Court case, vocal data protection authorities, and prior law requiring options 
for pseudonymity. Culturally, German identity management policy was 
influenced by a privacy mindset. 
 
Similar to the US, commercial issues influence and hinder German identity 
management policy. Only 28% of Germans have turned on the online 
authentication feature of the e-ID, largely due to weak marketing and lack of 
educating the municipal offices who distribute the cards. Administrators and 
officials had hoped that many commercial organisations would become 
certified to access personal data on the card, but numbers have remained low. 
This is mainly because those organisations are not yet convinced of the value 
of the official data on the card, and so they are unwilling to spend time and 
resources on becoming certified. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
230 
CHAPTER 7: COMPARISON OF GERMAN AND US POLICIES 
Introduction 
This chapter compares US and German identity management policies for 
citizen credentials, focusing on requirements for unlinkability. There are 
similarities and pronounced differences in the policy history and environments 
of the two countries, but both require identity management systems for citizen 
access to e-government to be able to create unlinkable pseudonymous logins. 
The core influence for this requirement is the principle of data minimisation 
and proportionality, present in German law and in a set of principles 
underpinning US privacy policy. The German Federal Data Protection Act 
requires data minimisation, in line with the European Data Protection 
Directive. The Act goes further, mandating that Òpersonal data are to be aliased 
or rendered anonymous as far as possibleÓ (Federal Data Protection Act, 2003, 
Sec. 3a). These requirements, plus a telecommunications law and a seminal 
Constitutional Court case are the direct antecedents of German unlinkability 
policies. The US Privacy Act of 1974 and a non-binding set of Fair 
Information Practice Principles containing the principle of data minimisation 
guide American privacy policy. These formal instruments directly inform US 
unlinkability requirements. 
 
A key finding of this research is that the privacy features of the German e-ID 
and the proposed US Federal Cloud Credential Exchange are some of the most 
advanced citizen-facing privacy and data protection policies in their respective 
countries. They are also a notable appearance of privacy-enhancing technology  
in national information policy. This chapter compares the countriesÕ formal and 
informal policies, technical and non-technical implementations, data protection 
models, key actors, the commercial dimension of implementation, and inherent 
challenges. These topics form the ÒgestaltÓ of unlinkability policy development 
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(McClure, et al., 1999, p. 314) and allow for a direct comparison of the ÔhowÕ 
and ÔwhyÕ of these policies in Germany and the US (Heidenheimer, et al., 
1990, p. 3). Comparing the two countries in this way creates an elaborated 
context to understand unlinkability and citizen credentialing generally, as well 
as in each country particularly.  
 
There is very limited empirical research on American citizen credentialing, its 
privacy architectures and its risk methodologies (Adjei, 2013; Katzan, 2011a, 
2011b; Schwartz, 2011). There is also limited research on the German e-ID 
data protection model, (Hornung and Ro§nagel, 2010; Noack and Kubicek, 
2010) and little empirical research of unlinkability policies generally. This 
thesis addresses those gaps. 
 
The research also identifies a sub-branch of information policy, Ôidentity 
management policy.Õ It includes online citizen credentialing activities, 
government employee and contractor credentialing, the relationship between 
government and private actors performing identity management services, risk 
models and policies relating to e-government access. Identity management here 
is used in the technical sense discussed in Chapter 4; it is systemic, comprised 
of data, organisationally-derived and transactional. IDM policy overlaps with 
Ôidentity policy,Õ which includes national identification systems, citizenship, 
and the relationship between citizens, non-citizens and the state (Davies and 
Hosein, 2007). IDM policy is influenced by data protection and privacy 
policies, procurement policies, security policies, e-government activities, and 
the needs of law enforcement and the military. 
 
Germany and the US are both capitalist, advanced democracies. Both have 
federal and state governments. They both have national policies in place to 
protect the privacy of their citizens, although there is wide variation in the 
scope and manner of this protection. Both countries addressed electronic 
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identity issues during the first decade of the millennium, and both saw 
significant growth in the use of e-government in that same period. There are 
many differences between the two polities as well. GermanyÕs population is 
approximately 80 million (BBC, 2013), whereas the US is approximately 316 
million (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). This difference in population scale 
affected policy options. Germany is part of the European Union, and as such 
some of GermanyÕs laws are directly influenced by it; its sovereignty is not 
completely its own. The United States is not a member of any supranational or 
intergovernmental entity that can influence its laws to the same degree.  
 
Significant to this research are differences in data protection regime. Germany 
has a data protection policy ÔlayerÕ Ð a regime comprised of an omnibus data 
protection law, a federal data protection commissioner, and data protection 
authorities in each German state. The US is absent this layer; its data protection 
laws are sectoral, and there are no data protection authorities or commissioners. 
Different regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, are responsible for different facets of data protection and privacy in 
their respective sectors. 
 
Another key point of difference between the two countries is the source of 
citizen credentials. In Germany, the federal government is issuing credentials 
directly in the form of a national e-ID card. They manage and pay for the 
identity supply chain: enrolling citizens and residents, contracting out the card 
production, managing the loading of identity data, card distribution, and 
revocation. The German government is responsible for the full e-ID Ôlifecycle.Õ 
The US government relies on the private sector to supply online credentials to 
Americans. It owns no infrastructure for generic citizen electronic identity; 
some individual departments and civil agencies have their own authentication 
infrastructures. Its model is similar to procurement, defining product standards 
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for its needs. However, it is not paying for credentials. Consequently, the 
ÔmarketÕ for citizen credentials is stillborn. At the time of this writing, the only 
credentials available to the general citizenry have little to no confidence in the 
identity behind them. This means that they cannot be used with e-government 
applications that exchange personal data as the credentials do not satisfy 
privacy requirements. German policy is more mature than US policy; 18.5 
million e-IDs have been distributed as of February 2013. Only 28% of those 
have their online authentication capability turned on (Bundesverwaltungsamt, 
2013). So, while GermanyÕs credentialing efforts are far ahead of the US, the 
low number of activations hinders the policy intent to foster trusted, privacy-
preserving online credentials. 
 
This chapter finds that unlinkability is a policy choice derived of the principles 
of proportionality, minimum disclosure, and context separation. It is encoded 
into the formal and informal policies of Germany and the US, and into their 
credentialing technical architectures. It overlaps appreciably with requirements 
for pseudonymous online interaction. In this way, the research is also an 
appraisal of national pseudonymity policies. Identity management and e-ID 
policies are advancing privacy and data protection goals generally. Germany 
and the US are both incorporating technical forms of privacy enforcement 
based on cryptography. Unlinkability, a strategy to frustrate profiling and 
enhance user control, is specified in technical requirements, protocols and 
system architectures, as well as organisational operating constraints. In 
Germany, the unlinkability features of their e-ID card reinforce and reapply 
prior requirements in data protection and telecommunication law. 
 
A comparison of the two countriesÕ electronic citizen identity efforts and 
policies illustrates that German privacy and data protection is more ÔcoherentÕ 
(Righettini, 2011, p. 146; see also Busch, 2010) than the United States. Chapter 
8 theoretically analyses the institutional dimension of both countriesÕ data 
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protection and privacy regimes using the new institutionalist approach. The 
present chapter first compares the formal policies and laws of each country, 
policy implementation and the governing data protection model. Key policy 
actors are compared, as is the commercial aspects of policy implementation, 
which became a significant issue through inductive analysis of the case data. 
Finally, implementation challenges in the two countries are compared.  
Policy requirements 
There are several policy instruments that led to the US requirement for 
unlinkability. The Privacy Act of 1974 constrains federal agenciesÕ collection 
and use of personal data. It requires data minimisation and proportionality by 
mandating that agencies shall Òmaintain in its records only such information 
about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose ÉÓ 
(Privacy Act of 1974, Sec. e(1)). Many government stakeholders cited the non-
binding Fair Information Practice Principles as a strong influence on citizen 
credential privacy requirements (G001, Interview; G003, Interview; G006, 
Interview; N005, Interview). With regard to data minimisation and 
proportionality, the FIPPs state: 
ÒOrganizations should only collect [personally identifiable information] 
that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the specified 
purpose(s) and only retain [personally identifiable information] for as 
long as is necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s).Ó (White House, 
2011, p. 45) 
One government lawyer (G006, Interview) noted the influence of the Office of 
Management and BudgetÕs (2007) Memorandum 07-16, which requires the 
safeguarding of personally identifiable information: 
ÒThe term Ôpersonally identifiable informationÕ refers to information 
which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such 
as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or 
when combined with other personal or identifying information which is 
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linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of 
birth, motherÕs maiden name, etc.Ó  
All government agencies are required by the E-Government Act of 2002 to 
conduct Ôprivacy impact assessmentsÕ: 
ÒÉ an analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling 
conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements 
regarding privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of collecting, 
maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form in an 
electronic information system, and (iii) to examine and evaluate 
protections and alternative processes for handling information to 
mitigate potential privacy risks.Ó (Office of Management and Budget, 
2003) 
 
For credentials intended for e-government use, the Trust Framework Provider 
Adoption Process (ICAM, 2009d) defines the privacy requirements for 
participating identity providers (IDPs). It bans Ôactivity tracking,Õ stating: 
ÒIDPs must not disclose information on end user activities with anyone 
and must not use the information for any purpose other than the 
federated identity service.Ó (ICAM, 2009d, p. 12) 
This requirement limits identity providers from using or disclosing information 
on which websites a user accesses with the IDPÕs credential. 
 
The Federal Identity Credential and Access Management (FICAM) body 
defined three Ôidentity schemesÕ Ð protocol subsets of three identity federation 
standards: Secure Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0, OpenID 2.0, and 
Identity Metasystem Interoperability (IMI) 1.0. The schemes are constrained 
configurations of the standards, encoding privacy and security requirements 
deemed necessary to interact with federal IT systems. SAML 2.0 and OpenID 
2.0 are capable of sending a pseudonym to identify citizens instead of more 
identifiable information, such as a name or social security number. A different 
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pseudonym can be sent to each relying party, making the credentials unlinkable 
Ð these are called ÔpairwiseÕ pseudonyms.  
 
Figure 7.1  Pairwise pseudonyms 
 
 
FICAMÕs published specification for OpenID 2.0 requires the use of 
pseudonyms (ICAM, 2009b), and the SAML 2.0 specification strongly 
recommends them (ICAM, 2011a). There are no IMI 1.0 systems in 
production. All activity on the standard has ceased, and this research does not 
make further reference to it. 
 
The Federal Cloud Credential Exchange, described further in the technical 
section below, currently exists as a request for proposals (RFP). One of its 
mandatory business requirements is: 
ÒThe FCCX service shall support the privacy requirements of 
anonymity, unlinkability and unobservability.Ó (United States Postal 
Service, 2013a, p. 5) 
This requirement is expanded into mandatory prohibitions on identity providers 
having Òvisibility into customer transactionsÓ carried out with other IDPs and 
relying parties, and prohibitions on relying parties having visibility into 
transactions in other relying parties (U.S. Postal Service, 2013b). The 
transactions in question are logins and activity on a federal website. 
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The German e-ID is authorised by the 2009 Personalausweisgesetz, the Act on 
Identity Cards and Electronic Identification. The Act does not mention 
pseudonyms. Instead, Technical Guideline TR-03127, published by the Federal 
Office for Information Security (2011), details the technical nature of the 
pseudonym function, and specifically cites an unlinkability intent: 
ÒThe pseudonym is generated in such a manner that the pseudonym for 
one service provider cannot be used to derive a pseudonym generated 
for another service provider.Ó (Federal Office for Information Security, 
2011, p. 22) 
The overarching policy governing privacy and data protection for online 
activities is the 2003 Federal Data Protection Act, amended in 2009; a required 
transposition of the 1995 European Union Data Protection Directive. The Act 
requires data minimisation, stating: 
ÒPersonal data are to be collected, processed and used, and processing 
systems are to be designed in accordance with the aim of collecting, 
processing and using as little personal data as possible. In particular, 
personal data are to be aliased or rendered anonymous as far as possible 
and the effort involved is reasonable in relation to the desired level of 
protection.Ó (Federal Data Protection Act, 2003, Sec. 3a) 
 
As detailed in Chapter 6, the decisions of a 1983 Constitutional Court exert a 
strong influence on all German data protection. The court derived a right to 
informational self-determination, and mandated that the state cannot be 
considered a single entity in regards to the collection and processing of 
personal data (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009). These two decisions add context 
and a legal framework to all data protection activity (Hornung and Schnabel, 
2009; Mller, Interview). By disallowing the state to act as a single data 
processor, the court mandated Ôcontext separationÕ Ð data used in one civil 
context must be separated from other, disparate civil contexts. Unlinkability is 
a strategy to address this mandate by keeping contexts separate via different 
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pseudonyms. The court decision adds to the coherence of German data 
protection and privacy mechanisms underpinning the choices of its e-ID 
policies. The US lacks the legal weight of a court decision or law. Still, the 
ÔspiritÕ of the German context separation is appearing within American policy. 
Citing the FIPPsÕ Use Limitation principle (White House, 2011, p. 45), a 2012 
privacy framework released by the White House (2012, p. 15) calls for 
ÒRespect for ContextÓ: ÒConsumers have a right to expect that companies will 
collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the 
context in which consumers provide the data.Ó The Privacy Coordination 
Committee (2013) of the steering group convened to help realise the National 
Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace outlines a variety of privacy 
harms including ÒUnanticipated RevelationÓ: ÒDissonance in the contextual 
use reveals or exposes person or facets of a person in unexpected ways.Ó These 
non-judicial and non-legislative documents are public policy, albeit with 
stronger normative force than coercive, which are part of the formal influences 
that contributed to US unlinkability policies. 
 
A legal precedent for pseudonymity requirements exists in the 
Telemediengesetz (Telemedia Act), legislation relating to e-commerce and 
Òinformation society servicesÓ (Telemedia Act, 2007, Preamble). The Act 
requires the option for pseudonymous use of an online service: 
ÒThe service provider must enable the use of telemedia and payment for 
them to occur anonymously or via a pseudonym where this is 
technically possible and reasonable.Ó (Telemedia Act, 2007, Sec. 13(6)) 
The Act also cites a specific intent of unlinkability: Òuser profiles É cannot be 
brought together with details to identify the holder of the pseudonymÓ 
(Telemedia Act, 2007, Sec. 13(4.6)). Relatedly, a German e-signature law that 
pre-dated the European UnionÕs e-signature directive allowed pseudonymous 
signing, although the same pseudonym was envisioned to serve for all 
interactions, rendering it linkable (Hornung, Interview; ULD, Interview). 
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For Germany, the online credential policy process-making was coherent given 
a prior national identification policy, an omnibus conception of personal data, 
strong pre-existing laws that emphasised pseudonymity, and a formal data 
protection policy layer in the form of state agencies and a federal 
commissioner. A German law specifically created both the e-ID and its online 
authentication capability. In the US, citizen credentials grew out of e-
government and cybersecurity policy priorities rather than a specific 
authorising law. The US had to erect a new body of policy to realise its identity 
management goals, versus Germany who built their e-ID laws and policies 
upon pre-existing ones for national identification, telecommunications and e-
signature. There was also a single German agency responsible for electronic 
identity, the Ministry of Interior. It was already responsible for the prior ID 
card, the passport and e-passport, and immigrant identification issues. It had 
introduced the e-passport immediately prior to the e-ID and had strong 
institutional ties to the German Parliament. The Federal Office for Information 
Security, who had technical oversight for identity documents, is the MinistryÕs 
sub-agency. Taken together, policy development of the e-ID, including its 
privacy requirements, was a coherent process. It took five years from the initial 
public announcement of the e-ID to the start of its distribution.  
 
US credentialing efforts for citizens were less coherent than German efforts. 
Lacking an omnibus data protection or privacy framework, the US relied on 
administrative rules, sectoral legislation, and non-binding principles to form 
the privacy regime for electronic citizen credentials. All identity documents are 
governed by various parts of the Executive branch. Travel documents such as 
passports fall under the ambit of the State Department. The policies and 
organisational resources deployed for travel documents and federal employee 
identification had a very limited impact on general citizen credentialing; it was 
effectively started from scratch. The choice to rely exclusively on external 
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providers yielded a set of stakeholders with various and independent interests. 
Unlike the German Ministry of Interior, who had direct command over large 
swathes of e-ID policy and a strong influence on the other parts, FICAM and 
the other actors of US IDM policy development had limited influence on the 
implementation piece of the policy. Implementation from the identity provider 
side was in the hands of private actors. By not using the power of the federal 
Ôpurse,Õ those private actors had little incentive to meet government needs.  
Technical implementation 
Unlinkability in Germany is accomplished by the use of pseudonyms created 
from the union of two cryptographic keys: one held on an e-ID card and one 
contained within a certificate bound to an individual service provider. In 
combination, the two keys produce a unique pseudonym Ð it is Ôcard- and 
service provider-specific.Õ In the case of two different service providers, each 
with its own certificate, a unique pseudonym is produced for each provider.  
 
Figure 7.2  The e-ID pseudonym generation process 
 
 
 
When logging into two different websites with two different pseudonyms 
generated in this fashion, it cannot be determined that the same citizen is 
logging in. This is only true, though, in the absence of other linkable data, such 
as an email address.  
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The German government is unable to know which service providers citizens 
visit due to a lack of centralised servers in the e-ID architecture that could log 
online activity. This can be called ÔunobservabilityÕ; the government is the 
assumed observer in this case (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010, p. 17). In 
unlinkability terms, the government is the identity provider Ð it issues the 
identity credential after vetting the claimed citizen identity at the time of 
enrolment. Whenever the credential is used at a relying party, such as an e-
government resource, the identity provider is not aware of the usage. This 
arrangement distinguishes ÔonlineÕ identity providers, where credential usage 
ÔspeaksÕ in real-time to the IDPÕs systems, and ÔofflineÕ providers, where 
credential usage is effectively severed from the originating IDP. The German 
system is an offline identity provider Ð the e-ID is a standalone credential, and 
its activities are not logged by its originating source. It was an intentional 
policy choice to avoid using centralising servers in the German e-ID 
architecture (Mller, Interview). During policy development, administrators 
reviewed the Austrian e-ID system and rejected it because of the linkability 
posed by centralised servers (Fromm, Interview). 
 
 
The US technical implementation should be viewed in two stages: pre-FCCX 
and post-FCCX. The Federal Cloud Credential Exchange is in its earliest 
design stage at the time of this writing, existing as a set of requirements in an 
RFP, but its eventual deployment could greatly affect the use of unlinkable 
credentials by US citizens. The proposed FCCX is described as a 1-year pilot 
project (U.S. Postal Service, 2013a). The contract to build and maintain it was 
awarded to SecureKey Technologies, Inc., a Canadian identity management 
and security company, in August 2013 (SecureKey, 2013). 
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Pre‐FCCX 
In the original policy design of citizen-facing online credentials, unlinkability 
was technically accomplished by the requirement for each identity provider to 
use a ÔpairwiseÕ pseudonym with each different relying party. However, of the 
two identity protocols in use, SAML 2.0 and OpenID 2.0, only the OpenID 2.0 
identity scheme requires pairwise pseudonym usage Ð the SAML 2.0 scheme 
leaves this as a recommendation. The ICAM OpenID 2.0 Profile (ICAM, 
2009b, p. 18) states: 
ÒThe pseudonym is used to identify the end user to the RP in a way that 
protects the end user's privacy by preventing propagation of the end 
user's common identifier throughout the Federal GovernmentÉ. The 
IdP MUST construct a pseudonym in a way that ensures that it cannot 
be reverse engineered to help identify an end user across multiple 
realms.Ó 
This language is the most specific technical requirement for unlinkability in US 
public policy, except for the requirements for the as-yet unbuilt FCCX, detailed 
below. It mirrors the language in the Telemediengesetz in the preceding section 
regarding the option for pseudonymous internet use. In contrast to OpenID, the 
ICAM SAML 2.0 Profile (ICAM, 2011a, p. 20) states: 
ÒThe use of pseudonyms (persistent identifiers) is strongly 
RECOMMENDED [sic]Ó 
A senior government identity management administrator has acknowledged 
that the disparity between the two Profiles is a flaw: 
ÒThat is not strong enough in my point of view, and I think we are 
actually going to be tightening up that languageÉ.Ó (G009, Interview) 
The disparity is particularly problematic because the OpenID 2.0 Profile is 
only approved for Level of Assurance (LoA) 1 where there is little to no 
confidence in an asserted identity, but SAML 2.0 Profile is approved for LoA 
1, 2 and 3; pseudonymous usage is acceptable up to LoA 2. For the 
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pseudonymity to have any real value to obscure a real identity, it must be used 
at LoA 2, which requires some confidence in an asserted identity. 
 
Figure 7.3  The redirect method: User begins at service provider 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from ICAM, 2011a, p. 10 
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The overall design for logging into relying parties using SAML 2.0 or OpenID 
2.0 in the current, pre-FCCX period is called the Ôredirect methodÕ Ð requests 
to log in to a service provider are redirected to an identity provider. There are 
two use cases: a user begins her journey at a relying party, or the user begins at 
an identity provider. Figure 7.3 above illustrates the first case. 
 
In this model, a citizen visits a service providerÕs website, e.g., an e-
government resource. In order to log in, the citizen selects an identity provider 
with whom she has previously enrolled. The service provider redirects the 
login request to this identity provider. The citizen authenticates herself to the 
IDP. The IDP then sends confirmation of a successful login to the service 
provider, who grants access to the citizen. For transactions up to Level of 
Assurance 2, the IDP may send a pseudonymous identifier that represents the 
citizen instead of a linkable identifier, like a name or email address (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2003, p. 14). When this ceremony is performed at 
two different service providers, they each get a different pseudonym. The 
online interactions are, in the absence of other linkable data, unlinkable. In the 
second use case, where a citizen begins her interactions at the identity provider, 
the process is similar except that the selection of the IDP and the relying party 
are reversed. It is vital to note that in the redirect model the identity provider is 
aware of all of its credential uses. It knows each relying party the citizen visits, 
and maintains a mapping of all pseudonyms used at those relying parties. This 
is ÔRP/RP blindnessÕ Ð the relying parties cannot, in the absence of other 
linkable data, determine the identity of a pseudonymous user by colluding. 
However, a citizenÕs identity can be discovered by an RP colluding with an 
IDP. 
Post‐FCCX 
Once the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange has been built, it will increase the 
federal governmentÕs ability to render citizen credentials unlinkable. The 
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FCCX is an intermediary layer between identity providers and relying parties. 
Its chief goal is to centralise and harmonise identity management efforts for 
federal agencies (G010, Interview). An additional benefit will be the ability to 
blind both sides of identity transactions, IDPs and RPs. Figure 7.4 below shows 
a simplified diagram of the FCCX. 
 
Figure 7.4  Proposed Federal Cloud Credential Exchange 
 
 
 
Computer systems inside the FCCX will receive credentials from identity 
providers and remove information identifying the credentialÕs source (G009, 
Interview; John, 2012). This way, relying parties will only know that they have 
received a valid credential, but not know its origin. When the credential 
contains pseudonymous identifiers, two different relying parties will not be 
able to determine the identity of citizen Ð RP/RP blindness. However, the 
FCCX also prevents an identity provider from knowing the final destination 
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and use of its credential. All it knows is that it received a request for a 
credential from the FCCX. While the IDP maintains a mapping of citizens to 
pseudonyms, it does not know whom the recipient of those pseudonyms is Ð 
this would be IDP/RP blindness. 
 
For citizen credentials envisioned by the National Strategy for Trusted 
Identities in Cyberspace Ð i.e., not for e-government use Ð policy development 
is still too formative to know what types of technical enforcement are feasible. 
The NSTIC is very clear about its unlinkability goals (See Chapter 5), but it 
remains to be seen how they will be realised. 
Data protection models 
The German model of data protection for citizen-focused digital identities 
largely relies on technical enforcement. Protection of personal data stored on 
the e-ID is accomplished through cryptographic security measures. Cards 
divulge the data stored on them only in the presence of appropriate 
authorisation certificates. The biometric data on the card can only be accessed 
via readers in a face-to-face interaction; it is not possible to access or send the 
data in other ways (Fromm, Interview; DE-G005, Interview). For non-law 
enforcement access to the rest of the data on the card, a piece of software is 
required: the AusweisApp. This application, supplied by the government, sits 
between the citizen and the service provider wishing to read the card data. The 
card will only release the data via the application if the service provider has a 
valid authorisation certificate; see Chapter 6 for a complete explanation. 
Service providers obtain the legal authorisation to procure a technical 
certificate by applying to the Federal Office of Administration. This agency 
reviews the application to ensure that the service provider will request only the 
minimum amount of data needed for its service. In this way, non-technical 
policy mechanisms support technical ones. Unlinkability is achieved through 
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reliance on the service providerÕs authorisation certificate and a cryptographic 
key stored on the e-ID specifically to create pseudonyms. 
 
The US model of data protection began with a mix of technical and social 
means of enforcement, but is now in the early stages of creating a stronger 
technical regime. Initially, data protection was driven by requirements and 
audits to ensure compliance. FICAM, the governing body for citizen 
credentials, required participating identity providers to have privacy policies 
comparable to the federal governmentÕs. Independent assessors, working under 
the banner of one of the Trust Framework Providers, certify that identity 
providers conform to the requirements. Additionally, technical interoperability 
must also be achieved. Identity federation relies on the use of standards, which 
can be configured in a number of ways. The federal government requires a 
constrained set of three standards to be used with government relying parties. 
The standards encode privacy goals to various degrees. One standard, OpenID 
2.0, requires the use of pairwise pseudonyms in certain types of transactions, 
and another, SAML 2.0, recommends their usage. This is the greatest degree of 
technical enforcement of unlinkability in the extant citizen credentialing 
system for e-government access. Identity providers learn about their usersÕ 
online activities through normal use of the system. FICAM rules require IDPs 
to keep this information confidential and not use it for other purposes, such as 
marketing. Ergo, for the data protection model to work, audits must be 
comprehensive and IDPs must not lie about their operations. Compared with 
Germany, where no IDP is aware of credential uses, this is a weaker form of 
privacy protection. Drummond ReedÕs spectrum of unlinkability, discussed in 
Chapter 5, illustrates the how different data protection influences based on 
different methods of enforcement yield the unlinkability policies of Germany 
and the US. The figure below combines US and German policy instruments 
and influences that contribute to their respective policies of unlinkability. 
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Figure 7.5 Reed's Spectrum: US and German policy instruments and influences 
 
 
 
US identity management policy administrators realised that they would need to 
assist agencies to meet their mandate to accept externally-issued credentials: 
ÒAgencies have been challenged É due to technical, policy and cost 
barriers that have made it challenging to accept third-party credential 
providers accredited by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access 
Management (FICAM) initiative.Ó (U.S. Postal Service, 2013a, p. 4) 
In January 2013, a request for proposals was released to gather bids to build the 
Federal Cloud Credential Exchange. The FCCX will contain most of the 
infrastructure needed to accept various credential types from a plurality of 
identity providers. The requested system design requires unlinkability: identity 
providers are to be blinded from the uses of their credentials, and relying 
parties are to be blinded from one another. This technical means of 
enforcement, when built, enhances US identity management privacy goals 
further than previous policies. The FCCX RFP states: 
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ÒSpecifically, the FCCX service must limit loss of anonymity, 
unlinkability and unobservabilty.Ó (United States Postal Service, 2013a, 
p. 5) 
This requirement is ambitious and far-reaching Ð the FCCX design proposal 
also requires a capability to support 135 million users (U.S. Postal Service, 
2013b). 
 
Until the FCCX is built, unlinkability goals in the US will be satisfied by social 
enforcement upon private actors who will then technically and socially enforce 
the goals. FICAM requires (social) participating identity providers to configure 
their systems to produce pairwise pseudonyms (technical), and not share the 
information they learn of a citizens online activity (social). In contrast, the 
German system relies more on technical enforcement. Cryptography on the 
card and within the e-ID system creates pairwise pseudonyms, and the overall 
architecture renders the system unobservable to the government. However, 
there is no overarching requirement in Germany for organisations to use 
pseudonymous logins. Instead, such use occurs when an organisation deems 
that a particular online service could function pseudonymously. When the 
FCCX is built, technical enforcement methods will supersede social ones, and 
the US commitment to unlinkability will rival or surpass GermanyÕs. 
Actors 
Regarding electronic identities for citizens, one agency in Germany is 
responsible for making policy, but in the US policy-making has been more 
diffuse. In Germany, identity and travel documents fall under the ambit of the 
Ministry of Interior. It has been the primary actor in evolving GermanyÕs 
original paper ID into the current e-ID. Its sub-agency, the Federal Office for 
Information Security, was responsible for the technical architecture of the 
system, having designed the e-passport system immediately prior. A different 
sub-agency, the Federal Office of Administration, was responsible for 
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developing and managing the data protection model for accessing citizen data 
on the cards. Federal and state data protection authorities contributed to the 
development of the privacy and data protection principles embedded within the 
e-ID through direct consultation with the Ministry. Local municipality offices 
played a role by being the first point of citizen contact and the distribution 
point for finished e-ID cards. Also, the increased administrative burden of 
registering citizens for the e-ID caused the municipalities to raise cost 
objections to the Ministry, who subsequently tripled the cost of the e-ID from 
the cost of the previous ID card (Fromm, Interview; Kubicek, Interview). Still, 
the Ministry of Interior unquestioningly drove the e-ID process, wrote the 
majority of its authorising law, and managed the rollout of the cards. It took 
five years from the first public discussion of policy to card deployment. 
 
A central figure in the policy development of the e-ID was Jan Mller, a 
lawyer within the Ministry of Interior. He was hired specifically to work on e-
ID issues. Prior to joining the Ministry, Mr. Mller worked for the ULD, the 
data protection authority of the state of Schleswig-Holstein. His experience at 
the ULD helped shape his views regarding privacy and identity (Kubicek, 
Interview; Mller, Interview), ultimately influencing the data protection 
principles embedded in the personalausweis. At the Ministry, Mr. Mller was a 
key actor in the design of the e-ID law and in the policy interaction between 
the German Parliament and the technical agencies responsible for building the 
e-ID architecture. Under Mr. MllerÕs direction, the e-ID design included a 
selective disclosure feature for age and locality, and the pseudonymity function 
to enable unlinkable logins. 
 
German academics and researchers also played a role in the development of e-
ID policy. Herbert Kubicek, a University of Bremen scholar, researched the e-
ID during its formative policy development and has provided research to the 
Ministry of Interior (Kubicek, Interview). Gerrit Hornung, a law scholar of 
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electronic identity issues at the Universities of Kassel and Passau, and Prof. Dr. 
Alexander Ro§nagel of the University of Kassel participated in feasibility 
studies and other research on behalf of the government (Hornung, Interview). 
The Technical University of Darmstadt was involved in pilot studies of the 
card technology (DE-G005, Interview), and the Fraunhofer research institution 
served in an advisory capacity (Fromm, Interview). 
 
In the US, the Executive branch of government has driven identity 
management efforts. Besides electronic citizen identities, parts of the Executive 
branch have engaged in multiple identity initiatives. These include a passport 
card (in lieu of the traditional booklet), the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential, and the personal identity verification (PIV) card for 
federal employees and contractors. Travel-related documents fall under the 
ambit of the State Department. Physical and online identity management 
initiatives fall under the remit of the Federal Chief Information Officers (CIO) 
Council, an inter-agency council comprised of the chief information officers of 
Executive branch agencies and the intelligence and military communities. The 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) subcommittee of the 
CIO Council has direct responsibility for identity management issues within 
government-to-government, government-to-business, and government-to-
citizen interactions (ICAM, 2009c). FICAM (the ÔFÕ is added for ÔFederalÕ) is 
staffed in part by members of the General Services Administration, who assists 
in the implementation of government-wide policy for the Executive branch, as 
well as by representatives of the Department of Defense (G001, Interview). 
Privacy policy for government-to-citizen credentialing was overseen by 
members of a privacy subcommittee of the CIO Council who formed an 
identity management subcommittee for the task (G006, Interview; G010, 
Interview). On this subcommittee was Naomi Lefkovitz, a privacy lawyer who 
previously was Senior Attorney for the Division of Privacy and Identity 
Protection at the Federal Trade Commission and the Director for Privacy and 
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Civil Liberties of the Cybersecurity Directorate at the White House. Ms. 
Lefkovitz was also one of the core authors of the privacy language in the 
NSTIC and is a key privacy figure in the development of the FCCX (G010, 
Interview).  
 
While Ms. Lefkovitz and Mr. Mller certainly did not act alone Ð both were 
part of multi-agency teams and worked in concert with other lawyers, 
administrators and technologists Ð they are central figures in the policy 
evolution of unlinkability. They and their colleagues are part of a small number 
of individuals directly responsible for the evolution of privacy within identity 
management, and, it is argued, privacy and data protection as a whole within 
their respective countries. Mr. Mller was given great latitude in his 
development of the privacy features of the German e-ID: 
Ò[The Ministry] hired Mller to take care of the privacy issues. And my 
impression is that they didnÕt really care what he proposed because they 
believed in him.ÉÓ (Kubicek, Interview) 
Ms. Lefkovitz and her colleagues Debbie Diener and Toby Levin distilled the 
Fair Information Practice Principles into the FICAM privacy requirements for 
citizen credentials (G006, Interview). As one of the authors of the NSTIC 
privacy language, Ms. Lefkovitz further derived the FIPPs into very specific 
unlinkability goals. For example, the NSTIC explains the ÔdriverÕs license 
model,Õ highlighting how privacy can be maintained by severing information 
links between organisations: 
ÒThe offline world has structural barriers that preserve individual 
privacy by limiting information collection, use, and disclosure to a 
specific context. For example, consider a driverÕs license: an individual 
can use a driverÕs license to open a bank account, board an airplane, or 
view an age-restricted movie at the cinema, but the Department of 
Motor Vehicles does not know every place that accepts driverÕs 
licenses as identification. It is also difficult for the bank, the airport, and 
the movie theater to collaborate and link the transactions together.Ó 
(White House, 2011, p. 11) 
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The privacy features of the German e-ID and the American FCCXÕs 
requirement for unlinkability are the most advanced citizen-facing privacy and 
data protection policies in their respective countries. In this way, identity 
management policy is advancing data protection and privacy generally. The 
contemporary needs for strong authentication and the introduction of new 
technologies to meet those needs caused reinterpretations and extensions of 
earlier data protection and privacy principles, specifically proportionality and 
minimisation. Ms. Lefkovitz and Mr. Mller are parallel, key agents of data 
protection and privacy evolution. They and their colleagues are responsible for 
a greater use of privacy-enhancing technologies Ð in this case, 
cryptographically-based unlinkability Ð in public policy. 
 
The Trust Framework Providers (TFPs) are actors in their own right, though, as 
discussed in the institutional analysis in Chapter 8, they serve as 
intermediaries. As FICAM was developing the Trust Framework model, policy 
was iterative, and the Trust Framework Providers themselves contributed to the 
shape of the policy (Thibeau, Interview; N004, Interview). The US government 
committed to the Trust Framework model, and therefore needs the TFPs to 
implement IDM policy.  
 
The Trust Framework Providers are necessary to bridge US government 
requirements to external identity providers. There is no equivalent in Germany 
as the government itself is the only identity provider. There is no evidence that 
academics were consulted during US policy development, as opposed to 
Germany, who additionally could rely on the input of federal and state data 
protection authorities, a policy layer absent in the US. These two additional 
voices in German policy development evince a greater degree of data 
protection coherence than the US. 
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Technical support for cybersecurity and identity management policy came 
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Much like the 
German Federal Office for Information Security, NIST was responsible for 
development and approval of cryptographic standards and technology for use 
in federal IT systems. Standards organisations such as the OpenID Foundation 
and OASIS, responsible for the SAML protocol, were also actors within IDM 
policy development. As discussed in Chapter 5, the OIDF membership 
declined to work directly with the US government on its identity management 
needs and instead spawned a separate organisation, the Open Identity 
Exchange, to address those needs. OASIS was obliquely related in that its 
membersÕ values and norms infuse the SAML specification, as discussed in the 
institutionalist analysis of Chapter 8.  
Commercial influences 
German and US identity management efforts are both affected by commercial 
considerations, which in turn affect the implementation and use of unlinkable 
credentials. In the US, the market and commercial organisations are critical 
factors since the government is not willing or able to deploy its own citizen 
credentials. By choosing to rely on private organisations to supply credentials, 
government policies are intrinsically bound to the logic of the market: 
returning shareholder value, profits, building for multiple markets, reduction of 
costs. So far, the lack of a business model that could yield sufficient revenues 
for commercial IDPs has held back the creation of high assurance credentials 
for use with e-government. In Germany, credential issuance business models 
are not a problem because the government is itself the issuer. However, private 
organisations are not interested in becoming certified to access the data on the 
German e-ID because the cost is not justified. Companies that operate 
internationally do not have incentive to pay for the certification because the 
value of verified card data versus volunteered personal information is not 
perceived to be high enough.  
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Regarding unlinkability, German citizens can gain its benefit only when the 
owner of a website becomes certified to access the e-ID data. When credentials 
are to be used with e-government sites, commercial logic is diminished in 
favour of mandates to engage more citizens, reduce interaction costs and 
improve service delivery. A return on the investment in the certification 
process is subsumed by the logic of e-government. However, policy intentions 
to provide citizens with a trustworthy online credential for use with 
commercial entities are frustrated by the lack of incentive for private actors to 
participate in the e-ID system.  
 
For the US, citizens will not get online credentials at all for meaningful e-
government use until the business case is satisfied. It may come to pass that 
different government agencies pay for credentials for their client populations, 
giving commercial identity providers incentive to deploy systems, but this has 
not yet occurred. For the InCommon Federation, comprised of higher 
education and research organisations, the profit motive is mitigated, though 
cost is still a factor. InCommon members, such as Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University, are beginning to become identity providers 
certified to FICAM requirements. Their mandate is to serve their student and 
researcher populations (Morgan, Interview), and enable easier access to e-
government resources, such as those built by the National Institutes of Health. 
Certification of higher education and research organisations is still 
burdensome, though, and there are differences of opinion as to the 
appropriateness of government privacy imperatives in the higher education and 
research space (Morgan, Interview). Further, it is still unclear how valuable 
federally approved credentials are to those organisations. Bob Morgan 
(Interview), a senior technologist at the InCommon Federation explained: 
ÒÉ is it a significant university use case to use your university ID to go 
to the IRS and do tax stuff? If thatÕs gonna increase my risks Ð it sure 
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sounds like it is Ð then IÕm not interested in even doing that, right? ItÕs 
certainly not in my mission.Ó  
 
One other commercial issue of note is the influence of the companies that build 
and manage identity card systems, what David Lyon calls Òthe card cartelÓ 
(2011, p. 16).  
ÒThe forces driving national ID card systems are like a combination of 
firms that get together to keep prices artificially high and to keep out 
competition.Ó (Lyon, 2011, p. 68) 
Lyon ties the growth of national ID card projects after 11 September, 2001, to 
the longer history of government procurement of security and surveillance 
infrastructure from private sources. The Ôhand-in-gloveÕ relationship between 
states and commercial interests helps to explain the similarity of ID initiatives 
in disparate countries: 
ÒÉ the card cartel theory helps to explain É why ID card systems of 
strikingly similar kinds are introduced despite deep political 
controversies over the acceptable rationale for them.Ó (Lyon, 2011, p. 
80) 
The development of the German e-ID cannot therefore be fully understood 
without accounting for influence of the ÔoligopolyÕ of commercial interests 
intertwining with technological and government pressures. Lyon (2011, pp. 82-
83) notes: 
ÒDifferent pressures, at once governmental, commercial and 
technological, converge to make the development of ID card systems 
seem like a ÔsolutionÕ to several perceived problems at once.Ó 
It is unclear if LyonÕs cartels extend to US credentialing efforts, but his theory 
adds context to the German case. It could potentially help explain the swiftness 
of the e-ID deployment and the explicit policy desire to change the size of the 
e-ID to the more common ID-2 format. That isomorphic physical characteristic 
  
 
 
 
 
 
257 
could arguably be explained by the commercial logic to build similar products 
for the widest possible range of government customers. 
 
ID cards and digital identities are products, and are therefore imbricated in 
commercial prerogatives. Since US credentials originate from private sources, 
the choice to include unlinkability is also ultimately commercial. That is, for a 
private organisation to issue credentials the government can accept, it must 
choose to include unlinkability in its product architecture. In the German case, 
the inclusion of unlinkability is distanced from commercial considerations 
because the credentials originate with the state who needs no commercial 
mandate for privacy. 
Implementation Challenges 
The key challenges facing both countries relate to credentialing generally, not 
unlinkability specifically. In Germany, the main challenge is the high number 
of citizens not activating their e-IDsÕ online authentication function. As of 28 
February 2013, 18.5 million e-IDs have been distributed, and only 28% have 
their online authentication function turned on (Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2013). 
This low usage thwarts the policy intention to facilitate trustworthy 
transactions on the internet in a privacy-preserving manner. The goal of 
enabling pseudonymous logins cannot be realised if citizens do not use the e-
ID online. Some German administrators believe that the key reason the online 
authentication function is not being used is marketing Ð citizens do not know 
what they can do with it, and municipal agents who are the first and last point 
of contact for the e-ID do not have a reason or enough knowledge to 
recommend it be activated (DE-G002). Jens Fromm of the Fraunhofer Institute 
observed that government may have been overly ambitious in its expectations 
of the breadth of e-ID use: 
ÒThe hope was in the beginning É that this card would be widely used 
for all kinds of services, not only É in initial identification, but as it 
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was a marketing slogan in the beginning, Ôone for all.Õ And there was a 
key, many keys, and there was the German ID card and all keys around 
this card.  This was in my opinion a wrong view, a wrong expectation. 
But this was in some peopleÕs mind, their expectations in the beginning 
when we were thinking and starting this whole processÉ.Ó (Fromm, 
Interview) 
Relatedly, he also questioned the e-IDÕs value to a citizen (Fromm, Interview). 
The relatively low number of websites that accept the e-ID as authentication 
highlights the issue of value: 65 commercial sites and 40 e-government sites 
(Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2013). The challenge lies in the business case for 
commercial entities. The authorisation process to obtain a certificate to get data 
from the e-ID involves cost and staff focus. So far, the value of gaining access 
to verified, official data about German citizens and residents versus relying on 
traditional sources of that data remains unclear. 
 
For the US, the challenge is somewhat greater in that citizen credentials for 
high assurance transactions have barely begun to appear. The key 
implementation challenge is the lack of a business case for identity providers to 
invest in high assurance credentials. As detailed above, the cost and complexity 
do not yet have an attractive return on investment. In the higher education 
domain, the case has not yet been made for universities to pay to become 
certified for their credentials to be used in Level of Assurance 2 transactions. 
The cost and constraints are not yet justified for many universities to 
participate (Morgan, Interview). 
 
Both US and German identity management efforts face a challenge of 
usability, documented in Chapters 5 and 6. Pinch (2008, p. 474) observes: 
ÒA technology may succeed or fail depending on how well users are 
able to operate it.Ó 
There is widespread agreement that privacy-preserving credentials are 
conceptually complicated and difficult to present in easy-to-use ways (G007, 
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Interview; Morgan, Interview; N006, Interview; P001, Interview). This 
difficulty and complexity increases the likelihood that users will not 
understand their options, or even care to exercise them. IDM expert Paul 
Trevithick (Interview) observed: 
ÒPrivacy and unlinkability and things like that É arenÕt baked into the 
fabric so it requires you to take extra steps to do things, install things in 
your software, and itÕs a very small percentage of the end-user market 
who will take a proactive step for an uncertain long-term benefit.Ó 
Also, there is a danger that user needs will be assumed rather than investigated 
in the design of identity management systems: 
ÒThe needs and concerns of citizens or customers are often assumed by 
those commissioning and designing the identity solution, rather than 
researched.Ó (Rahaman and Sasse, 2010, p. 607)  
 
A fundamental challenge to a central goal of unlinkability Ð frustrating 
profiling Ð is the common use of linkable identifiers in online transactions. In 
e-commerce, citizens must supply a form of payment which invariably contains 
linkable identifiers like name, phone number and email address. In e-
government, many meaningful interactions, such as reviewing available 
benefits or submitting medical claims, require strong authentication to defeat 
fraud and comply with privacy laws. In basic web interactions, sites often want 
to communicate with users when they are not visiting the site, so email 
addresses are requested. Email addresses are, in the words of Bob Morgan 
(Interview), the Òcurrency of the realm.Ó The internet is suffused with linkable 
activity. With regard to online payment, the use of anonymous cash is 
impossible, and anonymous forms of payment such as BitCoin are in their 
infancy with no guarantee of survival. Basic commerce requires in the least a 
method to contact customers in case of problems with an order; this means a 
linkable identifier. As such, it is not clear that unlinkability will gain traction in 
the identity market. If the Ôstandard operating procedureÕ of the internet is 
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linkability, the goal of unlinkable interaction may face an insurmountable 
uphill battle. One identity management expert opined: 
ÒI guess the questions are, ÔIs there a real use case for unlinkability and 
É whoÕs trying to be protecting who from [whom]?Õ Until we have 
clear answers for that, itÕs really hard to design any kind of technical 
solutionÉ. if you ask the privacy people, they think that it is super 
important but donÕt necessarily understand all of the issues; theyÕre É 
putting a big padlock on the door but the door is made out of tissue 
paper.Ó (N003, Interview) 
This issue may be the greatest challenge to using unlinkability as a privacy 
strategy. The internet is a highly linkable Ôplace.Õ Linkages infuse data with 
value. There are many times when linking is desirable, for efficiency or fraud 
detection, for example. Paul TrevithickÕs quote above is also salient: extra 
steps reduce the likelihood of use. Privacy-protecting technologies may need to 
be more invisible to be effective. These are the early days of PETs as public 
policy, and there will no doubt be many stumbles and iterations before 
realistic, feasible privacy policies can be enacted in such a way as to cooperate 
with market forces and the way people naturally use the internet. 
Defining Identity Management Policy 
Comparison of the two countries helps to build a definition of Ôidentity 
management policy.Õ Given the heterogeneous and sometimes contested 
boundaries of information policy (See Chapter 2), defining this sub-field is a 
useful exercise. Nominally, it includes issues related to government use of 
identity management systems. This subsumes, then, digital identity credentials 
and their lifecycle: citizen (or resident) enrolment, acquisition of identity and 
attribute data, credential use, problem resolution, and deactivation. Identity 
management policy includes specific technical architectures and procurement 
practices. It also includes privacy policies and system configurations. All of 
these topics are visible in the two cases, but identity management policy can be 
drawn more broadly. The US case demonstrates how digital identity is tied to 
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risk management via the Levels of Assurance framework. This framework is a 
crucial plank within IDM policy Ð the viability of federal agencies accepting 
external credentials is premised on it. While this kind of framework is not 
necessary internally within Germany, Germany is member of the European 
Union which is constructing a legal framework for the interoperability of 
electronic identities across its membersÕ borders (EC, 2012). The EU 
framework addresses the same problem that the US Levels of Assurance does: 
the challenges in trusting authentications based on identity systems originating 
outside a host government. An EU project called Secure Identities Across 
Borders Linked (STORK) has developed a methodology similar to the Levels 
of Assurance called Quality Authentication Assurance (Hulsebosch, Lenzini 
and Eertink, 2009). German companies and agencies have participated in 
STORK, and Germany will ultimately be subject to any EU Directive that 
includes e-ID interoperability requirements. IDM policy therefore must include 
national, international and supranational issues related to interoperability as 
well as risk management frameworks. 
 
Identity management policy concerns digital identity credentials generally Ð 
this means both online-only credentials, such as those envisioned by US policy, 
and physical credentials as with the German e-ID. By extension, IDM policy 
includes government use of credentials for non-internet-based transactions, 
such as electronic ID cards for physical entry into restricted areas and 
credentials for government employee access to electronic resources. This 
would subsume the US governmentÕs Personal Identity Verification card 
system for federal employees and contractors, and the Transportation Workers 
Identification Credential used for secure access to ports and maritime vessels.  
 
IDM policy also includes e-signature policies. While e-signature is used as an 
electronic version of a handwritten signature to signal legal intent, it also has 
technical capabilities to authenticate the signer. The EUÕs 1999 Directive on 
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electronic signatures recognised this and created law to support the acceptance 
of e-signatures as proof of identity (EC, 1999). In the US, the Government 
Paperwork Elimination Act (1998, Sec. 1710(a)(1)) defines an electronic 
signature as Òa method of signing an electronic message that É identifies and 
authenticates a particular person as the source of [an] electronic message.Ó In 
the early days of GermanyÕs identity management efforts, e-signatures were 
relied on for authentication until it was realised that German certificates did not 
contain enough information to fully individuate someone with a common name 
(Kubicek, Interview). The current draft EU regulation to replace the 1999 e-
signature Directive is an attempt to build a Òcomprehensive EU cross-border 
and cross-sector framework for secure, trustworthy and easy- to-use electronic 
transactions that encompasses electronic identification, authentication and 
signaturesÓ (EC, 2012). While there is an argument to be made that signalling 
legal intent is not identity management per se, e-signature technology and use 
militates its inclusion in identity management policy topics.  
 
Identity management policy also includes the facilitation of ÔtrustworthyÕ 
credentials for general (i.e., non-governmental) use. Both US and German 
initiatives include this as a policy goal. The German e-IDÕs online 
authentication was designed expressly with government and business 
considerations in mind, and the US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 
Cyberspace is aimed non-governmental usage.  
 
A synthesis of the above discussion yields a definition of identity management 
policy: Identity management policy is the set of laws and policies enacted by 
governments and supranational bodies concerning the facilitation, 
procurement, use, liability, legal nature, interoperability, technologies, risk 
methodologies, lifecycle and privacy of digital identities for its citizens and 
employees. This includes physical and logical authentication, e-signature, and 
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electronic identification technologies for access to physical and electronic 
resources.  
Conclusion 
This chapter compared the similarities and differences of US and German 
policies regarding the option for unlinkable credentials. The formal policies, 
influences and technical implementations were compared, as well as each 
countryÕs data protection model, the main policy actors, the commercial 
dimension, and key challenges each country faced in its implementation. It 
found that German data protection policy coherence led the country to reapply 
and extend core principles in the construction of e-ID policy, yielding a 
capability for unlinkable logins in the e-ID. Despite a less coherent data 
protection and privacy regime, US policy-makers and administrators 
interpreted the same data protection principles and promulgated requirements 
for unlinkability in privately-originating citizen credentials. In a proposed, 
unbuilt identity management infrastructure, unlinkability is required and 
strengthened above current policies.  
 
German identity management policy is more mature than the equivalent US 
policy. Chiefly, this is because the German government is supplying its citizens 
with credentials in the form of an e-ID. The US government is soliciting 
private actors to supply credentials. As yet, none exist for the general citizenry 
than can be used in e-government interactions that require confidence in an 
asserted identity. Private actors lack incentive to build and configure their 
systems to meet federal requirements because no viable business model has yet 
emerged for general citizen use. Germany lacks the need for a business case for 
credential issuance, and 18.5 million cards have been issued at the time of this 
writing. However, German policy intentions for the e-ID to be used in 
commercial as well as e-government interactions are thwarted by commercial 
organisationsÕ lack of interest in becoming certified to interact with the e-
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Only 28% of issued cards have their online authentication feature turned on 
(Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2013). 
 
In both Germany and the US, a single lawyer has had a wide influence on 
privacy considerations within citizen identity management. Private government 
consultants have had strong influence on US identity management policy. Both 
governments are technically enforcing their privacy goals, and both identity 
management programmes are challenged by the conceptual complexity of 
pseudonym use and the difficulty of building usable technologies for a general 
populace. 
 
The online authentication features of the German e-ID were carried forward by 
the larger policy goals of updating the German national ID card. Throughout 
the 2000s, many European nations updated their IDs to e-IDs. There was a Ôfair 
windÕ for this kind of policy. Or, according to Lyon (2009), an oligopolistic 
Ôcard cartelÕ strongly influenced many nations towards such a policy. In any 
case, online authentication was nested in a set of other policy issues that had 
their own momentum. It could be argued that the e-ID was going to be issued 
irrespective of online authentication considerations. This point is important 
when coupled with the implementation of the system. The bureaucrats in 
charge of the e-ID did not have to wait for relying parties to exist. On the 
contrary, until the MinistryÕs sub-agency, the Federal Office of Administration, 
defined the authorisation regime to allow organisations to read data from the 
card, no relying party could exist.  
 
Compare this to the US model: an ÔecosystemÕ must be created, with IDPs and 
RPs appearing at the same time. That is, federal agencies (relying parties) need 
to build authentication infrastructures to consume credentials from IDPs. If 
there are no IDPs offering useful credentials, why spend money and focus? On 
the other hand, IDPs are commercial companies and universities, external to 
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government. They need a justification to invest in system alterations to meet 
federal requirements. If there are few relying parties, and no sustainable 
business model has emerged, why alter the systems? In the German model, the 
government did not have to wait for relying parties. It could just go ahead and 
release the e-ID card; the online authentication function was secondary. In the 
US model, without RPs there will be no IDPs, and vice versa. As a result, the 
policy is stalled. The Federal Cloud Credential Exchange is an attempt to 
redress this. When built, it will do most of the Ôheavy liftingÕ involved in 
building an authentication infrastructure for US agencies. Ostensibly, this 
would speed up the addition of RPs to the ecosystem, creating a more 
favourable market for IDPs. The key to all of this is how IDPs will make 
money. The ecosystem Ð which serves government goals but not necessarily 
market player goals Ð hinges on commercial IDPs being able to make a profit.  
 
The US IDM policy environment is one of Ôuse case vs. business case,Õ and it 
illustrates a tension in uniting citizen identification issues with commercial 
prerogatives. There is certainly evidence that the US would have had 
tremendous political difficulty in issuing a government-based citizen identity 
scheme. Nonetheless, meaningful e-government services cannot appear on a 
national scale until credentials do. Reliable credentials faithfully bound to the 
correct person are expensive and, so far, do not appear to constitute a market 
unto themselves. Given that these credentials are organisationally derived and 
managed, they may also only be relevant to the needs of particular 
organisations: Google logins are only useful to GoogleÕs marketing strategy, 
university logins are only useful to universitiesÕ goals. The German e-ID 
represents government interests and follows a path laid down by prior policy. 
The US IDM case may represent a failure of the plan to cross-pollinate private 
organisational interests with government interests. The UK has erected a policy 
similar to the US, the Identity Assurance Programme, relying on externally-
provided credentials for e-government access (Gov.uk, n.d.). The key 
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difference is that the UK government is paying those providers. The US may 
have no recourse but to follow suit. 
 
The comparison of German and US identity management initiatives helps to 
identify the contours of national identity management policy. By uniting the 
technical and policy features of the initiatives, a definition of identity 
management policy could be offered. The output of a definition for this 
heretofore undefined policy area illustrates the value of the comparative 
method in identity management research. 
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CHAPTER 8: APPLYING NEW INSTITUTIONALISM TO 
UNLINKABILITY 
 
A core contribution of this thesis is the application of new institutionalist 
approaches to data protection and identity management. Information policy 
suffers from fragmentation in both its policy-making institutions and its 
resultant policies (Rowlands, 1996; Browne, 1997a). Accordingly, information 
policy research Òneeds to examine the component interactions not only within, 
but between policy contextsÓ (Trauth, 1986, p. 43). Such research benefits 
from an interdisciplinary approach, including perspectives from business, law, 
sociology, information systems, political science and computer science. These 
perspectives fit comfortably in the broad church of institutionalist thought. This 
chapter answers the calls of scholars to attend to the theoretical Ð specifically, 
the institutional Ð concerns of information policy research, and to examine the 
role of values and norms in policy-making. It applies the propositions at the 
end of Chapter 2 to the empirical case data to help explain the emergence of 
unlinkability. 
 
Identity management and e-ID policies overlap with privacy and data 
protection regimes. Complementary and competing prerogatives of the state 
and the market, the tacit pressures of culture, and the inexorable progress of 
technology exert their influences on policy-making in the two case studies. By 
separating these influences and analysing their variable effects, it becomes 
clear that citizen identity management is subject to multi-stakeholder 
governance, and is affected by informal factors as much as formal instruments. 
The choice to include unlinkability in citizen credentialing architectures 
reflects history, technology, culture and power. New institutionalism is 
particularly helpful in this respect. It draws out the values embedded within 
these influences and highlights the relationships among actors, partly 
explaining the appearance of one policy versus another. It recalls the policy 
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choices of the past and illustrates how they affect the decisions of the present. 
This Ôpath dependenceÕ is evident in the case data: GermanyÕs e-ID is 
constrained by court decisions of 30 years past; US identity management 
policy is affected by legislation 40 years old.  
 
Equally important are the cultural values embedded in IDM technologies. 
Institutionalist approaches are valuable in understanding the interplay of the 
cultural and the material. The German e-ID and concomitant US IDM 
technologies cannot be fully understood without considering their institutional 
role. Ò[M]ateriality itself exercises a form of agency,Ó Pinch (2008, p. 466) 
writes. As such, the cryptography of US and German IDM systems constrain 
and enable social action. Their data protection functions reflect the logic of the 
market, the pressures of data protection regimes, the process of policy-making, 
the power of policy actors, and the cultural expectation that personal data is 
sensitive and worthy of being safeguarded. In order to understand information 
policyÕs effect on society, Braman (2009, p. 5) argues that we ignore its 
normative dimension at our peril. Institutionalist analysis enriches identity 
management research by focusing on the norms, values and informal aspects of 
information policy-making, the relationships among actors and technology, the 
visible and the invisible. There is limited application of new institutionalism to 
identity management research; this thesis addresses that gap. The research was 
conducted to better understand the role of public policy in the growing digital 
identity layer of the internet, and the formal and informal forces that shape data 
protection instruments brought to bear in that space. 
 
Germany and the US have different policy histories and environments. Without 
direct policy influence on one another, both have promulgated policies that 
require the availability of unlinkable online credentials for its citizens. 
Unlinkability is a form of data protection, in service of privacy goals, and the 
two countries have substantially different data protection and privacy regimes. 
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Germany has a national, omnibus data protection law that transposes the 
supranational EU Data Protection Directive, plus a similarly transposed law on 
telecommunications and internet services. Citizens must legally possess a 
national identity card or passport beginning at age 16. The United States, at the 
federal level, has a set of sectoral privacy laws and a non-binding set of Fair 
Information Practice Principles. There is a strong antipathy towards national 
identity schemes due to fears of an overly intrusive state, and it is politically 
difficult for the government to furnish its citizens with online credentials, even 
for use restricted only to e-government access. The US lacks a data protection 
policy layer, versus Germany who has both federal and state level data 
protection authorities. The US lacks the Òinstitutional coherenceÓ (Righettini, 
2011, p. 146) of Germany with regard to data protection. Given these 
differences, the reasons that both countries adopted a policy of unlinkability for 
its citizen credentialing are not immediately obvious. The policy histories, 
inputs and outputs, and environmental pressures alone do not explain the 
parallel appearance of unlinkability. Approaching the two cases theoretically 
helps to better understand the influences that led to a similar policy choice in 
two separate polities. Institutionalism in particular enriches scholarship on data 
protection and issues pertaining to electronic identity by drawing out the 
informal influences of norms, values, culture and relationships. 
 
New institutionalism argues that policies cannot be understood without an 
examination of their institutional dimensions. It attempts to illustrate the link 
between Òproblems, politics and policiesÓ (Weir, 1992, p. 191). As such, it 
assists the twin goals of information policy research: better understanding of 
existing information policies, and the utility to improve policy-making. 
Governments historically struggle with information policy because of its 
complexity and rapid evolution (Browne, 1997a; Reidenberg, 1997). IDM and 
e-ID in particular are complicated subjects, and their privacy dimensions are 
heterogeneous and broad in scope.  
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Electronic identity management of citizens is affected by data protection and 
privacy policies. In turn, it also affects them both. This dualism and IDMÕs 
complex, diverse set of technologies, goals, policies and actors are well suited 
for a theoretically enriched analysis. In the present research, multiple 
institutions and their subject organisations envelop the actors, choices and 
influences that yielded unlinkability policies. In IDM, the fields of e-
government and national identification interplay with market actors, 
cybersecurity imperatives, legislatures, various communities of practice and 
national culture. A new institutionalist approach can begin to examine some of 
the forces and influences at work that a comparative analysis of the formal 
policies and implementation challenges alone would not reveal. Application 
and analysis of the propositions in the next section illustrate that the policy 
development of unlinkability is inseparable from its institutional context.  
 
There is limited academic research on data protection as an institution. 
Literature discusses data protection authorities (Burkert, 1981; Righettini, 
2011) and policy formation (Bennett, 1992) rather than considering the whole 
of data protection an institution. The discussion of the institutional nature of 
data protection in Chapter 2 and the institutional analysis of this chapter are 
part of the main contributions of this thesis. The findings help answer the 
central research question: How is unlinkability emerging as public policy? The 
analysis also answers the questions, what does identity management policy do 
to the institution of data protection, and what does it take from it?  
 
This chapter finds, in the institutionalist perspective, that electronic identity 
management policies are extending and stabilising the institution of data 
protection. IDM and e-ID policies reproduce core data protection principles 
and innovate with them in a new technical domain. This is accomplished 
through regulative and normative methods: laws, standards, value-laden 
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strategy documents, and, importantly, material technologies. As to the 
appearance of unlinkability in two separate polities, the technocratic nature of 
e-ID policy-making amplified the power of data protection practitioners who 
seized upon an opportunity to advance privacy regulations in their respective 
countries.  
 
Policies of unlinkability further the institutionalisation of data protection, and 
materially embed its underlying principles. In line with institutionalist thought, 
policy decisions resulting in unlinkability were influenced by formal and 
informal mechanisms, and prior policy choices influenced later ones, 
engendering path dependence. US and German unlinkability requirements are 
isomorphic without having had direct, formal influence on one another. 
Coercive, normative and mimetic forces encouraged this isomorphism. Formal 
and informal relational networks of actors enabled the Ôtravel of ideasÕ (Scott, 
2003, p. 887) among relevant policy stakeholders, carrying values and 
lexicons, enhancing the legitimacy of the strategy of unlinkability. 
 
Material artefacts, such as the German e-ID card and the servers and 
applications of the US identity management Ôecosystem,Õ embed the values and 
preferences of policy actors, carrying and extending the institution of data 
protection. These artefacts are a durable expression of the institution, 
contribute to its stability, and evidence a re-application of core principles to 
recent technological developments. IDM and e-ID infrastructures are 
Òcrystallized institutions É both the outcome as well as the instruments of 
regulationÓ (Katzenbach, 2012, p. 130). In Germany, they embed a multi-
decade policy commitment to the principles of proportionality, minimisation 
and context separation. In the United States, they represent the largest scale 
application to date of the Fair Information Practice Principles.  
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Digital identity is a product, subject to the institution of the market and its 
influences, as well as the prerogatives of e-government and data protection. It 
is a technology and a policy outcome, pregnant with multiple institutional 
influences and forces. New institutionalism treats technology as an analytic 
object, unearthing its submerged values. It shows how material objects, like the 
chip inside a German e-ID, move ideas Òthrough space and timeÓ (Scott, 2008, 
p. 79). This thesis contributes to institutionalist scholarship by subjecting the 
specific technologies of citizen credentialing to institutionalist analysis, testing 
it against rich empirical data. 
 
Unlinkability architectures embed the underlying institutional forces of the 
policy domains they inhabit. These domains are suffused with the interests of 
many actors, and the policy outcome of unlinkability reflects the power of data 
protection practitioners. New institutionalism shows how regulative, normative 
and cultural-cognitive mechanisms work together to shape behaviour. This 
chapter explicates the above points, applying new institutionalist thinking to 
explain the similar outcomes in each country. Below are each of the 
propositions synthesised from the review of new institutionalism in Chapter 2. 
The propositions are applied to unlinkability, identity management and e-ID 
policy development in Germany and the US. This analysis highlights the 
cultural, structural, political, technological and economic forces that 
contributed to the emergence of unlinkability, enriching our understanding of 
information governance as a whole. 
The choice to include unlinkability in citizen credentialing is 
influenced by formal and informal mechanisms. 
Both the US and Germany had formal and informal mechanisms influencing 
the choice to include unlinkability in its credentialing efforts. The US Privacy 
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Act of 1974, a formal regulative instrument, was one of the laws applied to 
citizen credentialing. It states: 
ÒEach agency that maintains a system of records shall É maintain in its 
records only such information about an individual as is relevant and 
necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agencyÉ.Ó (Privacy Act of 
1974, Sec. e(1)) 
This coercive requirement embodies the principles of proportionality and data 
minimisation. Unlinkable credentials reflect these principles by frustrating 
profiling activities, making it more difficult to identify citizens across varied 
online activities.  
 
All US respondents cited the Fair Information Practice Principles as the key 
policy informing the privacy requirements for e-government credentials. The 
FIPPs are quasi-formal in that they are not binding law. Rather, they are a set 
of principles restated in various ways across a range of administrative 
documents and policies. The US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 
Cyberspace, which applies to non-e-government credentials, explicitly bases its 
privacy rationale on the FIPPs, calling them Òthe widely accepted framework 
of defining principles to be used in the evaluation and consideration of 
systems, processes, or programs that affect individual privacyÓ (White House, 
2011, p. 11). This language blurs the FIPPsÕ regulative and normative 
character. Their Ôwidely acceptedÕ nature belies a Òlogic of appropriatenessÓ 
(March and Olsen, 2004), yielding a Òbinding expectationÓ (Scott, 2008, p. 51) 
on policy actors. That expectation reinforces the inclusion of the FIPPs in 
formal policy instruments, creating a layer of data protection policy that does 
not exist as coherently elsewhere in federal law, as opposed to the formal data 
protection laws of Europe. 
 
The US federal policy that directly affects the creation and management of 
citizen credentials for e-government access is the Trust Framework Provider 
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Adoption Process (ICAM, 2009d). Though the TFPAP requires Ôminimalism,Õ 
its definition of that term does not encompass unlinkable credentials, stating: 
ÒIdentity Provider must transmit only those attributes that were 
explicitly requested by the [relying party] application or required by the 
Federal profile.Ó (ICAM, 2009d, p. 12) 
The onus of data minimisation falls only on the relying parties and how they 
form their requests. Instead, it is the ÔlowerÕ levels of identity protocols and the 
technical specifications of the proposed Federal Credential Cloud Exchange 
that requires unlinkability in the most practical terms. Unlinkability was further 
supported by posts on an official identity management blog describing the 
federal governmentÕs wish to minimise ÔpanopticalityÕ and discussions of the 
technical challenges therein (John, 2012). The term is not value-neutral: it 
connotes an all-seeing eye of far greater power than the subjects whom it 
observes (Reiman, 1995). Using such terminology is another method of 
legitimising unlinkability. Communicating the idea of panopticality in the 
context of identity management reinforces the value of data protection. 
Schmidt (2009, pp. 530-532) argues:  
ÒÉ political actorsÕ ideas serve to (re)conceptualize interests and 
values as well as (re)shape institutionsÉ.[I]deas and discourse É help 
explain the dynamics of change (as well as continuity) in political 
economy.Ó  
By linking identity management discussions to the broader discourse of 
privacy, policy actors are engaging in a Òcoordinative discourseÓ and a 
Òcommunicative discourseÓ (Schmidt, 2009, p. 531). Coordinative discourse 
involves Òindividuals and groups at the center of policy construction who are 
involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and 
programmatic ideasÓ (Schmidt, 2009, p. 531). Communicative discourse 
Òconsists of the individuals and groups at the center of political communication 
involved in the public presentation, deliberation, and legitimization of policy, 
programmatic, and philosophical ideas.Ó (Schmidt, 2009, p. 531). The blog on 
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which panopticality is mentioned is meant for both identity management 
practitioners and the public at large. By using such language, the authors Ð one 
of which has been at the centre of US identity management privacy policy Ð 
build their case extending and innovating data protection in IDM.  
 
Requirements to build credential systems that actively frustrate the profiling of 
citizensÕ online activity are value-laden and normative inasmuch as they are 
mandated by explicit regulative instruments; the formal and informal reinforce 
one another. The professionals and administrators responsible for creating 
technical and policy requirements for citizen credentialing interpreted formal 
laws and channelled the social expectations of data protection and privacy in 
the context of citizen use of the internet.  
 
The entire US citizen identity strategy was influenced by a cultural rejection of 
national IDs. As one senior government administrator remarked: 
ÒÉ whenever you talked about a centralised organisation managing 
identities in the federal government, you come to national ID card, even 
if itÕs a virtual national ID card. You still end up there Ð somebody will 
raise that, and then everything dies when that happens, everything 
stops. (G001, Interview) 
This constraint foreclosed the possibility of government-issued credentials, 
necessitating the involvement of private actors. The relatively weak data 
protection regime that could be applied to those actors caused federal 
administrators to innovate by extending the Privacy Act of 1974 to cover non-
federal entities. This led to the Ôcomparability paradigm,Õ where private actors 
would need to show that their privacy and data protection mechanisms were at 
least comparable to federal ones. Many respondents took it for granted that a 
national identity scheme would be impossible to create in the United States 
(G001, Interview; G003, Interview; G007, Interview; G010, Interview; N005, 
Interview; N006, Interview; Thibeau, Interview). The belief is a form of 
orthodoxy. The highly influential 1973 Health, Education and Welfare report, 
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Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, which first codified the FIPPs 
in the US, spoke of the perception and potential harms of a Òstandard unique 
identifierÓ (SUI): 
ÒÉ the idea of an SUI is objectionable to many Americans.É Many 
people both feel a sense of alienation from their social institutions and 
resent the dehumanizing effects of a highly mechanized civilization. 
Every characteristic of an SUI heightens such emotions.Ó (U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973, Sec. VII) 
The data under study shows this view to be alive and well. One privacy 
advocate noted: 
ÒÉ when you say Ônational ID cardÕ or Ônational ID card for the 
internet,Õ peopleÕs instinct is to go for repression and no privacy.  
ThatÕs what resonates in peopleÕs heads.Ó (N005, Interview) 
Correspondingly, the 2011 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 
Cyberspace states: 
ÒÉ the Strategy does not advocate for the establishment of a national 
identification card or system.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 8) 
The culturally supported, common belief that the American people reject 
national identity systems locked policy-makers into the need to obtain 
credentials from private sources.  This caused them to embrace the institutional 
influences of the market and higher education in order to find suppliers. These 
private actors have so far lacked incentive to supply citizens with high 
assurance credentials Ð a strong enough business case to justify the investment 
is yet to materialise. Had the US government been able to supply its own 
credentials, like Germany, its exposure to market forces would be limited with 
respect to e-government authentication. The government perceives a higher 
value to citizen credentials than private organisations. This illustrates the 
institutional conflict at work in citizen credentialing. The state, paternalistically 
setting privacy policy for its citizens to reduce potential harms of profiling and 
ÔunfairÕ information practices, required citizen credentials from private actors 
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to conform to federal privacy policies that the actors would otherwise not be 
subject to. The private actors were willing to meet these requirements, but not 
without remuneration to build the complex systems citizen credentialing 
entailed. Government could pay for those credentials, but has so far declined to 
do so. The needs of government and the market are orthogonal to one another, 
and have not aligned sufficiently to achieve the governmentÕs goals of enabling 
strongly authenticated, privacy-preserving e-government access. This 
highlights Òhow institutions mediate and filter politicsÓ (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992, p. 16). At present, only one university and no private companies are 
offering FICAM-compliant credentials for general use by the citizenry. 
 
Germany shows similar formal and informal mechanisms at work in the choice 
to enable unlinkable credentials. Unlike the US, Germany has a general data 
protection law, which is a transposition of the supranational EU Data 
Protection Directive. Section 3a of the German Federal Data Protection Act 
(2003) states: 
ÒPersonal data are to be collected, processed and used, and processing 
systems are to be designed in accordance with the aim of collecting, 
processing and using as little personal data as possible. In particular, 
personal data are to be aliased or rendered anonymous as far as possible 
and the effort involved is reasonable in relation to the desired level of 
protection.Ó 
The 1983 Constitutional Court decision also acts as a formal constraint over 
the treatment of personal data. It derived a right to informational self-
determination from the German constitution, and forbade the state from being 
treated as a single data processor (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009). The 
Personalausweisgesetz, the law establishing the e-ID card and most of its 
privacy features, co-exists with the court decision and data protection law. The 
pseudonymity features of the e-ID exist as official technical specifications 
from the Federal Office for Information Security (2011). The procedures for 
becoming authorised to access the e-ID and to interact with the card 
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pseudonyms are published by the Federal Office of Administration. The 
competency for identity documents is established by law at the federal level, 
but citizen registration is legally specified at the state level (ULD, Interview). 
Each state has a data protection authority, responsible for the data protection of 
the civilian registries.  
 
There is no requirement for the Ministry of Interior to consult the state data 
protection authorities (ULD, Interview). However, the Ministry did consult 
them for their expertise and to encourage them to support the decision to 
deploy an e-ID (ULD, Interview). Marit Hansen, the Deputy Privacy & 
Information Commissioner of Schleswig-Holstein, observed, Òit is always good 
to talk to Data Protection Authorities if you want acceptanceÓ (ULD, 
Interview). The pseudonymity function of the e-ID was directly influenced by 
this informal inclusion of the views of the state authorities. Pseudonymity was 
a part of the data protection landscape, enshrined in both a telecommunications 
law and an earlier e-signature law (ULD, Interview). The normative value of 
pseudonymity, data minimisation and context separation ÔtravelledÕ from the 
data protection authorities to the Ministry of Interior. Marit Hansen noted: 
ÒÉ if everything is more digital and you want more acceptance also 
from the Data Protection Authorities, you should always have the 
possibility of pseudonym functionÉ.Ó (ULD, Interview) 
There is a taken‐for‐granted quality to the policy of unlinkability. 
In both the German and US case data, respondents relate views that represent 
cultural-cognitive carriers of institutionalised data protection. In Germany, a 
privacy mindset is cited (DE-G003, Interview; Mller, Interview; ULD, 
Interview). Of the origin of the unlinkability requirement, one engineer said 
there was Ònot a specific service or application behind it, it was more É a 
general approach following, letÕs say, a common mindset....Ó (DE-G003, 
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Interview). Jan Mller noted that pervasive cultural issues around privacy were 
the backdrop of the e-ID: 
ÒÉ privacy and self-determination, itÕs a big issue in Germany. 
Basically the whole privacy issue is something [that] has had a lot of 
cultural background and how you feel about it and what do you think, 
what is private and what is not private.Ó (Mller, Interview) 
Jens Fromm, a scientist at the Fraunhofer research institution, explained in 
cultural terms his preference for a state-issued form of ID over commercially-
derived ones: 
ÒÉ in some situations, I am strongly convinced that itÕs good that we 
have a sovereign state-given identityÉ. This is not something I can 
rationally explain. I think this is really a cultural and somehow 
philosophical question.ÉÓ (Fromm, Interview) 
 
In the US, the identity management expert, Paul Trevithick (Interview) spoke 
of a design ethos among technologists:  
ÒÉ we believe in this stuff and want to do this stuff.É We get up in the 
morning and we think about distributed systems, we think about anti-
centralisation whatever, we try to shift control out to the edge of 
networks and É I think we all have this natural feeling, like, shouldnÕt 
we be sovereign actors, and shouldnÕt information about us be É as 
much as possible under our fingertips and controls?Ó 
A senior US government official spoke of her belief in a right to anonymity: 
ÒI think, certainly in common law countries, where much of this body 
of regulation grew from, we have a belief Ð an underlying principle Ð 
that people should have some right to anonymity.Ó (G001, Interview) 
The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace cites the ÔvitalÕ 
requirement of pseudonymity: 
ÒIt is vital to maintain the capacity for anonymity and pseudonymity in 
Internet transactions in order to enhance individualsÕ privacy and 
otherwise support civil liberties.Ó (White House, 2011, p. 1) 
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In ScottÕs pillars of institutions (2008, p. 51), the above citations are 
understood as common beliefs, orthodoxy and shared logics of action. They 
mesh with normative and regulative elements of data protection. The NSTIC 
quote is Ôcommunicative discourse,Õ using language and ideas to involve the 
public in considerations of privacy within identity management (Schmidt, 
2009). One US identity management policy administrator stated, Òthe work that 
weÕre doing is focussed very much on doing the right thing by our citizens in 
protecting É any services that we deploy that are citizen-facingÓ (G009, 
Interview). Unlinkable credentials and other privacy-preserving requirements 
are the rules and artefacts of what is Ôright.Õ The ethos of designers is made 
more durable in the form of standards and the technologies that rely upon 
them. The German privacy mindset is fixed in regulative laws and the 
cryptographic design of the e-ID. There is no discrete boundary between the 
culture of privacy, the laws that require it and the technologies that fix it in 
hardware. 
 
Values embedded in material technologies can encourage people to take their 
presence and underlying principles for granted. The Ôrules-in-useÕ Ð the actual 
use of institutional rules by those subject to them (Ostrom 1992, p. 19) Ð here 
are citizens using e-IDs and private credentials to access various websites. 
Awareness of their privacy-preserving characteristics and repeated use of them 
can cause citizens to believe in their appropriateness, reinforcing the views of 
the policy-makers, strengthening the overarching institution. In this way, 
identity technologies frame online interaction  
ÒÉ through the infrastructure they provide and the negotiated or 
established uses attached to it. In this sense, they are Ôtaken-for-
granted,Õ a more-or-less invisible and untested background and frame 
for social structures and our daily courses of action.Ó (Katzenbach, 
2012, p. 130) 
And indeed they are invisible to users. The cryptographic processes performed 
by the German e-ID or the proposed US FCCX are abstract and imperceptible 
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to the citizens they serve. That invisibility, claims Pinch (2008, p. 467) 
enhances the power of the material dimension of data protection: 
ÒIt is because social choices appear to have vanished from technologies, 
or are so deeply embedded within technical structures that they become 
invisible to all but the technical experts, that technologies are powerful 
institutions.Ó 
Invisibility is a hallmark of the internet Ð its ubiquitous use derives in part from 
hiding its complexity. As more people use the internet, the institutions 
embedded within its architecture will see further enactment. However, that 
architecture is pregnant with many institutions Ð data protection, the market, 
law enforcement, government Ð overlapping and sometimes in direct conflict. 
In this we see LessigÕs (2006; see also Koops and Leenes, 2005) Ôcode is lawÕ 
argument modulated by competing institutional effects. The invisible 
architecture of the internet is as much a battleground for competing institutions 
as it is for competing code. 
There is an isomorphic dimension to the choice to require 
unlinkability. 
Despite their differences in policy history, culture and technology, both 
Germany and the United States Ð as well as other nations such as Canada and 
Austria Ð have enacted policy requiring various forms of unlinkability. This 
ÔhomogenisationÕ reflects DiMaggio and PowellÕs (1983) view that coercive 
and normative mechanisms cause organisations to become isomorphic with one 
another. Of coercive isomorphism, they write: 
ÒCoercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which 
they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within 
which organizations function. Such pressures may be felt as force, as 
persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion.Ó (1983, p. 150) 
And, of normative pressures, DiMaggio and Powell write: 
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ÒA É source of isomorphic organizational change is normative and 
stems primarily from professionalization.É we interpret 
professionalization as the collective struggle of members of an 
occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to 
control Ôthe production of  producersÕ É and to establish a cognitive 
base and legitimation for their occupational autonomyÉ.Ó (1983, p. 
152) 
Both US and German data protection policies have similar principles at their 
core. They are also enacting unlinkability mechanisms in the same timeframe 
as one another. Without direct policy influence between them, it is fruitful to 
consider which isomorphic forces may be influential.  
 
As Gellman has shown (2012), the Fair Information Practice Principles have 
existed in some form since the early 1970s. The substance of those principles 
appears in the Privacy Act of 1974, the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, the 1995 EU 
Data Protection Directive, the 2003 German Federal Data Protection Act, 
FICAMÕs privacy requirements, and the National Strategies for Trusted 
Identities in Cyberspace (Gellman, 2012). In 1972, a British Parliamentary 
committee on privacy wrote that Ò[t]he amount of information collected and 
held should be the minimum necessary for the achievement of the specified 
purposeÓ (Gellman, 2012, p. 3). This principle of minimum disclosure, early in 
the history of data protection, has been restated in a variety of forms in the 
instruments outlined above and continues to exert influence on policy actors. 
Unlinkability is a direct expression of this principle, and its presence in 
German and US policy reflects both coercive and normative influences on 
policy-makers. In Germany, the coercive force is more evident as the minimum 
disclosure principle is codified in federal data protection law. In the US, the 
coercive nature of the minimum disclosure principle is more informal Ð though 
still potent Ð because of a lack of an omnibus data protection policy that 
includes the principle. Minimum disclosure is a strong value within the data 
protection community of practice, as evidenced by its consistent inclusion in 
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policy instruments for over 40 years. The reproduction of minimum disclosure, 
collection and use limitation, proportionality, purpose specificity and a respect 
for context separation are, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 152) note above, 
part of this professional communityÕs Òcollective struggle É to control Ôthe 
production of the producersÕÉ.Ó 
 
Standards are another site of isomorphic influence, encompassing regulative 
and normative elements. Pinch (2008, p. 472) writes: 
ÒStandards are rarely simple technical matters; they are powerful ways 
of bringing a resolution to debates that might encompass different 
social meanings of a technology. Standards are set to be followed; they 
entail routinized social actions and are in effect a form of 
institutionalization.Ó 
In ScottÕs terms (2008, p. 79), standards are routines, carrying the regulative 
elements of institutions, though given their technical nature can also be seen as 
artefacts. Identity management and data protection rely on a panoply of 
standards. SAML 2.0 had a sufficient capability to produce unlinkable 
credentials but OpenID 2.0 did not, and had to be altered during the course of 
FICAMÕs policy development to meet government specifications (N003, 
Interview). SAML has the ability to issue a new (ephemeral) pseudonym each 
time an identity provider communicates with the same relying party as well as 
the ability to issue the same (persistent) pseudonym to the same rely party for 
each return visit. The specification designers felt that the ephemeral 
pseudonym was a valuable privacy-preserving feature, but it has seen no use 
(N003, Interview). One senior standards developer explained: 
ÒItÕs not supported in very many products and probably would just 
cause things to blow up. So itÕs one of those things that when we were 
creating SAML seemed like a good idea but never got any 
deploymentÉ. In general, people use federated login to identify people 
over time ... doing a single SAML authentication with a bunch of 
claims that let you do something like an Ôover-eighteen claimÕ É but 
É prevented the relying party from telling that you are the same person 
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who came last time É itÕs a theoretical problem and has no real world 
uptake, at least with SAML.Ó (N003, Interview) 
Standards development organisations and their human members are 
institutional actors, and the standards they publish are carriers of 
institutionalisation. In this case, data protection is innovating with regard to the 
advent of identity management technologies, and standards developers have 
encoded their values into relevant specifications. This institutional 
development has been embraced in the persistent pseudonym case, but not in 
the ephemeral case. The logic of the market Ð here, lack of take-up due to lack 
of demand Ð is in tension with the ethos of the SAML specification writers. 
However, the specification exists; it is durable. Products based on SAML are 
not neutral; they contain the values of the specification writers. Should the 
market case for ephemeral pseudonyms improve, the normatively-infused 
specification can affect the data protection characteristics of new products. The 
values of standards developers ÔtravelÕ through the standards they define. Like 
data protection practitioners, standards developers are professionals who 
influence Òthe production of producersÓ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152). 
If Galloway (2004, p. 122) is to be believed, 
ÒÉ this loose consortium of decision makers tends to fall into a 
relatively homogenous social class: highly educated, altruistic, liberal-
minded science professionals from modernized societies around the 
globe.Ó 
Galloway supplies no methodological evidence for this claim, but despite this, 
it reflects the more defensible position that standards are inescapably political. 
As Kapor (2006) observed, Òarchitecture is politics.Ó 
 
International standards defining unlinkability and related privacy 
configurations have been in development for several years. Standards 
committees are thereby an important site of isomorphism. A workgroup of the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) is developing IEC/ISO 29191, 
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ÒRequirements for partially anonymous, partially unlinkable authenticationÓ 
(De Soete, 2013). This workgroup, WG5, falls under the ISOÕs Joint Technical 
Committee 1 / Subcommittee 27 (JTC1/SC27), whose membership includes 
representatives from 50 countries. The committee is led by Dr. Walter Fumy, 
co-editor of a book on e-ID security that features the German e-ID as a 
prominent case study (Fumy and Paeschke, 2011). SC27 is a relational network 
for professionals and other stakeholders to exchange ideas and values, 
ultimately returning to their home countries and organisations with explicit 
documentation and the invisible narratives that will inform their work. 
 
SC27 published a terminology document that Òserves as a basis for desirable 
additional privacy standardization initiatives, for example a technical reference 
architecture, the use of specific privacy technologies, an overall privacy 
management, assurance of privacy compliance for outsourced data processes, 
privacy impact assessments and engineering specificationsÓ (Rannenberg, 
Stnuit, Yamada and Weiss, 2007). As another form of isomorphism, this 
normative lexicon helps to shape and legitimise the privacy views and 
subsequent actions of data protection practitioners, scientists, product 
managers and the many other stakeholders in identity management. Meyer and 
Rowan (1977, p. 349) called this a Ôvocabulary of structureÕ: 
ÒFrom an institutional perspective, a most important aspect of 
isomorphism with environmental institutions is the evolution of 
organizational language. The labels of the organization chart as well as 
the vocabulary used to delineate organizational goals, procedures, and 
policies are analogous to the vocabularies of motive used to account for 
the activities of individualsÉ. Vocabularies of structure which are 
isomorphic with institutional rules provide prudent, rational, and 
legitimate accounts.Ó (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 349) 
SC27Õs lexicon carries the institution of data protection, evolving it, 
rationalising newer privacy-preserving strategies like unlinkability. Similar 
efforts to legitimise privacy in identity managment are visible in other fields, 
such as academia and government research. Marit Hansen of the ULD 
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collaborated with Andreas Pfitzmann (2010) of the Dresden University of 
Technology on ÒA terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: 
Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, 
and Identity Management,Ó which attempts to define key privacy terms and 
translate them into 10 different languages. The eGovernment unit of the 
European Commission funded the Modinis-IDM project which published a 
Study on Identity Management to Òprogress towards a coherent approach in 
electronic identity management in eGovernment in the European UnionÓ 
(Modinis IDM Study Team, 2005). This Study contained a ÒCommon 
Terminological Framework for Interoperable Electronic Identity ManagementÓ 
as well as a set of identified Ôgood practices.Õ More expansive was the Future 
of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) project funded by the European 
Union which produced an extensive body of research on the technical, 
conceptual, social, law enforcement, legal and economic dimensions of digital 
identity (Rannenberg, Royer and Deuker, 2009). These lexicons, standards and 
research reports are a rich repository of language, values, narratives and 
technical designs that ÔtravelÕ and are reproduced throughout the world of 
identity management. Privacy norms and material possibilities are thus 
transmitted, providing a partial explanation for the developement of 
unlinkability in different polities. 
Prior policy choices constrained and affected the choice to 
require unlinkability. 
In Germany, the decision of the 1983 Constitutional Court looms large over all 
data protection policy subsequent to it. The right to informational self-
determination Ð the Òlegal anchor for data protection in the German 
constitution,Ó (Hornung and Schnabel, 2009, p. 84) Ð the principles of 
proportionality and data minimisation, and the banning of the state being 
treated as a single data processor were the backbone of the privacy architecture 
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of the e-ID system. The power of the German court and its long-lasting effects 
contribute to the stability of the institution of data protection, supporting the 
evolutionary step of fixing unlinkability in the architecture of the e-ID. The 
court decision itself was dependent on the creation of a new German 
constitution in 1949. The rights to dignity and the full development of oneÕs 
personality, enshrined in the first two articles, are directly responsible for the 
legal reasoning allowing the court to derive the informational self-
determination right (Rouvroy and Poullet, 2012).  
 
The course of German policy was also influenced by its membership in the 
European Union, which required the transposition of EU directives into 
national law. Consequently, German data protection policy is modelled on the 
1995 EU Data Protection Directive which contains the principle of 
proportionality. German policy choices were also dependent on the historical 
requirement to possess an identity document, dating at least from 1938 (Noack 
and Kubicek, 2010, p. 93). National identity cards are institutionalised in 
Germany, and the introduction of an electronic ID to replace the laminated 
paper one is a Ôpath continuationÕ (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 107). Merged 
with this path is the e-passport. The e-passport infrastructure pre-dates the e-
ID, though engineers and policy-makers were contemplating an e-ID when 
designing its architecture. One senior scientist recalled: 
ÒÉ when we started designing the protocols for the e-passport we 
already had also an identity card in mind.  So when we planned for the 
protocols we planned it in a way we could also base an identity card on 
[it].Ó (DE-G001, Interview) 
Noack and Kubicek (2010, pp. 107-110) note that the authorisation process 
needed to access the e-ID card data and resultant technical certificates are a 
Ôpath creationÕ: 
ÒThere is no predecessor for a similar certification procedure for online 
access to personal data in other sectors in Germany or anywhere else in 
the world.Ó (Noack and Kubicek, 2010, pp. 107-108) 
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The e-IDÕs pseudonym capability, however, can be seen as a path continuation. 
A 2007 telecommunications law requires internet services to enable 
pseudonymous use where possible: 
ÒThe service provider must enable the use of telemedia and payment for 
them to occur anonymously or via a pseudonym where this is 
technically possible and reasonable.Ó (Telemedia Act, Sec. 13(6)) 
The Federal Data Protection Act also sets a bias for pseudonymity (ÔaliasingÕ): 
ÒPersonal data are to be collected, processed and used, and processing 
systems are to be designed in accordance with the aim of collecting, 
processing and using as little personal data as possible. In particular, 
personal data are to be aliased or rendered anonymous as far as possible 
and the effort involved is reasonable in relation to the desired level of 
protection.Ó (Federal Data Protection Act, 2003, Sec. 3a) 
Unlinkability can thereby trace much of its policy influences to these earlier 
laws. The pseudonymity requirements of the Telemedia Act and the Federal 
Data Protection Act are given specific effect in the pseudonymity function of 
the e-ID. 
 
In the US, the influence of prior policy choices is more diffuse. The Fair 
Information Practice Principles are not binding law, though they are the 
strongest influence on the choice to require unlinkability. The FIPPs inform the 
Privacy Act of 1974, which exerts influence on the privacy requirements for 
citizen credentialing for e-government, although the FIPPs themselves are cited 
as the core principles at work (G001, Interview; G003, Interview; G006, 
Interview; N005, Interview). In the NSTIC, a 2008 formulation of the FIPPs is 
cited explicitly as the grounding principles for privacy in the Ôidentity 
ecosystemÕ for non-e-government credentials (White House, 2011, p. 12). One 
legal researcher noted that this use of the FIPPs is the first omnibus application 
of it in the US (Dazza Greenwood, Interview). Unlinkability embodies the 
FIPPsÕ data minimisation principle, reflecting and reinforcing, as in the 
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German case, the institutional stability of data protection and its capacity to 
adapt to new technical developments. 
 
Pseudonymous access to government services was envisioned in the US 
Electronic Authentication Partnership, an evolutionary precursor to FICAM. 
Though intended for low assurance transactions, where little or no confidence 
in a claimed identity is needed, identity management policy-makers and 
government consultants incorporated the view that Òless is moreÓ (P006, 
Interview). Chris Louden, one of the security and privacy consultants involved 
in the EAP, and his associates continued to consult on later identity 
management policy. He and his associates co-authored FICAMÕs identity 
schemes and contributed to FICAMÕs general privacy framework (N003, 
Interview; P006, Interview; Wilsher, Interview). This continuity of actors 
contributed to a continuity of values in the development of IDM policy. 
 
Where Germany had pre-existing identity document requirements, the absence 
of such requirements and the strong antipathy towards such policy forced the 
US to engage private actors to fulfil its policy goals. The spectre of a national 
ID and the political difficulties of government-supplied online credentials 
caused the US to go down a path that implied cooperation with private 
organisations, effectively necessitating multi-stakeholder governance. This 
path forced the commingling of government and market needs. Government 
institutional logic can mandate particular privacy requirements in service of 
societal privacy goals. Market logic, however, need not share these goals, and 
in the absence of mandatory legal requirements, is not necessarily aligned with 
government. Further, market actors need compelling reasons to spend money 
on system development and operation. By comparison, Germany did not need 
the complicity of the market to deploy e-ID cards: it created policy, bought the 
infrastructure, and distributed the cards. Due to the orthogonal interests and 
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logics of the government and private industry, citizen digital identities in the 
US are stalled. 
 
US and German citizen IDM efforts both follow initial forays into e-
government. The data shows that e-government is a driver of identity 
management, though not exclusively. This finding is consistent with prior 
research on IDM in Europe (Kubicek and Noack, 2010). The need to exchange 
personal data in citizen-government interactions in combination with the 
difficulty of authenticating people on the internet contributed to greater policy 
activity around citizen digital identities, which ultimately contributed to 
privacy and data protection policy changes. In the US, the choice to require 
unlinkability comes from a reapplication of pre-existing privacy principles by 
administrators, consultants and privacy professionals. In Germany, e-
government and other forces drove the federal government towards the 
replacement of their paper identity card with an electronic one. The seminal 
Constitutional Court case nearly 25 years prior exerted a strong influence on 
the choice to include unlinkability as a feature of the e-ID system. 
 
Both the US and German case data show effects from the terrorist attacks of 11 
September, 2001, which could be construed as an Ôexogenous shockÕ or 
Ôcritical juncture.Õ In the US, this event triggered a spate of cybersecurity 
activity in government, influencing the development of US identity 
management policy. One senior government official recalled, Òthere were a lot 
of them that came out that time, a lot of homeland security presidential 
directives, but they were all responses to the report that came out on 9/11Ó 
(G001, Interview). A different government official, however, did not see 
September 11th as a policy driver (G003, Interview).  That said, the decision to 
include unlinkability does not appear to be influenced directly by the event. 
Rather, the policy environment reflected a heightened focus on security 
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generally, and in the domain of information sharing specifically. Another 
government official said that  
ÒÉ the issue of information sharing is significant for the federal 
government. Not just because of post-9/11, but certainly because of 
post-9/11.ÉÓ (G006, Interview) 
 
In Germany, two electronic identity scholars both saw the 9/11 attacks as 
influential on e-ID policy development (Noack and Kubicek, 2010; Hornung, 
Interview). However, this influence seemed to extend only to questions of the 
inclusion of biometrics Ð again, a security issue rather than privacy. As in the 
US case, the terrorist attacks were influential on the general policy milieu 
rather than on privacy choices within identity management. Gerrit Hornung 
(Interview) observed: 
ÒÉ after September 11, people in Europe started to think about having 
this biometric passport É the German biometric passport started in 
2007 É and so when people started to implement that project I think 
there were parallel thoughts on having biometric data on the identity 
card as well, and obviously that implied changing the technical base of 
the identity card because the former one didnÕt have a chip. And so that 
was definitely one thing where the actual project É got momentum 
from because then obviously people from the more e-government-
oriented side started to think, ÔOkay, if we change the technical base of 
the whole thing anyway, so why donÕt we then provide e-government 
applications by the new identity card as well?ÕÓ 
 
Institutionalist scholarship argues that historical events, timing and sequence 
affect policy outcomes. In the empirical data, there is an oblique effect of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th. More potent is the sequence of policies. In 
both cases, e-government policy commitments predate and strongly influence 
identity management and its privacy elements. In Germany, the e-ID is based 
on both the prior national identity card and the predating e-passport.  
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Networks of social actors influenced the policy of unlinkability. 
One of ScottÕs (2003, p. 886) four Ôcarriers of institutionalisationÕ is Òrelational 
systems,Ó which are Òmade up of connections among actors, including both 
individual and collective actors.Ó These systems are networks that Òconnect 
organizational decision-makers É through professional and business 
associations and interlocking membershipsÓ (Scott, 2003, p. 887). Identity 
management, data protection and privacy professionals interact in such 
networks, diffusing ideas between themselves over time and geography.  
 
Organisationally and individually, the US identity management community has 
had a diverse and often consistent group of actors since the late 1990s. Some of 
the same government officials involved in developing President BushÕs E-
Government identity management initiatives continued to shape policy in the 
Electronic Authentication Partnership and FICAM (G003, Interview; G004, 
Interview). Technologists who developed novel identity management 
technologies sat on a variety of IDM standards committees and contributed to 
policy development (Trevithick, Interview; Reed, Interview; P001, Interview). 
Businesses and individuals involved in standards development work ultimately 
saw their efforts incorporated into Trust Framework operators, such as the 
Kantara Initiative (Nash, Interview). Those efforts were also then submitted to 
international bodies to become incorporated into global standards (Wilsher, 
Interview). Government privacy lawyers involved in FICAM were also authors 
of the privacy language in the NSTIC and privacy policy at the Department of 
Homeland Security (G006, Interview; G010, Interview). Individuals from 
government and industry sit on international standards working groups (N003, 
Interview; P001, Interview). These interlocking sets of relationships Ð these 
Ôcommunities of practiceÕ Ð foster the Òtravel of ideasÓ (Scott, 2003, p. 887). 
From informal discussions in hotel lobbies to the durable encoding of views 
and values in open standards and proprietary technologies, these networks 
facilitate isomorphism and the diffusion of policy preferences. In this way, the 
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normative views of consultants, engineers, policy-makers, advocates and 
business managers proliferate and are reified. This helps to explain the 
appearance of unlinkability across a range of countries. 
 
In the case of Germany, there are a variety of interlocking relationships. As 
Marit Hansen (ULD, Interview) noted in Chapter 6, the Ministry of Interior 
engaged state data protection authorities for their expert views. There was 
much interaction between the Ministry and its sub-agencies, the Federal Office 
for Information Security (BSI) and the Federal Office of Administration 
(BVA). During the e-IDÕs policy development, the Ministry and the German 
Parliament communicated extensively, with input from the Federal 
Commissioner for Data Protection (ULD, Interview). To develop the 
certification regime to access e-ID card data, the BVA convened working 
groups comprised of Ministry representatives, the BSI, and industry (DE-
G002, Interview). Technical specifications were designed by the BSI working 
in concert with the German Industry Forum and an IT industry association, 
BITKOM, whose members included card manufacturers, chip manufacturers, 
Microsoft, T-Systems, and the German Federal Printer (Noack and Kubicek, 
2010, pp. 103-104). The ULD, one of GermanyÕs leading data protection 
authorities, has been involved in a number of European projects that connected 
them to a much larger, international community of practice (ABC4Trust, 2012; 
FIDIS, n.d., FutureID, n.d.; PrimeLife, n.d.). Members of the ULD also worked 
directly with data protection and identity management academics, producing 
substantial peer-reviewed work. European projects such as ABC4Trust brought 
together scholars, data protection authorities and technology companies such as 
IBM and Nokia-Siemens Networks (ABC4Trust, 2012). All of these 
interlocking relationships foster formal and informal connections among 
participants, institutionalising data protection through shared values and 
requirements encoded into standards and technologies. Claus Offe (2006, p. 
16) writes: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
294 
ÒInstitutions are dependent upon requisite sectoral virtues and informal 
codes of conduct.É No institution can function unless such 
corresponding informal codes of conduct and sector-specific ethos are 
observed by participants. One important function of institutions is to 
inculcate such loyalty.Ó 
Through professional connections, the Ôsectoral virtuesÕ of data protection Ð 
which include a bias against profiling Ð are transmitted. Scott (2003, p. 890) 
calls this Òcombined carriersÓ: 
ÒRelational ties provide the conduits, but cultural beliefs supply the 
content.Ó 
 
In some of his most recent work on institutions, Scott (2003, pp. 888-889; 
2010, pp. 13-14) highlights the importance of intermediaries: 
ÒTo the categories of producers and users of ideas must be added a 
collection of go-betweens Ð intermediaries that do not create but 
transmit and market information.Ó (2003, p. 888) 
ÒÉ [a] broad collection of actors [who] help to enable and guide action 
and, more generally, serves to ÔthickenÕ and stabilize the fields in which 
they work.Ó (2010, p. 13) 
These intermediaries are clearly visible in the US case in the form of the Trust 
Framework Providers: the OIX, Kantara, SAFE-Biopharma and InCommon. 
The organisations seek to broker relationships on behalf of their members and 
clients. With regard to data protection, they behave differently depending on 
their stakeholders. The OIX was effectively neutral with regard to the 
governmentÕs credential requirements, passing their requirements intact to the 
participating entities (Thibeau, Interview). InCommon, however, took a more 
active role, negotiating directly with the government when it saw the 
requirements as misaligned with its educational membersÕ needs (Morgan, 
Interview). In all cases, the TFPs must accredit auditors who then certify that 
applicant organisations meet the governmentÕs requirements. The 
  
 
 
 
 
 
295 
governmentÕs requirements are ÔtranslatedÕ by the TFPs into language that the 
assessors can use in their assessment. In this way, the TFPs ÔstabiliseÕ the 
market for citizen identities, in ScottÕs language, and become a site of power 
exchange between stakeholders and intermediaries.  
 
Pinch (2008, pp. 476-477) also highlights the importance of intermediaries, 
specifically salespeople: 
ÒIn building markets, a key part is played by mediators like salespeople. 
It is salespeople who move between the world of use and the world of 
design and manufacture and who bring the two into alignment. We 
need to pay more attention to intermediaries such as salespeople and 
repair people.Ó 
One of the challenges facing the German e-ID is weak marketing. A 
Fraunhofer scientist observed: 
ÒI think [whatÕs] crucial really is É the marketing aspects. Why should 
citizens use the identity function, are they aware of these identity 
functions? About 65% of the citizens are opting out the function 
because they just donÕt know why they should use it, why they should 
opt in.Ó (Fromm, Interview) 
As of February 2013, 72% of citizens were opting out, turning off their e-IDÕs 
online authentication functions (Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2013). This marketing 
weakness hampers policy-makersÕ intentions to make the e-ID broadly usable 
with commercial and e-government services. Commercial organisations are 
largely unconvinced of the value of becoming certified to access the card data, 
and municipality staff and citizens are not aware of the value of using the card 
online (DE-G002, Interview). Members of the Federal Office of 
Administration (BVA) spend a significant amount of time traveling around 
Germany trying to convince organisations and people of the e-IDÕs value. One 
official noted: 
ÒWe also want to win clients to É use this function. Of course weÕre 
doing also a little bit of promotion for this. Germany has invested a lot 
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in this so we want companies and Government to use it.... We initiate 
conferences, we go to the states, we go to the cities, we talk to them and 
inform them about the possibilities and the functions that they could use 
just so that they get an idea of what they can benefit from.... Like a 
product convention.Ó (DE-G002, Interview) 
In this way, BVA staff is an active part of the adoption of the e-IDÕs privacy 
features. The selective disclosure of age and locality and the pseudonymity 
function, elements that innovate the institution data protection, have to be used 
to become part of the landscape. In their role as salespeople, the BVA staff is a 
conduit, building the ÔmarketÕ for digital identity interactions. They align the 
policy goals of informational self-determination and trustworthy online 
transactions with the realities of deploying an e-ID Ôproduct.Õ The municipal 
office staffs can be viewed as underutilised salespeople. By not supporting 
them with more information, or including them in the communicative discourse 
of the value of the online authentication feature, the BVA turned potential 
allies into neutral or hostile parties.  
 
Identity management is complex technologically, politically and in regards to 
business relationships. US policy documents speak of an Ôidentity ecosystem,Õ 
(White House, 2011) highlighting the interconnected nature of various actors. 
This ecosystem is made of businesses, governments, standards and their 
development organisations, advocates, products, markets, political 
arrangements and the public. Information policy-making within this ecosystem 
is iterative and collaborative, involving public and private actors alike. This 
complexity and diversity complicates policy-making, implementation and 
enforcement, necessitating multi-stakeholder governance. On this point, 
Katzenbach (2012, p. 120) writes: 
ÒDue to the increasing complexities, dynamics and diversity of 
contemporary societies and their communication structures, the efficacy 
of statutory regulation is seen as limited; therefore, private actors are 
included in regulative structures.Ó 
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Within the US case, this is best exemplified by the use of Trust Framework 
Providers to assess private identity providers for comparable privacy and data 
protection policies. The TFPs are private organisations and, as discussed 
above, are sometimes neutral and sometimes not. Privacy goals are filtered 
through the TFPs because the US government has elected not to issue its own 
identity credentials. The policy domain of identity management, influenced by 
the institution of data protection, is pregnant with a variety of interests. The 
complexity of identity management invites compromise, the translation of 
goals, and mutualism in order to advance. Trust Framework Providers are 
relational as well as symbolic systems, composed of networks of actors and 
governing rules. They are Òboth the outcome as well as the instruments of 
regulationÓ (Katzenbach, 2012, p. 130) 
Material artefacts further institutionalise data protection. 
Unlinkability is a characteristic of a technical system. The chips, servers and 
code that render credentials unlinkable are a material embodiment of data 
protection and privacy values and choices. The German e-ID system relies on 
cryptographic functions embedded within its authentication architecture to 
create unlinkable pseudonymous logins. The unobservable characteristic of the 
e-ID system as a whole, denying the government information about citizensÕ 
online activities, derives from an architecture that specifically eschews 
centralised servers. These technical features are not by-products Ð they are 
intentional choices writ in code and silicon, reflecting the norms of actors and 
their communities.  
 
Though it lacks an identity card-based infrastructure, the US system is 
similarly value-laden. The use of servers and applications configured to create 
pseudonyms on a per-relying party basis, and the architecture of the proposed 
Federal Cloud Credential Exchange, designed to blind both relying parties and 
identity providers, are material reifications of data protection values and policy 
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choices. The appearance of the term ÔpanopticalityÕ on official blogs 
(Gallagher and Lefkovitz, 2012) connects US data protection to the broader 
discourse of privacy research. The technology of the FCCX seeks to diminish 
such omnipresent monitoring, materially embedding the values that deem 
panopticality harmful and unfair.  
 
As technology changes, so must the institution of data protection. Lowndes 
(2010, p. 66) observes that institutions are changed and sustained though 
human action. The use of federated identity technologies and cryptographic 
identity cards require data protection practitioners to actively reapply and 
reinterpret institutional logic. In the case data, this happens via multiple 
carriers: new laws, new networks, changes in standards, and new technologies. 
The principles of data minimisation, proportionality, context separation and a 
bias against profiling are interpreted and filtered through actors, ÔlocalisingÕ the 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements of data protection. As 
DiMaggio observes: 
ÒÉ central institutional forms will be subject to local modification. 
Such local modifications represent a pool of potential innovations that 
may themselves diffuse to organizations throughout the field.Ó 
(DiMaggio, 1988, p. 15) 
The pseudonymity generator on the German e-ID and the unlinkable design of 
the FCCX are part of this pool of innovations, and both have the potential to 
diffuse through the field of identity management through its various 
organisations and actors. Both sets of technology anchor the locally interpreted 
institution in a self-reproducing material dimension. They stabilise the 
institutional innovation of unlinkability, and further institutionalise data 
protection within society. In the German case, the e-ID is a multi-decade 
commitment to the normative and legal principles underpinning national data 
protection and privacy priorities. In the US, the FCCX is a pilot project, 
trialling the various and complex components needed for a privacy preserving 
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Ôidentity ecosystem.Õ Both of these technologies are also technical forms of 
enforcement; ostensible improvements on a reliance on purely social methods 
of administering privacy requirements. They add to the Ômosaic of solutionsÕ to 
regulatory problems (Bennett and Raab, 2003, p. 165). 
 
Identity management is a combination of Òthe technical, political, social, and 
economicÓ (Pinch, 2008, p. 468). Institutional forces strongly influenced the 
inclusion of unlinkability in the design of US and German identity 
management systems. In the German case, the weight of cultural privacy 
imperatives, and the normative and regulative force of the 1983 Constitutional 
Court case urged the e-ID design towards one that would reinforce 
informational self-determination. The interpretation of that right influenced Jan 
Mller and his colleagues to build in a capability for unlinkable logins. In 
America, the technological innovation of the FCCX afforded an opportunity 
for the institutional innovation of enforcing unlinkability technologically on 
non-governmental actors, extending central features of data protection without 
additional legislation. In both cases, institutional innovation was possible 
because of the power of the data protection community in each country, 
augmented by the technocratic nature of electronic identification policy. That 
power is reflected in the durability of the technical artefacts of unlinkability. 
 
The requirement of unlinkability embeds the power dynamics of 
actors and institutional relationships.  
Unlinkability is institutional development (Jepperson, 1991), extending and 
reapplying core data protection principles within a new technical milieu. It 
comports with JeppersonÕs (1991, p. 152) description: 
ÒInstitutional development (or elaboration) represents institutional 
continuation rather than an exit Ð a change within an institutional 
form.Ó 
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Its appearance in the information policy of Germany and the US is 
evolutionary, and illustrates growth of the power of certain institutional actors. 
Levi (1990, p. 407) observes: 
ÒSome institutions serve the interests of the many, some the interests of 
the few, but all facilitate and regulate resources of power.Ó 
The institution of data protection serves the interests of the many Ð human data 
subjects. The strength or weakness of the institution influences how much 
power is accorded its practitioners and their capability to enforce the norms of 
data protection. Requirements for unlinkability in citizen credentialing are an 
exercise of the power of data protection policy-makers and advocates in a 
world of fast-evolving technology. 
 
Data protection is well-institutionalised in Germany. Burkert (2012, p. 101; see 
also Noack and Kubicek, 2010, p. 95) notes that the German state of Hesse 
created the worldÕs first data protection law in 1970. German history, its 
adherence to EU law, privacy mindset, extensive system of data protection 
authorities (DPAs), and strong academic focus on privacy and data protection 
all contribute to this well-institutionalised character. The strength of state data 
protection authorities, for example, helps explain why the Ministry of Interior 
included them in policy development even though they were not formally 
required to do so. That inclusion also demonstrates the need for technical 
expertise during policy considerations of electronic identity issues. The 
technocratic nature of e-ID policy-making amplified the power of the 
authorities. The ULD, in particular, led the state DPAsÕ input to the e-ID policy 
process because they had been involved in a number of pan-European 
electronic identity research projects (ULD, Interview). Jan Mller, after he was 
hired away from the ULD to the Ministry, was given wide latitude to develop 
the privacy architectures of the e-ID card. Herbert Kubicek noted: 
ÒÉ [they] hired Mller to take care of the privacy issues. And my 
impression is that they didnÕt really care what he proposed because they 
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believed in him, because the ULD is the most critical of all sixteen 
privacy state offices. So if they agree with something, you can be safe 
that there will be no discussion followingÉ. [I]t was his idea to bring 
in this [pseudonymity] function which is contrafactual to what the main 
project was aboutÉ. the ULD just had finished a huge project on 
unobservability and unlinkabilityÉ. So out of this experience and this 
project he just had it in his head and he was free toÉ nobody cared to 
stop him or ask more.Ó (Kubicek, Interview) 
Discussions of the pseudonymity and selective disclosure features did not rise 
to the level of Parliamentary debate (Hornung, Interview; Kubicek, Interview). 
The only data protection concerns to reach that level were the inclusion of 
biometrics and the question of centralised databases. Gerrit Hornung, recalled: 
ÒÉ political debate on this new identity card I believe focused to, say, 
90% on that biometric issue, so neither the electronic signature function 
nor the authentication mechanism or the pseudonym function É played 
a major role in the political debate.  That was possibly in part due to the 
statements of É data protection officers. I mean the federal data officer 
made a strong claim against the fingerprints, but on the authentication 
mechanism, he said, ÔWell, IÕve looked into that and itÕs technically 
sophisticated, itÕs data protection friendly, so IÕm happy with that.ÕÓ 
(Hornung, Interview) 
The pseudonymity function became embedded into the cryptographic 
architecture of the e-ID system. The power of the data protection community of 
practice is evident here. A single individual was largely responsible for 
embedding the normative bias towards data minimisation, context separation 
and a bias against profiling into a technical architecture that will be in place for 
decades to come. Holding some form of identity document is mandatory for 
Germans 16 and over, and all citizens will possess an e-ID (or a passport) by 
2020 due to the eventual invalidation of all paper IDs. The concretisation of 
core data protection principles in hardware and cryptography shows the 
technocratic character of e-ID policy-making, as well as an exercise of power 
by data protection practitioners. It is an example of Meyer and RowanÕs (1977) 
assertion that powerful actors can build their goals directly into society as 
institutional rules; in this case, their goals are built materially. Still, that power 
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is limited to the actorsÕ sphere of influence: the e-ID. International businessÕ 
lack of interest in becoming certified to access the personal data on the e-ID 
means that this power is limited to e-government and the low number of 
certified private German companies. A recent example, however, of the extent 
of the power of German DPAs over non-German businesses can be found in a 
2012 declaration by the ULD that Facebook violates German law requiring the 
option for pseudonymous use of internet services (ULD, 2012). The 
subsequent resulting injunction was defeated in a state court; the case was 
appealed and awaits action at the time of this writing (Jaeger, 2013).  
 
The US shows similar signs of the power of the data protection community in 
the development of its identity management policy. A special subcommittee of 
the Federal CIO Council was formed to address privacy considerations of 
citizen-focused identity management. Respondents involved in discussions 
with FICAM cite slowdowns in the policy development to allow for internal 
privacy debates (G001, Interview; G003, Interview; P006, Interview). Prior to 
the enactment of FICAMÕs citizen-specific policies, members of the CIO 
Council privacy subcommittee reviewed the policies and required changes 
before going forward. This was a Ôveto point,Õ in ImmergutÕs (1990) language; 
a contestation between the logic of data protection and the logic of e-
government, which would otherwise move the policies forward in service of 
efficiency. 
 
Like Germany, a number of formal policy instruments in the US exert coercive 
or normative influence over information policy formation. The US can be seen 
as having weaker, less coherent data protection institutions in comparison with 
Germany due to its lack of omnibus data protection legislation and data 
protection authorities. In recent years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
an agency charged with protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive or anti-
competitive practices, has published a number of reports to encourage privacy 
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in the world of accelerating technology. The 2012 FTC report, ÒProtecting 
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,Ó specifically evaluates issues 
regarding the linkability of personal and non-personal data (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2012, pp. iv, 18-22). In 2008, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), a large agency encompassing border security, immigration 
policy implementation, anti-terrorism activities, cybersecurity and emergency 
response management, published a guide to implementing privacy across its 
various departments in service of transparency and to serve as an example to 
other US agencies (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The guide 
has the Fair Information Practice Principles as its core privacy rationale. 
Members of the DHS and FTC privacy staffs were part of the CIO Council 
subcommittee on privacy in identity management, and have been part of the 
larger community of practitioners affecting the norms and rules of data 
protection of citizen digital identities. In the US as in Germany, discussions 
about privacy in identity management have not risen to the legislature Ð they 
remain at the level of administrators, bureaucrats and agency policy-makers. 
Requirements for unlinkable credentials for e-government and the strongly 
worded normative language in the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 
Cyberspace exhibit the exercise of power of the data protection community. 
Specific calls for the limiting of ÔpanopticalityÕ or of the loss of Òanonymity, 
unlinkability and unobservabilityÓ (United States Postal Service, 2013a, p. 5) 
underscore the technocratic nature of identity management policy. That nature 
provided opportunity for data protection practitioners to re-apply their values. 
These practitioners recognised their opportunity, as one senior identity 
management official noted: 
ÒI think that they relished the opportunity that they were being brought 
into the FICAM picture and [were] able to work on policies that would 
be implemented.Ó (G003, Interview) 
The scale of the opportunity was huge. The Federal Cloud Credential 
Exchange has been designed for 135 million users (U.S. Postal Service, 
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2013b). Requirements for unlinkability within the FCCX are symbolic of the 
power of a select group of data protection and privacy practitioners. As with 
Germany, this power is circumscribed by the specific policy domain: citizen 
identity management for e-government. However, use of the FCCX by citizens 
may impart a normative or cultural-cognitive influence, making unlinkability 
appear over time to be more appropriate than its absence.  
 
Identity management and e-ID policy is fertile ground for data protection and 
privacy practitioners to apply recent thinking and normative values. 
Credentialing and identity technologies are complicated, particularised and 
potentially obscure. This renders their policy domains technocratic, providing 
an opportunity for the exercise of power by data protection professionals who 
can understand the technology and use the surrounding policy development as 
an opportunity to re-apply core data protection principles Ð minimisation, 
proportionality, context separation and a bias against profiling. The power of 
this community can be seen in the embedding of unlinkability requirements in 
technical designs for citizen identity management systems. Policy development 
at administrative and bureaucratic levels shields the evolution of privacy from 
the vicissitudes of political change within the legislature. This contributes to a 
more consistent application of Òmoral resourcesÓ (Offe, 2006, p. 19) and 
Òsectoral virtuesÓ (Offe, 2006, p. 16). The technocratic opportunity to advance 
data protection goals via IDM and e-ID policy is one explanation for the 
similar appearance of unlinkability in two different countries with substantially 
different policy histories and cultures. 
Institutional Change 
Lowndes and Roberts (2013, pp. 116-132) chart recent institutional theories of 
change against two analytic continua: the tempo of change, and the balance 
between structure and agency. This leads to four quadrants: 
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¥ structured, incremental change 
¥ agential, incremental change 
¥ structured, punctuated change 
¥ agential, punctuated change 
 
The use of unlinkability as a policy tool represents a change in the enactment 
of the institution of data protection. In both the US and German cases, agency 
plays a very strong role. Key groups of actors in both countries are largely 
responsible for the inclusion of unlinkability in the privacy and data protection 
regimes applied to citizen credentialing initiatives. However, the informal 
pressure to include German data protection authorities in the policy 
development process, the power of the 1983 Constitutional Court on 
subsequent data protection policy, and the power of the Ministry of Interior in 
setting the e-IDÕs agenda add structural elements to the explanation of the 
emergence of unlinkability. Such structural reasons are more weakly present in 
the US. The involvement of privacy lawyers from the CIO Council in the 
FICAM processes and the existence of the Fair Information Practice Principles 
were the core structural elements that influenced the inclusion of unlinkability. 
 
In Germany, given the pseudonymity requirements of the Federal Data 
Protection Act and the Telemedia Act, the right to informational self-
determination, and the requirement to separate the state into different 
informational contexts, German unlinkability is an incremental change. The US 
is less incremental due to its lack of formal instruments requiring context 
separation or pseudonymity. Using Lowndes and RobertsÕ (2013, pp. 116-132) 
framework, Germany and the US can be mapped as follows: 
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Figure 8.1  Location of Germany and US on map of institutional change 
explanations 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 117 
 
Germany, represented by ÒG,Ó appears very close to the maximum position for 
incremental change, but at a nearly central balance between agential factors 
and structural factors. The US reflects more a punctuated change than an 
incremental one, with higher agential factors than Germany. The map helps to 
visualise the comparative political relationship between the two countries with 
regard to the emergence of unlinkability. It provides additional context to 
explaining the particular influences in each country that led to convergent 
information policies. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter applied the theoretical approach the new institutionalism in order 
to explain the similarities and differences between US and German policy-
making. New institutionalism illuminates the various influences that explain 
the isomorphic emergence of unlinkability policies in two separate countries. 
ScottÕs and LowndesÕ synthesis of new institutionalism, detailed in Chapter 2, 
are potent frameworks by which to approach policy analysis. The empirical 
data illustrates ScottÕs (2003, p. 881) view that 
ÒÉ most full-fledged institutions are made up of diverse elements. 
There are few ÔpureÕ cases.Ó 
Institutionalism illuminates the material dimension of the reproduction and 
extension of the institution of data protection. This chapter attempted to answer 
PinchÕs (2008, p. 461) call to theoretically account for technology: ÒÉ social 
theorists need to attend better to materiality: the world of things and objects of 
which technical things form an important class.Ó Consideration of the 
institutional forces at work in identity management policy helps to explain the 
parallel appearance of unlinkability in two countries, and in future work may 
be fruitfully applied to research on the privacy dimensions of other nations, 
including Canada, Austria and the UK. Data protection is an institution, 
enacted by human actors and material technology. Information policy both 
subsumes and is subject to data protection. Identity management systems and 
electronic identity cards are recent technological innovations that affect and are 
affected by data protection. Policy scholarship of IDM and e-IDs must attend 
to institutional factors to try to understand the history and future of the fields.  
 
This chapter found that new institutionalism aids in understanding how two 
different countries with varied approaches to the protection of personal privacy 
both arrived at a policy of unlinkability. Institutional dynamics in each country 
contributed to a reapplication of core data protection principles. While 
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Germany has a more coherent data protection and privacy regime than the US, 
the base principles informing each countryÕs regime were similar and could be 
reapplied and innovated within the field of identity management. Prior policy 
commitments, both formal and informal, helped shape current policies. The 
isomorphic quality of German and US unlinkability policies reflect the values 
of the data protection community of practice, technologists, consultants and 
bureaucrats. In each country both actors and political structure influenced 
policy, contributing to the emergence of unlinkability. In Germany, structure 
and agency were largely balanced factors: a history of pseudonymity policies 
and requirements for context separation of information processing by the state, 
combined with the direct action of Jan Mller and others. Unlinkability was an 
incremental change in German information policy given the continual 
application and reinterpretation of data protection principles over the course of 
40 years. Actors played a more decisive role in US information policy, taking it 
upon themselves to reinterpret historic and modern data protection principles in 
the absence of new legislation or other formal pressures. There were weaker 
structural factors leading to unlinkability than in Germany. The main structural 
factors were the 1974 Privacy Act, the privacy oversight subcommittee of the 
CIO Council, and the non-binding Fair Information Practice Principles. The 
tempo of change in the US was therefore punctuated Ð a significant change in 
the privacy regime. 
 
Electronic identity is a complicated technical domain, replete with protocols, 
cryptography, and complex concepts of the fragmentary nature of the digital 
self. This caused policy-making to be technocratic, yielding an opportunity for 
data protection practitioners to assert their values and augment their national 
privacy regimes. Their commitments to the principles of proportionality, 
context separation, minimal disclosure and a bias against profiling were 
concretized in the servers, software and chips of identity management 
infrastructure. The cryptographic functions of the German e-ID and the 
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technical requirements of the proposed Federal Cloud Credential Exchange 
extend the institution of data protection. They are the vanguard of privacy-
enhancing technology as policy, innovating and reifying 40-year old principles. 
Given the heterogeneity of information policy tools, and the diffuse 
institutions, laws, actors and influences that comprise the field, new 
institutionalism shows itself to be a helpful lens to bring the historical, cultural, 
political and technical into focus. It emphasises context over structure and 
function, and theorises the continuous and discontinuous elements of the 
protection of personal data. Information policy research benefits from this 
approach, reassembling the fragments of particular policies into a more visible 
whole. 
 
New institutionalism has great explanatory power, but there is a danger for it to 
become all-encompassing. That is, it remains difficult to separate cultural 
practices, behaviour and political phenomena from institutions. Marriage, 
handshakes, the formal and informal rules of legislatures, Christianity, and the 
market are all said to be institutions by various scholars (Friedland and Alford, 
1991; Greenwood, et al., 2008; Shepsle, 1989). There is a danger in such 
breadth: if an institution means everything, then the concept becomes 
imprecise. The boundary between an institution and its environment is blurry. 
It is further difficult to separate the concepts of ÔinstitutionÕ from 
Ôinstitutionalisation.Õ To wit, is national identification in Germany an 
institution, or are national identity cards institutionalised? Therefore, is the 
analytical object the ID card, or the institution Ð laws, norms, mores, 
expectations, narratives Ð that gives rise to the material object? The utility of 
new institutionalism is challenged by these fine distinctions.  
 
Institutionalism is helpful in explaining political and sociological phenomena, 
but these do not fully comprise all the dimensions of information policy. For 
example, the issue of usability factors strongly in both Germany and the US. 
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Policy intentions can be thwarted by poor design. Institutionalism is ill-suited 
to identify such areas Ð usability and design do not emerge from an analysis of 
institutional factors, yet they are significant in the realisation of policy goals.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis examined how unlinkability is emerging as public policy. The 
research found that it appears in various ways in the identity management 
policies of Germany and the US. The two countries have been constructing 
policies and infrastructures to supply their citizens with digital credentials for 
use with e-government and commercial websites. ÔIdentity management 
policy,Õ a sub-field of information policy, is an appropriate heading to capture 
the digital credentialing activities of governments and the privacy architectures 
therein. In both Germany and the US, IDM policy is affiliated with e-
government initiatives. In Germany, IDM policy is strongly related to national 
identification, an institutionalised practice which stretches back into the early 
20th century. This is not the case for the US, and the American polityÕs strong 
rejection of national identification is a crucial factor in explaining the current 
state of US citizen credentialing efforts. Unlinkability is a technical feature and 
a privacy strategy situated within identity management initiatives, so the 
formerÕs fate is influenced by the latterÕs successes. 
 
The appearance of unlinkability in the two countries is isomorphic Ð similar 
policies at similar times in similar domains. Given the lack of direct policy 
influence between the US and Germany on these issues, this isomorphism can 
be partly explained by institutionalist analysis. Indeed, to understand the 
parallel emergence of unlinkability, the key differences in its implementation 
and in citizen credentialing generally requires an examination of the 
institutional effects within the IDM policy field. In this way, the new 
institutionalist approach is helpful in theorising the under-theorised field of 
information policy. Information policy research benefits from a theoretical 
approach that is value-critical, and that examines local contexts, norms and 
power relationships in addition to formal policy instruments. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
312 
Data protection is itself an institution, sustained by laws, culture, expectations, 
norms, formal instruments and informal relationships. As an institution, it is 
enacted by human actors, such as data protection practitioners, and material 
technologies, such as cryptography. The institution of data protection exerted a 
strong pressure to include privacy-preserving elements within the new field of 
identity management policy as it emerged in Germany and the US. Digital 
identity, from a citizen or consumer perspective, is a recent phenomenon. It 
evolved alongside the internet, born of the need to identify users on local 
computer systems and to ensure that only they can access their authorised 
resources. Identity federation across organisational contexts and boundaries has 
contributed to the internet becoming a more identifiable place; a digital identity 
ÔlayerÕ is forming, with more and more identity transactions occurring. This 
research began by examining how regulation and policy would and could affect 
this layer. National identity management policies implicated the institution of 
data protection because those identities are made of personal data. The 
influence of that institution is powerful and visible in German and US policies 
to supply their citizens with digital identities. Its application in the field of 
identity management contributed to the field becoming the vanguard of each 
countryÕs privacy regime.  
 
The first explanation of unlinkabilityÕs emergence is the influence of prior data 
protection instruments. The proportionality principle appears in 1970 in Hesse, 
and in nearly all subsequent formulations of the core set of North American 
and European data protection principles. ProportionalityÕs progeny, the 
principle of data minimisation, is also present in these formulations, and the 
two principles are direct antecedents of the choice to include unlinkability in 
IDM policy. In Germany, a strong bias towards context separation contributes 
to unlinkabilityÕs appearance. A seminal 1983 Constitutional Court case laid 
the legal foundation for the e-IDÕs pseudonymity function and German data 
protection as a whole. There is evidence as well of a pervasive culture of 
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privacy plus the influence of a vocal group of data protection authorities 
contributing to the policy choices that yielded unlinkability. In historical 
context, the German policy of unlinkability is an incremental policy change.  
 
The US shares a data protection policy antecedent with Germany in the form of 
the Fair Information Practice Principles, which contain principles similar to 
those found in the EU Data Protection Directive and the German Federal Data 
Protection Act. Though non-binding, the FIPPs strongly influenced US policy, 
contributing to the choice to include unlinkability in citizen credentialing 
systems. Rather than having a prior legal commitment to context separation as 
in Germany, the FIPPs contain a principle of use limitation. However, recent 
US policy documents identify Ôrespect for contextÕ as a privacy goal, bringing 
US privacy thought, if not law, closer to the German model (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2012; White House, 2012). Whether the policy goal is fairness, to 
frustrate illegitimate profiling, or to support oneÕs right to informational self-
determination through linkage control, unlinkability is a tool in the toolbox of 
data protection policies available to the state in its pursuit of privacy. Data 
protectionÕs history and its current application and reinvention by a community 
of practitioners are key reasons that unlinkability appears in US and German 
IDM policy. 
 
Institutions are sustained, or not, by human action; and there is competition 
among different institutions. Policies, too, require human action to come into 
being: unlinkability needed champions. Federated identity, cryptography, 
identity and attribute claims are esoteric, technical subjects. In terms of 
national policy-making, none of these rose to a level of substantive discourse in 
the legislatures of the two case study countries. Instead, IDM policy-making 
occurred at ÔlowerÕ levels Ð among administrators, bureaucrats, government 
lawyers, standards bodies and various interested parties. This protected identity 
management from the vicissitudes of electoral politics. IDM policy is a case of 
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multi-stakeholder governance, including actors from government, the business 
community, privacy advocates, computer scientists, standards communities and 
the professions. The voices of the data protection community were not the only 
ones competing for space to be heard. The codification of unlinkability and 
other privacy-preserving features is here evidence of the power of that 
community and their location within institutional arrangements. The multi-
stakeholder governance of IDM, the presence of data protection and privacy 
practitioners during policy development, and the highly technical nature of 
citizen credentials gave those practitioners an opportunity to re-apply core 
privacy principles in the burgeoning digital identity layer. This is another 
example of the utility of an institutional perspective: the policy field is 
pregnant with many interests, and power is in flux. The strength of the privacy 
commitments in US and German IDM policy is a demonstration of the power 
and opportunism of the data protection and privacy practitioners who 
contributed to its policy development.  
 
The lack of commercial interest in either providing online credentials to the 
American public or in accessing the German e-ID is exemplary of the logic of 
the market, a competing institution. US reliance on private actors rendered it 
more susceptible to market influence, hindering its policy goals more than in 
the German case. The institutionalised nature of identity credentials in 
Germany allowed for an easier path to the creation of the e-ID, whereas the US 
had to build its citizen IDM policies from scratch. The German Ministry of 
Interior had control over the development and, importantly, the implementation 
of IDM policy. In the US, implementation was given over to private actors 
who, so far, have not delivered what the government wants. Largely, this is 
because the government is not paying them to do so. The tension between 
government needs and market logic is evident in the US case, and authoritative 
general citizen credentials are still absent. 
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IDM and e-ID privacy requirements represent some of the most forward-
looking data protection policies in their respective countries. This is most true 
in the US, which lacks the institutional coherence of Germany for these issues. 
For Germany, unlinkability was an incremental policy change, building upon 
the Federal Data Protection ActÕs and the Telemedia ActÕs pseudonymity 
requirements, the Constitutional CourtÕs mandate that the state not be 
considered a single data processor, and the well-entrenched policies of data 
minimisation. For the US, it was more of a leap, given a lack of laws requiring 
pseudonymity, an absence of context separation requirements, and weakly 
supported minimisation requirements. The comparative method is useful here, 
illustrating the ÔdistanceÕ each country had to travel to arrive at similar policies.  
 
In both countries, unlinkability requirements are a rare appearance of privacy-
enhancing technology as general policy aimed at citizens. In Germany, the 
cryptography generators embedded in each e-ID card are a reification of data 
protection principles; a multi-decade commitment to context separation and 
pseudonymity writ in silicon and plastic. The principles are reproduced and 
enacted in the online interactions of German citizens using their e-IDs. In the 
US, the unlinkability requirements of the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange 
will be no small feat Ð the envisioned cryptographic architecture is highly 
complex. No off-the-shelf product will suffice; it will require innovative, 
concerted engineering to meet privacy requirements yet also make the system 
auditable and able to fix problems when they arise within the projected 
population of 135 million users. The USÕs privacy requirements for the FCCX 
are a step towards greater institutional coherence by anchoring minimisation 
and context separation privacy goals in technical enforcement mechanisms. 
ÔCode is lawÕ in this respect: if the FCCX blinds identity providers from 
relying parties and relying parties from each other by default, privacy happens 
invisibly and with less reliance on human beings; this in the absence of 
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legislation. This enforcement model brings it closer to Germany, whose IDM 
architecture is mainly anchored in technical enforcement. 
 
IDMÕs role as privacy vanguard can be seen in the formative governance of the 
US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. The privacy 
subcommittee of the NSTICÕs steering group has defined a set of privacy risks 
based on SoloveÕs (2006) ÒA Taxonomy of Privacy.Ó For the envisioned users 
of NSTIC-approved credentials, the ÔecosystemÕ must take heed of privacy 
risks such as Òdistortion,Ó Òexclusion,Ó Òappropriation,Ó Òloss of liberty,Ó and 
ÒstigmatizationÓ (Privacy Coordination Committee, 2013). Though these risks 
are embedded in the avowedly privately-led governance of national identity 
management efforts, they are remarkable for their significant advancement 
from the Fair Information Practice Principles and US privacy law. Though it 
lacks any formal instruments mandating informational self-determination, the 
US has edged closer to it through its identity management policies. Notably, 
the ÒappropriationÓ harm above is defined as ÒPersonal data is used in ways 
that deny a person self-determination or fair value exchangeÓ (Privacy 
Coordination Committee, 2013, emph. added). A fruitful continuation of this 
research would be to directly compare the German informational self-
determination right to the policies emerging from US identity management 
development. As the US moves closer to the German privacy model, it moves 
closer to the European model Ð the draft regulation to update European data 
protection and e-signature law draws directly upon German law with regard to 
pseudonymity (Albrecht, 2013, p. 76; see also Cannataci, 2008). Further, the 
right to informational self-determination could be used as a metric by which to 
measure privacy and data protection evolution in countries beyond the field of 
identity management. This would be especially salient in the US given its 
sectoral approach to data protection. 
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IDM technology is built upon standards. The organisations that develop and 
manage standards are institutional actors, and the resultant technologies are 
carriers of institutionalisation. Policy-makers must rely on technology to effect 
policy Ð if the standard cannot do something envisioned, it wonÕt happen 
without alteration. Such alteration is subject to market conditions and the 
governance of the managing standards body. Conversely, standards that have 
privacy-features, such as unlinkable pseudonyms and selective disclosure of 
attributes, provide new tools for the policy toolbox. The values of standards 
communities are at work in IDM inasmuch as the values of policy 
administrators. Architecture is indeed politics (Kapor, 2006). The SAML 
community built the capability for a new (ephemeral) pseudonym to be sent 
each time a user returned to a website, making it so that the site could not 
recognize it was the same user. No commercial products implement this feature 
(N003, Interview), but it is there. An unused tool, a norm lying fallow. Values, 
the culture of privacy, laws, standards and technology are inseparable from 
each other. 
 
A critical institution to consider in identity management research is the market. 
In the two cases, its influence is visible in different ways, and is ultimately 
responsible for hindering policy goals. Largely because of the spectre of 
national identification, the US elected to go to the market for its citizen 
credentials. The perceived political impossibility of deploying government 
credentials, even ones restricted only to e-government use, led the US to 
engage private for- and non-profit organisations to meet its needs for strongly 
authenticated citizens credentials. Ten years after the publication of a risk 
methodology to harmonise agency acceptance of external credentials, there are 
none for the general populace that can be used to reliably identify people. 
There is no business case to provide them Ð the US government, so far, has 
failed to create an identity market. Regarding universities and research 
institutions, there is not a compelling reason to adapt their systems. The key 
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problem is that government is not paying anyone to build or adapt 
credentialing systems to suit its needs. It is Ôuse cases vs. business casesÕ Ð 
governmentÕs idea of value is not mirrored in the private sector. It is as if the 
US government conceived of digital identities as a procurement process, but 
never bought the product, hoping instead that private enterprise would 
creatively find ways to profit.  
 
Digital identity is a product. This is true in the US, where commercial 
companies make the credentials the government sought to take advantage of, 
and it is true in Germany, though there the government is the final 
manufacturer. The logic of the market Ð reducing costs to increase profits, 
building for multiple markets, the absence of social considerations in favour of 
returning shareholder value, shaping client interests to match product strategies 
Ð conflicts with the logics of government; ruling by mandate, the absence of a 
sales view, accountability and transparency, voter support. In Germany the 
market did not retard the release of credentials as in the US, but market logic 
still frustrates policy intentions. The e-ID was conceived as a way to help 
Germans interact in a trustworthy, privacy-preserving way online, both on e-
government sites and commercial ones. To access the e-IDs, government must 
certify organisations. This certification costs money and requires staff 
attention. Only Germans and residents have an e-ID or its counterpart, the eAT. 
This means that the identity market is only the size of the German population 
and its residents. It is seemingly not enough, given the low number of non-
government organisations who have gone through the certification process. 
The market is not convinced of the value of official, verified citizen personal 
data. In evaluating the effects of market actors becoming authoritative for 
citizen identities versus traditional official identities, the distinction between 
official data and commercially obtained or volunteered personal data is a 
factor. Research into the changing nature of citizen-government relations 
would benefit from further analysis of the impact of commercial identity 
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providers supplanting the state. Issues such as accountability, intervenability, 
privacy and transparency are vital to consider where private interests supply 
forms of citizen identification. 
 
The product nature of e-IDs can been seen in the main reason Germans are not 
activating the online authentication feature: weak marketing. The first and final 
point of contact for citizens and residents to get their e-ID is a staff member of 
a municipal office Ð in essence, a Ôsalesperson.Õ The citizen or resident 
(ÔcustomerÕ) needs product information to understand and value the product. 
Neither the salesperson nor the customer was armed with enough information 
to know or care about the online authentication functions of the e-ID, and so 
only 28% of the 18.5 million cards in circulation have it turned on 
(Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2013). A key recommendation of this research is that 
policy-makers attend more to the product nature of digital identity. Treating it 
as an extension of official identity, which was historically bound up in issues 
of movement and citizen-government interaction (Torpey, 1997), may blind 
policy-makers to digital identityÕs commoditised character. This is especially 
true where online citizen credentials are not compulsory, as with the US and 
Germany. When identity documents are compulsory, the question of their 
value to citizens is moot. When they are not but yet they still factor in policy 
goals, value to the citizen becomes essential. Here again the government use 
case collides with other needs Ð the need for citizens to care enough to avail 
themselves of online credentials, which is a function of the credentialÕs 
perceived value. Government digital identities are entering a glutted market Ð 
Facebook, Google, mobile carriers and many others are already trying to be the 
Ôidentity gatewayÕ for their customers. Governments may be ill-suited to 
compete and must reflect on whose interests the IDs are being deployed for. If 
it is their own interests Ð for example, to make public service delivery more 
efficient Ð they will have to work hard to convince their customers to buy their 
cards and ideas. Prior research shows that citizens will not readily take up 
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government digital credentials when there are established alternatives that 
sufficiently fulfil authentication needs (Kubicek and Noack, 2010). While 
digital identities can be viewed as a public service in and of themselves, 
governments must be careful not to treat them exclusively so. They ignore their 
commodity nature and their competitive profile at their peril. 
 
Historically, citizen identification was the province of the state. Official 
identification cards, driverÕs licenses, statements of citizenship, birth 
certificates Ð the state held a monopoly of authenticity on peopleÕs identities. 
This is shifting. A major contrast between the German and US cases is the US 
reliance on market-based identities, which are also appearing in several other 
nations. Finland and Sweden are but two European countries with an 
ÔecosystemÕ of coexisting private and official digital identities. In May 2013, it 
was announced that Nigeria would release national identity cards underpinned 
by MasterCard technology (England and Wallis, 2013). Comparison of the US 
and Germany highlights the institutional effects when a country relies solely on 
the market for its identities versus Ôin-houseÕ production by government. It also 
shows the comparative method to be favourable to IDM and privacy research: 
the comparative effectiveness of US versus German IDM policy is analytically 
valuable in understanding each country and others. A valuable continuance of 
this research would be to analyse the German and US cases from the 
perspective of David LyonÕs card cartel theory, which includes market 
pressure, the prerogatives of law enforcement and cybersecurity, and an 
isomorphic momentum from concentrated efforts by parties who stand to gain 
financially from digital identities. Such an examination would contribute to 
understanding the Ôbusiness of privacyÕ Ð how commercial influence advances 
or retards privacy evolution on national and international scales. This would 
require research on the policy influence of the card cartel, and locating 
alignments between government and commercial IDM and security narratives.  
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Returning to the product nature of digital identity, it remains to be seen if the 
value of privacy-preserving features in government identity products will 
outcompete commercial identity products with weaker privacy architectures. 
Conversely, commercial identity providers could potentially raise their privacy 
minimums to avoid looking illegitimate. US government stakeholders believe 
this to be possible (G007, Interview). Further investigation of the institution of 
data protection from the perspective of competitive market pressures will help 
to frame the emergence of PETs as policy. Much of the normative literature 
calling for PETs in policy-making does not address the competitive and 
financial aspects of business stakeholders in great depth. While governments 
can mandate privacy on the grounds of dignity and rights, commercial 
companies need incentive to build privacy into their products Ð someone needs 
to make money to make privacy happen. 
 
Institutionalism illuminates the creation of new actors and their roles. In the US 
case data, the Trust Framework Providers are new actors in the domains of data 
protection and identity management. They are Ôtranslation points,Õ interpreting 
and passing on privacy requirements from one set of stakeholders to another. 
Similar is the role of consultants. A steady stream of them in US policy 
development helped shape the course of national IDM policy. Their values 
emerged through the technocratic processes of developing citizen credentials 
and became invisibly codified in the protocols that knit together IDM systems. 
Their power contributed overall to that of the data protection community, and 
its application reflects the need for specialist knowledge in IDM policy-
making.  
 
This research found that usability is a key issue in unlinkability specifically, 
and privacy and citizen credentialing generally. Both German and American 
policy stakeholders take note of this. Here the market model for credential 
issuance potentially trumps government issuance Ð a panoply of private 
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organisations have a better chance and strong motivations to create more 
usable identity management products. Further, the companies engaged by the 
US government Ð Google, Yahoo!, PayPal and others Ð were already well-
established internet companies with large teams of designers and usability 
experts. The German government, as sole supplier of both the e-ID and the 
AusweisApp, necessary to interact with the card online, was in a comparatively 
weak position to address usability. They also lacked any competitive pressure 
to create better software designs. The complexity of online credentials and the 
questionable value of privacy features to users necessitate sound usability 
design. The UK has learned this lesson, and has a vocal, dedicated team of 
usability and design experts constantly iterating interfaces and the user 
experience of the Identity Assurance Programme, a citizen identity 
management system for British e-government (Reichelt, 2013). A key 
recommendation of this research is that to compete in the identity market, 
governments will have to treat usability as critically as they do privacy, 
security and utility. Research into the successes and failures of the UK IDM 
usability design process would be extremely valuable to other countries still in 
the early design phase of national electronic identity systems. 
 
There is much literature of the surveillance dimension of national 
identification, both traditional paper forms, and the electronic variety (Bennett 
and Lyon, 2008; Caplan and Torpey, 2001; Lyon, 2009). A key contribution of 
this research is empirical data on deliberate attempts by states to not know 
what its citizens are doing via their identity documents. Germany is a 
significant example, given its specific choices to build an e-ID architecture 
with no centralised servers capable of tracking the activities of its populace. If 
unlinkability is rare, unobservability is rarer still. Future research in this area 
could examine the risks to German policy intentions posed by the appearance 
of e-ID proxies who sit in between card holders and authorised service 
providers (relying parties). One IDM scholar intimately familiar with the 
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German architecture (Kubicek, Inteview) cited their potential threat to system 
security. More generally, there is much research to be done on the international 
convergence of policies that blind the state to its citizensÕ activities. 
Unobservability is less directly connected to historical data protection 
principles and is more closely aligned with anonymity. Van der Hof, Koops 
and Leenes (2009) examined anonymity in citizen-government relations. A 
fruitful line of research lies in the intersection of this work and unobservable 
IDM architectures. Empirical research into emergence of unobservability 
would add to scholarship on privacy by design and PETs, and would be of 
value to policy-makers in the design stage of citizen IDM systems. 
 
In the US, the picture of such issues is different because of significant 
architectural differences. In Germany there is but one identity provider: the 
state. So, unobservability is possible because there is only one observer; one 
panoptic eye to shut. US IDM policy envisions a plurality of identity providers. 
The existing FICAM rules and architecture blind government agencies from 
one another at Level of Assurance 1 and 2 Ð linkability is possible at Levels 3 
and 4 where meaningful names must be sent to relying parties. The state can 
attempt to deny itself some knowledge of citizensÕ e-government activity, but 
they can only go so far in terms of restricting the private organisations 
supplying the credentials. The FICAM rules acknowledge that identity 
providers will always know the mapping of real identities to pseudonyms, and 
so they have been enjoined from using their knowledge for activities beyond 
citizen credentialing and are forbidden from sharing what they learn with 
others. The forward-looking FCCX requirements take things further by 
attempting to blind identity providers as to the use of their credentials Ð a 
technical method in place of a social one. Again, the ÔdevilÕ is in the details, 
and the empirical work of this thesis explores the complex and iterative 
relationship between policy intent, business prerogatives, standards, and 
enforcement mechanisms. It illustrates national attempts at privacy by design 
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and shows the tension between a stateÕs embrace of its people through identity 
documents and a bias against inappropriate profiling by creating context 
separation. 
 
This research contributes to information policy scholarship by examining 
government intentions to foster ÔtrustworthyÕ transactions on the internet. The 
core definition of trust here is the ability to rely on the validity of a presented 
identity Ð that an identity can be trusted to be whom it purports. This is vital for 
e-government efforts, but US and German policies intend for this trust to grow 
beyond government needs. Here we see portents of digital identity as a public 
service, and government identity management policy as an attempt to be the 
rising tide that raises all ships. Future research in this area could try to align the 
discourse and policy tools of trust with those of privacy to see if one correlates 
with or influences the other. Trust is vaguer than privacy, and it remains to be 
seen how this popular word translates into policy priorities. Trustworthy digital 
credentials are a new policy priority, and this research contributes to 
information policy scholarship by analysing its appearance. 
 
The US case shows a link between digital identity and risk management. If an 
identity is organisationally derived, crossing the boundaries of another 
organisation entails risk as one may not be able to fully account for the identity 
processes inside the other. Identities are local and trust is not transitive among 
disconnected organisations. For the US government to trust the identities 
supplied by external organisations, a risk management strategy had to be 
created Ð the Levels of Assurance. These external identities are confidence-
rated as their authenticity is difficult to judge. This risk characteristic is less 
present in the German case because there is only one identity source, the state, 
and it carries the pedigree of being official. The perception of risk in accepting 
the governmentÕs credential is very low; it has a high degree of trust. 
Nonetheless, total elimination of fraud is impossible. Digital identity, 
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especially the federated kind, must be subject to a risk calculus. Europe is 
building a policy infrastructure to allow one countryÕs e-ID to be used in 
another; for one member state to trust another member stateÕs credential in 
order to provision public services. There is recognition that all credentials are 
not created equal. To allow, for example, Spain to trust Belgian e-IDs, a risk 
methodology very similar to the Levels of Assurance is being developed. The 
Secure Identity Across Borders Linked (STORK) project has promulgated its 
Quality Authentication Assurance (QAA) framework to address cross-border 
ID trust issues. Like its US counterpart, QAA has four levels of assurance in a 
credential (Hulsebosch, Lenzini and Eertink, 2009). A similar framework is at 
work in BritainÕs Identity Assurance Program (Cabinet Office, 2013). For 
governments, risk is an endemic quality to the use of digital identities for 
public services, and there is policy convergence between Europe and North 
America. These policy efforts are rising to the level of international 
standardisation. ISO/IEC 29115 (2013) mirrors the US and STORK four levels 
of assurance. These frameworks, however, do not address privacy Ð they 
address authenticity. Privacy runs along a different policy track. This study 
contributes to identity management research by analysing the intersection of 
risk management, standards and authentication. 
 
This thesis contributes to information policy scholarship by providing 
empirical data on the link between digital identity and public services. Both 
case studies show that the needs of e-government are connected to citizen 
identity management initiatives. Concern of an informationally-intrusive state 
contributed to the privacy regimes in those initiatives. In turn, those regimes 
advanced the state of privacy in Germany and the US, yielding PETs as policy. 
As such, this thesis performs Òanalysis É of policy-makingÓ Turner (1997, p. 
19), fulfilling a summative rather than formative role, though the 
recommendations in this Conclusion make some attempt at helping to shape 
future policy.  
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A core contribution of this research is the definition of identity management 
policy: Identity management policy is the set of laws and policies enacted by 
governments and supranational bodies concerning the facilitation, 
procurement, use, liability, legal nature, interoperability, technologies, risk 
methodologies, lifecycle and privacy of digital identities for its citizens and 
employees. This includes physical and logical authentication, e-signature, and 
electronic identification technologies for access to physical and electronic 
resources. Future IDM research can test this definition for accuracy and utility. 
The comparative method was instrumental in arriving at this definition. If only 
German policy were examined, for example, the risk management dimension 
of citizen credentials would not have become evident. This definition 
contributes to information policy scholarship by circumscribing a sub-field of 
policy inquiry, adding context to the concept of IDM. 
 
The research contributes to institutional theory by applying it in a novel 
domain, identity management. In doing so, the study answers calls within 
information policy literature to apply social theory in order to better understand 
phenomena. Institutionalist theory offers a variety of perspectives by which to 
examine values and norms, and interrelationships among actors, organisations 
and technology. Institutionalism is used in a diverse set of fields, enabling it to 
be a powerful approach in the interdisciplinary field of identity management. It 
enables political and sociological analysis, and helps to conceptualise Òthe 
digital economy as an emergent, evolving, embedded, fragmented and 
provisional social production that is shaped as much by cultural and structural 
forces as by technical and economic onesÓ (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001, p. 
154). This study contributes to information policy scholarship in particular by 
examining the political processes of identity management, which are 
underrepresented in academic research. 
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In particular, institutionalism is useful in integrating the formal and informal 
influences of policy development explanations. It shows the roles values, 
norms and culture play in the institutionalisation of data protection and identity 
management. The architecture of the internet is a battleground for competing 
institutions as much as it is for competing code. The institutional perspective 
analyses the relationship between the values of actors and the hardware and 
software that accomplishes policy goals. It contextualises the material aspects 
of policy development, situating them within a social and historical context.  
 
With regard to unlinkability, the institutionalist perspective unites cultural, 
legal, and social factors in an explanation of its emergence. It helps to separate 
structure and agency features of unlinkability policies. Lowndes and RobertsÕ 
(2013, p. 117) map of institutional change (see p. 301) contextualises policy 
change within data protection, enabling further comparison between different 
countriesÕ tempo of change, the influence of structural features, and the 
influence of actors. Future research on the privacy architectures of national 
IDM initiatives could use this map as a framework to compare policy change 
and analyse the balance of structural factors and the role and power of actors in 
the evolution of privacy.  
 
Institutionalism draws attention to human actors, emphasising both key 
stakeholders and the role of intermediaries in the shaping of policy 
development. It highlights the Òsector-specific ethosÓ (Offe, 2006, p. 16) 
influencing political choices, and demonstrates how values travel through 
informal routes, such as lexicons and standards communities. Through its 
examination of coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms, it partly explains 
isomorphism in information policy. 
 
Institutionalism is, of course, imperfect, and is by no means a way to construct 
a complete explanation of policy development. A central criticism of institution 
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is its imprecision. If the state, Christianity, capitalism, marriage, a handshake, 
the rules governing a legislature, and data protection are all institutions, what is 
not? The boundaries between an institution and its environment are unclear. 
And, while an informal influence such as a relational network is a carrier of 
institutionalisation, the mechanisms of influence are imprecise. As a theory, it 
is blind to certain kind of phenomena. Within the empirical data, the important 
factor of usability is unaccounted for within institutionalism, yet a holistic 
analysis of identity management policy must include it. Still, despite these 
problems, institutionalism is valuable in integrating the formal with the 
informal in the search for explanations of policy development, innovation and 
change. It is a valuable way of theorising within the under-theorised field of 
information policy in an interdisciplinary way. 
 
This methods and theoretical approach of this thesis forms a framework that 
can be applied to future research. The definition of identity management policy 
can circumscribe a research domain. Within it, the methods of comparative 
policy study can frame the selection of cases for a particular IDM topic. Those 
cases can be analysed thematically, and then compared using a synthetic 
institutionalist approach. This approach would draw out the actors and 
institutions influencing the policy under study, emphasising the coexistence of 
formal and informal factors, the tempo of change in relation to the balance of 
structure and agency, the roles of values, norms and culture, and the 
institutional effects of material technologies in explaining policy development. 
While this approach would only yield a partial explanation for the policy 
phenomena, the interdisciplinary framework would examine the formal and the 
informal, the explicit and the implicit, and the social and historical context of 
the issues, and so broaden the depth of scholarship on information policy-
making. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS 
US Case Interview Subjects 
G001, senior government identity management policy-maker and administrator 
G003, senior government identity management policy-maker and administrator 
G004, senior government identity management policy-maker and administrator  
G006, senior government privacy lawyer 
G007, senior federal government identity management administrator 
G008, senior federal agency identity management administrator 
G009, senior federal government identity management administrator 
G010, senior government privacy lawyer 
N002, identity management expert 
N003, identity management expert and standards developer 
N004, identity management federation expert 
N005, privacy advocate 
N006, privacy advocate and identity management expert 
P001, group: commercial identity management, standards and privacy experts 
P005, commercial identity management technology and standards expert 
P006, commercial identity management technology and standards expert 
P007, commercial identity management technology and standards expert 
Don Thibeau, Chairman, Open Identity Exchange 
Drummond Reed, former Executive Director of the Open Identity Exchange  
and the Information Card Foundation 
Scott David, expert in contract law for identity management and counsel for  
the Open Identity Exchange 
Richard Wilsher, principle architect of the Kantara Initiative Identity  
Assurance Framework and former principle architect of tScheme 
Bob Morgan, senior architect of InCommon Federation, identity management  
expert and senior standards developer 
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Dazza Greenwood, identity management legal expert and MIT lecturer 
Andrew Nash, Head of Identity at Google and senior identity management  
standards developer 
Paul Trevithick, founder of the Information Cards Foundation and senior  
identity management standards developer 
 
German Case Interview Subjects 
DE-G001, senior government information security expert 
DE-G002, senior government administrator 
DE-G003, group: commercial e-ID experts 
DE-G005, senior e-ID and information security academic 
Jens Fromm, Head of e-ID Research Group, Fraunhofer FOKUS 
Prof. dr. Gerrit Hornung, Chair of Public Law, IT Law and Legal Informatics,  
Institute of IT-Security and Security Law, University of Passau  
Prof. dr. Herbert Kubicek, Director of the Institute for Information  
Management Bremen and Professor of Applied Computer Science, 
University of Bremen 
Jan Mller, Officer at Federal Ministry of Interior 
Dr. Marian Margraf, information security scientist at Federal Ministry of  
Interior 
ULD, Independent Centre for Privacy Protection, data protection authority for  
the German state of Schleswig-Holstein. Interview group comprised of: 
Marit Hansen, Harold Zwingelberg, Ninja Marnau and an anonymous 
subject 
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APPENDIX B: TOPIC GUIDE 
Regulation 
Language used for unlinkability 
 
Genesis of regulation 
¥ Legal/Policy mandate 
¥ Relationship of eGov credentials and regulation to e-sig, e-passport, e-
ID 
¥ Extant regulations that crosscut the new regulation (e.g., disclosure reqs 
for AML, anti-fraud, terrorism, federal recording of eGov site use, 
carve outs for law enforcement) 
¥ Key actors 
¥ Previous regulations that led to the current one (predecessors; failed 
regs) 
¥ Timeline of major events 
¥ Opposing views 
¥ How did technical feasibility estimations factor when the regulations 
were being authored? (US: The community of practioners is very 
divided on many elements; there are only 2 possible technologies that 
can do unlinkability, and at least one does not do everything desired, 
etc.) 
 
Separate, related state/regional regs or laws? 
 
Under what circumstances can users be linked / pseudonymity be broken? 
 
Mechanisms of enforcement & audit 
 
Justification for regulation 
¥ Relationship of regulation to historical privacy and data protection 
regimes 
o US: FIPPs, what else? 
o Germany: forbidden unique identifiers, EC DPD, what else? 
o Are there international or professional influences on the 
regulations? 
¥ Underpinning moral/ethical/political discourse 
¥ What problem does the regulation address? 
 
Relationship between unlinkability and desired linkability.  
 
How unlinkability relates to concerns of unique identifiers 
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[US: relationship to REAL-ID] 
 
Resistance to the regulationÕs implementation 
 
Current status of the regulation 
 
What do you think of the regulation? Good? Bad? 
 
Is there feedback to the regulators? 
 
How does the government "trust" that the system does what it's supposed to 
do? 
 
The regulationÕs effect on non-eGov use 
 
What is the cost of compliance? 
 
What does success of the regulation look like (in 5 years, in 10)? 
 
[add questions of inefficiency and rejection of data sharing btwn agencies] 
Technical 
What is the overall architecture of the eGov credentialing system? 
 
How is unlinkability achieved? 
¥ How is it measured? 
¥ Are their contrary positions as to the security or privacy of the system? 
 
Who are the key actors? 
¥ In the supply chain 
¥ In oversight 
¥ Which department/entity ÒownsÓ the eGov credentialing? 
 
How was the system tested/certified? 
 
How is the system audited? 
 
How does the system accommodate legal re-linking? 
 
What is process that translated the policy into technical specs? 
¥ How was the process managed? 
¥ How were ambiguities handled? 
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¥ How does the government "trust" that the system does what it's 
supposed to do? 
 
Is there a functional difference between use of the system for eGov versus non-
government sites? 
 
How are change requests handled? 
 
Are there international or professional influences on the technology? 
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